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The proceedings of the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU
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Volume lll: Assembly documents.
Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, offrcial report of debates, general
index.
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Document 1234 lst October 1990
AGENDA
of the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session
Paris, 3rd{th December 1990
I. Report of the Council
Thirty-sixth annual report of the Council(first part)
II. Political questions
l. Consequences of developments in Report tabled by Mr. Lemoine on behalf of the
Central and Eastern Europe for Political Committee
European security
2. Revision of the modified Brussels Report tabled by Sir Geffiey Finsberg on behaA
Treaty: of the Political Committee
(a) rcply to the second Part of the
thirty-fourth annual report and the
thirty-fifth annual report of the
Council
(b) WEU and the European Com-
munity
3. European security and the Gulf crisis F;ff;::f\;flu,l,l{; De Decker on behatf of the
m. Defence questions
L Consequences of the invasion of Report tabled by Mr. De Hoop Schffir on behalf
Kuwai[: continuing operations in the of the Defence Committee
Gulf region
ry. Technological and aerospace questions I
Konversiya - conversion in Soviet mil- Report labled.by Ur. Tummers on behalf of the I
ita.y inOust.y ieZhntoligical and Aerospace Committee i
V. Budgetary questions
l. Draft budget of the administrative Report tabled by Mr.. Klejdzin^s^ki on behalf of the L
expenditurJ of the Assembly for the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
financial year l99l tration
2. Accounts of the administrative expend- Report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behaA of the
iture of the Assembly for the financial Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
year 1989 
- 
the auditor's report and tration
motion to approve the final accounts
VI. Parliamentary and public relations
Enhancing WEU's public relations Report tabled by l4r. Roman on 
-bghg{ of,tlte
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions
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Document 1235 14th November 1990
ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session
Paris, 3rd-6th December 1990
MONDAY,3rd DECEMBER
Morning
Meetings of political groups.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
l. Opening of the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session.
5. Action by the Presidential Committee:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the
Assembly.
Debate.
6. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
7. Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty
(a) rcply to the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and the thirty-fifth annual
report of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Political
Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
(b) WEU and the European Community:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Political
Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
TUESDAY,4th DECEMBER
Morning 10 a.m.
l. Chairmanshipin-Office of the Council 
- 
presentation of the first part of the thirty-sixth
annual report of the Council.
Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.
2. European security and the Gulf crisis:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Political Committee.
Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on behalf of the Defence
Committee.
Joint debate.
1l
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Afternoon 3 p.m.
l. Chairmanship-in-Oflice of the Council 
- 
presentation of the first part of the thirty-sixth
annual report of the Council.
Address by Mr. Chevdnement, Minister of Defence of France.
2. European security and the Gulf crisis:
Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region:
Resumed joint debate.
WEDNESDAY, sth DECEMBER
Mornlng 10 a.m.
l. Address by Mr. Bartholomew, Under-Secretary for International Security Affairs, United
States Department of State.
11 a.m.
2. Address by Mr. Clark, Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United
Kingdom.
3. European security and the Gulf crisis:
Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region:
Resumed joint debate.
Votes on the draft recommendations.
4. Enhancing WEU's public relations:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Roman on behalf of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
I . Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year I 99 I :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the draft budget.
Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989 - the
auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the motion to approve the Jinal accounts.
Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lemoine on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.
2.
3.
t2
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THURSDAY,6th DECEMBER
Morning 10 a.m.
l. Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security:
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
l. Konversiya 
- 
conversion in Soviet military industry:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the Technological and Aero-
space Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
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Imer from the President of the Assembly
to the Audinr submitting tlu rccoants
for the finoncial year 1989
Iith April 1990
Dear Mr. Chandernagor,
In accordance with Article 14 of the
Financial Regulations of the Assembly of WEU,
I have the honour to submit to ygu the accounts
for the financial year 1989 in accordance with
the statements attached hereto, which refer to:
(a/ Summary of income and expenditure
financial position as at 3lst
December 1989 (Appendix I);
29th June 1990
(D/ Statement of budget authorisations,
expenditure and unexpended credits(Appendix II);
(c/ Contributions (Appendix III);
(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV).
As is customary, after being audited these
tables will be signed by the President of the
Assembly, the Clerk of the Assembly and the
Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration before being sub-
mitted to the Assembly.
2. The statement of budget authorimtions,
expenditure and unexpended credits shows a
Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial yenr 1989
THE AUDMOR'S REPORT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Lrrren FRoM THE pRESIDENT oF THE Assruglv ro rHE Auomon SUBMITTING THE
AccouNrs oF rHE Assrlasry FoR rHE FTNANcTAL vren 1989 
- 
l3th April 1990.
Lerren FRoM THE AUDrroR To rHE pRESTDENT oF THE ASSEMBLy 
- 
l5th June 1990.
Rrponr oF THE ExTERNAL AUDrroR To rHE ASSEMBLy oF wEsrERN EURopEAN uNtoN oN
THE AccouNTs FoR rHE FTNANCTAL yeen 1989 
- 
l5th June 1990.
Cenrrncerr oF THE AUDrroR FoR THE FTNANCTAL venn 1989 - lsth June 1990.
AppeNorces
I. Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1989 - financial
position as at 3lst December 1989.
II. Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the
financial year 1989.
III. Statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of WEU London
in respect of contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1989.
IV. Provident fund 
- 
account for the financial year ended 3lst December 1989.
V. 1989 balance sheet for the Communist Group
VI. 1989 balance sheet for the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European
Democrats
VII. 1989 balance sheet for the Liberal Group
VIII. 1989 balance sheet for the Socialist Group
r5
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saving of F 42 973, whereas the final statement
of income and expenditure shows a credit
balance of F 106 ll3. The difference between
these two flrgures, i.e. F 63 140, shows an excess
of receipts over estimates:
Sub-Head 30 of the operating budget of the
Assembly.
Yours sincerely,
Charles GoeneNs
President of the Assembly
Monsieur Andrd CIrnNornNncon
Premier Pr6sident de la Cour des Comptes de
France
13, rue Cambon
75OOI PARIS
Letur frum thc Auditor to the President
of the Assembly
15th tuae 19N)
Dear Mr. Goerens,
I have the honour to enclose the accounts
of the Assembly of Western European Union for
the financial year 1989 together with my
opinion and report on these accounts.
Yours sincerely,
Andrd CHnNornxncon
,:#'#;'##;;!:y,o;,li*n
Commissaire awc Comptes
Mr. Charles Gornrns
President of the Assembly of
Western European Union
43, avenue du Prdsident-Wilson
75016 PARIS
Reprt of ilp Menol Auditor
to tlro Assanbty of Westen Eumpcan Union
on tlu occoun* for the finoncial year 1989
15th lune 19!N
I have audited the accounts of Western
European Union for the financial year 1989 in
accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Reg-
ulations of the Assembly in order to appraise the
correct management of the budget and the book-
keeping.
The flrnal statement of income and
expenditure shows a credit balance of F 106 I 13
whereas the statement of budget authorisations,
expenditure and unexpended credits shows a
saving of F 42973.
The difference, i.e. F 53 140, is due to
higher sundry receipts than estimated; receipts
were F 702140 compared with the corre-
sponding estimates of F 639 000.
- 
Bank interest
- 
Sundry receipts
- Sale of publications
- 
Contributions 7%
- 
Receipts for 1989
estimated in the
budget
F
8t 627
86 128
34269
500 l16
702 140
639 000
+ 63 140
3. Excess expenditure under Head V of the
operating budget, amounting to F 381 276, has
been met by transfers from other heads of the
budget.
4. The statement of contributions for the
financial year 1989 (revised 1989 budget)
received from the Secretary-General of WEU
l,ondon, is given at Appendix III.
5. Amounts in the Assembly's provident
fund are incorporated with those of the other
organs of WEU and the joint fund is adminis-
tered by the Secretary-General in consultation
with the Clerk of the Assembly.
On 3lst December 1989, these amounts
totalled F 4771055 as shown in Appendix IV.
On that date there remained two loans to two
staff members amounting to F 833 140.
The Secretary-General has continued to
receive advice from the advisory panel set up
within WEU and from outside bankers on the
investment of these funds. On 3lst December
1989 the fund was held by Montagu Investment
Management Limited in Iondon.
6. Also appended to the accounts of the
Assembly are the reports on the funds attributed
to the political grcups drawn up in accordance
with the directives issued by the Presidential
Committee (document A/UIEU/CP (86) 39) as
follows:
- 
Communist Group;
- 
Federated Group of Christian Demo
crats and European Democrats;
- 
Liberal Group;
- 
Socialist Group.
These reports will be considered as an
integral part of the accounts of the Assembly;
they give details of the use of credits included in
l6
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The total saving in the budget may be
summarised as follows:
Part I:
Operating Budget
Head I
Permanent
staff 11774508 11736338
Total
credit
after
transfers
F
Head II
Temporary staff 3 109 077
Head III
Expenditure
on premlses
and equipment I 643 195
Head IV
General adminis-
trative costs I 915 052
Head V
Other expend-iture 2005 276
Head VI
Premises
Part II
Pensions Budget
Head I
Pensions, allow-
ances and social
charges
Total
3 109 073
t 963 394
l 643 189
I 914 288
2005 22t
| 963 394
3 t33 492 3 r29 518 3974
42973
Difference
between
estimates
and income
-220 526
- 
153 514
- 
75 588
+ 53 140
Total
expenditure
F
Balance
F
38 170
4
764
55
The financial situation compared to that
on 31st December 1988 has therefore improved
significantly as shown in the following table:
Final statement
of income
."d;*l^dii:I.^- on 
"i3llion,"*on Jlst LrecemDer
of the financial year
1986: + 20731 +241257
1987: + 35 + 153 549
1988:+ 6591 + 82179
1989: + 106 ll3 + 42973
In particular, it should be noted that:
- 
after having been practically nil in 1987
and 1988, the result of the financial
year in 1989 is F 106 I 13;
- 
the steady decline in available budget
credits available at the end of the
financial year: from F 241 257 in 1986
to F 42 973 in 1989, which shows a
better overall adjustment of credit and
actual expenditure, subject to what will
be emphasised hereafter regarding
changes made by transfer during the
financial year affecting more particu-
larly certain heads and sub-heads of the
budget;
- 
the complete reversal of the situation
noted from 1986 to 1988, i.e., the
deficit resulting from the shortfall of
income compared with estimates; in
1989, there was a positive balance of
F 63 140.
In the main, in spite of a further reduction
in bank interest (from F 143 669 in 1988 to
F 81 62'l in 1989), this is due to a more realistic
assessment of initial estimates of income.
Situation of transfers
between heads in 1989
+-
Part I:
Operating Budget
Head I
Head II
Head III
Head IV
Head V
Head VI
Part II :
Pensions Budget
Head I
Total
25 910
63 249
62 638
41 180
388 276
149 402
299 t72
97 043
t52 t28
1000
142792 19 300
124 045724 045
Analysis of transfers within Heads II to V
or between these heads, in accordance with
Article 6,Pafi III, of the Financial Regulations,
calls for the following comments.
In Head V " other expenditure ", not
negligeable amounts have been paid into sub-
heads 25 (expenses for representation) and
27 (official journeys of members of the Oflice of
the Clerk) during the year, i.e., respectively:
+ 66.36010 and + 45.5Vo, distinctly more than in
r988.
It is to be noted that changes of this mag-
nitude have been possible because no transfers
have been made to sub-heads of other heads of
the budget, which are apparently systematically
over-funded in the initial budget.
This is so for a few budget items which act
as a reservoir for flexible modifications during
the year ofthe shape ofthe budget adopted pre-
viously:
Head II (temporary stall)
Sub-Head 6.2r interpretation service (during sessions)
- 
t2% (- 10.5% in 1988)
Sub-Head 6.J; translation service
- 
l4Vo (- 15% in 1988)
t7
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Sub-Head 7.' interpretation staffrequired for Assembly work
between sessions
- 
ll.5% (+ 1096 in 1988)
Head IV (general administrative costs)
Sub-Head 20: pinting and publication of documents
- 
12.7% (- 26Vo in 1988)
A determination of estimates taking
account of the conditions in which the previous
budget was implemented and as accurate an
assessment as possible of requirements for the
financial year in question would make it pos.
sible to respect more strictly the initial shape of
the budgetary appropriations.
Having completed this audit, I thank the
President, the Clerk and staff of the Assembly
for their cmperation in the exercise of my
duties as Auditor.
Andr6 CHeNpsnl.racon
(Premier Prhsident de la
Cour des Comptes de France)
Commissaire aux Comptes
Certifuate of the Auditor for tlu financial
year lst lanuary to 31st Duembu 1989
15th lau 1990
In application of Article 15 of the
Financial Regulations of the Assembly of
Western European Union, I have examined the
appended financial statements of the Assembly
comprising the summary of income and expend-
iture for the financial year 1989.
My examination included verification of
the books and other relevant documents that I
deemed necessary.
As a result of this examination, my
opinion is that these operations were in con-
formity with the budget estimates, the financial
regulations, the financial instructions and other
decisions of the legislative authority, and that
they are a correct record of the financial situ-
ation for the year ended 3lst December 1989.
Andr6 CneNoenNncon
(Premier PrAsident de la
Cour des Comptes de France)
Commissaire aux Comptes
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APPENDIX I
Summary of incomc aad upenditure for thc financial year 19E9
(in French francs)
Per attached statement
Assessments of member states (see Appendix III)
Miscellaneous
(A) Sundry receipts
Bank interest ...
Sundry receipts
Sale of publications ....
(B) Pensions
Contributions (7%)
Budget credits
Total expenditure (see Appendix II) .
Excess of income over expenditure .
Financial position as at 31st Decembcr 19E9
Assets
Contributions received
Bank interest ...
Contributions 790
Sundry receipts
Non-recoverable taxes
Liabilities
Balance at the bank .
Sums paid
Excess of income over expenditure .
24 904 994
8t 627
86 l2E
34269
500 l16
702 140
25 607 134
2s 501 02t
F 106 ll3
3 829 220.36
49 739.35
r0 673.53
33 s33.53
453 927.15
F 4377 093.92
1 288 104.75
298287s.93
1061t3.24
F 4 377 093.92
Charles GoenrNs
President of the Assembly
Certified correct:
Georges Moulns
Clerk o{ the Assembly
Karl-Heinz Klupztwsrl
Chairman of the Committee
on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration
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STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTIIORISATIONS,
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET
A. l. 
- 
OnorNnnyExpENDrruR.E
Henp I 
- 
PtnunNsxrsrnrr
Sub-Head / Basic salaries
Sub-Head 2 Allowances
2.1. Expatriationallowance
2.2. Household allowance
2.3. Allowance for children and other dependent persons
2.4. Rent allowance
2.5. Education allowance
2.6. Allowance for language courses
2.7. Overtime
2.8. Home leave
Sub-Head 3 Social charges
3.1. Social security
3.2. Supplementaryinsurance
3.3. Provident fund
Sub-Head 4 Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of
permanent officials
4.1. Travelling expenses of candidates for vacant posts
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of per-
manent offrcials and their families
4.3. Removal expenses
4.4. Installation allowance
Sub-Head 5 Medical examination
8 320 000
825 000
380 000
475 000
82 000
6s 000
2 000
50 000
20 000
l 120000
350 000
160 000
APPENDIX II
)Ixn
ND UNE)(PENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINAI\CIAL YEAR 19E9
ancs)
8 277 925
82s',ng
361 980
433 924
79 063
64054
63 82s
19 097
t 082793
361 059
157 599
825720
362 680
434 508
82 000
6s 000
63 830
20 000
l 082 810
361 060
157 600
Lt 774 508 I I 736 33825 9r0
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PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Total budgetfor 1989
HEAD II 
- 
Trupo.nnnY srAFF 
- 
,
Sub-Head 6 Stalf recruited for sessions of the Assembly
6.1. Sittings service
6.2. Interpretation service
6.3. Translation service
6.4. Other services
Sub-Head 7 Interpretation staffrequired for Assembly work between
. 
sessions
Sub-Head 8 Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk
Sub-Head 9 Social charges
9.1. Inzurance for temporary stalf other than interpreters
9.2. Provident fund for interpreters
9.3. Insurance for interpretem
137 000
549 000
799 000
40 000
640 000
l5 000
l2 000
146 000
7 000
Total of Head II 3 345 000
Hrno III 
- 
ExpENortuRE oN pREMrsEs AND EeurpMENT
Sub-Head l0 Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises
SubHead 11 Hire of committee rooms
Sub-Head 12 Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions
Sub-Head 13 Various services for the organisation of sessions
Sub-Head 14 Maintenance of the premises of the Offrce of the
Clerk
SubHead 15 Purchase or repair of oflice furniture
Sub-Head 16 Purchase of reproduction and other oflice equipment
Sub-Head 17 Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other
oflice equipment
406 000
s 000
72t 6N
47 0N
l3 000
s0 000
435 000
li
l'
I
l'
i
lr
{
ll
Total of Head III t 677 600
22
{
I
APPENDIX II
l 175 353
483726
684 845
35 185
565 751
39 896
65 273
tt4 t54
4 814
74 249
I 175 353
483 727
684 846
3s 186
565 751
39 896
3 109 073
323 6s0
33 481
725 602
50 96s
l 385
46922
461 190
323 647
33 480
725 602
50 965
l 385
46922
461 188
l 643 195 l 643 189
23
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PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Total budgetfor 1989
Hsno IV 
- 
GrNrnal ADMrNrsrRATrvE cosrs
Sub-Head 18 Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents
Sub-Head 19 Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other
oflice supplies
Sub-Head 20 Printing and publication of documents
Sub-Head 21 Purchase of documents
Sub-Head 22 Official cars
Sub-Head 23 Bank charges
500 000
270000
077 500
63 000
l l5 000
500
Total of Head IV 2026000
Hrnn V 
- 
Orsnn ExpENDrruRE
Sub-Head 24 Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance
for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of com-
mittees and rapporteurs
Sub-Head 25 Expenses for representation
Sub-Head 26 Committee study missions
Sub-Head 27 Official journeys of members of the Oflice the Clerk
Sub-Head 28 Expenses of experts and the auditor
Sub-Head 29 Expenditure on information
Sub-Head 30 Expenses for political groups
Sub-Head 31 Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere
provided for
Sub-Head 32 Non-recoverable taxes
160 000
220000
5 000
400 000
70 000
410 000
336 000
3 000
20 000
rl
l
I
Total of Head V t 624000
Total 20 570 600
24
-
-lt
APPENDIX II
13 878
l 37 950
532 810
256 122
939 sso
63 702
t22 668
200
s32 806
255 377
939 s46
63 702
122 667
190
4
745
4
I
l0
t52 128 l 915 052 t 914 288
28 824
146 363
t82 765
8 202
t5 490
188 824
366 363
582765
78 202
425 490
336 000
l 000
26 632
188 823
366 362
582764
78202
425 490
336 000
949
26 631
388 276
20447 108
25
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PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Total budgetfor 1989
A.2. 
- 
ExrneonoruARY EXPENDITURE
Henp VI 
- 
Pnruses
Sub-Head 33 Reorganisation of the building
SubHead 33.1 Feasibility study
SubHead 33.2 Work on utilities
SubHead 33.3 Prime contractorship
SubHead 34 Installation of committee rooms
Sub-Head 34.1 Interpretation equipment
Sub-Head 34.2 Furnishing committee rooms
Sub-Head 34.3 Fumishing corridor
Sub-Head 35 National delegation offices
SubHead 35.1 Furniture and other offrce equipment
SubHead 35.2 Typewriters
SubHead 36 Lounge in the first basement
61 000
792022
374 656
309 986
397 512
28 2t8
Total of A.2 t 963 394
Total of Part I 22 s33 994
26
a
!
J
APPENDIX II
61 000
792022
374 656
309 986
397 512
282t8
61 000
792022
374 656
309 986
397 512
28 2t8
22 4t0 502 22371503
27
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PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET Total budgetfor 1989
HEno I 
- 
PENsroNs, ALLowANcEs AND socrAl cHARGES
Sub-Head I
1. t.
1.2.
1.3.
1.4.
1.5.
2
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
3
Pensions and leaving allowances
Retirement pensions
Invalidity pensions
Survivors' pensions
Orphans' or dependants' pensions
Leaving allowances
Family allowances
Household allowances
Children's and dependants' allowances
Education allowances
Supplementary insurance
SubHead
Sub-Head
2 466000
228 000
52 000
l l0 400
40 600
40 000
73 000
I
Total of Head I 3 010 000
Total 25 543 994
Charles GorneNs
President of the Assembly
Goor{
Clerk fi
28
!
,l
APPENDIX II
tt3 492
2486200
229 000
s2 000
tt3 492
I 10 900
35 600
25 700
80 600
2 486 185
228 917
5l 463
tt3 492
l l0 849
35 502
22 554
80 556
3 133 492 3 129 5r8
25 543 994 25 501 021
'OULIAS
t Assembly
Karl-Heinz KrspzrNsrr
Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration
29
+
Transfers Total aftertransfers
Total
expenditure
Unexpended
credits
20200
I 000
500
7 600
5 000
l4 300
l5
83
537
5l
98
3 146
44
t42792 19 300 3 974
724 045 72404s 42973
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APPENDIX III
STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AI\TD RECETVED FROM THE SECRETARY.GENERAL
OF WEU I,ONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY
BUDGET FOR 19E9
Member states
Contributions to the ordinary budget Contributions
to the extra-
ordinary budget
Total
payments up to
3lst March 1990lst payment 2nd payment 3rd payment
Belgium
France
Federal Republic
of Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
United Kingdom
Total
485 311.88
987 075.00
987 075.00
987 075.00
t6 451.24
485 3l1.88
987 075.00
4 935 375.00
t 092925.83
2222900.N
2222900.W
2222900.W
37 048.34
L 092925.83
2222900.00
l l 114 500.00
607 6t0.52
235 818.00
235 818.00
235 818.00
20 596.96
607 610.52
I
I
I
I 235 818.00
6 179 090.00
t 564 328.95
27 605.81
768 361.57
l 564 328.9s
3924 62s.28
2 r85 848.23
4 445 793.N
6 010 r21.95
4 44s 793.00
tot 702.35
2954209.80
0.00
0.00
6 010 121.95
26153 590.28
1989 budget .........
1987 and 1988 surplus
Contributions brought forward in 1990 ..
24904 994.00
82 626.64
24822367.36
133t 222.92
26 ts3 590.28
Karl-Heinz KrsozrNsxr
Chairman of the Committee
on Budgetary Alfairs and
Administration
4
fi
I
I{
I
j
I
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Charles GoenrNs
President of the Assembly
Georges Moulrns
Clerk of the Assembly
I
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APPENDIX IV
PROVIDENT FI.JND
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1989
Georges Mouuns
Clerk of the Assembly
Charles GopnrNs
President of the Assembly
Karl-Heinz KluozrNsxr
Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration
in French
Balance brought fonuard:
Accounts of stalf members as at lst January
1989
Contributions of staff members and of the
Assembly of Western European Union
Repayments of loans by staff members
Interest received during the year
.F
4853511
236 053
2t6 600
349 789
Withdrawals
Management fee
Accounts of existing staff members as
3lst December 1989
I-oss on valuation at 3lst December 1989
F
t7 442
4771O55
t7 456
s 655 953 5 655 953
'u
'!trlzg
X
Uoo
tnz+
N)t,
o\
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APPENDIX V
1989 Balonce sheet for the Commanist Gmup
Surplus at 3lst December 1988 (bank accounts, cash).
Interest
Appropriations gtranted by the Assembly of WEU for 1989
F
Liabilitics
I. Expenditure
l. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) ..
3. Seminars and meetings ...
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .
5. Interpretation costs
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)
7. Sundry expenses
II. Surplus at 3lst December 1989 (bank accounts, cash) .
Total .
Signatures of the Treasurer (Ptrnnu-l)
and two auditors of the group (CnNNarn, BrNnssl)
35 793
l3 758
5 494
5 634
3 991
3 287
3 0s2
577
35 793
32
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APPENDIX VI
1989 Balance sheet for the Federuted Group
of Christion Democrats and European Democrats
Surplus at 3lst December 1988 (bank accounts, cash).
Interest
Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1989
Total
Liabilities
I. Expenditure
l. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, oflice supplies) .
3. Seminars and meetings ..
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .
5. Interpretation costs
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)
7. Sundry expenses
Total
II. Surplus at 3lst December 1989 (bank accounts, cash)
Total
Signatures of the Treasurer (JuNc, Dudley Srr,rrrH)
and two auditors of the group (LrNrz-ConNErrE, Penlsr) . .
1.
2.
3.
F
200 565.78
l2 138.81
142 59r.00
355 295.s9
39 000.00
t 209.30
42 597.tt
53 064.58
135 870.99
2r9 424.60
355 295.59
33
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t.
2.
3.
APPENDIX VtI
1989 Bolance shozt for the Liberal Group
Surplus
Interest
Assets
at 3lst December 1988 (bank accounts, cash)
Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1989
F
43 742.05
| 623.1t
49142.N
94 507.16
23 001.00
4 050.00
l3 000.00
2 460.00
8 900.00
5l 4l r.00
43 096.t6
94 507.16
Total
Liabilities
I. Expenditure
l. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, offrce supplies) .
3. Seminars and meetings ...
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .
5. Interpretation costs
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)
7. Sundry expenses
Total .
Surplus at
Total
3lst December 1989 (bank accounts, cash)
Signatures of the Treasurer (Vonnrn)
and two auditors of the group (MnmNo, Zvwrcrz)
u.
34
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APPENDIX VIII
1989 Balance shea for the Socialist Group
Assets
l. Surplus at 3lst December 1988 (bank accounts, cash).
2. Interest
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1989
Total .
Ltabilities
I. Expenditure
1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, oflice supplies) .
3. Missions and meetings ...
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .
5. Seminars
6. Interpretation costs
7. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)
8. Sundry expenses
Total .
II. Surplus at 3lst December 1989 (bank accounts, cash) .
Total .
Signatures of the Treasurer (Gnnnrrr)
and two auditors of the group (LrNsrEn, TuuuEns)
Bank Statement No. 227
= 6275
+ 200 (to be credited)
6 475
+ 150000 short term
t56 475.t4
F
185 468.75
l0 000.00
108 474.00
303 942.',ts
79 044.00
3023.40
38 854.21
l l 546.00
l5 000.00
r47 467.61
156 475.14*
303 942.75
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lfth September 1990 I
l
Accoants of the administative erpenditurc of the Assembly
for the linancial ycar 1989
MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY
FOR THE FINAI\CIAL YEAR 1989 
'
submitted oa behalf of the
Committee on Badgetary Atfain ond Administrution2
by Mn Kleidzinski, Chairman and Rapprteur
The Assembly,
Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1989, together with i
the auditor's report, in accordance with Article 16 of the financial regulations,
Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his
financial responsibility.
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Iolt. Klejdzinski (Chairman); Il'[Ill. Rathbone, Lagorce (Alternate for Mr. Dhaille) (Vice-
Chairmen); MM. Alvarez (Alternate: Fabra), Biefnot, Mrs. Blunck MI0l. Diaz, Durand, Eversdijk (Alternate: Mrs. Baameld-
Schlaman), Dame Peggy Fenner (Alternate: Lord), MM. Garcia Sanchez, Greco, Mrs. Haas-Berger, Mrs Hoffmann, MM.
Masseret (Alternate: Hunault), Morris, Niegel, Noerens, Oehler, Ranti, Redmond (Alternate: Lord Mackie), Silva Marques
(Alternate: Fernandes Marques), Sinesio, Triglia (Alternate: Giagu Demartinil, Yara.
N.B. Tie names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Document 1237 21st August 1990
Communiqud issued at tlu close of the ministerial meeting
of the Council of Wutera European Union
Paris,27st August 1990
l. The Foreign and Defence Ministers of WEU met on 2lst August 1990 to discuss the situation in
the Gulf caused by the Iraqi invasion and then the annexation of Kuwait. The meeting was held pur-
suant to Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the WEU treaty, the Rome declaration of October t984 and the
platform on European security interests of October 1987, which provides for member countries to
concert their policies on crises outside Europe insofar as they may affect European security interests.
2. The ministers of the WEU member states repeat their unreserved condemnation of the invasion
and annexation of Kuwait by Iraq and call on Iraq to comply immediately and unconditionally with
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660 and 662. They restate their firm determination to
continue to take all necessary steps to comply with the embargo of Iraq in accordance with United
Nations Security Council Resolution 661 and to render it effective. They call on the Security Council
to take any further useful measures to this end.
3. Ministers declare that the determination their countries intend to display in upholding the law is
for the sole purpose of ending aggression and its consequences. The action they have initiated is aimed
at upholding respect of the principles which obtain in relations among states, for they concern the
whole international community and serve as a safeguard for all its members.
4. Faced with a situation that in the first instance affects the Arab states, ministers emphasise the
solidarity linking their countries to the Arab world and their resolve to support its efforts to seek a
solution from within which respects the relevant Security Council resolutions in the context of their
ongoing co-operation and dialogue with the Arab world.
5. Ministers express their acute concern and indignation at the restrictions on the freedom of
movement of nationals of the member countries and at the inhuman treatment inflicted on some of
those nationals. They warn Iraq of the grave consequences that would inevitably ensue were their
safety to be placed at risk. They reiterate their support for Security Council Resolution 664 and
demand that Iraq complies with it without delay.
6. They stress that WEU member countries, bearing in mind the vital European interests in the sta-
bility, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the states of the area, intend to contribute towards further
enhancing the unprecedented international solidarity that has developed since the aggression and has
led to effective action by the United Nations Security Council. The countries that are suffering from
the economic consequences of this action deserve their solidarity.
7. Ministers welcome the measures being taken by member states in support of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 661 and in response to the requests for assistance from states in the Gulf
region, with the aim of obliging Iraq unconditionally to withdraw its troops from Kuwaiti territory and
restore Kuwait's sovereignty.
8. They have decided closely to co-ordinate their operations in the area aimed at implementing and
enforcing the measures mentioned in paragraph 7, as well as any further measures the Security Council
may adopt, also assuring, by common agreement, the protection of their forces. Building on the expe-
rience acquired, including the consultation mechanisms during the Gulf operations in 1987 and 1988,
they have instructed an ad hoc group of foreign and defence ministry representatives to ensure the
most effective co-ordination in capitals and in the region. This should cover among other things overall
operational concepts and specific guidelines for co-ordination between forces in the region, including
areas ofoperation, sharing oftasks, logistical support and exchange ofintelligence. Contact points are
being nominated in the ministries of defence to assist with co-operation at the practical/technical level
and, as an immediate step, to prepare for a meeting of chiefs of defence staff to be held in the next few
days.
9. Ministers emphasise that co-ordination within WEU should also facilitate co-operation with
other countries deploying forces in the region, including those of the United States.
10. The presidency of the Council will inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the
outcome of this meeting.
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Document 1238 10th September 1990
INFORMATION LETTER
from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEA,
on the activities of the ministerial organs
(May 1990 
- 
Augas, 1990)
London, l0th September 1990
Dear President,
Since 2nd August, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, Europeans have been faced by the disturbing real-
ities of one of the North/South threats which the Council's Mediterranean Sub-Group is mandated to
assess and which had been pushed to one side by the wave of near euphoric optimism generated by the
ending of the cold war.
The situation created by Saddam Hussein's aggression, and the unanimous responses of the
United Nations Security Council in first condemning the invasion and then denouncing the illegal
annexation of Kuwait, have led to a policy of United Nations backed sanctions being put into place
and American military support being given to Saudi Arabia and those Gulf states which have requested
it. The taking of thousands of European and American hostages by the Iraqi leadership, who imagined
that they could thereby place a human shield around their strategic, civilian and military installations,
has provided a new dimension to the conflict, setting back the prospect of a diplomatic settlement 
- 
the
only way of preventing further hostilities.
In this context, Europe had a duty to make its voice heard; it did so on 2lst August last with a
WEU ministerial meeting and an extraordinary ministerial meeting of European political co-operation
which took place on the same day. Annexed to this letter is the text of the communiqud published after
the WEU ministerial meeting and of the press statements issued after the meetings of chiefs of staff of
the member states on 27th August and of the ad hoc co-ordination group on 3lst August. The meeting
on 2lst August provided confirmation of the unanimous wish of the WEU member states to see the
restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty and the aggressor's unconditional withdrawal of its forces. It dem-
onstrated their willingness to act in concert both in implementing and complying with the measures
agreed by the United Nations Security Council and in committing their armed forces to the blockade of
Iraq and to the enforcement of the embargo.
The mechanisms put in place during the previous Gulf crisis in 1987-88 have provided a basis
for agreement on the framework for the ad hoc consultations and co-ordination currently taking place
within WEU. These consultations and co-ordination are at three levels: the politico,military level with
the ad hoc Group of Foreign and Defence Ministry Representatives, that of the naval contact points in
the capitals and, lastly, that of the commanders of units deployed in the region. The aim is to ensure
tactical co-ordination of operations in the Gulf so as to give maximum effectiveness to the European
presence and, more particularly, to facilitate co-operation between Europe and the United States in
their support of the Arab states who are united in their condemnation. of an unjustified act of
aggression. Ministers also thought it necessary to call for a meeting of the chiefs of staffof the member
countries. At this meeting 
- 
a * first " in WEU's reactivation history 
- 
the chiefs of staff agreed on the
wording of joint specific guidelines for concerted action by the member states, these guidelines subse-
quently being approved by the ad hoc co-ordination group on 3lst August. The chiefs of staffcould
meet again at alater date depending on how the situation evolves in the Gulf. The need for confidenti-
ality to ensure the effectiveness of the deterrent forces being assembled does not, for obvious reasons,
allow me to give any more details about the agenda of the current consultations taking place within the
WEU intergovernmental organs and the ad hoc co-ordination group.
The forthcoming meetings between the Chairman-in-Office and the Presidential Committee will
undoubtedly be an opportunity for detailed exchanges of view on WEU's reaction to the events and on
its r6le in the international effort being made to checkmate the unacceptable behaviour of the Iraqi
aggressor. The fact that WEU, in its own right, co-chaired the naval conference in Bahrain on 8th Sep-
tember along with the two United States and Arab states representatives is tangible proof that our
organisation is indeed the only one competent to give practical expression to the European will to react
concretely to the direct threats to peace and security in the widest sense. This conference was prepared
by a meeting of WEU member states' representatives on the spot.
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It is clearly too soon to draw conclusions on the impact of this new Gulf crisis on the future
development of European security structures or of WEU operational mechanisms concerning problems
" out of Europe ". What we can do at least is to itemise the premisses on the basis of which WEU must
now undertake a process of reflection; this should be conducted in the coming weeks with the utmost
seriousness by the three component parts of our organisation, namely, the Council and its working
groups, the Institute for Security Studies and the committees of the parliamentary Assembly.
Apart from the radical transformation in East-West relations and in the European strategic land-
scape, it is clear that 1990 will also be marked by a split in the turbulent history of the Near and Middle
East, i.e. in the Arab world as a whole. Consequently, WEU must not only monitor daily the develop-
ments in the Gulf region and in particular their repercussions throughout the Arab world and the Med-
iterranean basin 
- 
as the ministerial meeting on 2lst August instructed it to do - but, even more
important, it must analyse the long-term consequences of this crisis for the European continent and for
the future of security relations between Europe and the Arab world.
With the ending of the cold war, Central and Eastern Europe and the Arab world have seen the
emergence of problems partially obscured by the diplomatic acts which sanctioned the break-up of the
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires and later by Yalta. For long hidden from view by virtue of the
Soviet grip on half the continent, these problems are again surfacing in various places and with varying
degrees of intensity. Given that they are likely to call into question issues of sovereignty or frontiers, or
even both, particularly in the Balkans, they demand our closest possible attention. In the Arab world,
the interlinked issues of decolonisation, oil and the Arab-lsraeli conflict have aroused a shady natio-
nalism cause to use force in order to " liberate " and, at the same time, unify an Arab homeland about
which the myths are so strong that it is hard to define either their substance or geographical bound-
aries. The fact is that the Iraqi argument that a proletarian nation has been compelled to use force by
the egotistical behaviour of oil oligarchies with no real legitimacy does not fall on deaf ears among
Arab public opinion. For all that, a policy of appeasement towards Saddam Hussein is nonetheless
unacceptable both from the point of view of international law and human rights and in view of the sub-
sequent risks of the Iraqi leadership using chemical or even nuclear weapons as a means of blackmail.
But the response to the Iraqi leader's act of aggression must not be seen as a crusade by the rich. Europe
is committed on the ground to the implementation of the Security Council resolutions and because its
vital interests are at stake. These interests are not fundamentally different from those of the Arab coun-
tries with whom multi-faceted co-operation is in fact both vital and desirable. The practical arrange-
ments for this co-operation will have to be co-ordinated so that it is not dominated by the priority 
- 
too
often given in the past 
- 
to short-term commercial interests favouring immediate f-rnancial gain. Could
not the present crisis be an opportunity for negotiations aimed at resolving all the region's problems
once Iraq has stopped flouting international law?
In this context, the efforts being made by Europe and the Maghreb to map out a joint diplomatic
approach, together with the proposals for a conference on security and co-operation in the Mediter-
ranean, take on added importance. There is an urgent need to define a joint European policy in this
regard.
The Gulf crisis has confirmed the restoration of United Nations credibility, the Secretary-
General excelling in making optimum use in the circumstances of his limited margin of manoeuvre.
The unprecedented speed of reaction shown by the Security Council has undoubtedly prevented the
conflict spreading and only under United Nations sanctions can there be a sufficiently effective joint
implementaion of the embargo measures. Lastly, only under United Nations auspices could military
action be taken if, in the last resort, it became clear that there was no other way of restoring the terri-
torial integrity of Kuwait.
If the r6le of the United Nations in the Gulf crisis testifies to its renewal, this will increase
respect for the rights established under international law, the flouting of which represents an unaccep-
table retrogade step. However, the United Nations'capacity for action will be even more meaningful if
it can devolve to regional co-operation organisations for which the CSCE could provide a model if the
prospects for institutionalisation materialise.
The very nature of the current upheavals, the progress of the procedures for the peaceful reso-
lution ofconflicts and the growing degree ofglobal interdependence all call into question the concept
of neutrality which seems no longer tenable in the face of global challenges. The extent of the repercus-
sions in Europe is hard to predict and they will trigger chain reactions from which no European state
can consider itself immune.
All this calls, in the final analysis, for strengthened European cohesion both at the diplomatic
level and in the field of security. The swift political action by the European Community must not be
allowed to conceal the patchy and uncertain nature of some national reactions. The difficult progress
towards political union in Europe, the faltering attempts at " Europe in its defence dimension " have
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been repeatedly underscored by events. Mr. Martens and a number of observers were right in saying
that the crisis has revealed the regrettable lack ofa European security policy and that the consequences
of that should be weighed at the intergovernmental conference on political union. At least the need for
close consultation between the member governments of WEU in deploying their forces and securing
the embargo has enabled encouraging progress to be made.
The Helsinki summit is to be welcomed for having contributed to the concert of nations' con-
demnation of the use of force and to the clear reaffirmation that there can be no compromise which
endorses the aggressor's act of impunity. The Helsinki summit has strengthened the international con-
sensus whilst keeping open the option of a diplomatic settlement. It marked an important stage in the
prevention of armed conflict. The aggressor, now and in the future, must be made to understand that
aggression against one member of the United Nations is tantamount to aggression against all and that
he can have no hope of succeeding by counting on the divisions within the Security Council.
The collapse of communism, German unification, conventional disarmament, the increasing
number of areas of instability in Europe and on the periphery of our continent are part of the new
geostrategic order which demands that the countries of WEU commit all their political, economic and
military resources in order that Europe can shoulder full responsibility for its territorial defence and
that of its overseas interests. With WEU, Europe has a nucleus around which to build a new European
defence structure, a structure which must include operational responsibilities, particularly for inter-
vention outside Europe.
Thus, beyond the events of the Gulf crisis, the urgent need to identify institutional solutions ena-
bling Europe to play its rightful rOle in maintaining peace and international stability will dominate the
WEU agenda until the end of this year and beyond.
rt
*tf
In the wake of the Ministerial Council of last April, the Permanent Council has met four times
between 30th May and l8th July to oversee the implementation of the ministerial mandates.
The Council has closely monitored developments in the German unification process and the
preparations for the Atlantic Alliance summit. The London declaration and the results of the summit
were at the centre of the Council's discussions on topical questions on l8th July and of those of its
working groups the following day. The summit marked an historical turning-point for the alliance: the
cold war was now a thing of the past.
The implications of these events for the CFE negotiations in Vienna and the adaptation of
member countries' armed forces were, together with the prospects for the institutionalisation of the
CSCE, on the agenda of meetings of the Special Working Group and the Defence Representatives
Group. These groups met separately twice and held a joint meeting on l9th July.
The institutionalisation of the CSCE, as envisaged by Chancellor Kohl in his speech on 25th
May, is regarded as a vital stage in the creation of a structure complementary to the present framework
of European security consisting of the Community, WEU and NATO. Such a structure would enable
the Soviet Union gradually to become fully associated with new forms of pan-European co-operation.
That means intensifying the dialogue through regular meetings at various levels of both foreign affairs
and defence representatives; the establishment of a Permanent Council with a small secretariat to
provide continuity; a communications system dedicated to the 35 member states; more frequent con-
tacts between the armed forces; a joint verification centre and/or a centre for conflict prevention whose
responsibilities and method of operation have yet to be discussed.
The Special Working Group and the Defence Representatives Group have begun to study the
prospects for future negotiations on conventional arms control " post CFE ", both from the point of
view of their specific aims and as regards a definition of their legal framework. At the same time, dele-
gates have stressed the importance of member states ensuring the continuity of the process of negoti-
ating conflrdence-building measures under the existing mandate until the Helsinki conference in 1992
and that they should do this irrespective of the stage reached in the negotiations by the time of the
CSCE summit next November.
German unity has implications for the future CFE treaty and indeed for the choice of an appro-
priate forum (23 or 35 nation?) for continuing the negotiations on questions not resolved by this treaty
(further force reductions and force restructuring, problem of aircraft, and the question of troop levels,
for example). The general aim of these negotiations could be the establishment of regional balances and
of new military structures based on defensive doctrines. Conventional arms control, confidence-
building measures and the creation of new security architectures are, alongside the institutionalisation
of the CSCE, the three ways of strengthening stability in Europe. There are two short-term aims; first,
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to limit the Soviet army's margin of manoeuvre for offensive action since it will undoubtedly remain
the most powerful on the European continent for some time to come; second, to prevent the emergence
of regional instability in Central and Eastern Europe.
Detailed consideration also needs to be given to the means of nuclear deterrence in Europe in
general and the aims of the future negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles in particular.
Finally, the Council's working groups have continued their exchanges of view on a definition of
Europe's future security system. The key question at issue is to know how security co-operation can be
established among all the countries of Europe through the intermediary of the CSCE withoutjeopardising the commitments binding the countries of Western Europe 
- 
the European Community,
WEU 
- 
or those linking these countries with North America.
On the question of the current review of alliance strategy, WEU member states must bring all
their weight to bear in this process. Western Europe will in fact have to shoulder a greater responsi-
bility for conventional defence and the new constraints arising from the implementation of the CFE
treaty will call for much closer defence co-operation, which will undoubtedly affect the linkage between
the component parts of the reorganised European defence posture. It is within WEU that specific pro-
posals must be drawn up enabling Europeans to reply positively to the invitation from the United
States for " partnership in leadership " within the alliance and its politico-military bodies.
The Defence Representatives Group has continued its work on co-operation in the field of veri-
fication. Meetings of experts are planned. In addition, the feasibility of multinational units is still on
the group's agenda, as are preparations for a meeting of chiefs of staff next year.
The Mediterranean Sub-Group met on l8th May and considered the opportunities of a possible
conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean, about which there have been several
initiatives and proposals. There was also a discussion of the results of the Rome meeting (2lst-22nd,
March) on the prospects for regional co-operation in the Western Mediterranean; this meeting was
attended by the five countries of the Arab Maghreb Union and by four member states of WEU.
Having finished its report on naval deployments, the sub-group agreed to continue a process ofjoint reflection on the complex problems of including talks on naval resources on the agenda of a con-
ference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean. What now has to be done is to examine in
greater depth the arguments underlying the western position on this question, as defined in the context
of the CFE negotiations.
The sub-group decided to update the report on the implications for European security of ballistic
missile proliferation with respect to the chemical capabilities of those countries possessing missiles. A
" tour de table " was primarily devoted to the worrying scale of the armaments programme in Iraq,
which seems determined to acquire a long-range strike capability.
Lastly, the sub-group was briefed on developments in the Saharan peace process.
The ad hoc Sub-Group on Space held several meetings at both plenary and expert level in order
to prepare specific proposals which would enable the Ministerial Council, at its next meeting, to give
its opinion on the opportuneness of setting up a satellite observation agency. Given the highly-
specialised nature ofthe studies in hand, the Presidency decided to assign the highest degree ofconfi-
dentiality to these studies. Consequently, it is not possible to comment on their progress in this infor-
mation letter.
In the coming months, it will be more important than ever that the activities of the three compo-
nents of our organisation are coherent, having due regard of course to their political and intellectual
independence. This is something that we shall all have to keep uppermost in our minds. I am therefore
pleased that my colleagues and I will soon have the opportunity to meet the Assembly's committees.
This will allow a more flexible and substantive dialogue to develop between the Assembly and the
Council and contribute to the necessary strengthening of our organisation's work for European
security.
*
**
On l8th July, the Director of the WEU Institute for Security Studies outlined to the Permanent
Council the work programme he planned to implement with the help of the four research fellows
appointed on l3th June 1990. The Council endorsed the basic guidelines of this programme, namely,
stimulating the wider debate on European security and carrying out study and research for the govern-
ments of the member states, and it congratulated Mr. John Roper on the energetic way in which his
team had set to work on four subjects of equal importance, i.e.:
- the European security identity in the context of European union;
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- 
the development of new European security structures taking account of the situation of the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe;
- 
the evolution of national defence policies, the new alliance strategy and the ensuing restruc-
turing of forces;
- the economic, industrial and technological factors involved in creating a European defence
" pillar', and the North-South dimension of European security.
From this autumn onwards, the Institute will play an important r6le through its contributions to
the discussions on security policy consultation within WEU both at the level of the working groups and
the Ministerial Council.
***
The re-emergence or appearance - depending on the country concerned - of pluralist democratic
rdgimes in Centralind Eastein Europe espousing the market economy have prompted the countries of
Wistern Europe to provide aid through economic co-operation under Community auspices or on a
regional basis.,q,t the initiative of the Council of Europe.and the WEU Assembly, contacts have been
foiged and developed. The Council has recognised the important rOle of these two bodies and wel-
comed the initiatives.
At their Council meeting in Brussels, WEU Ministers instructed the Presidency and the Secretary-
General to establish contacts for two-way information with the democratically-elected governments in
Central and Eastern Europe. Preparations are in hand for a visit to Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
From 3rd to 6th July 1990, I visited Poland at the invitation of the Director of the Polish
Institute of International R-elations. The initiative for this invitation came from the Polish Foreign
Minister during talks I was privileged to have with him last March in Luxembourg on the fringes of the
Assembly's extraordinary session.
During my visit, I gave a speech on the present and future rdle of WEU to the Polish Institute of
International Ri:lations lplStvt). I was received by Professor Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Onyszkiewicz, Deputy Minister of National Defence and former Solidarity-spokesman,
Professor Geremek, Chairman bf the Foreign Affairs Committee of the SEJM, and,lastly, by Professor
Lamentowitsj, on secondment to the Centre for International Studies of the Senate.
Professor Makarczyk, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave a dinner !1 my honour attended
by representatives of WEU countries. (France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were
present at ambassadorial level.)
The talks centred on the future of the Warsaw Pact after the CFE treaty had been signed. My
interlocutors expressed interest in the idea of multinational forces, which could become a symbol.of
European reconiiliation, and also in the activities of WEU in its three component parts. The- Polish
leadership wished to develop a political consultation process with their Baltic and Balkan neighbouls,
with those to the West andlo the East, whilst at the same time strengthening the CSCE process. My
interlocutors underlined their interest in belonging to the Council of Europe, without waiting for the
elections the following spring, and in being accorded observer status at WEU. They were keen to dem-
onstrate that they be-longed within the sphere of western-style parliamentary and pluralist democ-
racies.
***
In the field of public relations and information on the rOle and activities of WEU, my colleagues
and I attended the following events:
- 
on 8th May, Mr. Anthony Elford represented the secretariat at the NATO exercise " Bold
Game 90 " in the Baltic Sea, involving exercises with fast patrol boats. It also provided an opportunity
to explain to the German, Danish and Norwegian officers taking part the r6le and activities of WEU,
particularly in the Gulf crisis of 1987-88;
- 
from l4th to lSth May, Mr. E. F. Destefanis, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs,
attended an international seminar in Nice and Toulon on " Les iles et la s6curit6 en Mdditerrande "
organised by the Observatoire stratdgique m6diterran6en; Mr. Destafanis spoke on the current aspects
of security in the Mediterranean;
- 
on l4th May, Mr. Anthony Elford visited Airbase 132 at Colmar-Meyenheim for a verifi-
cation exercise as part of preparations for the establishment of the French verification unit:
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- on l5th May, at the secretariat, I received a delegation from the German Defence College and
addressed them on the subject of WEU;
- on l6th and lTth May, the Deputy Secretary-General and I attended SHAPEX 90 on the
theme " European transition - challenges for NATO "; the exercise focused on the measures to be
taken to enhance and ensure stability in Europe in the years to come. Among the subjects discussed
were WEU, defence at the borders, the concept of multinational units and future structures for pan-
European co-operation. The activities of the working groups illustrated the growing interest being
shown in NATO and SHAPE circles in the activities of WEU;
- 
on l Tth May, I attended a meeting of the " Bremer Tabak-Collegium " in Brussels, during
which Mr. Woerner spoke on the security of Europe in this decade;
- 
on l Tth May, Mr. Arnaud Jacomet represented the secretariat at the East-West conference
organised by the British Atlantic Group of Young Politicians which took place from l4th to lTth May
at Lancaster House: he spoke on " The r6le of WEU in the new relations with Eastern Europe ";
- 
on 22nd May, I addressed the NATO Defence College in Rome on " A security design for
Europe ";
- on 3lst May, I addressed the Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels on the
subject " Europe's security in a European union ";
- 
on 3rd and 4th June at Orta San Giulio (near Milan), I addressed the 7th International
Workshop on NATO political-military decision-making organised by the Centre for Strategic Decision
Research;
- 
on l9th June, Mr. E. F. Destefanis gave a talk about WEU and its activities to Brigadier Erik
Rossander and 42 students of the Swedish War College who were on an oflicial visit to the United
Kingdom;
- 
on 20th June, I addressed the United States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, on
the subject " Allies and adversaries " as part of a forum which was held from l9th to 2l st June on * A
ready navy, politics, budgets and naval forces in the 2lst century";
- 
on 22nd June, I took part in a conference organised by the Defence Study Centre of the
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Brussels, where I spoke on " The emerging security structure of
Europe and the European Community ";
- 
on 29th June, I took part in a conference on the building of a new Europe organised by the
Federal Trust for Education and Research at the offices of the European Commission in London;
- 
on 2nd July, I gave a speech on " The changed conditions of European security " at a seminar
organised by the Paul Loebe Institute in Berlin;
- 
on 9th July, I visited Luxembourg to attend an East-West conference on the future of Europe,
organised at the Bourglinster Castle by the Luxembourg Institute for European and International
Studies and the Luxembourg Harvard Association;
- 
from I lth to l3th July, Mr. Diarmid Williams attended the annual international symposium
organised by the Centre for Arab Gulf Studies at the University of Exeter and he presented a paper;
- 
on l6th July, Mr. A. Jacomet represented WEU at a dinner discussion organised by the
European-Atlantic Group which was preceded by a talk by Mr. Michael Legge on " Security in the 90s:
NATO's r6le ";
- 
on 17th July, Ambassador Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, spoke on the problems of
arms co-operation during a seminar on this subject organised in Brussels by the Defence Systems Man-
agement College;
- 
on 28th July, I gave a talk on the new conditions ofEuropean security and the future r6le of
WEU at the l8th annual conference of the Standing Conference of Atlantic Organisations which was
being held at Fontainebleau and whose general theme was * Ending the division of Europe ".
Throughout this period, I have continued to have contacts with the press, radio and television to
explain the orientation of WEU's activities and its r6le in the current European context and in the Gulf
cflsls.
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Communiqud issued at the close of the ministerial meeting
of the Council of Western European Union
Paris, 18th Septemfur 1991)
The foreign affairs and defence ministers of the member countries of Western European Union,
at their extraordinary meeting in Paris,
- 
unreservedly condemn the new breaches of international law by the Iraqi authorities and the
assault on personnel arising from the violation of diplomatic premises in Kuwait city, and following
Iraq's intolerable act of aggression against another Arab country; they recall that the authors of these
violations will carry a personal responsibility,
- 
express their resolve to apply and ensure the strict implementation of the embargo decided on
by the United Nations Security Council in all its forms - the only way of reaching a political and
peaceful solution to the crisis,
- 
decide to exchange information on all violations of which they may be aware, and jointly to
identify any shortcomings in their embargo measures in order to rectify them as soon as possible,
- 
welcome the fact that, since their meeting on 2lst August last, all the member states have
made an effective contribution to the common effort, and that the co-ordination is proceeding effec-
tively with other countries' forces deployed in the region,
- 
decide, as far as they are concerned, to take all further measures necessary, as soon as possible,
for the full and effective enforcement of the embargo, with particular attention to air traflic, and call
upon the Security Council rapidly to adopt the appropriate decisions to this end; these decisions should
apply if necessary to any countries not complying with the embargo,
- 
endorse the decision by some member states to reinforce their air and ground forces in the
region or to assist partners in deploying such forces and support the decisions taken or envisaged by the
member states with a view to further deployments should the situation so demand,
- 
decide to strengthen the WEU co-ordination and to extend the coordination at present oper-
ating in the maritime field to ground and air forces and, within this framework, to identify the forms
that these new deployments will take, to seek to ensure that they are complementary, to harmonise the
missions of member states' forces and to pool their logistic support capabilities as required,
- 
intend to strengthen co-ordination with other countries having forces in the region, in par-
ticular the Arab states and the United States of America,
- 
are resolved to continue providing humanitarian aid to those countries particularly affected
by the crisis,
- 
underline the solidarity linking their countries to the Arab world.
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DRAFT SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1990 1
submitted on hehalf of the
Committee on Budgaary Alfain ond Administation2
by Mr. Klejdainski, Chairman and Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Expr"lNA,ronv M eIvIoRANouL,t
I. General
II. Analysis of the various budget heads
Tnst;g RELATING To THE MANAGEMENT oF THE ExTRAoRDINARY EXPENDITURE SECTIoN OF
THE SUPPIJMENTARY BUDGET oF THE AssTunIy CoNCERNING THE woRK oN ADAPTING
THE BUILDING
ApprNnx
Financial statement of work as at 3lst July 1990 
- 
Letter from the architect's
oflice
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members ol the committee: Mr. Klejdzinski (Chairman); MM. Rathbone, Iagorce (Alternate for Mr. Dhaille) (Vice-
Chairmen); MM. Alvarez (Alternate: Fabra), Biefnot, Mru Blunck, MM. Diaz, Durand, Evendijk (Alternate: Mrs. Baaneld-
Schlaman), Dame Pegga Fenner (Alternate: Lor$, MM. Garcia Sanchez, Gr@o, Mrs. Haas-Berger, Mrs. Hoffmann, MM.
Mass€ret (Alternate: Hunault), Monis, Niegel, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti, Redmond (Alternate: Lord Mackie), Silva Marques
(Alternate: Fernandes Marques), Sinesio, Triglia (Alternate: Giagu Demartini), Yara.
N.B. Ifte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submined by Mr. Klajdainski, Chairmaa and Rapporteur)
I. General
l. In its supplementary budget for 1989, the Assembly, as the contracting authority, asked the
Council for the sums necessary for work to adapt the building in accordance with the plans submitted
by the office of Mr. Madon, the architect, and approved by the Council. This budget also included
other requirements stemming from the building of two large conference rooms on the ground floor and
a lounge in the basement, as well as the transfer of the national delegation oflices to the second floor.
2. Of these sums, amounting to F 8 535 335 for all the sub-heads concerned and which formed the
extraordinary section of the supplementary budget for the financial year 1989, F I 963 394 was used
during that financial year and the difference (F 6 571 941) was carried over to the financial year 1990
in application of Article l0 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.
3. Now that the work in question has been almost entirely completed and accepted, it is necessary
to adjust initial estimates and assess the extra sums that are essential if the Assembly is to meet its con-
tractual commitments.
4. In this connection, it should be stressed that the need to make the premises and equipment
available to the Assembly before the opening of the June 1990 session was an absolute constraint. The
contracting authority, assisted by the Council representative, was therefore faced with the need to take
immediate decisions which sometimes meant overspending, as was the case when a firm which
defaulted had to be replaced quickly. It should also be pointed out that extra expenditure was needed
to install video message equipment and receivers in the national delegation oflices which the Presi-
dential Committee considered essential because of the transfer of the national delegation oflices to the
second floor.
5. The analysis of commitments under each sub-head of the * Extraordinary expenditure " section
of the budget set out in the table below justifies the request for these supplementary sums.
II. Analysis of the various budga hetds
6. Sub-Head 33 " Reorganisation of the building "
6.1. A first financial statement relating to the work was transmitted to the Council on 12th April
1990, which showed that sums initially included in Sub-Head 33 of the " Extraordinary expenditure "
section of the supplementary budget had been overspent by F 342 098.23.
6.2. The offrce of Mr. Madon, the architect, prepared a further statement as at 3lst July 1990 (see
appendix) which included a summary of work carried out and fees. Taking into account extra work and
other work that was less than expected, the financial position on that date represented a grand total(work plus fees) of F 6 757 847.30 excluding tax.
6.3. Compared with total credits initially included in the supplementary budget for 1989 (Sub-Head
33 of the " Extraordinary expenditure " section), this total exceeds the total estimates by F 344 672, i.e.
5.32o/0.
6.4. It should be stressed that these figures are not yet final since, as the architect specified in his
letter accompanying the statement of 3lst July 1990, " negotiations with firms to work out the general,
final balance due have not yet been completed'. These negotiations relate in particular to work which
has not yet been accepted and the penalties to be applied.
6.5. It will therefore be possible to establish the final position only when the current negotiations are
completed and all the work has been accepted, but the final financial statement should not be very dif-
ferent from that set out in the abovementioned summary of work and fees.
6.6. Finally, it seems useful to give details of the sum of F 176 400 excluding tax that has been
charged to Sub-Head 33.3 for co-ordination of work on the site. Initial estimates under this sub-head
did not take account of this work which, in accordance with the decision taken on 6th November 1989
by the representatives of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Council and the Offrce of the
Clerk, was also assigned to Mr. Madon's office. The corresponding expenditure could have been
charged to Sub-Head 33.2 since it is strictly linked with the execution of work, but it was preferred to
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charge it to Sub-Head 33.3 so as to harmonise the Assembly's budget with the financial statement pre-
pared by the prime contractor.
7. Sub-Head 34 " Installation of committee rooms "
7.1. The international call for tenders for installing simultaneous interpretation equipment in the two
conference rooms and fourteen interpretation booths had extremely positive results since, as a result of
competition, this equipment cost F 929 958, i.e. a saving of F 310 202 compared with the estimate
under Sub-Head 34.1.
7.2. Conversely, fitting out these rooms cost F 128 652 more than the sum of F 600 000 granted by
the Council for this purpose. However, it should be recalled that the Assembly's initial estimates
amounted to F 825 000 and that the Council, in substantially reducing this sum, said it might grant
further sums on the basis of the results of the call for tenders.
7.3. There were various tenders for fitting out the corridor but the architect has not yet expressed his
opinion since he intends to propose furnishings that are both aesthetically coherent with the instal-
lation as a whole and functional. The initial estimate of F 36 000 should therefore be maintained.
7.4. There is thus a surplus (saving) under Sub-Head 34 of F l8l 550.
8. Sub-Head 35 " National delegation ffices "
8.1. Organisation of the national delegation oflices was far more complex and expensive than
expected because the furniture in the oflices of the former WEU agencies was nearly all so old and in
poor condition that it was unsuitable for use. The venetian blinds, too, were unusable.
8.2. In order to keep expenditure as low as possible, the following steps were taken:
(a/ Nine tables and ten chairs from the old conference rooms and ten other arm
chairs were repaired F 21362
(D/ Furniture (desks, arm chairs, typing desks, etc.) was purchased, plus other office
fittings (shelves with pigeon holes, lamp shades, etc.) strictly essential to com-
plete the furnishing of the various offices 53 963
(c) The venetian blinds in the oflices of the nine delegation chairmen were replaced
by net curtains l6 631
ll 430(d/ Furniture already in the building had to be handled and transferred
(e/ Name plates were fitted to nineteen doors 4 156
F t07 542
8.3. In addition, there was the cost of installing a video message system and a wiring system for lis-
tening to debates (F 152 899). At its meeting on 7th March 1990, the Presidential Committee agreed
that these were essential since the new delegation offices were so far from the chamber and decided
that they should be installed in time for the June 1990 session.
8.4. Expenditure charged to Sub-Head 35.1 thus amounts to F 260 441. A further subsequent amount
of F 50 000 should be added, needed to complete the replacement of the venetian blinds by net cur-
tains in the other eleven delegation offices, to purchase additional furniture, in particular for the
German Delegation, and to install wall plugs for receivers in the secretariat offices of certain delega-
tions.
8.5. Total actual expenditure and estimated supplementary expenditure under Sub-Head 35.1
therefore amounts to F 3 I 0 441, i.e. F 192 441 more than the credits included in the budget. Sub-Head
35 as a whole is affected by this result since expenditure under Sub-Head 35.2 coincides with credits
granted.
9. Sub-Head 36 " Lounge in the Jirst basement "
The sums granted proved insufficient, in particular because requirements had been assessed with
a view to fitting out the lounge alone, whereas it was also necessary to place chairs in the telephone
booths, behind the bank and travel agency counters and in the sound room. Furthermore 
- 
a more
important undertaking 
- 
the area affected by the work had to be emptied and the archives they con-
tained transferred to adjacent premises. This expenditure amounted to F 123 150, i.e. overspending of
F 68 150.
10. In conclusion, as shown in the detailed table below, this supplementary budget amounts to
F 424 000 excluding tax, account being taken of surpluses (savings) and sums overspent. The Assembly
therefore asks the Council for additional credits corresponding to this amount, which represents a total
increase of 4.96 9o compared with the initial budget.
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Table rebting to the managernent of the e.xtraordinary expend.iturc
section of the supplementary budga of the Assembly
concerning the work on adapting the building
Credits
used in
1989
Credits
carried
over to
1990
Total
Cost of
work and
supplies
+or-
Head VI
Sub-head 33
33.1 .....
77) 61 000792022
374 656
309 986
397 512
0
0
0
282t8
7 300
5 087 978
tst 219
930 174
202488
36 000
l l8 000
l2 000
26 782
68 300
s 880 000
525 875
t 240 160
600 000
36 000
I 18 000
l2 000
55 000
61 000
6114308
643 539
929 9s8
728 652
36 000*
310 44ltt
l2 000
123 150
+ 7300
- 
234 308
- 
rt7 664
+ 3t0 202
- 
128 652
- 
192 441
68 150
33.3.....
Sub-head 34
34.t .....74.2 .
34.3 .....
Sub-head 35
151
75)
Sub-head 36...
Rounded up to
- 
423 713
- 
424000
* Estimate.
** Of which F 50000 not yet spent.
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APPENDIX
Financial statement of work as at 31st July 1990
- 
I*tter from the architect's office
Serge Madon et Associds
Architecture et Ingdnierie Gdn6rale
Paris, 3lst July 1990
Subject: Reorganisation of a WEU building
43, avenue du Pr6sident-Wilson, 75016 Paris
Ref.: 0890027
I enclose a financial statement on the work as at 3lst July 1990 which includes:
l. a statement of work and fees as at 30th July 1990;
2. asummaryof initialcontractsfortheworkthesummaryof l5thJanuary 1990updatedfol-
lowing the default of SOGELEC (No. 7) and its replacement by FLORES (No. 7A) and STABI(No. 7B);
3. a statement of extra work that had to be carried out, as at 31st July 1990;
4. a statement of work not actually effected, as at 3lst July 1990.
I venture to point out that the statement of extra work includes all sums for joint expenditure
pro rata to the firms as well as the penalties for delays proposed by the architect.
Details will be sent to you at the end of August of extra work or work that was not actually
effected in the form of re-updated exchanges of statement.
Finally, I would inform you that the negotiations with firms to complete the general, final
balance have not yet been completed.
I would remind you that the work of the firms Glauselec and AM.2A has not yet been accepted.
The statement submitted is therefore subject to a few minor variations in the official final stage.
I am at your disposal for any further information you may require.
e. coquri
Assembly of WEU,
43, avenue du Pr6sident-Wilson
75016 PARIS
*
!t*
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REORGANISATION OF THE WEU BUILDING
43, avenue du Prdsident-Wilson
75016 Paris July 1990
CO}TTRACTING AUTHORITY: WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
43, avenue du Prdsident-Wilson
75016 Paris
Tel.: 47.23.54.32
Pnrur coNTRAcroR: SMA
85, rue du Dessous-des-Berges
75013 Paris
Tel: 45.86.26.26
Summary of the operation as at 30th July 1990(Work + Fees)
!t
t*
I ifiql ennfraeJs fnr fhe work F 5 850 238.70 excl. tax
+F 836080.10 excl. tax
-F 572010.71 excl. tax
Extra work which had to be carried out, as at 3fth July 1990
Work not actually effected, as at 30th July 1990
Torer, Wonr as at 30th July 1990
Fses
Architecf
F 6 114308.10 excl. tax
F 467 139.20 excl. tax
F 176 400.00 excl. taxOn site co-ordination
Torx- FeEs.. F 643 539.20 excl. tax
Gnar.ro Torar (Work + Fees) . F 6757 847.30 excl. tax
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RroncnNrsnrroN oF THE wEU BUILDING
43, avenue du Pr6sident-Wilson
75016 Paris July 1990
CovrnecrrNc AUTHoRITy: wESTERN EURopEAN UNIoN
43, avenue du Pr6sident-Wilson
75016 Paris
Tel.: 47.23.54.32
Pnrl,te coNTRAcroR: SMA
85, rue du Dessous-des-Berges
75013 Paris
Tel.: 45.86.26.26
rt
t*
Recapit ulat io n of c o nt ruct s
No. Lot Firm Cost exc. tax Cost inc. tax
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
I
9
l0
1l
t2
Demolition/Fabric/Masonry
PartitionVJoinery/Fittings
Metalwork/Metal joinery/Doors
Tiling/Earthenware
Stoneware
Fitted carpets/Flexible flooring
materials
False ceilings
Plumbing/Sanitation
Glassware
Paintwork/Wall coverings/Cleaning
Electricity/Low tension
Air conditioningA/entilation/
Heatine
Antony B0timent
Menuiseries des
Moutiers
AM.2A
Antony Bdtiment
Antony Bdtiment
Pr6votat et Cie
7A Flores
78 Stabi
Mailfert
AM.2A
Rigolot
Glauselec
GTCM Chaussididre
441200.00
l 610 572.00
555 754.00
62255.00
219 590.00
109 017.00
355 400.00
130 000.00
t30 825.72
387 287.00
260 000.00
s32 838.00
1 055 500.00
523263.20
910 138.39
659124.24
73 834.43
260 433.74
(2s9 9s9.74)
129 294.16
(129 285.86)
421504.40
t54 180.00
155 159.30
459 322.38
308 360.00
63t 945.87
251 823.00
To'ul. Rrrrr.DrNrl 5 850 238.70 6 938 383.00
(6 937 900.30)
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ReoncnwrslrroN oF THE wEU BUILDING
43, avenue du Prdsident-Wilson
75016 Paris July 1990
CoNrnccrNc AUTHoRITy: wESTERN EURoPEAN UNIoN
43, avenue du Prdsident-Wilson
75016 Paris
Tel.: 47.23.54.32
Pnrur, coNTRACToR: SMA
85, rue du Dessous-des-Berges
75013 Paris
Tel.: 45.86.26.26
*
ta
Statement of e*m worh thu hod to b canied out
No. l.ot Firm Cost exc. tax Cost inc. tax
l+
4+
5
2
3+
9
6
7
8
l0
ll
t2
Demolition/Fabri dMasonry
Tilingi/Earthenware/
Stonework
PartitionVJoinery/Fittings
Metalwork/Metal j oinery/
Doors
Fitted carpetdFlexible flooring
False ceilings
Plumbing/Sanitation
Paintwork/Wall coveringVCleaning
Electricity/Low tension
Air conditioningA/entilation/
Heating
Antony B0timent
Menuiseries des
Moutiers
AM.2A
Pr6votat et Cie
7A Flores
78 Stabi
Mailfert
Rigolot
Glauselec
GTCM Chaussididre
SNDTP
C Curgi
98 804.79
+ ll7 714.00
l.
+ 120 000.00
*
+ 2 540.00
+ l5 000.00
+ 4 500.00
+ 71 172.84
+ 85 798.80
+ 97 357.50
+ 192 408.00
+ 28 I17.50
+ 2 666.67
+ I 17 182.48
+ 139 608.80
t
+ 142320.00
*
+ 3012.44
+ t7 790.00
+ 5 337.00
+ 84 410.98
+ 101 757.38
+ I l5 466.00
+ 228 195.89
+ 33 347.35
+ 3162.67
Torar BUTLDTNG + 836 080.10 + 991 591.00
* Estimate pending details to be given by the hrm.
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REoncaMsnrloN oF THE wEU BUILDING
43, avenue du Pr6sident-Wilson
7S0t6 Paris JulY 1990
Cox'rnegnxc AUTHoRITy: wESTERN EURoPEAN t NIoN
43, avenue du Pr6sident-Wilson
75016 Paris
Tel.: 47.23.54.32
Pnrur coNTRAcroR: SMA
85, rue du Dessous-des-Berges
75013 Paris
Tel.: 45.86.26.26
Statement of work not actually etfeaed
No. l,ot Firm Cost exc. tax Cost inc. tax
l+
4+
5
2
3+
9
6
7
8
l0
ll
t2
Demolition/Fabric/Masonry
TilinglEarthenware/
Stonework
PartitionVJoinery/Fittings
Metalwork/Metal joinery/
Doors
Fitted carpets/Flexible flooring
False ceilings
Plumbing/Sanitation
Paintwork/Wall coverings/Cleaning
Electricity/Low tension
Air conditioning/Ventilation/
Heatine
Antony Bdtiment
Menuiseries des
Moutiers
AM.2A
Prdvotat et Cie
7A Flores
78 Stabi
Mailfert
Rigolot
Glauselec
GTCM Chaussididre
- 
168 659.61
- 
t4400,4.ll
- 
124 000.00
+
3820.07
t9 40t.24
34 617.07
19 768.86
1934.17
29 r01.87
26 703.71
- 
200 030.30
- 
170 788.87
- 
147 064.N
+
4 530.60
23009.87
- 
41 055.84
23 445.86
2293.92
34 514.81
3l 670.60
Torel BUILDING - 572010.71 - 678 404.70
t Estimate pending details to be given by the firm.
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DRAFT BUDGET OF THE N)MINISTRATTVE EXPENDITURB
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR I99I I
submitted on behalf of the
hmmittee on Budgetary Atfain and AdminMrution2
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N.B. Ifte names of those taking Wrt in the vote are printed in italics.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitud by Mr. fikidzinckl Cluirnan and Rappoaeu)
1. Generul
l. The Assembly's draft budget for l99l meets two main requirements:
(a) to complete the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk; a proposal in, this sense was- already
' ' included in the 1990 budget but only part of this was considered by the Corrncil, which
agreed only to the creation of a single post of translator-interpreter and said it would con-
sfuer all th-e other proposals after * a management review to assess inter alia the position on
stafftng ";
(b) to make estimates under Heads II to V of the operating budget as.accurate. as possible since,
' ' in the previous financial year, only approximate figures could be give!-in view of uncertainty
about ihe date on which-Portugu-ese and Spanish members would effectively participate in
the Assembly's work and how the new member countries would take part in the organisation
of the various session services.
2. The present draft budget is therefore not merely a renewal of the previous one but reflects, in
financial te-rms, the political work of the Assembly, which is ever more attentive to developments in
Europe and thioughbut the world. The paragraphs below analyse the abovementioned two points in
depth, as well as the other aspects of the draft budget for 1991.
2. Restructurtng the Olfrce of the Clork(Hed I ofthe drqft operating budget)
3. It should be recalled that, following the opinion expressed by the WEU Budget and Oryanisation-
Committee, the Permanent Council made consideration of the Assembly's pppos_al! for the creation of
five new posts subject to the submission of a management survey of the 9!fr.q of the Clerk. The insti-
gators of ihat requ-est apparently wondered whether better organisation of the Oflice of the Clerk might
iot allow the increase in its workload to be met, this increase being due to both the reactivation and the
enlargement of WEU. However, the independent experts specialised in p-arliamenta-ry- matters who
were asked by the Assembly to conduct the survey not only showed that the Assembly_ls request was
fully justified but also felt jt had been too modeit in working out its reguirements. They.therefore
ttroirgiit the Assembly should ask for the creation of three grade B posts rather than two, making a total
of six new posts to be requested.
4. At its meeting on 16th July 1990, the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee did not accept
the experts' conclulsions, its m-embers believing that the experts had not analysed in. depth the
organiiation of the Oflic6 of the Clerk as a whole but had confined themselves to supporting itj qro-
poiats. The survey therefore did not correspond to the mandate_fixed by the Councjl, i.e. the staff situ-
ition in relation io the management of the Office of the Clerk. In other words, and as the government
representatives specified at the abovementioned meeting, they needed information on three essential
points:
- 
a description and the objectives of each post;
- 
the number of staff and their grades in sectors to be strengthened;
- 
justification for the additional posts requested.
5. Your Rapporteur has to say that he does not quite grasp the point of view expressed by the
Budget and Orgahisation Committee. The answers to these questions were already set out in 4te report,
andiven formiO the major part of it. The report also contained the organogram of the Offrce of the
Clerk and a descriptior of all posts, both drawn up in accordance with usual practice in all the
Co-ordinated organisations, including the WEU ministerial organs. 11 any 
-event, members of the
Budget and Or{anisation Committee undertook to draw up a detailed list of matters on which they
wanted further information from the Assembly.
6. However, at the time of writing this explanatory memorandqm, the Assembly has not received
tnis fst. Your Itapporteur can therefdre but take up eiamination of the experts' report and systemati-
cally analyse the slructure of the OfIice of the Clerk, which should meet the concerns expressed by the
WEU Budget and Organisation Committee.
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7. On the basis of the present situation, the experts noted that " the Oflice of the Clerk of the WEU
Assembly works well but in precarious conditions which may have a considerable impact on any devel-
opment in the Assembly's r6le ". They wondered whether staff " could do even more if circumstances
required ". They were not certain, as illustrated by three examples:
" 
- 
The committee secretariats, each consisting of a secretary of high grade and an assistant,
have reached their maximum burden of work increase in the number of increasingly
complex reports, increase in the amount of documentation that has to be sought, consid-
erable amount of travel, etc. Several secretaries have other equally important duties at other
levels.
- 
The work of the technical services is also growing rapidly. This is also true of the mail and
archives service.
- 
For lack of staff, the study and documentation units cannot be developed to alleviate the
burden of the committee secretariats. Only the press service can absorb more numerous and
new tasks in acceptable conditions.
The standard of work in the Office of the Clerk is therefore closely linked with the
Assembly's rOle in WEU and the very r6le of WEU. It can already be foreseen that this will
grow in the years ahead thus raising, here and now, the question of strengthening the staffof
the services.'
8. On this basis, the authors of the report then studied whether the staff of the Office of the Clerk
would be able to meet the increased workload resulting from the development of the Assembly's r6le
and concluded that this would involve more important or new tasks at several levels of the
organis-ation. Thgy therefore endeavoured to verify whether the justifications given by the Assembly in
its draft budget for 1990 could be considered valid. They concluded that a third grade 83 post should
be added to the five posts already requested.
9. In regard to the organogram, they expressed the opinion that, while the research service, the sit-
tings service and the secretariat of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges should all be
und.er the authority of the Clerk Assistant for political affairs (whom they called the legislative Clerk
Assistant), they should be kept separate rather than entrusted to a single official directly-dependent on
the Clerk, as envisaged by the Assembly. On this specific point, the Assembly is not prepared to
endorse the experts'opinion and prefers a slightly different solution which will be described below.
10. One can but pay tribute to the rigour of the experts'analysis and recognise that their conclusions
are logical and well founded. Their report admittedly does not include quantitative data such as the
number of nages of reports drafted by each committee, which certain members of the Budget and
Organisation Committee would have liked to see, but it may be wondered how much importanie such
data have for the purpose of assessing intellectual work which show the professionalism of the com-
mittee secretaries and their ability to organise their research efficiently and make a synthesis of the
arguments with their personal contribution.
I l. 
_ 
The organogram proposed by the Assembly at Appendix II hereto shows clearly that the OfIice of
the Clerk has two main branches 
- 
political affairs and administrative and financial hffairs 
- 
under the
resPective responsibility of the two Clerks Assistant under the authority of the Clerk. Furthermore, the
Clerk is also directly responsible for the secretariat of the Presidential Committee and the Committee
on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and the sittings service, which ensures that the Rules of Pro-
cedure are applied correctly during debates (sittings, registry of speakers, minutes).
12. The political affairs branch consists of the committee service (Defence Committee, Political
Committee, Technological qnd Aerospace Committee and Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations),-the Press and External Relations Service and the Research Offrce. In adopting this
structure, the Assembly follows the experts' opinion only in part since it believes that the sittings
service 
- 
which the experts propose should continue undei the rtsponsibility of the Clerk Assistant f5r
political. affairs- (the 
_expression legislative Clerk Assistant proposed by thoie experts not having been
adopted) would not form a homogeneous whole with the political brarich of the Offrce of the Clerk. In
any event, the Clerk Assistant for political affairs is fully taken up during sessions with matters con-
nected with the committees' activities and the Assembly's public relations (meetings with the press).
This service should consequently be placed under the direct authority of the'Clerk in accordanc-e with
p_ractice 
-constantly followed hitherto. The way the Assembly has organised the political branch of theOflice of the Clerk takes into account the breakdown of work between the committees as provided forin the Charter and Rules of Procedure. It believes, indeed, that each of the abovemeniioned com-
mittees should have a secretariat consisting of a secretary and an assistant. A smaller structure with, for
instance, a single secretariat for two committees is n6t possible because each committee works in
accordance with its own specific programme. A single secretary and a single assistant would be unable
to afford Propgr assistance to two committees at once, particirlarly as all committee reports are pre-pared during the same period of the year.
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13. In view of prospects for its future activities, the workload of the Oflice of the Clerk and in par-
ticular of its political branch will grow. At its meeting on 9th July 1990, the Presidential Committee
instructed the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to study the creation of " a standing
committee... to ensure the Assembly's continuity of action following procedures similar to those prac-
tised in the Assembly of the Council of Europe. The WEU Assembly might thus communicate tech-
nical recommendations to the Council between sessions and also more easily adopt positions on topical
political questions'. This new element merely adds weight to the opinion expressed by the experts and
supports their conclusions, which imply assigning four new posts to the political branch of the Oflice of
the Clerk, i.e.:
(a) a grade A5 secretary and a grade 83 assistant for the Political Committee. The Clerk
Assistant for political affairs could thus devote himself wholly to tasks included in his attri-
butions (assisting the Clerk in- the area for which he is responsible, directing the committee
service, co-ordinating the work of the committee secretaries, helping to prepare written and
oral parliamentary interventions, organising the Assembly's participation in seminars, collo-
quies, conferences, etc.);
(b) a grade A3/4 official and a grade 83 assistant for a research office which would include the
documentation service. It goes without saying that, as soon as this oflice is set up, the official
responsible will have to study how to set up a network ofcorrespondents and obtain access to
many different sources of information. The material organisation of this oflice will therefore
be the subject of separate budgetary proposals.
14. Finally, the experts'proposal to combine the Press and External Relations Service in its present
form with the political branch of the Office of the Clerk has already been put into effect.
15. Where the administrative and financial branch is concerned, the organogram shows clearly that
the Clerk Assistant concerned assumes direct responsibility for the administration and finance service
proper and co-ordinating the translation and publications service, as well as temporary services during
sessions (except for the sittings service, which is under the authority of the Clerk), i.e. the summary
record, the verbatim report and the typing pool.
16. The staff of the administrative service proper carry out various duties. The Clerk Assistant 
-
who, as head of the administration and finance service and with the assistance of a grade 84 oflicial,
has general responsibility for the service 
- 
also ensures the secretariat of the Committee for Budgetary
Affairs and Administration and attends all meetings of the Presidential Committee. He also deals per-
sonally with all matters relating to the permanent and temporary staffof the Oflice of the Clerk. Here it
should be underlined that the organisation of each session involves the recruitment of some two
hundred persons of all categories (counsellors, parliamentary secretaries, verbatim reporters, summary
reporters, interpreters, translators, etc.), which means organising and updating files over a period of
several months before and after sessions. With the assistance of the head of general services, he also
organises ordinary and extraordinary sessions, colloquies and the more important committee meetings
held outside Paris, and this requires a whole series of contacts with the authorities concerned and the
study and adoption of measures necessary to ensure that work proceeds smoothly with due respect for
agreements with the authorities concerned.
17. The accounts section was strengthened in 1988 with the creation of a grade 83 post of
accountant to assist the already existing grade 86 chief accountant. The Council's favourable decision
normalised a situation which had become precarious, as the auditors had pointed out in their reports
on the audits of the Assembly's accounts. As the section has now been computerised, the two officials
assigned to it are able to carry out all their accounting and book-keeping operations clearly and accu-
rately. Where this section is concerned, the organogram is therefore unchanged.
18. The grade 42 oflicial who replaces the Clerk Assistant when absent is speciflrcally responsible for
general services. His duties include determining requirements for equipment of all kinds needed for the
work of the Office of the Clerk. He investigates markets prior to calling for offers for the supply of such
equipment and organises and co-ordinates the activities of the mail and archives service, storage of and
accounting for equipment and the reproduction workshop. He is also responsible for the security
service in the Office of the Clerk in co-ordination with the security service of the WEU Institute for
Security Studies.
19. In referring to the administrative service, the experts noted the growth in material tasks resulting
from the Assembly's opening towards the exterior (mail, printing, etc.). In this connection, a detailed
study prepared by the Oflice of the Clerk and appended to the experts' report mentions a considerable
increase in the workload in the archives, i.e. some 30090 compared with 1988, although only one
person is assigned to the service. The experts therefore concluded that there should be a second grade
B3 oflicial in the administrative service. The Assembly considers that this minimal request should be
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given wholehearted support particularly as the offrcial concerned would alsg be expected to type for the
[eneral services to improve ihe situation of the whole administrative and financial service where there
is at present only one typist, who is the assistant to the Clerk Assistant.
20. Scrutiny of the way the reproduction service is run reveals an enonnous mass of work in the
printing workshop, estimated at 2 500 000 printed pages per yeg: 
.It s-houl-{ be }rnderlined that the
ihree ofticials in tiris service also carry out tasks involving responsibility for all equiqment belonging to
the Office of the Clerk, for oflice supplies and the maintenance of the premises. Now,-too, there-are
new tasks connected with the operation of the sound system installed in the basement for controlling
the equipment in the two new conference rooms. No increase in staff is envisaged but a proposal is
made below for regrading the three posts.
21. In the context of general services, the creation of a post of chauffeur was supported by the
experts, who recognised the need for this recruitment. If the Council persists in not aut-horising the cre-
ation oithis post,-whose holder might also be usefully employed as a messenger ar,r! usher, the solution
adopted for 
-the institute for Secu-rity Studies might be,extended to the Assembly. A security guard
would then be asked to drive the ollicial car in case of need.
22. No change is proposed in the Translation and Publications-Service, qhi_c! has two sections:
English and French. The latter benefited in 1990 from the creation of a new.grade L3 post of translator-
intErpreter, a proposal for whose regrading is made below. Staffin this service are nev-ertheless working
at thi limil oi thiir possibilities. Rll documents prepared by the Assembly in one o_f thg-two working
languages are translated into the other and, in addition, many documents in other officiallanguagts are
traishled into English and French. This represents a considerable volume of work, i.e. about I 800 to
2 000 pages of Assembly texts translated by each section every year. In addition, day-to-day correspo-n-
dence is lranslated into one or other of the two working languages, the translators' work is revised, the
work of the temporary teams who translate the texts of debates has to be co'ordinated-and supervised
and, finally, th6 proiess of printing documents has to be followed throug!, including two. proof-
readings of itt tex-ts prior to publicatlon. It is to be expected that the workload of the Translation and
Publicltions Service will tend to increase considerably with the accession of Portugal and Spain to
WEU. It is therefore not excluded that the situation of this service will have to be reviewed in the near
future.
23. The analysis of the organogtram of the Office of the Clerk in the previous-paragraphs is a com-
plement to the experts' report and should answer the many questions_raised by th_e_governqeg! re_pre:
sentatives. The dnclusions reached by the experts can only be confirmed and Head I of this draft
budget therefore includes sums necessary for creating the following posts:
grade A5 post of secretary to the Political Committee;
grade 83 post of assistant to the Political Co,mmittee;
grade A3l4 post of head of the Research Off1ce;
grade gl post of assistant in the Research Offrce;
graAe nl post of assistant in general services and the archives;
grade C3 post of chauffeur.
24. In the framework of the proposals relating to the structure of the Office of the Clerk, the
Assembly believes it necessary to propose the regrading of the gradeL3 post of translator-intcrprcter on
a personal Dalls. The holder df tnis post has twenty-seve! years'linguistic experience, including sixteen
in NntO (of which ten years at grade L4 when she carried out the corresponding duties). Transferred
to the WEiJ Assembly aher wor[ing for the WEU agencies for security questions, she now, under the
responsibility of the Clerk Assistant for administrative and financi4 affa_irs, co-ordinates interpre-
tation teami recruited for sessions and between sessions. She herself also forms part of these teams,
thus enabling the Assembly to recruit twenty instead of twenty-two interpreters for sessions and five
instead of siifor other meeiings, so that considerable savings can be made. She also makes a significant
contribution to the French tianslation section, particularly as she also translates from ltalian and
Spanish. The proposal to give a grade L4 to the holder of this post on a personal basis therefore seems
fully justified.
25. A last proposal included in this draft budget concerns the regrading from category C to catego-ry
B of the posfs of the three oflicials assigned to the storage of and accounting for equipment and the
reproduction service.
In its reports on the budgets of the ministerial organs, the Assembly has on several occasions
drawn the Council's attention to the problem of the staffs career possibilities, an essential condition
for ensuring maximum motivation. This problem now arises more specifically for the three grade C
officials (on1 C6 and two C4) who, having reached the ceiling of their grades, have no further prospect
of progress although their work has changed not only quantitatively but qualitatively (see paragraph
20)-. Such regrading is thus fully in line with the principle that there should be concordance between
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duties to be carried out, qualifications and the professional category of staff. To raise the three oflicials
concerned to category B (the grade C6 official to grade 84 and the two grade C4s to grade 83) is jus-
tilied by their qualifications and increased knowledge. It should be pointed out that their colleagues in
the reproduction service of the WEU ministerial organs are already in category B.
To move these three officials to category B would, in the immediate future, have financial
advantages for only one of them, who would become entitled to the expatriation allowance, but in the
years to come they would be entitled to the subsequent steps provided for in category B.
26. A total sum of F 2 476 000 is therefore included under Sub-Heads 1,2,3,4 and 5 of Head I of
this draft budget, corresponding to the proposals to create six new posts and regrade four existing ones.
3. Heads II to Y of tlu draft operating budget
27. Apart from Head I * Permanent staff", where estimates were worked out on the basis of the new
organogram of the Oflice of the Clerk, criteria followed in determining estimates under other heads of
the operating budget take account of management experience relating in particular to the lirst year fol-
lowing enlargement.
28. The results of experience were the basis for assessing requirements, particularly in regard to the
organisation of the various temporary services recruited for sessions and the teams of interpreters
recruited for meetings outside sessions. It should, moreover, be underlined that, for this purpose, esti-
mates are based on the assumption that the Assembly holds two four-day part-sessions each year and
meets for a total of forty days at other times of the year (twenty-four days in Paris and sixteen else-
where), which implies 200 days'interpretation work. Any unforeseen requirement outside this normal
working context such as, for instance, the holding ofan extraordinary session can only be the subject of
a request for additional credits through the presentation of a supplementary budget in accordance with
normal procedure.
29. It was precisely because of past experience that it proved possible to reduce the number of ver-
batim reporters to twenty instead of the total of twenty-five included in the budget for 1990 since Por-
tugal and Spain are unable to second such staff for sessions. Debates in Portuguese and Spanish will
therefore be recorded and transcribed immediately by two Portuguese editors seconded by the Portu-
guese Assembly and two Spanish editors recruited by the Assembly in Paris. Nor does any further pro-
vision have to be made for recruiting four typists to work for these two verbatim reporters' teams as
was the case in the budget for the previous financial year.
30. Another important change concerns the ushers, whose number has been cut by nine, i.e. from
thirteen to four, the remaining four still being assigned to the chamber. This change is linked with the
need to improve the security service, which had a few weak points due to the fact that the French
authorities can no longer, as in the past, second police inspectors during sessions. Controls on the
premises will henceforth be ensured, in accordance with the agreements reached with the security
service of the Institute for Security Studies, by WEU security guards, with a qualified guard at the
entrance to WEU and two others at the entrance to the Palais d'[6na. Sums required for the
recruitment of these three guards have been included under Sub-Head 6.4 of Head II.
31. Where the interpretation service is concerned, as has already been stated (see paragraph 24)
teams for sessions will consist of twenty interpreters instead of twenty-two as hitherto, the duties of
co-ordinator and third member of the team in the French booth being carried out by the translator-
interpreter of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly. When working out requirements for meetings
between sessions, account was also taken of that official's participation in teams.
32. Thus, there is a reduction in real terms in total estimates under Head II, which are at a level
between that of total real expenditure in 1989, when the Assembly had seven members, and expected
expenditure in 1990, now that there are nine members (which became effective only as from the June
session), the latter expenditure also including the cost of the extraordinary session.
33. Under Head III " Expenditure on premises and equipment', estimates under only two sub-
heads call for comment, the other sub-heads reflecting a situation comparable to that of previous
financial years. These two sub-heads are Sub-Head l0 * Share of joint expenditure on the Paris
premises " and Sub-Head 17 ' Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other equipment ".
34. In regard to * Joint expenditure " which, by decision of the Council, continues to be managed by
the administrative service of the lnstitute for Security Studies, the relevant estimates represent 30Vo of
the annual total expenditure assessed by that service. This heading includes the cost ofthe upkeep of
the building, water, electricity, fuel, cleaning and insurance. Work on reorganising the building carried
out in 1990 implies a significant increase in the relevant expenditure compared with the financial year
1990, the Assembly's share of which (a total of 3090) is assessed at F 125 000.
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35. Estimates under Sub-Head 17 'Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other equipment'
are analysed in detail in Appendix IV. It should be noted that the programmes for modernising
equipment provide in l99l only for the replacement of one offset machine (total cost for hire and
maintenance: F 60 000) and the hire of more electric or electronic typewriters for use during sessions
since six old-fashioned mechanical typewriters assigned to national delegations are no longer usable. It
should be stressed that the same programme includes the financial implications until 1995 of the
gradual replacement of other equipment as it becomes obsolete.
36. These two requirements, which are additional to minor adjustments under other sub-heads of
Head III, justify the total increase of F 228 000 under this head compared with the budget for 1990, the
amount of F 50 0@ that was frozen and not used having been deducted from credits for 1990.
37. There are no substantial variations in estimates under Head IV compared with the previous
budget, except under Sub-Head 22 " Offrcial car ". Account has been taken of the fact that the creation
of a new post of chauffeur would bring about a saving of some F 80 000 since it would no longer be nec-
essary to hire a chauffeur-driven car for the President of the Assembly. If this new post is not created,
this sum will obviously have to be added to the estimate under Sub-Head 22, which would then
amount to F 125 000.
38. There is an increase under Head V as a whole of F 281 000 compared with 1990, the sum of F
208 000 frozen and not used having been deducted. Most of this increase relates to the adjustment to
Sub-Heads 25 * Expenses for representatiorr", 27 " Oflicial journeys of members of the Oflice of the
Clerk' and 30 'Expenses for political goups', these being the sectors of expenditure that are the
most strictly dependent on the Assembly's activities. In particular, sums for the political groups have
been increased by 2Wo in response to urgent requests from their chairmen, who intend to develop the
activities of their groups (oryanisation of meetings, seminars and debates with persons with authority
in defence matte$, etc.) to help to strengthen the r6le that will become incumbent on the WEU
Assembly in the new architecture of Europe. Where Sub-Head 29 'Expenditure on information' is
concerned, this has been left at the level of the previous financial year to allow the press service to
acquire additional computerised equipment to meet the need to store and have access to all its card
indexes: a Sony 5 " ll4 rewritable optic drive costing F 45 000 to store data on large-capacity (600 Mb)
interchangeable disks.
39. Figures in the Assembly's operating budget analysed below, compared with those for the pre-
vious financial year and taking account of foreseeable receipts, may be summed up as follows:
40. Considering only Heads II to V, whose management is marked by the Assembly's budgetary
autonomy, a comparison between the two financial years shows the following result, the amount for
1990 having been reduced by the sums frozen and not used (F 396 000):
l99l 1990 Growth rate
Tour ExPENDrruRE. 9 504 500 9 332 500 + 1.84 %
41. In concluding this analysis, your Rapporteur wishes to stress that the modest rate of increase
under Heads II to V as a whole testifies to the Assembly's effort to apply strictly economical criteria in
working out its budget estimates. These have been verified sub-head by sub-head on the basis of expe-
rience in the last two yeani so as to facilitate budgetary management and conform strictly to the initial
budgetary structure that the auditor advocated when the Assembly's accounts for 1989 were audited.
4. Pensions budga
42. No new pensions are foreseen in I 991 . Estimates under this section of the budget therefore rep
resent the total pensions of thirteen former officials (eleven retirement pensions, one invalidity pension
and one survivor's pension), adjusted, as for permanent staff, by a rate of increase in salary scales of
7.100/0.
I
I
rJ
rt
{
rl
l
\
l99l 1990 Growth rate
Total expenditure
Receipts
25 943 sN
105 000
23 020 500
I 10 000
+ 12.69 %
4.54 %
Nnr rora 25 838 500 22910 500 + 12.78 %
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43. Where receipts in the pensions budget are concerned, account has been taken of contributions
corresponding to the creation ofsix new posts and the regrading offour existing ones. These contribu-
tions amount to about F 96 000 and would have to be removed from the budget if these proposals were
not accepted.
5. Summary of the estimates in thc draft budga of
the Assembly for 1991 (operating and pensions badgets)
44. As shown in the tables at Appendix V, the net grand total of estimates in the Assembly's draft
budget for l99l (operating budget plus pensions budget less receipts) is F 28 412 5OO, i.e., compared
with the net grand total of the budget for the financial year 1990, a growth rate of 11.460/0.
Summary of atimates of *penditure and rcceipts
for the financial year 1991
Details Expenditure Reccipts
Panr I: Operating budget
Section A:
Head I:
Head II:
Head III:
Head IV:
Head V:
Section B:
Expenditure
Permanent staff
Temporary staff
Expenditure on premises and
equipment
General administrative costs
Other expenditure
Receipts
Nsr rornl
Pnnr II: Pensions budget
Section A:
Head I:
Expenditure
Pensions, allowances and social
charges
Receipts
Nrr rorer-
Ner rornr BUDcET
Section B:
l6 439 000
3 546 000
l 754 000
2 109 500
2 095 000
105 000
25 943 500 105 000
25 838 500
25 943 500 25 943 500
3 275 000
701 000
3 275 000 701 000
2 574000
3 275 000 3 275 000
28 412 s00
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Budga utinates
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET
Section A 
- 
Expenditure
HeodI-Pemtancnt$aIf
SubHeads
Estimates
for
199 r
Budget
for 1990
(revised)
Expected
expenditure
in 1990
Actual
expenditure
in 1989
Sub-Head I 
- 
Basic salaries
Sub-Head 2 
- 
Allowances:
2.1. Expatriation allowance
2.2. Household allowance
2.3. Allowance for children and
other dependent persons
2.4. Rent allowance
2.5. Education allowance
2.6. Allowance for language oourses
2.7. Overtime
2.8. Home leave
I 230000
s20 000
t
630 000
80 000
55 000
2 000
5s 000
30 000
Sub-Head 3 - Social charges:
3.1. Social security I 500000
3.2. Supplementary insurance 470 000
3.3. Provident fund 180000
Sub-Head 4 
- 
Expenses relating to the recruit-
ment and departure of permanent
oflicials
4.1. Travelling expenses of candi-
dates for vacant posts 16 000
4.2. Truvelling expenses on arrival
and departure of permanent
oflicials and their families 30 000
4.3. Removal expenses 165 000
4.4. Installation allowance 168 000
Sub-Head 5 
- 
Medical examination
Torx- or Hrno I
I l 296 000
2 602000
2 150 000
379 000
l2 000
9 389 000
2027 0W
l 836 000
30 000
10 000
9 08s 000
l 975 000
l 750000
80 000
l0 000
8 277 925
t 847 662
l 601 451
9 300
r6 439 000 132920W l2 900 000 I l 736 338
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Explanations
SubHeads I and 2
Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to
permanent staffin accordance with Chapter III of the StaffRules of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU
Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of global salaries in application of the scales in force on lst
July 1989 
', 
adjusted in accordance with an expected increase of 50/o as from lst July 1990 and 4o/o as
from lst July 1991. Adjustments taken into account amount to F I 060 000.
Estimates take account of the financial implications of the proposals for restructuring the Oflice
of the Clerk (creation of six new posts and regrading of four existing posts, amounting to F 2 476 000).
The table of establishment of the Offrce of the Clerk, showing grades, is given at Appendix I and
the organogram at Appendix II.
Sub-Head 3
Estimated expenditure for * Social charges " is based on commitments stemming from:
- 
application of the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the
Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1)';
- 
application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2)3;
- 
application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the
Provident Fund, amounting to l4Vo of basic salary, for staff not afliliated to the pension
scheme (Sub-Head 3.3).
Sub-Head 4
No officials are expected to leave in 1991. Estimates under this sub-head relate only to the new
posts included in the organogram of the Oflice of the Clerk.
Sub-Head 5
The sum requested is to cover the cost of the medical check-up which all members of the staff
must undergo under Article 9 of the Staff Rules. Medical check-ups for WEU staff in Paris are carried
out at the OECD medical centre.
l. These scales are worked out by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts and approved by the WEU
Council and the councils of the other co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA).
2. Under this agreement, WEU staff benefit from the French general scheme, with the exception of family allowances and
old-age pensions.
3. Under this convention, WEU staff benefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or permanent
disability. Furthennore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sum to the benefici-
aries he has named.
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Heod II 
- 
Temprary stalf
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
l99l
Budget
for 1990
(revised)
Expected
expenditure
in 1990
Actual
expenditure
in 1989
Sub-Head 6 - Staff recruited for sessions ofthe
Assembly
6.1. Sittings service
6.2. Interpretation service
6.3. Translation service
6.4. Other services
l 320 000
604 000
839 000
66 000
Sub-Head 7 - Interpretation staff required for
Assembly work between sessions
Sub-Head 8 
- 
Temporary stafffor the Office of
the Clerk
Sub-Head 9 - Socialcharges
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff
other than interpreters l0 000
9.2. Provident fund for inter-preters 130 000
9.3. Insurance for interpreters 5 000
Tor* oF HEAD II
2829 000
556 000
l5 000
146 000
3 217 000t
640 000
l5 000
173 000
3 035 000
50s 000
3s 000
147 000
2 379 109
565 751
39 896
124 317
3 s46 000 4 045 000* 3722000 3 109 073
* Including a sum of F 378 m0 frozen in case an ordinary session had to be held away from Paris, F 240 000 of which was used
to @ver tht coot of interpretation at the extraordinary session held in Luxembourg on 22nd and 23rd March 1990.
Explanations
Sub-Head 6
Estimates under this sub-head relate to:
(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the
reimbursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation
and translation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at
Appendix III.
(b) Lumpsum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post
offrce technician, typewriter mechanic, guards for the security service, etc.).
Salaries are calculated in accordance with scales in force on lst July 1989 in the coordinated
organisations (on the basis of salaries paid to permanent staff of comparable grades), adjusted in the
same way as for permanent staff, the adjustment amounting to F 158 204.
In application of the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the Interna-
tional Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI), the salaries of interpreters are calculated on the
basis of the scale in force for grade L4.8 staff, increased by 690.
Sub-Head 7
This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at
meetings of parliamentarians between sessions (salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances,
travelling time and travelling expenses.
Estimates are based on the recruitment of f,rve interpreters for each meeting (200 working days,
of which 120 in Paris), the sixth interpreter being the permanent official recruited in 1990. Salaries and
working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (cf. the note on Sub-Head 6
above). Their salary adjustment for l99l amounts to F 28 0@.
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Sub-Head 8
Estimates under this sub-head relate to the salaries of additional staff of all grades which the
Oflice of the Clerk may have to recruit exceptionally in 1991. They include an overall sum covering
salaries, possible travelling expenses and insurance.
Sub-Head 9
Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges:
Insurance for temporary stalf other than interpreters
Staffrecruited for Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company against
the risks of death, accident or sickness, 60% of the premium being paid by the Office of the Clerk and
4ffioby staff. The estimates take account of the updating of the capitd and premiums as from May
1988.
Provident fund for interpreters
In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations the IAC_I, WEU has to
pay into the conference interpreters' fund, or, where appropriate, another provident fund, a contri-
bution of l4Vo, which is added to a contribution of 7o/o by interpreters.
Insurance for interpreters
A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of StewSrt [rightson in.Lonlon,
covers interpreters for aciidents, sickness and temporary or pennanent disability_preventing them
from working. The premium of l.l% of their fees (lower rate) is divided between the OfIice of the Clerk
(0.70/o) and the interpreters (0.490).
Heil III 
- 
Expenditure on premisu and equipment
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
l99l
Budget
for 1990
(revised)
Expected
expenditure
in 1990
Actual
expenditure
in 1989
Sub-Head 10 - Share of joint expenditure on
the Paris premises
Sub-Head l1 - Hire of committee rooms
Sub-Head 12 - Technical and other installa-
tions for Assembly sessions
Sub-Head 13 - Various services for the organ-
isation of sessions
Sub-Head 14 - Maintenanceof thepremisesof
the OfIice of the Clerk
Sub-Head 15 - Purchase or repair of office fur-
niture
Sub-Head 16 - Purchase of reproduction and
other offrce equipment
Sub-Head 17 - Hire and maintenance of
reproduction and other equiP
ment
Torer- or Hrno III
s25 000
10 000
570 000
65 000
l5 000
3s 000
534 000
400 000
l0 000
555 000
100 000*
13 000
3s 000
2 000
461 000
430 000
3 000
s58 000
63 000
l6 000
3s 000
l5 000
430 000
323 647
33 480
725 602
s0 965
I 385
46922
188461
l 754 000 I 576 600+ l 550000 189643I
* Including a sum of F 50000 frozen in case a session had to be held away from Paris. This was not used.
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Explanations
Sub-Head 10
Estimates under this sub-head represent the 3096 share of joint expenditure relating to joint ser-
vices shared by the WEU organs in Paris. Following the abolition of the agencies, the Council con-
firmed the validity of the previous system of sharing this expenditure and made the administrative
service of the WEU Institute for Security Studies responsible for managing joint services.
Sub-Head l1
For meetings outside Paris, Assembly bodies normally have committee rooms with simultaneous
interpretation equipment made available to them by the national delegations concerned. However, in
certain cases the Assembly may have to pay for hiring a room or installing portable interpretation
equipment in rooms not so equipped. Sums requested under this sub-head are to allow the Assembly to
cover such expenditure if necessary.
Sub-Head 12
As its title indicates, this sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous
interpretation equipment, telephone booths, telex, screens and other installations in the premises of the
Economic and Social Council during Assembly sessions.
Sub-Head 13
Expenditure under this sub-head relates to contracts for the provision of various services during
Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises, transport of reproduction equipment
loaned free of charge, etc.).
Sub-Head 14
' As in the past, this sum is requested to allow minor repairs to be carried out to the premises of
the Office of the Clerk.
Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17
Sums under these sub-heads are justified by the five-year modernisation and maintenance pro-
gramme for equipment given at Appendix IV to this budget.
Hcod IY 
- 
General odministmtive costs
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
l99l
Budget
for 1990
(rcvised)
Expected
expenditure
in 1990
Actual
expenditure
in t9E9
Sub-Head l8 
- 
Postage, telephone, telex and
transport of documents
Sub-Head 19 
- 
Duplication paper, headed
writing paper and other office
supplies
Sub-Head 20 
- 
Printing and publication of
documents
Sub-Head 2l 
- 
Purchase of documents
Sub-Head 22 
- 
Offrcial car
Sub-Head 23 
- 
Bank charyes
Tornr or Hreo IV
560 000
280 000
l 154000
70 000
4s 000
500
480 000
280 000
l r20000
6s 000
140 000
500
540 000
2s0 000
l 090 000
65 000
180 000
500
532 806
255 377
939 546
63 702
122 667
190
2 109 500 2 08s 500 2 125 5N l 914 288
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Erplanations
Sub-Head 18
Estimates under this sub-head take into account the fact that the creation of the Institute for
Security Studies will necessarily involve an increase in the cost of operating the telephone switchboard,
whereai this was lower last year because of the abolition of the former agencies. For other categories of
expenditure (postage, telex, etc.), expenditure is also tending to rise due to intensification of the work
of the Assembly, particularly its Press Service. Every step has been taken to contain the cost of mailing
documents as far as possible.
Sub-Head 19
In spite of the considerable increase in reproduction work and the foreseeable variation of prices
in this sector (+3%), the increase in the estimate compared with the previous financial year is slight.
This has been made possible by modernising reproduction equipment, thereby economising paper and
consumable goods.
Sub-Head 20
Estimates under this sub-head take into account the expected increase in prices (3%).
Sub-Head 21
There is a slight increase in estimates under this sub-head as compared with the financial year
1990 due to the need to purchase a wider range of documentation essential for the preparation of
studies and reports.
Sub-Head 22
Estimates under this sub-head take account of the recruitment of a chauffeur to drive the oflicial
car of the Oflice of the Clerk. They include the cost of running the car (garage, petrol, servicing,
insurance, etc.) and of hiring a second chauffeur-driven car during Assembly sessions. tf the
recruitment of a chauffeur is not authorised, these estimates will have to be increased by F 80 000.
Sub-Head 23
The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged.
Head Y 
- 
Other expcnditure
Sub,Heads
Estimates
for
l99l
Budget
for 1990
(revised)
Expected
expenditure
in 1990
Actual
expenditure
in 1989
Sub-Head 24 - Travelling and subsistence
allowances and insurance for
the President of the Assembly,
Chairmen of committees and
rapporteurs
Sub-Head 25 
- 
Expenses for representation
Sub-Head 26 - Committee study missions
Sub-Head 27 - Offrcial journeys of members
of the Offrce of the Clerk
Sub-Head 28 - Expenses of experts and the
auditor
Sub-Head 29 
- 
Expenditure on information
Sub-Head 30 - Expenses for political groups
Sub-Head 31 - Contingencies and other
expenditure not elsewhere pro-
vided for
Sub-Head 32 - Non-recoverable taxes
TornI, or Hrno V
200 000
260 000
5 000
630 000
30 000
455 000
484 000
3 000
28 000
190 000
230 000
5 000
680 000r
30 000
455 000
403 000
3 000
26 000
178 000
255 000
s90 000
30 000
460 000
403 000
50
l5 000
188 823
366 362
582764
78 202
425 490
336 000
949
26 631
2 095 000 2022000* I 931 050 2005 22t
+ Including a sum of F 280 000 frozen in case an ordinary session had to be held away from Paris, F 72 fi)O of this sum was used
to cover the cost of the extraordinary session held in Luxemboury
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Expb.rutioas
Sub-Head 24
The cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly for sessions and
committee meetings is borne by the governments of member countries, as are those of members of the
Bureau and Presidential Committee.
The Assembly bears the cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for visits by the President
of the Assembly, rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairman when these visits are con-
nected with the preparation of a report or the work of the Assembly. Journeys by committee chairmen
and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee.
Sub-Head 25
The increase compared with the 1990 budget stems mainly from the intensification of the
Assembly's work. It should be pointed out that actual expenditure in 1989 was much higher than
appropriations under this sub-head because ofextraordinary expenditure incurred for the visit ofa par-
liamentary delegation from the Supreme Soviet to the WEU Assembly.
Sub-Head 26
Sums under this sub-head are to cover extraordinary expenditure for committee study visits. As
these sums cannot be foreseen accurately, the same amount has been requested as last year.
SubHead 27
Estimates under this sub-head take into account the variation in per diem allowances provided
for in the 263rd report of the Co-ordinating Committee; they are based on figures for previous
financial years and are due to the intensification of the Assembly's work.
Sub-Head 28
Estimates for 1991 are unchanged compared with the previous financial year. The Premier
Prdsident de la Cour des Comptes of France will continue to audit the Assembly's accounts in I 99 I .
Sub-Head 29
The estimate is unchanged compared with 1990, mainly in order to give the press service means
of developing its action in accordance with the long-term programme submitted last year.
Sub-Head i0
The estimate under this sub-head was increased by 2Wo in 1990 because of the increase in the
number of parliamentarians following the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU. However, the
chairmen of political groups have expressed their concern at the small resources made available to
them, particularly now that they intend, through more intensive action, to help to strengthen the r6le
that will be incumbent upon the WEU Assembly in the new European structure. There is therefore an
increase of 2Wo in estimates for l99l compared with the previous year. By decision of the Presidential
Committee, each group has an equal fixed share and a further sum in proportion to the number of
members listed and has to submit a balance sheet at the close of the financial year. All the balance
sheets are appended to the accounts of the Assembly and are consequently subject to verification by the
auditor.
Sub-Head 31
The same amount is requested as for 1990.
Sub-Head 32
The increase in the estimate under this sub-head is necessary to cover non-reimbursable VAT
payments.
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PART I: OPERATING BUDGET
Section B 
- 
Receipts
Explaaations
Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are based
on experience.
PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET
Section A 
- 
Expenditure
Head I 
- 
Pensions, ollowatces and social charges
Estimates
for
l99l
Budget
for 1990
(revised)
Expected
receipts
in 1990
Actual
receipts
in 1989
1. Sales of publications
2. Bank interest
3. Social security reimbursements
Tomr Rrcrprs
3s 000
60 000
l0 000
30 000
60 000
20 000
35 000
60 000
40 000
34 269
8L 627
86 128
105 000 l l0 000 135 000 202024
Sub-'Heads
Estimates
for
l99l
Budget
for 1990
(authorised)
Expected
expenditure
in 1990
Actual
expenditure
in 1989
Sub-Head I - Pensions and leaving
allowances
l.l. Retirement pensions
1.2. Invalidity pensions
1.3. Survivors' pensions
1.4. Orphans' or dependants'
pensions
1.5. Leaving allowances
Sub-Head 2 
- 
Familyallowances
2.1. Household allowances
2.2. Children's and other
dependants' allowances
2.3. Education allowances
2724000
2s0 000
57 000
122000
30 000
14 000
Sub-Head 3 
- 
Supplementary insurance
Tor* or Henp I
3 031 000
166 000
78 000
2 875 000
193 000
83 000
2 879 000
159 000
73 000
2 880 057
168 905
80 556
3 275 000 3 l5l 000 3 lrl 000 3 129 518
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Explanations
Sub-Heads I and 2
In 1991, the Assembly will be paying thirteen pensions, as follows:
- 
eleven old-age pensions;
- 
one invalidity pension;
- one survivor's pension.
Estimates of expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the provi-
sions of the pension scheme rules.
Sub-Head 3
Pensions are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article l9Dli of the collective
convention in force.
Estimates of expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid
by the Assembly.
PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET
Section B 
- 
Receipts
Estimates
for
l99l
Budget
for
1990
Expected
receipts
in 1990
Actud
receipts
inl989
Contrihufions hv nerrnanent offi cials 701 000 572000 56s 000 500 l16
Erplanatbw
Estimated receipts are calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid by the
thirty-six permanent stalf members of the Oflice of the Clerk of the Assembly (7% of basic salary) aftrl-
iated to the pension scheme.
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APPENDIX t
Recapitulatory tdlc showing changes in the staff
of the Otfrce of the Clcrh of the WEU Assembly
propsed in the 1991 Budga
Grade Duties l99l budget 1990 budget +or-
H.C.
A6
A5
A4
L4
A3l4
Lzt3
A2
A2
B6
B4
B4
B3
B3
B3
B3
C6
c4
C3
Clerk
Clerk Assistants
Counsellors
First secretaries
Translator-interpreter
Secretary
Translator-interpreter
Controller; Head of private office
Translators ; Documentalist
Chief accountant
Qualified assistants
Equipment accountan!
Head of documents reproduction service
Offset operator; Reproduction Clerk
Accountant
Bilingual shorthand-typists
Switchboard operator
Head of documents reproduction service
Offset operators service
Chauffeur
I
2
I
7
I
I
I
2
5
2
I
I
2
3
I
7
I
2
3
I
7
I
4
1
I
:
I
2
4
2
+l
+2
+3
-l
-2
+l
+l
+l
+l
-1
38 32 +6
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APPENDIX II
Organigram of the OIIice of the Clcrk of the Assembly
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APPENDIX III DOCUMENT 124I
APPENDIX III
Salades of staJf rucruited for Assembty sessbns
l. Sittiags senice
Duties Number No. ofdays
Daily
remu-
neration
F*
Total
F
Total
F
Counsellors to the President of Assembly
Heads of sections
Sergeant-at-anns ...
Parliamentary r..rrt"ri; :. : : :. : :. : . : : :
Precis writers
Verbatim reporters
Editors
Principal assistants
Assistants to the President's Counsellors
Assistants assigned to other Services .. .
Ushers
Messengers
Installations attendant
Cloakroom attendant
Offset-assemblers .
Mechanic
Adjustment for l99l (7.1%)
la
lb
la
1a
2b
lb
2a
2b
3a
3b
6a
l4b
2a
2b
6b
la
1b
14a
20b
4a
3a
1a
la
l3a
la
l6
l8
8
8
l0
l0
8
l0
8
l0
8
l0
8
l0
l0
l6
l8
8
l0
8
l0
24
8
l0
8
l 002
t 676
l 087
t 236
t 766
l 560
881
l 560
881
r 560
I 101
l 560
881
I 560
l 049
530
964
530
964
442
442
442
442
442
442
16032
30 168
I 696
9 888
3s 320
l5 600
14096
31 200
2t t44
46 800
52 848
2t8 400
t4 096
3t 200
62940
8 480
t7 352
59 360
192 800
t4 t44
t3 260
l0 608
3 536
57 460
3 s36
46200
53 904
l5 600
4s 296
67 944
271 248
45 296
340932
41 548
60 996
106 988 964
702t6
Travelling expenses
l 059 180
260 000
Rounded up to
I 319 180
l 320000
* In accordance with scales in force on lst July 1989.
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside Paris.
73
I
DOCUMENI I24I APPENDX III
2. Iatupctalion nnicc
Duties Number No. of days Total
F
Infernrefe t) I
l0
27t 776
257 744
Adjustment for l99l
8b
20 529 520
34 170
Travelling expenses
s63 690
40 000
Rounded up to
603 690
604 000
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruiled outside Paris.
N.B. On lst July 1988, the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted to F 2 831. In addition, interpreters rpcruited outside
Paris are entitled to paymeat for time spent in travelling (one or two half days as appropriate), a daily allowance (per diem) cor-
responding to that of a Grade L4 permanent oflicial, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses.
!
I
I
I
it
i
3. Truatlation aniu
Duties Number Daily
remuneration
F
Estimatesl Totd
F
Revisers
Translators
Principal assistants
Assistants
5a
3b
5a
3b
2a
2b
5a
5b
I lll
l 785
875
t 549
483
848
417
782
138 875
133 875
r09 375
l16 175
28 980
50 880
62 sso
I l7 300
272750
225 550
79 860
179 850
Adjustment for l99l
30 758 010
53 818
Travelling expenses 27000
Rounded up to
838 828
839 000
l. Based on 25 days for revisers and translators and 30 days for assistant$.
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside Paris.
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APPENDIX IV
Five-year modernisation and maintenoace prugrumme for the equilment
of the OIfice of the Clerk
(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices)
Ref.
No. Equipment
Modernisation and
equipment programme
Budgets
l99l 1992 1993 1994 1995
I
l.l
1.2
1.3
2.1
2.2
2.3
2
3
3.1
3.2
3.3
4
4.t.
4.2.
4.3.
5
5. l.
A. Reproduction and
printing equipment
Photocopiersl Rx l06s (1987)
l Rx 3107
I Gestetner 2200
Offset machinesI Gestetner3ll (1984)
I Gestetner339(1986)
I Gestetner 329 (1985)
E I ectrostatic st ereoty p ers
I Gestetner PIVI/9 (1980)
I GestetnerDT I (1985)
I Gestetner l00PM
(1e86)
Binding machines
I Gestetner 100
Orpo Planax
Orpo Thermatic
Miscellaneous
equipmentI Logabax-Ordina
7630 assembling
machine with stapler
Hire (rate blocked).
Maintenance contract (indexed).
Property of the Assembly.
There is no longer a mainte-
nance
contract for this machine
because of its age.
It is planned to replace it
in 1992 
- 
Hire
- 
Maintenance
Property of the Assembly.
Maintenance contract (indexed).
Property of the Assembly.
Maintenance contract (indexed).
Property of the Assembly.
Maintenance contract (indexed).
Property of the Assembly,
it is to be replaced in l99l
Estimated cost of hiring the new
machine
Estimated cost of maintaining
the new machine
Property of the Assembly.
Reserved for sessions.
Property of the Assembly.
Maintenance contract (indexed).
Property of the Assembly.
Maintenance contract (indexed).
Purchased in 1978, this machine
is in good condition. Normal
maintenance by the staff con-
cerned is enough to keep it in
good working order.
Property of the Assembly.
Normal maintenance by the staff
concerned is enough to keep it in
good working order.
Property of the Assembly.
Normal maintenance by the staff
concerned is enough to keep it in
good working order.
Purchased in 1977, this machine
is serviced when required, since
the cost of a maintenance con-
tract is exorbitant. It is planned
to replace it in 1993 on a hire
purchase basis.
74000
28 000
800
8 600
2 000
50 000
l0 000
I 450
3 000
6 000
't400o
l8 000
20 000
l2 000
800
8 600
2 000
50 000
10000
l 450
3 000
6 000
74W0
18 000
20 000
l2 000
800
8 600
2 000
50 000
l0 000
l 450
3 000
82 000
74 000
l8 000
20 000
12 000
800
8 600
2 000
50 000
l0 000
l 450
3 000
82 000
74 000
r8 000
20 000
l2 000
800
8 600
2 000
50 000
l0 000
l 450
3 000
82 000
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Ref.
No. Equipment
Modernisation and
equipment progmmme
Budgets
l99 r 1992 1993 1994 1995
5.2.
5.3.
6
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
7
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
I AM International
5000 addressograph
I Fortematic 655 paper-
cutting machine
B. Typewriters
and calcalators
Ofice of the Clerk
8 Olivetti ET l2l elec-
tronic typewriters
I ET 24AO OHvetti
I ET 22lOlivetti
3 Olivetti calculators
For use during sessioras
4 RX 6015 electronic
typewriters (Enelish
keyboards)
I IBM electric type-
writer (French key-
board)
2 ET 109 typerwriters(Italian keyboad)
I Editor electric type-
writer (Italian key-
board)
2 Olivetti ET 2400
electronic typewriters
- 
I Portuguese key-
board
- 
I Spanish key-
board
Hired typewriters
Property of the Assembly.
Maintenance contract (indexed).
This machine is serviced when
required. A single annual service
is enough to keep it in good
working order.
Purchased between l98l and
1983, these typewriters are in
good condition.
Purchased in 1989, it is in
excellent condition.
Purchased in 1983, this type-
writer is in good condition.
These machines are in good
working order.
These machines were purchasedin 1986 and are assigned to
session services.
Assiped to a political group.
Assigred to the Italian delegation
and the Italian summary
reporters.
Assigred to the Italian summary
reporters.
Purchased in 1989, they are
assigred to the Portuguese and
Spanish Delegations
All typewriters and calculators
are serviced twice a year, before
each session, by a mechanic
recmited for the purpose, but a
lump sum should be earmarkedfor possible repairs at other
times.
To meet the requirements of the
various services during Assembly
sessions, the following hire pro
gramme is envisaged for each
sessron:
- 
15 electric machines with
English keyboards
- 
15 electric machines with
French keyboards
- 
3 electronic machines with
French keyboardsI electronic machine with
German keyboard
3 850
750
9 000
39 000
3 850
750
9 000
39 000
3 850
750
9 000
39 000
3 850
750
9 000
39 000
3 8s0
750
9 000
39 000
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Ref.
No. Equipment
Modernisation and
equipment programme
Budgets
l99l r992 r 993 1994 1995
8
8.1
8.2
9
9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
9.5
9.6
l0
l0.l
10.2
10.3
10.4
lt
Typewriters in reseme
6 Olympia SGE 5l
electric typewriters
2 English keyboards
5 French keyboards(one with long car-
zrd6lflrpiu mechanical
typewriters
19 English keyboards
2 French keyboards
C. Miscellaneous
equipment
Dictaphones
2 Uher 5000
I Sony BM 80
2 Sony BM 75 (1990)
I I Grundig Stenorettes
stenotype machine
Grandjean
D. Word processors
and computers
Computers and
Word processors
4 Olivetti ETS 2010I Olivetti M 24I Olivetti M 300
Olivetti ETS 2010
Macintosh SE 30
E. OJfice furniture
Oflice of the Clerk
Purchased between 1966 and
1979, they will be used in case of
need (e.9. at the request ofjour-
nalists or in the event ofan elec-
tricity cut)
Purchased in 1971, they will
remain in service as long as pos-
sible.
Purchased in 1987, it is in very
good working order.
Purchased between 1963 and
1987, they should be replaced
gradually as from 1992.
Purchased in 1974, this machine
is in good working order.
Provision for an overall sum in
the budget for poSsible repairs to
equipment in this category.
These have been hired on a
five-year leasing basis. The three
contracts expire in September
1991, March 1993 and July 1995
respectively. Estimates take
account of the replacement pro-
gramme on these dates. Cost of
hire.
Property of the Assembly.
Maintenance contract (indexed)
for all word processors and com-
puters described in paragraphs
l0.l and 10.2
Purchased in 1988 and 1990, it is
considered suflicient to service
them when required.
Purchase or replacement of
various items of furniture.
4 000
185 600
105 000
2 500
3s 000
l2 000
4 000
145 350
I 16 700
2 500
35 000
l2 000
4 000
142600
l 16 700
2 500
35 000
l2 000
4 000
t32 100
128 400
2 500
35 000
l2 000
4 000
98 200
128 400
2 500
35 000
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Breakdown by budget classification
Budget classification Ref. No.
in progmmme
Budgets
Head SubHead l99l 1992 1993 1994 1995
III
m
15. Purchase or repair of office fur-
niture
Hire and maintenance of
reproduction and other offtce
equipment
t7.
Torer-
RouNprp up
ll
l.l
1.2
1.3
2.t
2.2
2.3
3.2
3.3
5.1
5.2
5.3
7.6
7.7
9.4
9.6
l0.l
10.3
10.4
35 000 35 000 3s 000 3s 000 3s 000
102 000
800
8 600
2 000
60 000
I 450
3 000
6 000
3 850
750
9 000
39 000
4 000
185 600
105 000
2 500
92 000
32 000
800
8 600
2 000
60 000
l 450
3 000
6 000
3 850
750
9 000
39 000
12 000
4 000
145 350
I l6 700
2500
92 000
32 000
800
8 600
2 000
60 000
r 450
3 000
82 000
3 850
750
9 000
39 000
12 000
4 000
142600
l 16 700
2 500
92 000
32 000
800
8 600
2 000
60 000
l 450
3 000
82 000
3 850
750
9 000
39 000
l2 000
4 000
132 100
128 400
2500
92 000
32 000
800
8 600
2 000
60 000
l 450
3 000
82 000
3 850
750
9 000
39 000
12 000
4 000
98 200
128 400
2 500
533 5s0
534 000
s39 000
s39 000
6122s0
613 000
613 450
614 000
579 550
580 000
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APPENDIX V
Trcnd of the Assanbly budgas fmm IW) to 1991
1990
a
l99l
b
mf
A. Operating budget
Head I. Permanent staff
Head II. Temporary staff
Head III. Expenditure on premises
and equipment
Head IV. General administrative
costs
Head V. Other expenditure
13 292 000 (l)
4 045 000 (2)
I 576 000
2 08s s00 (3)
2022000(d.)
l6 439 000
3 s46 000
I 754000
2 109 500
2 095 000
+ 23.67
- 
12.33
+11.29
+ l.l5
+ 3.61
Total expenditure
Receipts
23 020 500
l l0 000
25 943 500
105 000
+ 12.69
- 
4.54
Net Total 22 910 500 2s 838 500 + 12.78
B. Pensions budget
Pensions and leaving allowances
Receiots
3 l5l 000
s7200,0
3275000
701 000
+ 3.93
+22.55
Net Total 2579000 25740p/0
- 
0.19
Gpr.nner NET TorAL (A + B) 25 489 500 28 412 500 + I1.46
(l) Including F 30000 brought over from the financial year 1989.(2) Including F 37E000 frozen, F 240000 ofwhich was unfrozcn.(3) Including F 50fiD frozen.(4) Including F 280000 frozen, F 72000 ofwhich was unfrozen.
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APPENDIX VI
Implications of the vodoas heods for thc |W) ond 1991 opcming budgas
1990 l99l
Amount
%of
Amount
%of
A B A B
A. Operating budget
Head I. 
- 
Permanent staff
Head II. 
- 
Temporary staff
Head III. 
- 
Premises and equipment
Head IV. 
- 
General administrative
costs
Head V. 
- 
Other expenditure
Tornr
Receipts
13292N0
4 045 000
l 576000
2 085 500
2022000
57.74
17.57
6.85
9.06
8.78
58.02
17.65
6.88
9.10
8.83
16 439 000
3 546 000
l 754 000
2 109 500
2 095 000
63.36
13.67
6.76
8.13
8.08
63.62
t3.72
6.79
8. l6
8.1I
23020 s00
l l0 000
100.00 100.48
- 
0.48
25 943 s00
105 000
100.00 100.40
- 
0.40
Nrr rornr 22910 500 100.00 2s 838 s00 100.00
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Document 1241 Addendum 4th December 1990
Draft budget of tlre administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1990
Opinion of the Council
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ExpLeNetonY MEMoRANDUM
APPENDICES
I. Note by the Secretary-General on the WEU Assembly budget for l99l -
Document C-B(90)22
II. Letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, to Mr. Pontillon,
President of the Assembly, dated 30th November 1990
Explanatory Memorandum
l. As shown in document C-B(90)22 (see Appendix I), at its meeting on 15th November 1990 the
WEU Budget and Organisation Committee examined the Assembly's draft budget for l99l and
decided to recommend to the Council:
- 
the withdrawal of all the Assembly's staffrng proposals (creation of six new posts, regrading of
a grade L3 post and three grade C posts);
- 
revision of the estimates under Heads I and II of the pensions budget on the basis of salary
adjustments proposed by the Co-ordinating Committee of Budget Experts with effect from lst
July 1990.
The estimates as revised by the Budget and Organisation Committee are shown in Annex A to
document C-B(90)22 and represent an increase of 4.100/o in the operating budget compared with the
financial year 1990.
2. At its meeting on 29th November 1990, the Permanent Council decided (see Appendix II) to
accept the recommendations of the Budget and Organisation Committee. It also said it was prepared to
accept:
- the creation of a grade A2 post for a Portuguese national, provided the relevant expenditure(F 403 000, including social contributions, installation allowance and removal and travelling
expenses, etc.) is offset by savings under other heads ofthe budget, it being understood that, in
any event, the growth rate must not exceed 4.100/o;
- 
the creation of a grade A4 post for a Spanish national as from lst July l99l;
- 
the regrading of the post of the Secretary to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions from grade 44 to A5 as from lst July 1991. This regrading was not included in the
Assembly's proposals.
3. The refusal of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee to endorse the proposals to
restructure the Office of the Clerk is due to the need to keep as close as possible to a zero growth rate
which, in the opinion of that committee, should be the guiding principle for the budgets of all the inter-
national organisations. Furthermore, the improvement granted by the Council is not a real solution to
the Assembly's problems and, moreover, raises a problem of responsibilities since the attribution of
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
Members of the committee: Mr. Klejdzinski (Chairman); MM. Rathbone, lagoyce (Vice-Chairmen[ MM.. $lvqez (Alternate:
Roman), titefnot, Mrs. Blunck (Alternate: Ahrens), MM. Diaz, Durand, Eversdijk (Alternatei-Mrs. Baameld-Schlaman\, Dame
Peggy F-enndr, MM. Garcia Sanchez (Alternate: Fabra), Greco, Mrs. Haas-Berger, Mrs. Hoffmann, MM. Masseret (Alternate:
niiault), Monis, Niegel, Noerens, Rauti (Alternate: Rubner), Redmond (Alternate: LorA,Silva Marques, Sinesio, Triglia, Vara,
N...
N.B. Tie names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
8l
DocuMENr l24l eppeNpuu
two grade A posts to specific nationalities and the regrading of a post in the organogram which had not
been requested by the Assembly represent real interference in the affairs of the Assembly whichjeopardises its independence.
To allow the Assembly to have an operating budget within the statutory timeJimits, the draft
budget for l99l as amended by the Budget and Organisation Committee and the Council will be sub-
mitted for the Assembly's approval on Wednesday, 5th December. The restructuring problems of the
Office of the Clerk would have to be the subject of a supplementary budget aftei ihey have been
re-examined.
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APPENDIX I
Note by the Secrctary-Generul
on the WEU Assembly budga for 1991
(Documeat C-B(90)22, 21st Noycmber 1990)
l. The WEU Assembly draft budget for l99l (Assembly Document l24l) was circulated to the
Budget and Organisation Committee on l0th October 1990 under reference B(90)23, and was
examined during the committee's meeting on l5th and l6th November 1990 (BR(90)4 to be circu-
lated).
2. The net total of the proposed draft budget was:
(a) Operating budget F 25 838 500
(D/ Pensions budget F 2 574 000
Tornr F 28 4r2 500
This figure represented an increase of ll.460/o over the net grand total ofthe budget for 1990.
3. The Budget and Organisation Committee considered that the high increases envisaged for salary
scales with effect from lst July 1990 (10.1690) meant a considerable increase overall which needed to
be reconciled with the requirement of zero real growth. In the circumstances, no new posts or
regradings were acceptable. The committee requested revised figures to take account of this; the
revised figures for the operational budget were presented to the committee during the meeting (Annex
A). The net total for the pensions budget (F 2 645 000 in document 8(90)23 addendum) was revised to
F 2 745 000 to take account of the consequent reduction in contribution income (7% of net basic
salary) to the pensions budget, because the new posts and regradings were no longer included.
4. Subject to reservations by the Netherlands and United Kingdom Delegations, the committee was
able to recommend the Council to give a favourable opinion on the following amended budget for
1991. This represents an increase over the 1990 budget of 4.1090 for the operational budget and 4.340/o
for the net grand total.
5. The committee recommends, subject to the reservations by the Netherlands and United
Kingdom Delegations, that the Council give a favourable opinion on the Assembly's draft budget for
1991, as amended.
6. The Council's opinion will be sought at the next meeting on 29th November 1990. It is recalled
that this opinion should be conveyed to the Assembly before the next part-session opens on 3rd
December 1990.
A. Operating budget
Head
Credits
proposed*
F
Credits
recommended as revised**
F
I l6 925 000
3 635 000
l 754 000
2 109 500
2 095 000
t4 362000
3 635 000
I 754 000
2 109 500
2 095 000
II
III
IV
v
Income
26 518 500
r05 000
23 955 500
105 000
Net total operating budget. 26 4t3 500 23 850 500
B. Pensions budget
F.xnendif 3 366 000
72t 000
3 366 000
821 000Income
Net total pensions budget 2 645 000 274s 000
C. Net total budget. 29 058 500 26 595 500
* Including the l0.l6Yo salary adjustments.r* Excluding new posts and regradings.
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Trend of the Assembly budgas ftom 1990 to 1991
(Partial revision of Annex V (B (90) 23)
1990
a
l99l
b
% b-a
a
A. Operating budget
Head I- Permanent staff
F
13 292000
4 045 000
l 576 000
2 085 500
2022000
F
14 362 000
3 635 000
I 754 000
2 109 500
2 09s 000
+ 8.05
- 
10.14
+ 11.29
+ l.l5
+ 3.61
Head II. Temporary staff
Head III- Exnenditure on nremises and eouinment
Head IV. General administrative costs
Head V. Other expenditure
Total exoenditure 23020 s00
l l0 000
23 955 500
105 000
+ 4.06
4.55Receinfs
Nsr rorA.r 22910 500 23 850 s00 + 4.10
B. Peruions budget
Pensions and leaving allowances .
Receipts
3 l5l 000
s72000
3 366 000
621 000
+ 6.82
8.56+
Nrr ror.lr 2s79000 274500o + 6.43
Grurur NEr rorAl (A + B) 25 489 500 26 595 500 + 4.34
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APPENDIX II
I*tter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEA,
to Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly
30th November 1990
;;;r. the honour to inform you that the WEU Council at its meeting on 29th November 1990
expressed a favourable opinion on the draft supplementary budget of the Assembly for 1990 as con-
tained in C-B(90)23.
The Council also expressed a favourable opinion on the draft Assembly budget for 1991 as con-
tained in C-B(90)22. I should point out that this represents an amendment to the Assembly budget pre-
sented in Assembly Document 1241, excluding the additional posts and regradings proposed by the
Assembly. However, the Council expressed a desire to enable the two new member states to be repre-
sented in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly. To this end, the Council was prepared to accept:
(a) the creation of one post grade A2 for a Portuguese national with effect from lst January
1991. The cost of this post would be met within the budgetary envelope set out in C-B(90)22.
That is to say, after including this post, the increase in the operating budget for l99l com-
pared with that for 1990 would not exceed the 4.10/o in C-B(90)22;
(b) the creation of one post grade A'4 for a Spanish national with effect from lst July l99l;
(c) the upgrading from A4 to A5 with effect from lst July 1991 of the post of Secretary to the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.
The budgetary implications of (b) and (c/ would be in addition to the budgetary envelope in
c-B(90)22.
You should know that the Council's opinion on the budget and its acceptance of the creation of
the new posts and upgrading are " ad referendum " until 18.00 hrs on 3rd December 1990.
I recognise that under the procedure agreed (C-B(63)8) the Assembly will now consider whether
the Council's amendments are acceptable before proceeding further. I am attaching a copy of the pro-
cedure document for convenience.
Willem vnN ExrurN
Encl. C-B(63)8 Document
Mr. R. Pox-nu-oN
President of the Assembly of
Western European Union
43, avenue du Pr6sident-Wilson
75775 Paris Cedex 16
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Document 1242 20th September 1990
Eumpeaa security and events in the Near aad Middle fust
PART II
Tlu Kawait crisis
REPORT 
'
submitted oa belwlf of thc Political C-ommittecz
by Mr. Pieralli Rappnear
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DRAFT Rrcouununnrpx
on European security and events in the Near and Middle East
ExpI-eNetonv MeuoneNou rr,r
submitted by Mr. Pieralli, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. The Iraqi aggression
(a/ Chronologa of events prior to the meeting of the WEU Council on
2lst August 1990
(D/ Events since 2lst August 1990
III. The WEU Council decision of 2lst August 1990
IV. The Arab countries and the crisis
V. Conclusions
APPB.IDIcES
I. United Nations Security Council
Resolutions, New York
- 
660 (2nd August 1990)
- 
661 (6th August 1990)
- 
662 (gth August 1990)
- 
664 (l9th August 1990)
- 
665 (25th August 1990)
- 
666 (l3th September 1990)
- 
667 (l6th September 1990)
l. Adopted unanimously by the committce.
2. Memberc of the committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. De Decl<tr(Nternate for Mrs. StaelsDompas)(Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: Verbeek), Beix, Biihm, Bito, C-aadal (Alternate: Soares Costal, Caro, Colemur. Collart(Alternate: De Bondt), Cuatrecasas (Alterrate:, Diaz),Eich, Fabrc Forzr, Foschi, Hitschler, Koehl, van der Linden, Lord Mackie,
MM. Martinez, Martino, Miiller, Natali, Pluiaux, Pieralli, Mrs. Polfer, IotrM. de Puig, Roseta, Sarti, Sir William Shelton, MM.
StofTelen, Thyraud, Ward.
N.B. Tie names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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II. Arab I*ague
Resolution adopted at the Arab summit meeting,
Cairo, lfth August 1990
III. Statements by the Twelve
Statement on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
Brussels, 2nd August 1990
Statement on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
Brussels, 4th August 1990
Statement on the situation in the Gulf (Extraordinary EPC ministerial
meeeting),
Brussels, lfth August 1990
Statement on the situation of foreigners in Iraq and Kuwait (Extraordinary
EPC ministerial meeting),
Paris, 2lst August 1990
Statement on the crisis in the Gulf (Extraordinary EPC ministerial
meeting),
Rome, 7th September 1990
Statement on the situation of foreign citizens in Iraq and Kuwait (Extraor-
dinary EPC ministerial meeting),
Rome, 7th September 1990
IY. Bilateral Statements
United States-Soviet joint statement,
Moscow, 3rd August 1990
Joint statement issued by President Bush and President Gorbachev fol-
lowing their meeting,
Helsinki, 9th September 1990
V. WEU
Communiqu6 by Mr. Pontillon, President of the WEU Assembly,
Paris, 3rd August 1990
Communiqu6 issued at the close of the ministerial meeting of the Council
of Western European Union,
Paris, 2lst August 1990
Statement by Mr. Pontillon, President of the WEU Assembly, at the close
of the WEU ministerial meeting,
Paris, 2lst August 1990
Press communiqud issued at the close of the meeting of the Presidential
Committee of the WEU Assembly,
Paris, 2lst August 1990
Meeting of the chiefs of staff of the WEU member states,
Paris, 27th August 1990
Ad hoc Group of Foreign and Defence Ministry Representatives,
Paris, 3lst August 1990
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Draft Recommendation
i,'r#ru,'##ill'ffi|'
l. The Assembly welcomes the holding of an extraordinary ministerial meeting of the Council in
Paris on 2lst August 1990 to implement Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty
with a view to co-ordinating member countries' action following lraq's aggxession against Kuwait.
It welcomes the fact that the Council invited the countries taking part in European political
co-operation to attend its meeting and that Denmark and Greece were represented, as was Turkey.
It welcomes the fact that the Council placed its action in the framework of the implementation of
United Nations Security Council resolutions and asked the Security Council to define additional mea-
sures that would be necessary in applying an embargo on Iraq and the territory of Kuwait. It welcomes
the fact that Security Council Resolution 665 meets this request and that it stresses the need to make
maximum use of political and diplomatic measures, the first of which was the visit by the Secretary-
General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, to Amman.
The Assembly notes that, in adopting without delay several Security Council resolutions on the
first international crisis following the East-West rapprochement, the United Nations has emerged from
the paralysis forced upon it by the cold war and the opposition between the military blocs to become
the guarantor of peace and international order. It welcomes the fact that WEU, by the decisions.taken
at the extraordinary meeting of its Council of Ministers on 2lst August 1990, affirmed the prestige and
authority of the United Nations in the first major international crisis since the end of the cold war andjust when a new international order is emerging.
Recognising the importance of co-ordination with the United States, it also welcomes the fact
that the Council has expressed the will to support efforts by the Arab states to flrnd a political solution
to the conflict.
Finally, it welcomes the establishment of a system of co-ordination of member countries' naval
and air action in the Gulf.
lt RecoutrteNDs that the Council pursue the undertaking thus started and make the withdrawal of
Iraqi forces from Kuwait the prior condition for any settlement of the conflict.
2. The Assembly has noted with satisfaction that useful consultations between member countries
and the Soviet Union helped to ensure the adoption of Security Council Resolution 665.
It welcomes the fact that the Twelve reached agreement with the Soviet Union to adopt, at the
annual session of the United Nations General Assembly on 27th September, a joint statement on the
situation in the Gulf region.
It RBcotuueuos that the Council pursue and develop these consultations in order to maintain and
develop the cohesion shown by the international community in imposing respect for the embargo
against Iraq.
3. The Assembly has noted with indignation the many violations of the law of nations committed
by Iraq and in particular:
- 
the threat to use chemical weapons which is a violation of the'Protocol for the prohibition of
the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of
warfare " that was signed in Geneva on l Tth June 1925 and entered into force-on 8th February
1928. This threat is particularly serious since chemical weapons were effectively used during
the war against Iran and, in particular, against the Kurdish people;
- 
many violations of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the protection of civilian persons in time
of war;
- 
violations of the 196l Vienna Convention on the protection of diplomats.
It therefore Rrcoulrlrxos that the Council use every means at its disposal to terminate these vio
lations and bring Iraq to destroy its stocks of chemical weapons under international control and make
reparations foq the wrongs inflicted upon foreign nationals detained in Iraq against their will and those
inflicted on diplomatic representations in Kuwait.
4. The Assembly notes that the twelve EEC countries have announced their decision to afford eco.
nomic assistance to Arab countries victims of the embargo against Iraq. It considers this to be a pos-
itive decision and RrcouunNps that the Council considerthe possibiliti of convening a conference on
Euro-Arab co-operation bringing together the member countries of the EEC and of the Arab League.
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It is gratified that the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers in Paris on 2 I st August
provided an opportunity, on the same day, for a meeting of ministers for foreign affairs of the twelve
European Community countries to examine the political aspects of the crisis and, in particular, the
question of the hostages held by lraq contrary to international conventions. It considers this to be a
good example of task-sharing and close co-operation between WEU and the Twelve.
5. The Assembly considers that the weakness shown by the international community in ensuring
that the Iraqi Government respects human rights is one of the sources of the conflict. Many eastern and
western countries bear the responsibility for supplying Iraq with a powerful, dangerous military arsenal
during and after the war with Iran.
It recalls that it has denounced the delivery of arms to Iraq and illegal transactions in advanced
military technology by banks and producing firms in a few member countries of WEU and in the
United States.
In Recommendation 475, it also made detailed proposals for terminating the afins race in lraq
and in all Middle Eastern countries.
It regrets that the Council's reply was hardly satisfactory and, in the light of current events,
wishes greater attention to be paid to those proposals.
6. The Assembly regrets that, in many cases, the United Nations has been unable to ensure the
application of resolutions adopted by the Security Council. It fears that if this situation persists it may
lead to new and serious crises.
The Assembly considers that, after Iraq has been made to respect the Security Council decisions
and international law, the international community and the United Nations must demonstrate the
same cohesion in employing all political and diplomatic means and adopting vigorous measures of eco-
nomic and political pressure to obtain respect for Security Council decisions by confirming Israel's
right to exist within sure, recognised frontiers and the right of Palestinians to self-determination. This
would bring about the end of Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. Similarly, a political
solution to the present conflict may help to create conditions favourable to a settlement of the
Lebanese problem and the withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces from Lebanon.
It therefore Rrcouupxos that the Council implement without delay the provisions of Assembly
Recommendation 475 adopted in December 1989 which underlined the importance of convening an
international conference on peace in the Middle East under the aegis of the United ,Nations.
7. The Assembly strongly endorses the appeal made by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, for immediate humanitarian assistance for the hundreds of thousands
of refugees from different countries who are leaving or who have left Iraq via Jordan.
It therefore RrcouurNos that the Council ask the governments of member countries to take part
in this humanitarian effort.
8. The Assembly notes that, for the second time, Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels
Treaty has been the basis for co-ordinated action by member countries to foster the restoration of a
peaceful order threatened outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty.
It therefore Rrcourrrcxos that the Council maintain and strengthen in any revision of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty the commitments in that paragraph and ensure that no country is asked to join
WEU if it is not effectively prepared to fulfil these commitments.
9. The Assembly notes that none of the WEU member countries alone has adequate means of
taking effective action in the Gulf.
It RrcouurNos that the Council analyse the shortcomings that have thus emerged, particularly in
regard to monitoring and data-processing, and speed up consideration of measures to be taken to
remedy this situation on the basis of Recommendation 482 on observation satellites.
10. The Assembly wplcomes the fact that arbitration by the revitalised United Nations, security
through an alliance of WEU countries against aggression and, in Vienna tomorrow, disarmament may
help the emergence of a new system of security and international co-operation.
Finally, to achieve this end, it Rncorraumos that the Council make intensive use of all the pros-
pects revealed by the dramatic crisis in the Gulf for achieving as quickly as possible an effective
European defence organisation.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(sabmittcd by Mh Piemlli, Rqpaeur)
I. Intmduction
l. On the basis of Article VIII of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty, which calls on member
countries " to consult with regard to any situ-
ation which may constitute a threat to peace, in
whatever area this threat should arise, or a
danger to economic stability ", since 1970 the
WEU Assembly has constantly stressed the
implications of events in the Near and Middle
East for Europe's security (Recommendations
202 and 480).
2. Several times, and in particular in
December 1989 (Recommendation 475), it has
urged member governments to seek an interna-
tional agreement to ban the supply of sensitive
products or technology to Middle East countries,
especially certain chemical products and " tech-
nologa necessary for the development of
medium- and long-range surface-to-surface mis-
siles ". In 1984 (Recommendation 412) it urged
them to be vigilant in regard to violations of the
laws of war and to act jointly * in the event of an
extension of terrorist operations in the Middle
East or Western Europe ". It also recommended
them to " co-ordinate the action of their armed
forces for humanitarian operations and interna-
tional police duties at the request of the United
Nations ". It welcomed the initiative taken by
the Council in 1987 to co-ordinate member
countries'action in order to safeguard freedom
of navigation in the Gulf. In 1973,it set out in
detail what should be Europe's *joint energy
policy based on security requirements " (Recom-
mendation 241).
3. In a communiqud issued by its Presi-
dential Committee, the Assembly therefore
could but welcome the convening, for the first
time since WEU was set up in 1954, of an
extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council at
the level of ministers for foreign affairs and
defence on 2lst August 1990 in order to respond
to the serious crisis caused by lraq's invasion of
Kuwait by taking co-ordinated measures aimed
at ensuring respect for decisions taken by the
United Nations Security Council. It also wel-
comed the fact that the French Ministers for
Foreign Affairs and Defence, who hold the
chairmanship-in-oflice of the Council, organised
a meeting with the Presidential Committee at
the close of the ministerial meeting.
4. It was thus able to note that, for the
second time, the first being when it co-ordinated
member countries' minesweeping operations in
the Gulf in 1987-88 to ensure freedom of navi-
gation, the Council was drawing the full conse-
quences of paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the
modified Brussels Treaty, thus following the
course that the Assembly had been recom-
mending for twenty years. At a time when, with
growing d6tente, understanding and cG
operation between member countries of the
Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact, one
may wonder about the future of an organisation
whose sole aim, one might think, was to organise
member countries' participation in NATO's
activities, it was essential to underline, in this
way, that the only European organisation with
security responsibilities still had every reason to
exist because of its ability to act to maintain or
restore peace in other regions of the world.
5. It was in order to stress this r6le that the
Presidential Committee decided to meet on
2fth September 1990 to adopt draft recommen-
dations submitted by its Political and Defence
Committees without waiting for the Assembly's
ordinary session in December. As your
Rapporteur has had very little time in which to
prepare the explanatory memorandum, he will
keep to essentials with only brief reference to
other aspects. He has also avoided tackling the
military side of the crisis, which is the responsi-
bility of the Defence Committee.
II. TIE lro4i aggrasion
6. It is still diffrcult to analyse many aspects
of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. Like all
Middle East states, both countries came into
being with the disintegration of the Arab world
after the dismemberment of the Ottoman
Empire and the end of the mandates assigned to
the United Kingdom and France by the kague
of Nations. Both stemmed from the collapse of
the dream of a vast Arab state in the aftermath
of the first world war, and their frontiers corre-
spond neither to natural boundaries nor to clear
ethnic realities. However, national feelings took
shape during the two states' seventy years' exis-
tence and, in a manner hard to grasp, these
feelings cohabit with a sense of belonging to a
great Arab nation or of belonging to particular
nations, since Iraq's constitution specifies that
Iraqis may belong to either the Arab or the
Kurdish nation, the latter indeed being the case
of about lTVo of lraq's population.
7. Since it became independent in 1932, and
above all during the crisis it provoked when
Kuwait became independent in 1961, Iraq has
tried to assert its rights over Kuwait, on the one
hand because it only has an extremely small
outlet on the Gulf which is dominated by islands
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belonging to Kuwait, and on the other hand
because Kuwait has very large oil reserves and
resources, while the reserves of Iraq, with a pop-
ulation nine times larger, are about the samer.
Kuwait is extremely wealthy, with a per capita
GNP of $13 680, i.e. in line with the most pros-
perous industrialised countries, compared with
only $4 900 in Iraq. This wealth is very
unevenly shared between an 6lite which profits
directly or indirectly from oil income, the
remainder of the Kuwaiti population and, above
all, large numbers of immigrants, mainly from
Palestine, Egypt, India, Pakistan, Iran, Sri
Lanka, Bangladesh and neighbouring Arab
countries constituting almost half the country's
population.
8. Other, more economic, reasons may be
added to these long-term reasons for wishing to
take over Kuwait. Although it received consid-
erable financial assistance from its Arab neigh-
bours, and especially from Kuwait, Iraq accu-
mulated very serious debts during its war
against lran from 1980 to 1988. It has an
eiternal debt of about $40 000 million on which
it is not managing to pay the interest, more than
$3000 million per year. Iraq earned $12000
million from oil in 1988 and almost $15 000
million in 1989. However, in 1989, its imports
reached $11 000 million in the civil sector and
about $5 000 million for military equipment,
resulting in a balance of payments deficit of
$5 500 million that constantly forced it to ask its
creditors to delay the repayment dates. In these
circumstances, Japan, the United States, the
United Kingdom, France and Italy reduced
further credits and urged their industrialists to
be cautious. In Iraq, the freeing oftrade decided
in 1988 was limited, but inflation reached 250loin 1989. These circumstances were strong
encouragement for it to claim Kuwait's wealth
and its oil installations and reserves. Iraq also
complained vigorously in the months preceding
the Crisis about the ill will of Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia towards accepting a substantial increase
in the price of oil as defined by OPEC and
reduced output to ensure respect for decisions
on prices.
9. There is nothing to confirm Iraq's claim
on 2nd August 1990 that a Kuwaiti revolu-
tionary movement, representing a large part of
the population, had appealed to lraq to remove
Kuwait's governing r6gime. On the contrary,
Iraq's attempt to set up a government to replace
the one it had driven out failed, thus forcing it to
proclaim the pure and simple annexation of
Ruwaiti territory. This consideration obviously
carried great weight with almost the entire inter-
national community when it condemned the
Iraqi aggression.
l. Kuwait's res€rves are estimated at 95 000 million barrels
compared with 100 000 million for Iraq. It produces
I 800 000 banels per day compared with 2 830 000 for Iraq.
10. (a) Chronology of events prior to the
meeting of the WEU Council on 21st
August 1990
1990
3rd May
The Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Tariq Aziz, criticises the OPEC coun-
tries responsible for overproduction..
17th July
The President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein,
accuses certain Arab Gulf leaders of
applying a pro-American policy aimed at
bringing down the price of crude oil. The
official Iraqi agency INA issues a decla-
ration by the President, made on the
occasion of the Arab summit meeting in
Baghdad in May, affrrming that wars may
be provoked * for economic reasons ".
18th July
Publication in Baghdad of a message from
Iraq, transmitted to the Arab I-eague on
l6th July, accusing Kuwait of 'stealing'
Iraqi oil since 1980 by pumping oil from
the Rumaila flreld in the south of Iraq and
'eating into " its territory. Iraq calls on
Kuwait to reimburse $2 400 million, the
value of the * stolen " oil and describes
Kuwait's conduct as a 'military
agglession against Iraq ".
Baghdad also accuses Kuwait of having
taken advantage of the war with Iran to
implement'a plan for a progressive, pro-
grammed advance towards Iraqi ter-
ritory'.
l9th July
Kuwait rejects Baghdad's accusations out-
riglrt, accuses Iraq of having attempted on
several occasions to drill oil wells inside
Kuwaiti territory and turns to the Arab
League to settle the frontier problems.
2lst July
Baghdad accuses Kuwait of preparing the
gtround for intervention by foreign forces
in the Gulf by calling on the United
Nations. By taking such action, Baghdad
considers Kuwait has refused * the Arab
option " and Arab League mediation.
22nd July
Kuwait calls on Baghdad to encourage
Arab mediation and reaffirms that it
wishes the dispute to be solved through
the intermediary of the Arab League.
24th July
President Mubarak visits Baghdad,
Kuwait and Riyad. He trusts his medi-
ation will lead to a four-party meeting
between lraq, Kuwait, Egypt and Saudi
Arabia.
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27th Jttly
The OPEC Ministers decide to raise the
reference price per barrel from $18 to $21
and fix the production ceiling at 22.5
million barrels per day until the end of the
year compared with 22 million in the first
half of the yea1.^I-ryq had called for a ref-
erence price of $25.
30th July
King Hussein of Jordan visits Baghdad
and Kuwait.
3lst July
Opening of talks between Iraq and Kuwait
in Djeddah.
lst August
Suspension.of the Djeddah talks without
any agreement being reached.
Announcement of the closing of land fron-
tiers between lraq and Kuwait.
2nd August
The Iraqi army invades Kuwait. Baghdad
declares that * the revolution has driven
out the Kuwaiti monarchy " and that the
task of the Iraqi forces is to support the
* provisional government' that has
replaced it. Kuwait calls for assistance
from the Arab countries, but Iraq warns
them against any intervention. The price
of oil rises by l5%. The Emir of Kuwait
takes refuge in Saudi Arabia. The United
Nations Security Council meets to
condemn the invasion (Resolution 660).
The United States bans all trade with
Baghdad. Moscow suspends its arms sup
plies to lraq. Iraq freezes the repayment of
its debts in Washington, London and
Paris. The United States, France, the
United Kingdom, Japan and the Federal
Republic freeze Kuwaiti assets.
3rd August
Meeting in Nicosia of the Arab League
Council, which, by 14 votes to 4 (the
PLO, Jordan, Sudan and Yemen) and I
abstention (Mauritania), adopts a reso-
lution condemaing the lraqi aggression.
Libya and Iraq did not take part.
Washington urges Ankara and Riyad to
close their oil pipelines carrying lraqi oil
and announces that naval forces are being
sent to the Gulf. Baghdad says it will start
to withdraw its troops provided there is
no threat to the security of Kuwait and
Iraq.
Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze meet in
Moscow and urge all countries to take
political steps to ensure the immediate
unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops
from Kuwait.
4th August
The European Community freezes Iraq's
assets, suspends co-operation with Iraq
and places an embargo on its imports of
Iraqi oil and the export of arms to Iraq.
5th August
President George Bush declares that the
United States will never accept the puppet
government set up by Iraq.
6th August
The United States Secretary of Defence
visits Saudi Arabia. Baghdad closes one ofits oil pipelines that passes through
Turkey. Hundreds of Americans and
Europeans are rounded up in Kuwaiti
hotels, apparently to.be taken to Iraq.
The United Nations Security Council
decrees economic sanctions against lraq,
extended to Kuwait (Resolution 661,
adopted by thirteen of its fifteen
members). Imports of oil and all other
goods from Iraq and Kuwait are banned,
as are sales of arms to both countries. The
price of a barrel of oil reaches $28.05.
At the extraordinary meeting of the North
Atlantic Council in Brussels, members
hold almost identical views on the need to
apply sanctions to make Iraq understand
that the invasion of Kuwait is unaccep-
table.
7th August
President Bush decides to send fighter air-
craft and troops to Saudi Arabia to
protect it against a possible Iraqi attack.
Switzerland endorses the international
sanctions, as does Turkey. The gov-
emment installed in Kuwait by Iraq pro-
claims a republic.
8th August
Baghdad annexes Kuwait and affirms thatit will not attack Saudi Arabia. The
United Kingdom, France and the Soviet
Union strengthen their naval presence in
the area of the Gulf.
9th August
The Security Council declares the annex-
ation of Kuwait illegal (Resolution 662).
lfth August
President Saddam Hussein calls for a holy
war against American forces. At a summit
meeting in Cairo, twelve of the twenty
Arab heads of state urge Iraq to withdraw
its troops from Kuwait and agree to send
an all-Arab force to protect Saudi
Arabia.
Meeting in Brussels of the NATO Min-
isters for Foreign Affairs, who recall that
any attack on Turkey will be considered
an attack on all members of NATO.
European political co-operation meeting
at ministerial level; Iraq's annexation of
Kuwait is declared null.
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I lth August
British fighter aircraft and Egyptian
troops arrive in Saudi Arabia. Pro-Iraqi
demonstrations are held in Yemen, Mau-
ritania, Algeria, Jordan, Libya and the
Israeli-occupied West Bank.
l2th August
Saddam Hussein links the withdrawal of
Iraqi troops from Kuwait with Israeli
withdrawal from the occupied territories
and Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.
l3th August
King Hussein visits Baghdad. '
l5th August
Saddam Hussein proposes to Iran a final
settlement of the war between the two
countries on the basis ofacceptance ofthe
Algiers treaty on the Shatt Al Arab, Iraqi
withdrawal from occupied Iranian ter-
ritory and the exchange of prisoners of
war. I 000 Moroccan troops join the
3 000 Egyptians already in Saudi Arabia.
President Bush says the deployment of
American military forces is not intended
only to defend Saudi Arabia but also to
compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.
16th August
President Bush holds talks with King
Hussein and announces that the Kirtg
undertakes to apply the sanctions decreed
by the United Nations. Iraq orders the
4 000 British citizens and 2 500 Amer-
icans in Kuwait to assemble in two
hotels.
l8th August
Baghdad announces that * nationals ofthe
aggressive nations' will be assembled in
strategic civil and military areas of lraq
and Kuwait to serve as a human shield.
The United Nations Security Council
unanimously adopts a resolution insisting
that Baghdad allow foreigners to leave(Resolution 664).
The United States asks Iraq to reverse
immediately and unconditionally the
measures taken against foreigners, whichit considers wholly unacceptable. Pres-
ident Bush says he is profoundly troubled
and concerned.
l9th August
Baghdad asks western and Australian
nationals in Kuwait to gather in three
large hotels for their protection. Saddam
Hussein announces his conditions for
freeing foreign nationals, insisting in par-
ticular on American forces leaving the
Gulf in exchange. Baghdad announces
that a number of Austrian, Swedish,
Swiss, Finnish and Portuguese nationals
will be authorised to leave Iraq.
Washington rejects the latest conditions
laid down by Saddam Hussein for freeing
foreign nationals. lnndon adopts an iden-
tical position.
The five permanent members of the
Security Council continue their consulta-
tions in order to explore the possibility ofjoint military action.
21st August
Meeting in Paris of the WEU Council at
the level of ministers for foreign affairs
and defence, enlarged to include observers
from Denmark, Greece and Turkey. Pub-
lication of a communiqud (Document
1237).
Meeting in Paris of the European Com-
munity ministers for foreign affairs on the
question of Iraq taking nationals of
member countries as hostages.
Declaration by Mr. Mitterrand, President
of the French Republic, on France's aims
and action in the Gulf.
Iraq insists on the immediate closing of
diplomatic representations in Kuwait.
Twenty-one countries refuse to obey.
11. (b) Events since 2lst August 1990
22nd August
President Bush decides to call up
reservists.
Belgium, Spain, Greece, Italy and the
Netherlands decide to send units to the
Gulf on the basis of the decision of the
WEU ministers.
Iraq completes its evacuation of Iranian
territory occupied by its forces and frees
its Iranian prisoners of war.
23rd August
Saddam Hussein appears on Iraqi tele-
vision with western hostages.
25th August
By 13 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions
(Yemen and Cuba), the Security Council
adopts Resolution 665 allowing recourse
to force to ensure respect for the embargo
on Iraq and Kuwait.
Visit by Mr. Kurt Waldheim, President of
the Austrian Republic, to Baghdad. Aus-
trian nationals are authorised to leave
Iraq and Kuwait.
Blockade of embassies in Kuwait.
26th August
Visit by Mr. Dumas, French Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Chairman-in-Office of
the WEU Council, to Moscow and publi-
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cation of a joint declaration calling on
Iraq to respect international law and
submit to Security Council resolutions.
27th August
Meeting in Paris of the chiefs of staff of
WEU countries to implement the deci-
sions taken by the ministers on 2lst
August.
28th August
Saddam Hussein announces the release of
women and children held in lraq.
Iraq announces the annexation of the
eastern part of Kuwait (Rumaila oil field
and islands) to form part of the province
of Basrah and the establishment of the
eastern part as a new Iraqi province.
Members of the Moroccan Embassy in
Kuwait are forcefully moved to Baghdad.
Hungary evacuates the staff from its
embassy in Kuwait.
29th August
OPEC decides to increase its members'oil
output to make up for the absence of
Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil on the international
market.
Iraq proposes freeing all the hostages in
exchange for guarantees of non-
aggressron.
30th August
President Bush asks his allies to
expenditure resulting from the
crisis.
3lst August
Meeting in Amman between Mr. Perez de
Cuellar, Secretary-General of the United
Nations, and Mr. Taiq Aziz.
4th SeptemberIn a speech in Vladivostok, Mr.
Shevardnadze, Soviet Minister for
Foreign Alfairs, revives the proposal for a
general conference on the Middle East.
5th September
Meeting in Moscow between Mr. Tariq
Aziz and Mr. Gorbachev.
9th September
President Bush and President Gorbachev
meet in Helsinki.
Euro-Arab-American naval co-ordination
meeting in Bahrein.
Mr. Tariq Aziz visits Tehran.
l3th September
The Security Council adopts Resolution
666.
l4th September
Iraqi troops enter premises belonging tothe Belgian, Canadian and French
Embassies in Kuwait.
Iraqi television broadcasts a message from
President Bush.
l5th September
The President of the French Republic
decides to take retaliatory measures
against lraq, including sending a brigade
and air forces to Saudi Arabia.
l6th September
The Security Council adopts Resolution
667.
17th September
European political co.operation agrees on
retaliatory measures against Iran(expulsion of diplomats).
lSth September
WEU ministerial meeting in Paris.
III. The WEU Council duision
of 21st August 1990
12. Maintenance of the status quo in the
Middle East is not suflicient reason for inter-
vention by European countries in the region. All
countries are entitled to decide on their internal
r6gimes and, insofar as international peace is
not thereby threatened, two countries may
decide to merge without the international com-
munity having a say in the matter. However,
Iraq's aggression against Kuwait involves ques-
tions of quite another kind. There is nothing tojustify the claim that the people of Kuwait
wanted a change of r6gime or, even less, the
intervention of a foreign power to bring it about.
Consequently, Iraq's annexation of Kuwait can
in no way be assimilated to a voluntary merger
of two states. Everything indicates that this was
a pure and simple aggression by Iraq against
Kuwait, borne out by the fact that the lraqi Gov-
ernment found it impossible to form a credible
Kuwaiti Government in the days following
annexation.
13. It was for quite different reasons that the
WEU countries reacted to the aggression in
concert. They include:
14. (y' Concern to maintain peace in the
highly sensitive region of the Middle East. If the
conquest of one country by another were
accepted without reaction by the international
community, this would be an invitation to any
country whatsoever in the region, particularly
Iraq, to use force to solve innumerable
problems. In the third world, nearly all states are
of recent origin, many frontiers are contested
and the absence of reaction from the interna-
tional community to the Kuwait affair would
mean that it was prepared to allow everyone to
act as he thought fit.
15. Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and its
threats to the Arab countries round the Gulf
share
Gulf
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triggered the first serious international crisis
since the historic changes in Eastern Europe in
1989 when the cold war and worldwide United
States-Soviet and East-West opposition came to
an end and thus offered hopes ofpeace and sta-
bility. It is the first serious trial to face the inter-
national community since the end of bipolarism.
It will have lasting consequences in international
relations. It must therefore be shown that the new
international order is based on collective action,
excludes unilateral initiatives, imposes respect
for law and treaties, asserts, in all circumstances
and against anyone whomsoever, the principles
of non-aggression and non-interference in the
internal affairs of sovereign states and prevents
and punishes the use of force to solve regional,
frontier, ethnic, religious, economic and political
disputes. The United Nations, hitherto paralysed
by the confrontation between the United States
and the Soviet Union, has rediscovered the rOle
for which it was created: to be the guarantor of
international peace. The five resolutions adopted
without delay by the Security Council on
restoring Kuwait's sovereigtty and indepen-
dence, the embargo against Iraq and for its strict
application are unprecedented in the history of
the organisation. They were made possible by
close co-operation between the United States, the
Soviet Union and the other permanent members
of the Security Council. wEU, as an interna-
tional organisation, had specific responsibilities
for the defence of Europe. By deciding to send
naval forces to the Gulf to help to enforce the
embargo against Iraq and by coordinating the
action of these forces to back up the Security
Council's decision, member countries are making
a major contribution to the creation of a new
international order based on the prestige and
authority of the United Nations. The fact that
earlier Security Council decisions, taken in the
days when the world was divided into two
opposing blocs, were not respected does not
mean they have lost their validity. By taking vig-
orous action against the violations committed by
Iraq, the United Nations is creating the right con-
ditions for tackling with equal vigour, once the
Iraqi affair has been settled, the other major
issues in the region, i.e. the end of Israel's occu-
pation of Palestinian territories and the with-
drawal of foreign military forces from
Lebanon.
16. (ii) The deliberate, declared violation of
the principles and texts on which international
law is based, be they treaties implying recog-
nition ofstates and their frontiers, in particular
Iraq's recognition of Kuwait in 1963, or those
defining the law of war and in particular, in the
case oflraq, the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning
the use of chemical wealx)ns, the Geneva Con-
vention of l2th August 1949 on the protection
of civilian persons in time of war and the 1961
Vienna Convention on the protection of dip
lomats.
17. The 1949 Geneva Convention includes
the following provisions:
- 
in Article 4.' " Persons protected by the
convention are those who, at a given
moment and in any manner what-
soever, find themselves, in case of a
conflict or occupation, in the hands ofa
party to the conflict or occupying power
of which they are not nationals. "
- 
in Article 28: * T'he presence of a pro-
tected person may not be used to render
certain points or areas immune from
military operations. "
- 
in Article 34: * The taking of hostages is
prohibited.'
- 
in Article .35; " All protected persons
who may desire to leave the territory at
the outset of, or during a conflict, shall
be entitled to do so, unless their
departure is contrary to the national
interests of the state. The applications
of such persons to leave shall be
decided in accordance with regularly
established procedures and the decision
shall be taken as rapidly as possible.
Those persons permitted to leave may
provide themselves with the necessary
funds for their journey and take with
them a reasonable amount of their
effects and articles of personal use.
If any such person is refused permission
to leave the territory, he shall be
entitled to have such refusal recon-
sidered as soon as possible by an appro-
priate court or administrative board
designated by the detaining power for
that purpose.
Upon request, representatives of the
protecting power shall, unless reasons
of security prevent it, or the persons
concerned object, be furnished with the
reasons for refusal of any request for
permission to leave the territory and be
given, as expeditiously as possible, the
names of all persons who have been
denied permission to leave.'
18. Iraq acceded to these three agreements.
Yet it violated the first by threatening to use
chemical weapons if attacked. It violated the
second by preventing the nationals of a large
number of countries leaving its territory and
that of Kuwait and further by forming * human
shields' to protect a number of strategic objec-
tives on its territory. It violated the third in the
case of the western countries' embassies in
Kuwait.
19. (iii) The will to ensure respect for United
Nations decisions and in particular those of the
Security Council, since Iraq has taken no action
on Resolutions 660 and 662 addressed to it on
2nd and 9th August 1990. Ensuring respect for
95
DOCUMENT 1242
the orders of a worldwide international
organisation contributes not only to maintaining
peace but above all to oryanising a peaceful,
lasting international order. Conversely, to leave
these resolutions unapplied for lack of means of
implementing them would lead to international
anarchy under the supreme direction of the law
of the strongest. It was precisely to avoid the
embargo failing that the United Nations
Security Council, as a positive answer to
requests from the WEU Council of Ministers
and others, adopted Resolution 665 which:
* Calls upon thsse member states
co-operating with the Government of
Kuwait which are deploying maritime
forces to the area to use such measures
commensurate to the specific circum-
stances as may be necessary under the
authority of the Security Council to halt
all inward and outward maritime shipping
in order to inspect and verify their cargoes
and destinations and to ensure strict
implementation of the provisions related
to such shipping laid down in Resolution
661."
In the same resolution, the Security Council
again underlines the need to resort as far as pos-
sible to 'political and diplomatic measures " to
compel Iraq to accept the United Nations deci-
slons.
20. (iv) The violations of human rights com-
mitted by lraq, both against its own citizens and
against foreign nationals, during its war against
Iran and since the end ofthat conflict are not the
final reason for the action by third countries, but
they help to deprive Saddam Hussein's r6gime
of any right to the confidence of the interna-
tional community as a whole. They also con-
tribute to the maintenance of external pressure
on Iraq for it to rectify its internal practices.
21. (v) The will to halt the expansionism
which, following the invasion of Kuwait, would
most probably have been targeted on other Arab
countries in the region, none of which is strong
enough to offer effeetive resistance to lraq's mil-
itary strength. The fact that Iraq has large
numbers of sophisticated weapons and binary
chemical weapons too and that, in recent years,it has developed the production of long-range
missiles, i.e. with a range of over 1 000 km, and
has long been trying to acquire nuclear weapons
suggest that, if it is not stopped now, it will be
far more diffrcult and more costly in terms of
human lives to do so later. By stopping it now,
this will facilitate the subsequent acceptance of
the request in Assembly Recommendation 475
that all countries in the region, including Israel,
renounce arms of mass destruction.
22. (vi) The fact that a majority of the Arab
League condemned the Iraqi aggression and that
several Arab countries, including Egypt and
Morocco, are participating directly in the
deployment of forces designed to protect Saudi
Arabia means action can be taken without
Europe seeming to defend the West's own
interests in opposition to the Arab world. In the
communiqu6 of 2lst August, there is no
mention, among the reasons for or objectives of
the military action co'ordinated by WEU, of the
defence of any territory or of any alliance, thus
distinguishing it from the attitude of the United
States which is more committed to supporting
Saudi Arabia and permanent co-operation with
Israel. However, it asserts the wish of the WEU
countries for the Arab states to assume responsi-
bility for settling the conflict.
23. (uiy' Nor does the communiqud of 2lst
August refer to economic reasons, but it is clear
that the twelve countries concerned took the
utmost account of the rdle played by the Middle
East in oil production and of the size of oil
reserves in the region, particularly in Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait. This means that any event
in the region has worldwide economic conse-
quences and that the international community
cannot allow states to juggle irresponsibly with
oil oqtput and prices. It is not a matter of
opposing any increase in prices but ofensuring
that such increases do not upset the interna-
tional economic order unduly, the first victims
of which would be the third world countries
which do not produce oil. If Saddam Hussein
managed to take over Saudi Arabia's oil wells
and reserves, and even if he retained and
exploited only Kuwaiti wells and reserves, he
would be in a position of force that would allow
him to extend his domination over the entire
Middle East and subject the industrialised coun-
tries to all kinds of blackmail.
24. Nor will it be possible to return to the
status quo ante where oil is concerned once the
present international crisis has been settled. [n
the future, the present politicd and military
commitment of WEU and the Community will
have far greater moral and political justification
if Western Europe acts within international eco
nomic and financial organisations and the
United Nations to promote a fairer balance
between industrialised countries, the oil-
producing countries and the most needy corur-
tries of the third world. The world's principal
energy source cannot continue to be exploited in
the sole interest of the industrialised countries
and the feudal, financial and military classes
that hold sway in many of the oil-producing
countries. In future, it must also be used for the
benefit of the developing countries, which have
incurred intolerable debts vis-d-vis international
financiers, and help to fight the poverty of the
human masses of the third world. The United
Nations, which has assumed responsibility for
solving the present international crisis, as it had
never done in the past, can gradually become the
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forum for decisions involving development
compatible with the requirements of safe-
guarding the earth's environment and a new
worldwide economic order.
25. It should be noted that the invasion of
Kuwait took place just after a period of overpro-
duction and falling oil prices when the rise in
demand for crude oil, which had been noticeable
since the end of 1985, was leading to steadier
prices. This rise was not due to United States
and Western European imports but to those of
Eastern Europe, Asia (+lOVo) and, in general,
developing countries (+60/o). The rise in prices
reached 200/o and led to a parallel increase in
those of natural gas and coal. The OPEC system
of limits on production therefore worked and
the oil income of its members rose from $86 400
million in 1988 to $115 000 million in 1989.
Only five of the thirteen member countries, all
in the Gull had surplus capacities at the end of
1989, in spite of the rise in their quotas in
November 1989. Kuwait's then rose from l.l5
million to 1.5 million barrels per day. Moreover,
for technical reasons, North Sea, United States
and Soviet production could not be increased to
any great extent. Saddam Hussein therefore
chose a particularly appropriate time to strike at
the world economy.
26. There was some hesitation about the
framework in which powers determined to act to
put an end to Iraqi expansion could organise
their intervention. NATO was unsuitable, on the
one hand because the North Atlantic Treaty
makes no provision for joint action outside the
area defined in the treaty, and on the other hand
because the United States intends to respect
undertakings to Saudi Arabia and, probably,
Israel which do not concern the European
members of the alliance. Statements by
American authorities on 22nd and 23rd August
that American forces might take the initiative of
offensive operations against the lraqi afiny,
either in Kuwait or in Iraq itself, do not corre-
spond either to the mandate of the European
forces as defined by the governments concerned
on the basis of the WEU Council discussions on
2lst August or to the resolutions so far adopted
by the Security Council. Of course, some deg;ree
of co-operation between American and
European forces in regard to their deployment
and action to impose respect for the embargo
against Iraq is particularly essential since Euro-
peans have no satisfactory observation satellite
systems with immediate data transmission, and
this makes them dependent on the Americans.
But this technical co-operation must not lead to
political dependence.
27. The European Community, for its part,
and twelve-power political consultations
provide no basis for military action. Thanks to
Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified
Brussels Treaty, only WEU had a juridical basis
that allowed the chairmanship-in-office to
convene the WEU Council at the highest level to
examine the situation leading to concrete action.
At the request of the President of the Assembly
and, apparently, certain member countries, the
French chairmanshipin-office organised this
meeting on 2lst August.
28. The chairmanship-in-oflice is believed to
have decided to invite the other members of the
European Community plus Turkey to send
observers to the meeting. Denmark, Greece and
Turkey did so. Ireland refused because of its
policy of neutrality. These invitations are not
without importance, because they show that
WEU is not only, and perhaps no longer, princi-
pally the " European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance " but that it is more than ever the
instrument by which Western Europe can buildits defence identity and act independently
outside the NATO area. It is gratifying that the
Council did not confine itself to a strictlyjuridical view of its composition but welcomed,
in a matter that concerns Europe as a whole, all
European countries wishing to attend. It should
be noted that Greece decided on that occasion to
send a warship to the Gulf in the framework of
WEU co-ordination, and Belgian, Spanish,
Italian and Netherlands units either joined the
French and United Kingdom units already
deployed in the Gulf or were sent there even
before the meeting on 2lst August. Your
Rapporteur stresses the importance of the fact
that the Italian chairmanship-in-office of the
EEC, in agreement with the French
chairmanship-in-oflice of WEU, the promoter of
the extraordinary meeting of the Council of
Ministers, convened a summit meeting in Paris
of ministers for foreign affairs of the twelve
Community member countries. The same day -
2lst August 
- 
WEU took politico-military deci-
sions and the EEC tackled the political aspects
of the crisis and the question of hostages. The
co-ordinated WEU and EEC ministerial
meetings thus give an unprecedented all-round
picture of a joint policy for Western European
countries.
IY. The Arab countries and the crisis
29. Iraq's aggression against Kuwait occurred
at a time when the Arab world was particularly
disturbed. Since the second world war, it has
been riddled with political and religious move'
ments setting states' national policies against the
idea of a vast Arab cultural community and
sometimes too an even vaster Moslem com-
munity, which led them to reproach the leaders
of Arab states for betraying the * Arab nation "
for the sake of narrow interests. Arab society's
feeling of powerlessness to promote the cause of
the Arab nation has frequently led to assassina-
tions of heads of state or leaders of Arab coun-
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tries. In the last ten years, a vast protest move-
ment against the westernisation and secularisa-
tion of the Arab community has made consider-
able progress with the development of Islamism.
This force is particularly threatening to Arab
leaders since, in many countries, the absence of
democracy makes it impossible for it to have a
legal existence and participate constitutionally
in opposition to those in power. From time to
time, it gathers round charismatic leaders and
there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein, who
presented himself as the hero of Arabism versus
the Islamic fundamentalism of Iran from 1980
to 1988, is now endeavouring to assert himself
as the defender of Arabism and Islam vis-i-vis
the other states of the Arab world.
30. A second factor of division and instability
is to be found in the very unequal distribution of
wealth, derived primarily from oil, between and
within those countries. This inequality is parti-
cularly serious since it is mainly sparsely-
populated countries such as Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, the Emirates and Libya which have
abundant oil reserves, whereas Egypt and Syria,
which have very large, rapidly-growing popula-
tions, are almost without oil resources. Only
Iraq and Algeria have large oil resources and
fairly large populations. Thus, per capita GNP
varies considerably from one country to
another. The dream of a political organisation of
the Arab community is therefore associated with
the hope of a fairer sharing of resources between
countries and their inhabitants. While the rulers
of the Gulf region are not insensitive to this
claim, provide both the Palestinians and the
Egyptians with considerable assistance and also
afforded lraq substantial aid during the 198G88
war, this had very little eflect on the inequal-
ities. Furthennore, the unfair way oil revenue is
shared in several oil-producing countries makes
their leaders oppose any form of democratic
challenge to their power. This point was strongly
emphasised by Saddam Hussein in his speeches
aimed at Arab public opinion. At the same time,
he defended Islam, threatened by the presence
of non-believers close to the holy places at the
request of the Saudi head of state.
31. Finally, we must not overlook the fact
that the Arabs continue, in spite of the end of
colonisation, to consider themselves the victims
of an international order which favours the
industrialised European and American countries
both economically and in the sharing of political
power. Efforts by western powers to maintain
order, peace or simply the status quo in the
Middle East, whether justified or not, are seen
by a large section of Arab public opinion as
aggressions against the Arab nation. Associated
with these efforts are the establishment of the
state of Israel in 1949, its maintenance, its mil-
itary victories and, since 1967, its occupation of
the whole of Palestine and a fringe of Syria and
Lebanon. In the last two years, the intifada has
offered television viewers, particularly the
Arabs, the daily spectacle of permanent clashes
and repression of an Arab population deprived
of rights. The feelings aroused by these facts
explain why any challenge to the West, and in
particular to the United States, considered to be
Israel's main protectors, are celebrated as an
exploit. Thus, after Nasser, Saddam Hussein,
because ofhis bravado and violations ofinterna-
tional law, is viewed as a hero by part of the
Arab public which, even in countries which have
unreservedly condemned the Iraqi aggression,
has taken to the streets to show its enthusiasm
for the Iraqi dictator.
32. These circumstances probably explain the
hesitation of certain Arab leaders since
2nd August. It is fairly unlikely that these
leaders wish to have Saddam Hussein lead a vast
Islamic, pan-Arab movement and declare
himself a revolutionary in order to try to
recreate round Baghdad the unity once achieved
by the Abbassides. Yet several of them do not
wish to take the risk of opposing him too openly,
particularly when they are not immediately
threatened by the Iraqi army, because they fear
the reactions of their own people.
33. Clearly lraq's invasion of Kuwait has
caused a deep rift in the Arab world which has
always wanted issues between Arab countries to
be settled without the intervention of external
powers, always suspected of wishing to impose
their domination. On the other hand, certain
Arab countries, particularly those close to the
Gule have long felt threatened by Iraq's military
power and territorial claims, above all since its
military victory over Iran in 1988 gave it promi-
nence in the Gulf. However, even in coalition
the Arab countries are probably not able effec-
tively to resist Saddam Hussein's large, experi-
enced and very well-armed army. The sover-
eigns of the states close to the Gulf, all
monarchies, could but feel solidarity with
Sheikh Jaber al Ahmed as Sabah of Kuwait, who
took refuge in Saudi Arabia after the aggression
on 2nd August, particularly as several of them
know they are threatened by social instability in
their countries, but they also had to take account
of public opinion, not always unfavourable to
Iraq. Strong pro-Saddam Hussein demonstra-
tions took place at the beginning of August in
Yemen, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco and the
Israeli-occupied territories. It is impossible to
obtain an exact picture ofthe probably changing
reactions of a public which is unable to express
its views freely, be it in Iraq or in other countries
which are opposed to it.
34. These were the conditions surrounding a
ministerial meeting of the Arab League in
Nicosia on 3rd August at which the Iraqi
aggression was condemned. This meeting was
followed by a meeting of Arab heads of state in
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Cairo on 10th August. After difficult discus-
sions, this Arab summit meeting adopted a reso-
lution condemning the lraqi aggression, calling
for the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces,
refusing recognition of the annexation of
Kuwait, subscribing to Security Council Resolu-
tions 660, 661 and 662 and deciding to respond
to Saudi Arabia's request for military assistance.
It was obviously the last point more than any
other that caused difliculties since it meant Arab
countries deploying their forces alongside Amer-
icans in Saudi Arabia against an Arab country.
Only twelve countries voted for the resolution:
the six Gulf countries plus Egypt, Syria,
Lebanon, Djibouti, Somalia and Morocco.
Tunisia did not take part in the summit meeting,
Algeria and Yemen abstained, Jordan, the
Sudan and Mauritania expressed reservations
and Iraq, Libya and the PLO voted against. Fur-
thermore, King Hussein of Jordan did his
utmost from the start of the crisis to find a com-
promise between Iraq and the countries deter-
mined to apply the sanctions voted by the
Security Council. His aim was to avoid a con-
frontation which would probably be disastrous
for his country, the inevitable corridor between
Israel and lraq, and alarge part of whose popu-
lation seems favourable to Iraq.
The position of the PLO and Israel in the crisis
caused by lraq
35. Your Rapporteur will now examine in
greater detail 
- 
although his remarks will still be
sketchy and incomplete - the reactions of the
PLO and the Palestinians in the occupied terri-
tories and Israel's attitude. The PLO and Israel
were the main subject of your Rapporteur's
analysis presented to the Assembly on 5th
December 1989. Moreover, he is convinced that
once Iraq has been made to see reason the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict will return to the
centre of international preoccupations and dom-
inate the situation in the Middle East.
36. The frustration of Palestinians must not
be underestimated after three years of intifada
and diplomatic and political attempts which
have failed to lead to negotiations between the
PLO and lsrael because of Israel's refusal to
make the slightest concession. Pro-Saddam
Hussein demonstrations in the occupied terri-
tories are due more to disappointment at the
absence of results from PLO mediation than a
sudden liking for the Iraqi leader. Among the
Palestinians and Arabs in general, the absence of
results also weakened the prestige of Egypt,
which had undertaken to mediate between the
PLO, the United States and Israel, and whose
return to the fold of Arab League states had
raised great hopes for the solution ofthe Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, the Lebanese question and
the crisis in the Middle East.
37. It should be added that Community
Europe, while supporting the American and
Egyptian initiatives, welcoming the political
evolution of the PLO and bringing pressure to
bear on Israel, has taken no action of its own to
solve the Palestinian problem. Finally, the Pal-
estinians were even more disappointed by Mr.
Gorbachev's perestroika which, in Gaza and the
West Bank, introduced large numbers of Soviet
Jews to Israel and a very sharp fall in Soviet mil-
itary assistance to friendly Arab countries. Nor
should it be forgotten that the United States
intemrpted its talks with the PLO in Tunis
shortly before lraq's occupation of Kuwait. This
offers some explanation for the Palestinian peo-
ple's pro-Saddam Hussein reaction, not only in
the occupied territories but also in Jordan,
although it does not justify the PLO's direct or
indirect support of Saddam Hussein. Your
Rapporteur believes this support to be detri-
mental to a fair solution to the Palestinian
problem. Moreover, in this connection there is
disagreement and even a deep split among Pal-
estinians and within the PLO. A change of
attitude is therefore not to be excluded. It is
even probable in the context ofthe search for a
political solution to the present crisis for which
the PLO is starting to define mediatory pro-
posals.
38. In any event, your Rapporteur fully
endorses the statement made to his Israeli
friends by Emil Habibi, the great Palestinian
writer living in Jerusalem:
'The Palestinians may have made mis-
takes in this crisis, but they are not
responsible for starting it. On the con-
trary, they may become its PrinciPal
victims. "
39. Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and its
threats to use chemical weapons against Israel
confirmed the many recent denunciations by
Israeli leaders of the danger constituted by
Saddam Hussein and his determination to
ensure that, through military means, Iraq will
play a dominating r6le in the region following
the end of the war against Iran. Among the
Israeli population, the fear of becoming the
target for an attack by chemical weapons
became very acute after the occupation of
Kuwait and, above all, since it became apparent
that the present crisis might lead to a devas-
tating war.
40. The Israeli Government for its part is
trying to derive the maximum political
advantage for the future from the attitude
adopted by the PLO and the divisions appearing
in the Palestinian organisation and the Arab
countries. So far, the Israeli Government's prin-
cipal achievement has been to have fully
restored the traditional relations of its alliance
with the United States. Prior to the Iraqi attack
in the Gulf, these relations had fallen to the
lowest level in the history of the Hebrew state
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because of its refusal of Mr. Baker's five points
relating to the holding of elections in the
occupied territories.
41. The most obvious result of the United
States' change of attitude is President Bush's
proposal to Congress to give Israel some of the
very advanced technology military equipment(F-15 and F-16 aircraft, Patriot surface-to-air
missiles, tanks, etc.) that the United States is to
withdraw from Western Europe in implemen-
tation of disarmament agreements. The low
profile it has so far adopted in the Gulf crisis at
the request of the United States did not prevent
the Israeli Government from issuing serious
warnings to Jordan, caught in a vice between
Israel, Iraq and internal opposition. Nor did this
low profile prevent certain Israeli circles and
American Jews from exercising strong pressure
on President Bush, his administration and Con-
gress, urging an immediate American military
offensive against Iraq.
42. The WEU Council's communiqu6 illus-
trates the ministers' full awareness of the situ-
ation in the Arab world, particularly when it
calls on the Arab countries to find a solution to
the problem raised by Saddam Hussein's
aggression. It is also important that the Council
has instructed its Chairman-in-Oflice, Mr.
Dumas, to make the necessary contacts with the
Arab League. However, one may wonder
whether, in present circumstances in the Arab
world, the League, or quite simply the leaders of
the Arab states, will be able to reach agreement
on the terms of such a settlement.
43. Nor must we be content with a settlement
of the acute crisis provoked by the invasion of
Kuwait and, if possible, a return to the status
quo ante. If the chronic instability of the Arab
world were to continue for any length of time,
there would always be other states, dictators or
charismatic leaders capable of rallying to their
cause all the frustration with which the Arab
world is fraught.
44. It is naturally for the Arabs themselves to
settle their political problems. However, the
international community should in future be
firmer in ensuring the widest possible respect for
human rights as set out in the United Nations
Universal Declaration. Saddam Hussein would
have been unable to start this crisis ifthe perse-
cution of the Kurds and the use of chemical
weapons against them had triggered the reac-
tions they deserved.
45. It is also for the Arabs to manage their oil
production and share the revenue they earn
from it, but the industrialised world must not
place its strength and influence with Arab coun-
tries at the service of r6gimes which are opposed
to the introduction of liberal, democratic prac-
tices. For instance, if lraq is successfully haltedin its tracks, this must not be taken as
endorsement of such rdgimes in the countries
threatened by Iraq. Clearly a more equitable
sharing of wealth is linked with the introduction
of such practices. To tackle such problems and
those relating to economic assistance, the twelve
EEC countries have decided to $ant Arab coun-
tries which are victims of the crisis and the
embargo Europe's share of the assistance to ref-
ugees promised by Mr. Perez de Cuellar on
behalf of the United Nations. In tackling the
political questions raised by the situation in the
Middle East, it would be most desirable for a
Euro-Arab conference to be held as soon as pos-
sible on the initiative of WEU, the EEC and the
Arab League.
46. However, there is above all one area in
which the western countries might act to
promote the establishment of lasting peace in
the Middle East, and that is the search for a rea-
sonable solution to the problem of the right to
self-determination of Palestinians in Gaza and
the West Bank and the closely-related problem
of Lebanon. When our Assembly adopted Rec-
ommendation 475 in December 1989, it showed
it was aware of this global aspect of Middle East
affairs and made a few specific proposals for
" fostering an international conference on peace
in the Middle East under the aegis of the United
Nations ". Some countries seem prepared to act
in this sense, as can be seen from the Franco-
Soviet declaration of 26th August:
* The two parties declared they were con-
vinced that this crisis again brought to
light the urgent need for more intensive
efforts to settle other crisis situations in
the Middle East, and particularly the Pal-
estinian question. They renew their
support for Arab action for the settlement
of the Lebanese crisis. "
Saddam Hussein is quite right to underline that
the international community showed it was
extremely weak when it came down to applying
these resolutions and he was probably
encouraged by this weakness. The settlement of
the Kuwait crisis should lead to the search for
acceptable solutions to the other problems
which, for more than forty years, have been poi-
soning life in the Middle East and preventing
the establishment of lasting peace.
47. The international community was more
than weak, it was even well-disposed and rather
irresponsible towards the arms race by lraq
which is now aiming wealrcns purchased abroad
against the interests of the countries which sold
it military equipment. President Gorbachev told
the lraqis that they had been given weapons to
defend themselves and not to attack other goun-
tries and he continued with criticism of the
Soviet Union for the massive military assistance
it had given Iraq in the past.
48. Such self-criticism also applies to Euro-
peans and other western nations. In spite of
100
DOCUMENT 1242
repeated denunciations by European parlia-
mentary assemblies and parliaments of the
various WEU and EEC member countries, our
governments have not 
- 
except perhaps in part
and to a limited extent by banning exports of
material that might be used to produce chemical
weapons 
- 
taken the necessary steps to prevent
the sale of highly-sophisticated weapons and
military technology and the granting of western
credit and financing for the production of
weapons of mass destruction since the end of the
war between lran and lraq. Our governments
failed to take effective steps, even after press
campaigns covering the Atlanta bank scandal
and, more recently, what would have been a
very long-range howitzer. The Council of Min-
isters gave a most unsatisfactory reply to
Assembly Recommendation 475, which made
specific, firm proposals for putting an end to the
arrns race in the Middle East.
Y. Conclusions
49. At the time of writing, it is impossible for
your Rapporteur to foresee how the crisis will
end, how far the show of force will go, whether
recourse to arms will effectively be avoided as
the United Nations wishes, with great unity and
frrmness, whether Saddam Hussein's rdgime will
survive and whether the cohesion shown by the
United Nations will continue. However, the
lessons to be learned from this matter will
depend on these various elements, but it is
already possible to draw certain conclusions.
50. The first concerns the vital r6le played by
the Security Council, which managed to define
action to be taken by the international com-
munity in face of the aggression and violations
of the law committed by Iraq and to ensure that
a large number of countries, including those
which decided to co-ordinate their naval action
in the framework of WEU, took the necessary
steps to ensure that the embargo it voted could
be applied effectively. This was obviously the
result of the evolution of the Soviet Union since
1985 and the end of the cold war in Europe. The
Soviet Union, while endeavouring to avoid any
deterioration in its relations with certain Arab
countries and after vain attempts to influence
Iraq, voted for Resolution 665 authorising coun-
tries taking part in the naval operations to resort
to force if absolutely necessary. China, which
had quite recently complained about being boy-
cotted after the 1989 repression, adopted a
similar attitude. Furthermore, the United States
Government was careful not to allow its forces
to take action before the vote on the resolution,
the text of which seems to have been carefully
negotiated between Moscow and Washington. In
short, the international community showed it
was capable of acting firmly, with moderation
and relative unanimity and, while it is not yet
sure that this action will be successful, it will cer-
tainly place the Iraqi Government in a very dif-
ficult position.
51. Moreover, it must be noted that Saddam
Hussein's attempts to break the ranks of coun-
tries determined to see that the sanctions are
respected have in general failed in spite of his
cynical use of the promise to free the hostages of
one or other country. To date, only Mr.
Waldheim, representing a neutral country that
plays no part either in the Security Council or in
the Gulf operations, has arranged for the release
of the Austrian hostages by a personal approach
whose impact is necessarily limited. The western
countries which, in the early days of the crisis,
seemed hesitant about how to tackle the
problem, endorsed the international action as
soon as it seemed likely to succeed.
52. This matter has thus allowed the United
Nations to improve its reputation in interna-
tional public opinion and this is a major step
towards organising world peace. At this newjuncture, no one will be able to resort to force
unilaterally to impose national interests against
the wishes of other states without being sure
beforehand, if not of the agreement, at least of
the absence of reaction of the Security Council
which will be able to play the r6le assigned to it
by the United Nations Charter with far gtreater
authority than hitherto.
53. WEU for its part has contributed to this
consolidation of international order, first by
basing its intervention on Security Council reso-
lutions and then by approaching the United
Nations to ask it to strengthen the measures
planned for imposing the application of the
embargo. Secondly, it encouraged the Arab
countries to assume responsibility for the
political settlement of the conflict, thus showing
that Europe is not pursuing any particular
interest in the matter and that its action is not
intended to weaken, but to consolidate under-
standing among the Arab countries. Finally,
since it co-ordinated member countries' national
operations in the Gulf in 1987-88, the WEU
Council has shown that it represented Europe in
security matters from the moment armed forces
were involved. The twofold holding in Paris on
21st August of the WEU ministerial meeting
which defined the political, juridical and mil-
itary bases for European action and the working
luncheon attended by representatives of the
Twelve to consider what attitude Europe should
adopt towards lraq's measures of coercion
against foreign nationals was a clear indication
of the complementarity of WEU and twelve-
power Europe. It throws light on the long-
standing discussion about their respective r6les
in the preparation of a European union. The
latter can but be the result of a synthesis of insti-
tutions which, as foreseen in the Single Act,
would converge to achieve the same aims.
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54. Similarly, while the North Atlantic
Council, meeting in Brussels on 6th August,
could but note agreement on the need to apply
sanctions against Iraq, it was unable to make
arrangements to ensure that they were applied
since the region is not covered by the Wash-
ington Treaty. Conversely, it confirmed its
support for Turkey in the event of it being
attacked. However, in areas where United States
aims and commitments to certain countries did
not tally exactly with those of the European
members of the Atlantic Alliance, only WEU
could ceordinate European action. On the other
hand, on-the-spot technical co.operation
between American forces and forces from WEU
countries is still possible. It even seems nec-
essary in certain respects as long as Europe does
not have the wherewithal to process images
obtained by satellites. But, according to the
American authorities themselves, WEU is the
instrument for inter-allied dialogue on all mat-
ters relating to threats to peace and security out-
side the area covered by the Atlantic Alliance.
55. For these reasons, the governments
should give careful consideration to all the pros-
pects offered by the new situation in Europe and
not overlook the importance of our organisation
or of the modified Brussels Treaty, since it is an
essential means for Europe to play an effective
part in peacekeeping in the world. While the
organisation of peace in Europe is primarily a
matter for the CSCE, the latter does not, at least
in the next few years, seem appropriate for
co-ordinating participating countries' action to
promote peace outside Europe. The utmost
account will have to be taken of this WEU
vocation in tackling the possible enlargement of
WEU and the treaty revision made necessary by
the accession of Portugal and Spain. It should
also be stressed that Article VIII, paragraph 3, of
the treaty, which the Assembly has often
regretted was not sufliciently binding on
member countries to consult each other in the
event of crises outside Europe, is proving, now
that it is being implemented, to be a highly ade-
quate instrument for co-operation in which each
member country, for quite understandable
reasons, wishes to retain control over its own
armed forces and the degree of its military
involvement. The present situation in Europe
seems to preclude earlier commitments being
taken any further. It should be recalled that it
took thirty-three years for Article VIII, para-
graph 3, to lead for the first time, in 1987, to
WEU military co-ordination outside the NATO
area. Three years later, on 26th August 1990, the
first meeting of chiefs of defence staff of the
WEU countries since the signing of the Paris
Agreernents in 1954 was a new stage and a major
political event because it places this military
co-ordination at the highest level.
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RESOLUTION 660
adopted by the Secudty Council
on 2nd August 1990
THp Sscunrrv Couuclr"
Aunueo by the invasion of Kuwait on 2nd August 1990 by the military forces of Iraq,
Drrrnrranruc that there exists a breach of international peace and security as regards the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait,
Acrnc under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations,
l. CoNpprvrNs the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait;
2. DnlaeNns that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in
which they were located on lst August 1990;
3. Ceus upon lraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of
their differences and supports all efforts in this regard and especially those of the League of Arab
States;
4. Drcprs to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance with the
present resolution.
RESOLUTION 661
adopted by the Security Council
on 6th Augast 1990
Tnn SrcunttY CouNctl,
Reaffirming its Resolution 660 of 2nd August 1990,
Deeply concerned that that resolution has not been implemented and that the invasion by Iraq
of Kuwait continues with further loss of human life and material destruction,
Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait,
Noting that the legitimate Government of Kuwait has expressed its readiness to comply with
Resolution 660,
Mindful of its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of
international peace and security,
Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, in response to the armed
attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
l. Determines that lraq so far has failed to comply with paragraph2 of Resolution 660 and has
usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;
2. Decides, as a consequence, to take the following measures to secure compliance of Iraq with par-
agraph 2 of Resolution 660 and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;
3. Decides that all states shall prevent;(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait
exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution;
(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to
promote ihe export or trans-shipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait; and any
dealings by their nationals or their flag vessels or in their territories in any commodities or products
originating in Iraq or Kuwait and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, including
in farticular any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purposes of such activities or dealings;
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(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any
commodities or products, including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not origi-
nating in their territories but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in
humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or
body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait, and any activities
by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply
of such commodities or products;
4. Decides that all states shall not make available to the Government of Iraq or to any commercial,
industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or economic
resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from
their territories or othenvise making available to that government or to any such undertaking any such
funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait,
except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian cir-
cumstances, foodstuffs;
5. Calls upon all states, including states non members of the United Nations, to act strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the present resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or
licence granted before the date of the present resolution;
6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the
Security Council, a committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to
undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recom-
mendations:
(a) To examine the reports on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution which
will be submitted by the Secretary-General;(b) To seek from all states further information regarding the action taken by them concerning the
effective implementation of the provisions laid down in the present resolution;
7. Calls upon 4l states to co-operate fully with the committee in the fulfilment of its task, including
supplying such information as may be sought by the committee in pursuance of the present resolution;-
8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the committee and to make
the necessary arrangements in the secretariat for the purpose;
9. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 through 8 above, nothing in the present resolution
shall prohibit assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and calls upon all states:(a) 
.To take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its
agencres;
(b) Not to recognise any r6gime set up by the occupying power;
10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of
the present resolution, the first report to be submitted within thirty days;
11. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early end to the
invasion by Iraq.
RESOLUTION 662
adopted by the Security Council
on 9th August 1990
Tsr Srcunrry CouNcrL,
Recalling its Resolutions 660 and 661,
Gravely alarmed by the declaration by Iraq of a * comprehensive and eternal merger " with
Kuwait,
Demanding, once again, that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the
positions in which they were located on lst August 1990,
Determined to bring- the occupatio-n of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait,
Determined also to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait,
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l. Decides that annexation of Kuwait by lraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal
validity, and is considered null and void;
2. Calls upon all states, international organisations and specialised agencies not to recognise that
annexation, and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recog-
nition of the annexation;
3. Further demands that lraq rescind its actions purporting to annex Kuwait;
4. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early end to the occu-
pation.
RESOLUTION 664
adopted by the Security Council
on l9th August 1990
Tur SrcunrrY CouNcrL,
Recalling the Iraqi invasion and purported annexation of Kuwait and Resolutions 660, 661 and
662,
Deeply concerned for the safety and well-being of third state nationals in Iraq and Kuwait,
Recalling the obligations of Iraq in this regard under international law,
Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to pursue urgent consultations with the
Government of lraq following the concern and anxiety expressed by the members of the Council on
17th August 1990,
Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,
1. Demands that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and lraq of the
nationals of third countries and grant immediate and continuing access of consular officials to such
nationals;
2. Further demands that lraq take no action to jeopardise the safety, security or health of such
nationals;
3. Reaffirms its decision in Resolution 662that annexation of Kuwait by lraq is null and void, and
therefore demands that the Government of Iraq rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic and
consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the immunity of their personnel and refrain from
any such actions in the future;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on compliance with this resolution at
the earliest possible time.
RESOLUTION 665
adopted by the Security Council
on 25th Augast 1990
Tnr Srcup.lrY CouNcrr,
Recalling its Resolutions 660, 661,662 and 664 and demanding their full and immediate imple-
mentation,
Having decided in Resolution 661 to impose economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations,
Determined to bring an end to the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq which imperils the existence of
a member state and to restore the legitimate authority, and the sovereignty, independence and terri-
torial integrity of Kuwait which requires the speedy implementation of the above resolutions,
Deploring the loss of innocent life stemming from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and determined
to prevent further such losses,
Gravely alarmed that Iraq continues to refuse to comply with Resolutions 660, 66L,662 and 664
and in particular at the conduct of the Government of lraq in using Iraqi flag vessels to export oil,
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1. Calls upon those member states co-operating with the Government of Kuwait which are
deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circum-
stances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward
maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict
implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in Resolution 661;
2. Invites member states accordingly to co-operate as may be necessary to ensure compliance with
the provisions of Resolution 661 with maximum use of political and diplomatic measures, in
accordance with paragraph I above;
3. Requests all states to provide in accordance with the Charter such assistance as may be required
by the states referred to in paragraph I of this resolution;
4. Further requests the states concerned to co-ordinate their actions in pursuit ofthe above para-
graphs of this resolution using as appropriate mechanisms of the military stalf committee and after
consultation with the Secretary-General to submit reports to the Security Council and its committee
established under Resolution 661 to facilitate the monitoring of the implementation of this resolution;
5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
RESOLUTION 666
dopte.d by the Suurity Council
on 13th September 1990
Tne SrcunrrY CouNctL,
Recalling its Resolution 661, paragraphs 3 (c) and 4 of which apply, except in humanitarian cir-
cumstances, to foodstuffs,
Recognising that circumstances may arise in which it will be necessary for foodstuffs to be sup
plied to the civilian population in Iraq or Kuwait in order to relieve human suffering,
Noting that in this respect the committee established under paragraph 6 of that resolution has
received communications from several member states,
Emphasising that it is for the Security Council, alone or acting through the committee, to
determine whether humanitarian circumstances have arisen,
Deeply concerned that Iraq has failed to comply with its obligations under Security Council Res-
olution 664 in respect of the safety and well-being of third state nationals, and reaflirming that lraq
retains full responsibility in this regard under international humanitarian law including, where appli-
cable, the fourth Geneva Convention,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
l. Decides that in order to make the necessary determination whether or not, for the purposes of
paragraph 3 (c) and paragraph 4 of Resolution 661 , humanitarian circumstances have arisen, the com-
mittee shall keep the situation regarding foodstuffs in Iraq and Kuwait under constant review;
2. Expects Iraq to comply with its obligations under Security Council Resolution 664 in respect of
third state nationals and reaflirm that Iraq remains fully responsible for their safety and well-being in
accordance with international humanitarian law including, where applicable, the fourth Geneva Con-
vention;
3. Requests, for the purposes of paragraphs I and 2 of this resolution, that the Secretary-General
seek urgently, and on a continuing basis, information from relevant United Nations and other appro-
priate humanitarian agencies and all other sources on the availability of food in lraq and Kuwait, such
information to be communicated by the Secretary-General to the committee regularly;
4. Requests further that in seeking and supplying such information particular attention will be paid
to such categories of persons who might suffer specially, such as children under 15 years of age,
expectant mothers, maternity cases, the sick and the elderly;
5. Decides that if the committee, after receiving the reports from the Secretary-General, determines
that circumstances have arisen in which there is an urgent humanitarian need to supply foodstuffs to
lraq or Kuwait in order to relieve human suffering, it will report promptly to the Council its decision as
to how such need should be met;
6. Directs the committee that in formulating its decisions it should bear in mind that foodstuffs
should be provided through the United Nations in co-operation with the International Committee of
the Red Cross or other appropriate humanitarian agencies and distributed by them or under their
supervision in order to ensure that they reach the intended beneficiaries;
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7. Requests the Secretary-General to use his good oflices to facilitate the delivery and distribution
of foodstuffs to Kuwait and Iraq in accordance with the provisions of this and other relevant resolu-
tions;
8. Recalls that Resolution 661 does not apply to supplies intended strictly for medical purposes,
but in this connection recommends that medical supplies should be exported under the strict super-
vision of the government of the exporting state or by appropriate humanitarian agencies.
RESOLUTION 667
*'l{rol,r'Y,ffiHf;;6"u
Tnn SrcuntrY CoultclL,
Reaffirming its Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665 and 666,
Recalling the Vienna Conventions of l8th April 196l on diplomatic relations and of 24th April
1963 on consular relations, to both of which Iraq is a parly,
Considering that the decision of Iraq to order the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in
Kuwait and to wilhdraw the immunity and privileges of these missions and their personnel is contrary
to the decisions of the Security Council, the international conventions mentioned above and interna-
tional law,
Deeply concerned that Iraq, notwithstanding the decisions of the Security Council and the.provi-
sions of th-e conventions mentioned above, has committed acts of violence against diplomatic missions
and their personnel in Kuwait,
Outraged at recent violations by Iraq of diplomatic premises in Kuwait and at the abduction of
personnel enjoying diplomatic immunity and foreign nationals who were present in these premises,
Considering that the above actions by Iraq constitute aggressive acts, and a flagrant violation of
its international -obligations which strike at the root of the conduct of international relations in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
Recalling that Iraq is fully responsible for any use of violence against foreign nationals or against
any diplomatic or consular mission in Kuwait or its personnel,
Determined to ensure respect for its decisions and for Article 25 of the Charter of the United
Nations,
Further considering that the grave nature oflraq's actions, which constitute a new escalation of
its violations of international law, obtiges the Council not only to express its immediate reaction but
also to consult urgently to take further concrete measures to ensure Iraq's compliance with the Coun-
cil's resolutions,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
l. Strongly condemns aggtessive acts perpetrated by lraq against diplomatic premises and-per-
sonnel in Kuwait, includiig the abduction of foreign nationals who were present in those
premises;
2. Demands the immediate release of those foreign nationals as well as all nationals mentioned in
Resolution 664;
3. Further demands that Iraq immediately and fully comply with its international obligations
under Resolutions 660, 662 and 66e of the Security Council, the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic
and consular relations and international law;
4. Further demands that Iraq immediately protect the safety and well-being of diplomatic and con-
sular personnel and premises in-Kuwait and in Iraq and take no action to hinder the diplomatic and
consuiar missions inihe performance of their functions, including access to their nationals and the pro-
tection of their person and interests;
5. Reminds all states that they are obliged to observe strictly Resolutions 661,662,664, 665 and
666;
6. Decides to consult urgently to take further concrete measures as soon as poss-ible, under Chapter
VII of the Charter, in resfonse to lraq's continued violation of the Charter, of resolutions of the
Council and of international law.
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RESOLUTION
adopted at the Arub summit meeting,
Cairo, lfih Augast 1990
Meeting in Cairo on l0th August 1990, the Arab extraordinary summit meeting:
- 
after consulting the resolution of the Ministerial Council of the Arab League following the
extraordinary meeting held in Cairo on 2nd and 3rd August;
- 
after consulting the communiqu6 issued on 2nd August 1990 at the nineteenth meeting of the
Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference;
- 
on the basis of the provisions of the Arab League Pact and the treaty on joint Arab defence
and economic co-operation;
- 
on the basis of the United Nations Charter, in particular paragraph 4 of Article 2 and
Articles 25 and 5l;
- 
aware of the overwhelming historical responsibility dictated by the difficult circumstances
resulting from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its dangerous consequences for the Arab
nation, Arab national security and the overriding interests of the Arab nation,
Drcrpes As FoLLows:
L The summit confirms the resolution of the Ministerial Council of the League of 3rd August
1990 and the communiqud of the OIC of 4th August 1990;
2. The summit reaffirms respect for Security Council Resolutions 660,661 and 662 dated 2nd, 6th
and 9th August 1990 respectively insofar as they express international legality;
3. The summit condemns the Iraqi aggression against our brother Kuwait, refuses to recognise
Iraq's decision to annex Kuwait or any other consequences resulting from the invasion of Kuwaiti ter-
ritory by Iraqi armed forces and insists on the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces and their return to
the positions they occupied prior to lst August 1990;
4. The summit reaflirms the sovereignty of Kuwait, its independence and territorial integrity as a
member state of the Arab League, stresses the need for the return of the legitimate Kuwaiti
Government which was in place prior to lst August last and supports any measure adopted by that gov-
ernment to free its territory and recover its sovereignty;
5. The summit deplores Iraqi threats to Arab Gulf states, disapproves of the concentration of Iraqi
troops along the frontiers of Saudi Arabia and reaflirms the wholehearted solidarity of the Arab coun-
tries with that country and the other Arab Gulf states;
The summit supports the measures adopted by Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states
which are using the right to lawful defence in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the treaty
of joint defence and economic co-operation between the member states of the Arab League,
Article 5l of the United Nations Charter and Resolution 661 of the Security Council of 6th August
1990, it being understood that these measures will be withdrawn as soon as Iraqi forces have been com-
pletely withdrawn from Kuwait and there has been a return to legal power in Kuwait;
6. The summit decides to answer positively the request from Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf
states concerning the deployment of Arab forces to support their own armed forces so that they may
defend their territories and sovereignty against all external aggression;
7. The Arab extraordinary summit instructs the Secretary-General of the Arab League to follow the
implementation of this resolution and to submit a report to the Ministerial Council of the League
within fifteen days so that it may adopt the measures it considers necessary in this connection.
108
1
I
Hl
I
{
{
{
t:
iI
lr
ll
APPENDIX III DOCUMENT 1242
APPENDIX III
STATEMENT BY THE TWELVE
on the lraqi invasion of Kuwait
Brusselg 2nd August 1990
The Community and its member states have followed with apprehension during the last weeks
the increase in tension in the dispute between lraq and some Arab countries. They have welcomed the
diplomatic efforts that Arab countries and the Arab League itself were deploying and refrained from
any stance and initiative in order to preserve such initiatives from any interference.
Following the breakdown of talks held in Jeddah under Arab auspices, the Community and its
member states are now gravely concerned at the latest developments in the dispute and in particular at
the military aggression carried out by Iraq against Kuwait, not only a hostile action to a neighbour
country, but also a dangerous threat to peace and stability in the region.
The Community and its member states strongly condemn the use of force by a member state of
the United Nations against the territorial integrity of another state; this constitutes a breach of the
United Nations Charter and an unacceptable means to solve international difference. They therefore
fully support the resolution adopted today by the Security Council.
The Community and its member states call upon all governments to condemn this unjustified
use of force and to work for an early re-establishment of the conditions for the immediate resumption
of peaceful negotiations. In this light they ask for an immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from
Kuwaiti territory.
The Community and its member states maintain the matter under review and are ready to take
into consideration further initiatives.
STATEMENT BY THE TWELYE
on the lra4i invasion of Kuwait
Brussels, lth August 1990
The Community and its member states reiterate their unreserved condemnation of the brutal
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and their demand for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi
forces from the territory of Kuwait, already expressed in their statement of 2nd August.
They consider groundless and unacceptable the reasons provided by the lraqi Government tojustify the military aggression against Kuwait, and they will refrain from any act which may be con-
sidered as implicit recognition of authorities imposed in Kuwait by the invaders.
In order to safeguard the interests of the legitimate Government of Kuwait they have decided to
take steps to protect all assets belonging directly or indirectly to the state of Kuwait.
The Community and its member states confirm their full support for United Nations Security
Council Resolution 660 and call on Iraq to comply with the provisions of that resolution. If the Iraqi
authorities fail so to comply, the Community and its member states will work for, support and
implement a Security Council resolution to introduce mandatory and comprehensive sanctions.
As of now, they have decided to adopt the following:
- 
an embargo on oil imports from Iraq and Kuwait;
- 
appropriate measures aimed at freezing Iraqi assets in the territory of member states;
- an embargo on sales of arms and other military equipment to Iraq;
- 
the suspension of any co-operation in the military sphere with Iraq;
- 
the suspension of technical and scientific co-operation with Iraq;
- 
the suspension of the application to Iraq of the system of generalised preferences.
The Community and its member states reiterate their firm conviction that disputes between
states should be settled by peaceful means, and are prepared to participate in any effort to defuse the
tension in the area.
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They are in close contact with the governments of several Arab countries and follow with utmost
attention the discussion within the Arab League and the Gulf Co-operation Council. They hope that
Arab initiatives will contribute to the restoration of international legality and of the legitimate Gov-
ernment of Kuwait. The Community and its member states are ready to lend their full support to such
initiatives and to efforts to resolve by negotiations the differences between the states concerned.
The Community and its member states are carefully monitoring the situation of EC nationals in
Iraq and in Kuwait. They maintain strict co-ordination in order to guarantee their safety.
STATEMENT BY THE TWELVE
on the situation in the Gulf(Extraordinary EPC miaisteriol me.etiag)
Brussels, l(hh August 1990
The invasion of Kuwait by lraqi forces has already provoked an unreserved condemnation by
the Community and its member states, which have not only called for the immediate and uncondi-
tional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from the territory of Kuwait, but also clearly stated the unaccepta-
bility of the situation created by Iraqi military aggression against Kuwait.
Accordingly they reject the announced annexation of Kuwait which is contrary to international
law and therefore null and void, as stated in United Nations Security Council Resolution 662. The
same applies to the announced removal of diplomatic missions from Kuwait and to any attempt by the
Iraqi authorities to exert powers of government within the territory of Kuwait.
They have noted with appreciation the wide international solidarity which developed following
the aggression and led to effective action by the United Nations Security Council. They welcome the
r6le played by the United Nations and they will strive to maintain and further enhance such interna-
tional solidarity.
The Community and its member states immediately after the Iraqi invasion adopted a set of
measures against Iraq and subsequently have swiftly introduced legislation to implement United
Nations Security Council Resolution 661, which they consider a fundamental instrument to restore
international legality.
The Community and its member states have already expressed their grave concern for the situ-
ation of foreigners in Iraq and Kuwait. No effort or initiative will be spared to ensure that EC citizens
be allowed full and unconditional freedom of movement within and out of those countries. Precise
requests to this end have already been addressed to the Iraqi authorities, whom they hold fully
accountable for the safety of their citizens. The presidency will continue to ensure the appropriate
co-ordination aimed at guaranteeing the safety of EC citizens in Iraq and Kuwait.
The Community and its member states, having also in mind the vital European interests in the
stability, territorid integrity and sovereignty ofthe states ofthe atea, are ready to take further initia-
tives, in the framework of the United Nations Charter, that will prove necessary to contain the conflict.
They note that certain member states have already taken useful steps also to this end. They are strongly
determined to engage in broad efforts to afford the necessary international solidarity with other states
in the area threatened by the same aggressor in their efforts to comply with United Nations Security
Council Resolution 661, and to force Iraq to restore Kuwait sovereignty in compliance with United
Nations Security Council Resolution 662.
They have decided to maintain close contact with Arab governments and to offer their assistance
to Arab efforts aimed at defusing tensions and restoring international legality, within the framework of
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660, 661 and 662. They hope that the summit of Arab
heads of state and government convened today in Cairo may take concrete measures to this end. The
presidency will discuss with the Arab side the possibility of co-operation aimed at achieving this
common purpose.
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STATEMENT BY THE TWELYE
on the situation of forcigners in lra1 and Kuwait(Extraordinary EP|C ministerial meeting)
Paris,2lst August 1990
The Community and its member states, deeply concerned at the situation of foreigners in Iraq
and Kuwait, renew their condemnation of the Iraqi decision to detain them against their will as con-
trary to international law and fully support the Security Council Resolution 664 which requires lraq to
permit and facilitate their immediate departure from Iraq and Kuwait. They denounce that the Iraqi
Government has reacted up to now negatively to many representations of the Community and its
member states.
As members of the international community, which is founded not only on law but also on clear
ethical standards, the European Community and its member states express their indignation at lraq's
publicised intention to group such foreigners in the vicinity of military bases and objectives, a measure
they consider particularly heinous as well as taken in contempt of the law and of basic humanitarian
principles. In this context the fact that some foreigners have been prevented from contacting their con-
sular or diplomatic missions or have been forcibly moved to unknown destinations is a source of
further deep concern and indignation. In this connection, they attach the greatest importance to the
mission of two envoys of the Secretary-General of the United Nations which is now taking place. They
warn the Iraqi Government that any attempt to harm or jeopardise the safety of any EC citizen will be
considered as a most grave offence directed against the Community and all its member states and will
provoke a united response from the entire Community. They also warn Iraqi citizens that they will be
held personally responsible in accordance with international law for their involvement in illegal actions
concerning the security and life of foreign citizens.
They call on all those who may still influence the decisions of the Iraqi Government to have
these measures revoked and support the actions of the Security Council and the Secretary-General of
the United Nations to this purpose. They confirm their commitment to do all in their power to ensure
the protection of the foreigners in Iraq and Kuwait and reiterate that they hold the Iraqi Government
fully responsible for the safety of their nationals.
The Community and its member states, in the light of their condemnation of the Iraqi aggression
against Kuwait as well as of their refusal to recognise the annexation of that state to Iraq, firmly reject
the unlawful Iraqi demand to close the diplomatic missions in Kuwait and reiterate their resolve to
keep those missions open in view also of the task of protecting their nationals.
The Community and its member states note with satisfaction that this position is shared by a
great number of countries and is confirmed by Security Council Resolution 664, which requires the
reversal of the illegal demand to close the diplomatic missions.
STATEMENT BY THE TWELVE
on the crisis in the Gulf(Extraordinary EPC ministerial meeting)
Rome, 7th Septembcr 1990
The European Community and its member states reaffirm their full support for the implemen-
tation in all aspects of the resolutions of the Security Council relating to the crisis in the Gulf and their
determination to be active in ensuring that they are respected. The European Community and its
member states are convinced that a complete implementation of the embargo decided by the Security
Council with regard to Iraq is the essential condition for bringing about a peaceful solution to the
crisis. They are fully implementing the embargo and call on all members of the international com-
munity to do likewise.
The Community and its member states are conscious of the grave burden which the present
crisis imposes on the economy of many countries. They are therefore determined to contribute to the
effort being made by such countries to address the situation and faithfully implement the embargo.
Countries most immediately affected by the implementation of the embargo, and notably Egypt,
Jordan and Turkey, have applied for assistance to offset those short-term effects. The Community and
its member states have taken a decision on the principle of extending such short-term financial
assistance to these three countries. This assistance will take place in the framework of concerted action
with other industrialised countries as well as with the countries of the region. The General Affairs
Council will take appropriate decisions at its forthcoming meeting on the basis of Commission pro-
posals and the results of consultations with third countries.
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In this situation, it is essential that international oo-operation is intensified and that the interna-
tional institutions (IMF, World Bank, GATT and other bodies like the Paris Club) play their full r6le.
The newly-created EBRD should also contribute to the solution of the diffrculties for the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe. It is of crucial importance that all efforts are made to prevent the affected
economies turning in on themselves.
In addition to the humanitarian aid already provided, a major effort is necessary to assist in the
repatriation of refugees from Iraq and Kuwait. The Community is ready to commit a substantial
amount from its own budgetary resources for additional humanitarian aid. Member states will con-
tribute to the joint effort, notably by providing transportation facilities.
The Community and its member states reiterate their readiness to continue the political dialogue
and to strive for an early opening and a rapid conclusion of the trade agreement negotiations with the
GCC countries.
The Community will speed up work already under way concerning the intensification of the
Community's Mediterranean policy.
The European Community and its member states are moreover resolved to contribute to the
bringing into being of a policy of regional co-operation aimed at influencing, in a constructive way, the
solution of structural problems which afflict the Mediterranean area and the Middle East under the
aspects of stability and of economic and social well-being. The forthcoming Palma meeting in the
context of CSCE will be an important occasion to contribute to the much needed longer-term reflection
on these problems.
STATEMENT BY THE TWELVE
on thc situation of foreiga citizens in Iraq and Kuwait(Extruardinary EPC ministerid meetitg
Rome, 7th September 1990
The European Community and its member states reaflirm their utter condemnation of the mea-
sures taken by the Iraqi authorities against foreign citizens in Iraq and Kuwait and against embassies in
Kuwait. They insist on full respect of the right to freedom of movement of foreign citizens in those
countries. They regard these measures as totally unacceptable and contrary to international law and
will continue to react to them with complete solidarity.
The Community and its member states deplore the fact that despite the efforts made by the Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations through his emissaries and in person in the recent discussions in
Amman, the Iraqi authorities have not complied with Resolution 664, in which the Security Council
requires Iraq to permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of
third countries. They express the urgent wish that the Secretary-General of the United Nations could
pursue his efforts and extend them to the situation of the diplomatic and consular representations in
Kuwait by sending a mission in order to establish contact with them.
The Community and its member states look for the early resumption of discussions between the
Iraqi authorities and the ICRC and urge them to co'operate fully with the ICRC's efforts to establish
forms of protection and assistance for foreign citizens held in Iraq and Kuwait.
They reiterate that the Iraqi authorities are obliged to allow all foreign citizens and not only
women and children, held against their will, to leave. The Community and its member states remain
determined to do what is necessary to ensure their protection. They hold the Iraqi authorities fully
responsible, in accordance with international law 
- 
including in their individual capacities 
- 
for the
safety of foreign citizens.
They call on all those who may still influence the decisions of the lraqi Government to have
these measures revoked and support the actions of the Security Council and the Secretary-General of
the United Nations to this purpose. They confirm their commitment to do all in their power to ensure
the protection of the foreigners in lraq and Kuwait and reiterate that they hold the Iraqi Government
fully responsible for the safety of their nationals.
The Community and its member states, in the light of their condemnation of the Iraqi aggression
against Kuwait as well as of their refusal to recognise the annexation of that state to Iraq, firmly reject
the unlawful Iraqi demand to close the diplomatic missions in Kuwait and reiterate their resolve to
keep those missions open in view also of the task of protecting their nationals.
The Community and its member states note with satisfaction that this position is shared by a
great number of countries and is confirmed by Security Council Resolution 664, which requires the
reversal of the illegal demand to close the diplomatic missions.
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UNITED STATES.SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT
Moscow, 3rd August 1990
The Soviet Union and the United States, as members of the United Nations Security Council,
consider it important that the Council promptly and decisively condemn the brutal and illegal invasion
of Kuwait by Iraqi military forces. The United States and the Soviet Union believe that now it is
essential that the Security Council resolution be fully and immediately implemented.
By its actions, Iraq has shown its contempt for the most fundamental principles of the United
NationiCharter and international law. In response to this blatant transgression of the basic norms of
civilised conduct, the United States and the Soviet Union have each taken a number of actions,
including the Soviet suspension of arms deliveries and the American freezing of assets. The Soviet
Union and the United States reiterate their call for an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
Sovereignty, national independence, legitimate authorities and territorial integrity of the state of
Kuwait must be completely restored and safeguarded. The United States and the Soviet Union believe
the international community must not only condemn this action, but also take practical steps in
response to it.
Today, we take the unusual step of jointly calling upon the rest of the international community
to join with us in an international cutoffof all arms supplies to Iraq. In addition, the Soviet Union and
thg United States call on regional organisations, especially the League of Arab states, all Arab govern-
ments, as well as the non-aligned movement and the Islamic conference, to take all possible steps to
ensure that the United Nations Security Council resolution is implemented.
Governments that engage in blatant aggression must know that the international community
cannot and will not acquiesce in nor facilitate aggression.
JOINT STATEMENT
issued by President Bush and President Gorbachev following their meeting
Helsinki, 9th September 1990
We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No peaceful interna-
tional order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbours.
We reaffirm the joint statement of our foreign ministers of 3rd August 1990 and our support for
United Nations Securily Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665. Today we once again call
upon the Government irf Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait, to allow the restoration of
Kuwait's legitimate government, and to free all hostages now held in Iraq and Kuwait.
Nothing short of the complete implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions is acceptable. Nothing short of a return to the pre-2nd August status of Kuwait can end Iraq's
isolation.
We call upon the entire world community to adhere to the sanctions mandated by the United
Nations, and we pledge to work, individually and in concert, to ensure full compliance with the
sanctions.
At the same time, the United States and the Soviet Union recognise that United Nations
Security Council Resolution 661 permits, in humanitarian circumstances, the importation into Iraq
and Kuwait of food. The Sanctions Committee will make recommendations to the Security Council on
what would constitute humanitarian circumstances.
The United States and the Soviet Union further agree that any such imports must be strictly
monitored by the appropriate international agencies to ensure that food reaches only those for whom it
is intended, with special priority being given to meeting the needs of children.
Our preference is to resolve the crisis peacefully, and we will be united against Iraq'-s aggression
as long as the crisis exists. However, we are determined to see this aggression.end, and if the current
steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones consistent with the United Nations
Chirter. We must demonstrate beyond any doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay.
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As soon as the objectives mandated by the United Nations Security Council resolutions men-
tioned above have been achieved, and we have demonstrated that aggression does not pay, the presi-
dents direct their foreign ministers to work with countries in the region and outside it to develop
regional security structures and measures to promote peace and stability. It is essential to work actively
to resolve all remaining conflicts in the Middle East and Gulf. Both sides will continue to consult each
other and initiate measures to pursue these broader objectives at the proper time.
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APPENDIX V
COMMUNIQUE BY Mr. PONTILLON
n^'tr#,,%:l'off,Y,AssembtY
Mr. Robert Pontillon, President of the Assembly of Western European Union, strongly con-
demns the invasion and military occupation of Kuwait by lraqi troops. On behalf of all members of the
Assembly, he calls for the evai:uation and immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwaiti ter-
ritory.
He requests the governments of all WEU countries to have recourse, if necessary, to paragraph 3
of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.
He calls upon the United Nations to take all necessary steps to resolve this conflict in a just
manner and wittt-due regard for the principles of international law and the United Nations Charter.
He requests the governments of the member states of the Arab League - and particularly those
belonging to the Gulf eo-operation Council who are linked to Kuwait by a mutual defence treaty - to
assesithe importance of their responsibilities towards the community worldwide and to take whatever
political and -diplomatic action may be necessary to put an end to this violation of international law by
Iraq.
He unreservedly supports the measures announced jointly by the United States and the Soviet
Union.
COMMUNIQUE
issued at tlu close of thc ministerial meeting
of thc Council of Westem European Union
Paris,2lst August 1990
l. The Foreign and Defence Ministers of WEU met on 2lst August 1990 to discuss the situation in
the Gulf causedby the Iraqi invasion and then the annexation of Kuwait. The meeting wqs held pur-
suant to Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the WEU treaty, the Rome declaration of October 1984 and the
ptatform on European security interests of October 1987, which provides for member countries to
ioncert their policies on crises outside Europe insofar as they may affect European security interests.
2. The ministers of the WEU member states repeat their unreserved condemnation of the invasion
and annexation of Kuwait by Iraq and call on Iraq to comply immediately and-unconditionally with
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660 and 662. They restate their firm determination to
continue to take all neiessary steps to comply with the embargo of Iraq in accordance with United
Nations Security Council Reiolution 661 and to render it effective. They call on the Security Council
to take any further useful measures to this end.
3. Ministers declare that the determination their countries intend to display in upholding the law is
for the sole purpose of ending aggression and its consequences. The action they have initiated is aimed
at upholding respect of the priniiptes which obtain in relations.among states, for they concern the
whole international community and serve as a safeguard for all its members.
4. Faced with a situation that in the first instance affects the Arab states, ministers emphasise the
solidarity linking their countries to the Arab world and their resolve to support its efforts to seek a
solution-from within which respects the relevant Security Council resolutions in the context of their
ongoing co-operation and dialogue with the Arab world.
5. Ministers express their acute concern and indignation at the restrictions on the freedom of
movement of nationals of the member countries and at the inhuman treatment inflicted on some of
those nationals. They warn lraq of the grave consequences that would inevitab_ly ensue were their
safety to be placed lt risk. They reiterate their support for Security Council Resolution 664 and
demand that Iraq complies with it without delay.
6. They stress that WEU member countries, bearing in mind the vital Europeal-r interests in the sta-
bility, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the states of the area, intend to contribute towards further
enhincing the unprecedi:nted internaiional solidarity that has developed since the aggression.and has
led to eff6ctive aition by the United Nations Securily Council. The countries that are suffering from
the economic consequences of this action deserve their solidarity.
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7. Ministers welcome the measures being taken by member states in support of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 661 and in response to the requests for assistance from states in the Gulf
region, with the aim of obliging Iraq unconditionally to withdraw its troops from Kuwaiti territory and
restore Kuwait's sovereignty.
8. They have decided closely to co-ordinate their operations in the area aimed at implementing and
enforcing the measures mentioned in paragraph 7, as well as any further measures the Security Council
may adopt, also assuring, by common agreement, the protection of their forces. Building on the expe-
rience acquired, including the consultation mechanisms during the Gulf operations in 1987 and 1988,
they have instructed an ad hoc group of foreign and defence ministry representatives to ensure the
most effective co-ordination in capitals and in the region. This should cover among other things overall
operational concepts and specific guidelines for co-ordination between forces in the region, including
areas ofoperation, sharing oftasks, logistical support and exchange ofintelligence. Contact points are
being nominated in the ministries of defence to assist with co-operation at the practicaUtechnical level
and, as an immediate step, to prepare for a meeting of chiefs of defence staffto be held in the next few
days.
9. Ministers emphasise that co'ordination within WEU should also facilitate co-operation with
other countries deploying forces in the region, including those of the United States.
10. The presidency of the Council will inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the
outcome of this meeting.
STATEMENT BY MT. PONTILLON
President of tne WEU Assembly
at the close of the WEU ministerial meaing
Paris,2lst August 1990
The WEU Assembly has constantly stressed the implications of events in the Near and Middle
East for Europe's security, and in particular its Mediterranean dimension.
It looks to the Council to continue to organise member countries'consultations and reactions so
as to respond immediately and vigorously to the aggression committed by lraq against Kuwait because
it is a challenge to all the principles underlying international peace based on the law of nations. There
must also be a response to the very serious violations of human rights committed by Iraq on this
occasion and Security Council resolutions must be made fully effective.
It considers that the seriousness of the situation created by the Iraqi aggression requires the
establishment of a joint strategy by the Western European countries and its effective implemen-
tation.
It therefore urges the Council to pursue the consultations started on 2lst August in order to
define Europe's security interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It recalls the importance
that it attaches to the deployment of all the instruments necessary for this security, including the devel-
opment of European observation satellites.
It welcomes the fact that the Council considers that the threats to the maintenance of interna-
tional peace require an immediate meeting of the chiefs-of-staff of member countries' armies to
organise Europe's participation in the measures that will have to be taken by the international com-
munity to restore peace. The Assembly, which has advocated the formation of a committee of chiefs-
of-staff of member countries, considers that such co-operation, essential until a lasting, peaceful order
has been restored in the Middle East, is a decisive step towards a European security organisation.
PRESS COMMUNIQUE
issued at the close of the mecting of the
Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly
Paris,2lst August 1990
The Presidential Committee of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU met in Paris following the
meeting of the Council of Ministers of that organisation. Representatives of all member countries and
all political groups were present.
Fully informed by its talks with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence of
France, Chairmen-in-Oflice of the Council, and with the Secretary-General of WEU, the Presidential
Committee approved the conclusions reached by the Ministers.
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In particular, the Presidential Committee expressed its indignation at the violation of interna-
tional law represented by the invasion and annexation of Kuweit and Iraq's threats to Saudi Arabia
and other Arab states. It considered that fundamental human rights had been seriously violated by the
taking of hostages among foreign nationals. Finally, it expressed the utmost concern at Iraq's threat to
member countries' economic life and that of developing countries.
It urged Iraq to apply United Nations Resolutions 660 and 662 immediately and welcomed the
fact that the Council had itressed the importance of the r6le of the Arab countries in this affair.
MEETING OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF
OF THE WEU MEMBER STATES
Paris, 27th August 1990
Information issued to the press
l. [n conformity with the decisions reached during the joint meeting of the WEU defence and
foreign affairs miniiters held on 2lst August, the chiefs-of-staffof the armies of these countries or their
representatives as well as the WEU Deputy Secretary-General, have met in Paris on 27th August.
This meeting has been the first in the history of the organisation.
2. The chiefs of staff have examined a set of military provisions, in view of achieving a close
co-cordination, in the area covered by the crisis, of their activities carried out to enforce the emba[g9
against Iraq and Kuwait, on the basis of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 661 and 665.
These measures cover the following aspects: mission definition, deployment co-ordination,
action zones, information exchange, logistic and operational support, mutual protection of the vessels
in the area.
3. The work carried out during this meeting aims at translating in military terms the will which was
expressed, during the ministerial meeting held on 21st August, by all the member countries, to show-
thiough concrete-steps their determination and solidarity in the face of the invasion and annexation of
Kuwait by Iraq.
AD HOC GROUP OF FOREIGN AND DEFENCE MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVES (PARIS)
31st August 1990
l. In accordance with the decisions taken by WEU foreign and defence ministers on 2lst August
there have been further meetings of the co-ordinating ad hoc group representing foreign and defence
ministries as well as meetings between chiefs of defence staff and naval experts. As a result, joint spe-
cific guidelines have been agreed upon for co-ordination of naval opeEtions of IVEU members in the
Gulf-region, aimed at securing the effective implementation of the United Nations embargo against
Iraq and the occupied territory of Kuwait on the basis of Resolution 665.
These guidelines address the following areas of co-operation:
- 
the scale and nature of their deployments,
- 
areas of operations,
- 
execution of the mission,
- 
exchange of information,
- 
logistic and operational support,
- 
co-ordination structures.
Collective co-ordinating mechanisms are already in place between capitals as well as in the Gulf
region to put these guidelines into practice.
2. All WEU countries will contribute to the effort, directly or indirectly. WEU countries currently
plan to deploy by September more than thirty naval vessels in the area.
3. WEU countries will play a full part in co-ordinating their activities with other forces taking part
in the implementation of the embargo decided by the United Nations.
4. The presidency will inform the United Nations of the implementation of the embargo through
the naval presence of the forces in the region.
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Consequences of the invosion of Kuwait: operations in the Gulf
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee2
by Mr. De Hoop Schetfer, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DncFT RrcouurNpnrroN
on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: operations in the Gulf
Exptexnronv MruonnNouu
submitted by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. Iraq: the military forces and policy options
(i) Armv(ii) Air force(iir) Navy
(iv,) Arms deployed in Kuwait and South Iraq
III. The responses of the United States and other nations
IV. Western European Union reactions and initiatives
Command and control
V. Conclusions
(y' Burden-sharing and the American connection(irl Observation satellites(iii) The immediate future
AppeuorcEs
I. External naval forces in the Gulf area
II. External naval forces in transit to the Gulf
III. External air forces in the Gulf area
IV. Foreign troops stationed in Gulf states
V. Armed forces of countries in the Gulf region
YI. Iraq's air forces
1. Adopted in committee by 16 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.
2. Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mn Uyuendaele (Vice-Chairmen); MM.
Alloncle, Bassinet, Borderas, Cariglia, Chevalier, Cox (Alternate: Thompson), De Decker, Dees, Ewing (Alternate: Lord Newaltl,
Fernandes Mar4ues, Fiandrotti, Fillon, Fioret, Foun4, Irmer, Jung Kittelmann, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, IItrM. Man's, Mota Torres,
Moya, P*chioli (Alternate: Cannato), Perinat, Romero, Scheer, Sinesio (Alternate: Stegagnini), Speed, Steiner,Sir John Stokes,
MM. Vieira Mesquita, Zierer.
N.B. Tie names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommcndation
on ttu conse4uerces oI iyrifsfrf of l{anait:
l. The Assembly approves the action taken by the Council in invoking Article VIII, paragraph 3, of
the modified Bruss-els-Treaty as a result of lraq's aggression against and occupation of Kuwait.
The Assembly welcomes the Council's readiness to place WEU co-ordination in the context of
the implementation of United Nations Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665.
The Assembly supports the Council's decision, not only to convene the meeting of the M-lnp-
terial Council, but itso to constitute an ad hoc group to cover the Gulf crisis and especially to call the
first meeting, under direct WEU auspices, of the chiefs of defence staffs.
The Assembly believes that the Council should remain open to the idea of_further co-operation
and co-ordination Lt different levels over all aspects of operations in the Gulf area and therefore
RrcouurNos that the necessary steps be taken toformalise the Gulf ad hoc group to co-r_rsider policy
and implementation on a day-tb-day basis, as long as the present crisis lasls, and urges all WEU nations
to provide maximum information t6 the operational cell being run in the French Ministry of Defence.
2. Concerned that the proliferation of vessels in the Gulf area could lead to problems in the very
near future, the Assembly RrcorrarvrpNps that further consultations take place immediately at govern-
mental level to establish 6ommon command and control in the various Gulf zones already agreed and
further RecouurNps that urgent measures be taken to harmonise rules of engagement at least within
each zone, and ensure that rEcognition procedures (IFF) are properly co-ordinated between all aircraft
and naval units to assure the safety of friendly forces.
3. The Assembly considers that WEU could play a useful r6le in helping to ceordinate^(perhaps in
conjunction with oiher agencies) logistic support, reinforcement and resupply for the Gulf operations
and that WEU nations'issets for iea- and airlift might be provided, in some cases where combat
forces, for whatever reason, may not be available, and RecouMENDs that the Council study the options
for providing such assistance without delay.
4. Disappointed that the transatlantic presentation of WEU's contribution to support the United
Nations' efforts to solve the crisis in the Gulf has yet to have an impact, the Assembly RrcouurNos
that the Council establish forthwith a liaison office in Washington to serve as a channel for North
American links and as a matter of priority to convince the United States Administration that direct
dialogue with WEU is possible and to be welcomed, particularly at present.
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Expbnatory Memorutdam
(submiaed by Mn De Hnp Scheficr, Ropprteur)
I. Infioductioa
l. As a direct result of the invasion and then
the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq at the
beginning of August, Article VIII (paragraph 3)
of the modified Brussels Treaty was invoked and
an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Minis-
terial Council held on Tuesday 2lst August
1990, under French chairmanship.
2. At the close of the meeting, the Assem-
bly's Presidential Committee was briefed by the
Chairmen-in-Office, MM. Dumas and
Chevdnement, respectively French Ministers for
Foreign Affairs and Defence, and by the Secre-
tary-General of WEU, Mr. van Eekelen. The
Ministers had reached the following conclu-
sions:
'Ministers welcome the measures being
taken by member states in support of
United Nations Security Council Reso-
lution 661 and in response to the requests
for assistance from states in the Gulf
region, with the aim of obliging Iraq
unconditionally to withdraw its troopsfrom Kuwaiti territory and restore
Kuwait's sovereignty.
They have decided closely to co-ordinate
their operations in the area aimed at
implementing and enforcing the measures
mentioned in paragraph 7, as well as any
further measures the Security Council
may adopt, also assuring, by common
agreement, the protection of their forces.
Building on the experience acquired,
including the consultation mechanisms
during the Gulf operations in 1987 and
1988, they have instructed an ad hoc
group of foreign and defence ministry rep-
resentatives to ensure the most effective
co-ordination in capitals and in the
region. This should cover among other
things overall operational concepts and
specific guidelines for co-ordination
between forces in the region, including
areas of operation, sharing of tasks, logis-
tical support and exchange ofintelligence.
Contact points are being nominated in the
ministries of defence to assist with
co-operation at the practicaUtechnical
level and, as an immediate step, to
prepare for a meeting of chiefs of defence
staff to be held in the next few days.
Ministers emphasise that co-ordination
within WEU should also facilitate co-
operation with other countries deploying
forces in the region, including those of the
United States. "
3. The Presidential Committee at its subse-
quent meeting on the same day, and deliberating
in the name of the Assembly, fully approved the
conclusions reached by Ministers. The President
made the following statement:
" The WEU Assembly has constantly
stressed the implications of events in the
Near and Middle East for Europe's
security, and in particular its Mediter-
ranean dimension.
It looks to the Council to continue to
organise member countries' consultations
and reactions so as to respond immedi-
ately and vigorously to the aggression
committed by Iraq against Kuwait
because it is a challenge to all the prin-
ciples underlying international peace
based on the law of nations. There must
also be a reslrcnse to the very serious vio-
lations of human rights committed by
Iraq on this occasion and Security
Council resolutions must be made fully
effective.
It considers that the seriousness ofthe sit-
uation created by the Iraqi aggression
requires the establishment of a joint
strategy by the Western European coun-
tries and its effective implementation.
It therefore urges the Council to pursue
the consultations started on 2lst Augustin order to define Europe's security
interests in the Mediterranean and the
Middle East. It recalls the importance thatit attaches to the deployment of all the
instruments necessary for this security,
including the development of European
observation satellites.
It welcomes the fact that the Council con-
siders that the threats to the maintenance
of international peace require an imme-
diate meeting of the chiefs of defence
staffs of member countries to organise
Europe's participation in the measures
that will have to be taken by the interna-
tional community to restore peace. The
Assembly, which has advocated the for-
mation of a committee of chiefs of
defence staffs of member countries, con-
siders that such co-operation, essential
until a lasting, peaceful order has been
t20
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restored in the Middle East, is a decisive
step towards a European security
organisation. "
4. In addition, the Presidential Committee
decided to adopt, at its meeting on 20th Sep-
tember, two recommendations on developments
in the Middle East crisis. It asked the Political
and Defence Committees respectively to address
the various political and military aspects.
5. The Political Committee's report and rec-
ommendations, " European security and events
in the Near and Middle East, Part II, The
Kuwait Crisis " (Rapporteur: Mr. Pieralli),
covers in particular the chronology of Iraqi
aggression against Kuwait, the WEU Council
decision of 2lst August 1990 and the attitudes
of the Arab countries and Israel to the crisis, and
are entirely complementary to this present
report, as well as being essential reading for an
understanding of the whole context.
6. This report of the Defence Committee
aims to present the military picture, concen-
trating on Iraqi capabilities, the responses of
other nations (especially the United States) and
emphasising of course Western European Union
reactions and initiatives. In addition, the appen-
dices to the report contain the most up-to-date
listing possible of:
L External naval forces in the Gulf area;
II. External naval forces in transit to the
Gulf;
III. External air forces in the Gulf area;
IV. Foreign troops stationed in Gulf
states;
V. Armed forces of countries in the Gulf
region;
VI. Iraq's air forces
II. Irag: the military forces and poliq options
7. Analysis of arrned forces is always dif-
ficult and often open to speculation. However,
in the case of [raq, information given by its
major arrns suppliers and studies on Iraqi
warfare during the eight years' war with Iran
help clarify the capabilities and strategies ofthe
Iraqi armed forces as well as the resulting policy
options.
8. In quantitative terms Iraq is very
strong:
(i) Army
I 000 000 troops:
Republican Guards
People's Liberation Army
5 500 tanks:
2 500 Soviet T-54 and T-55
I 000 Soviet T-62
500 Soviet T-72
I 500 Chinese T-59 and T-69
3 000 artillery pieces
200 multiple rocket launchers
66 surface-tosurface missile launchers (30 Frog 7,
36 Scud-B, T-7)
160 armed helicopters (including c. 40
Soviet-made Hind attack helicopters)
180 surface-to-air missile systems
(ii) Air Force I
800 aircraft including:
16 Soviet Badger and Blinder bombers
4 6D anti-ship bombers
94 French Mirage F-l (some with Exocet)
l0 French Mirage F-l from the Kuwait Air
Force
70 MiG-21 multi-r6le fighters
70 MiG-23 Flogger fighters
25 MiG-25 Foxbat fighters
18 MiG-29 Fulcrum attack fighters
30 Su-7 ground-attack fighters
50 Su-20 ground-attack fighters
30 Su-25 close support fighters
120 Chinese J-6 and J-7 fighters
(iii) Navy t
5 frigates (including the Italian-built Lupo
class)
38 patrol and coastal vessels
8 mine warfare vessels
6 amphibious vessels
(iv) Arms deployed in Kuwait and South lraq
150 000 troops in Kuwait
115000 troops along the Southern Iraqi
border
I 500 tanks in Kuwait
1200 armoured vehicles in Kuwait
700 artillery pieces in the area
9. The Iraqi army is composed of the Repub-
lican Guards and the People's Liberation Army.
The Republican Guards (12 000-15 000 troops)
are the elite troops of the Iraqi army. They are
experienced and well-equipped with modern
T-72 tanks. The Republican Guards are pre-
pared for quick offensive action and launched
the 2nd August attack on Kuwait. Within a short
period three mechanised armoured divisions
and four infantry divisions had invaded and
taken Kuwait.
10. The second echelon is the People's Liber-
ation Army which consists of conscripts and vol-
unteers. The People's Liberation Army is com-
paratively lightly-armed, with low military
skills, negligible mobility, and is not equipped to
frght by night.
ll. The Iraqi air force has extensive assets,
although its effectiveness, in spite of being
equipped with modern French Mirage F-l and
Soviet MiG-29 aircraft, is doubtful because of
low training standards and poor serviceability
l. Further details/characteristics will be found in the appen-
dices.
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resulting in fewer operational aircraft. During
the Iran-Iraq war the air force was under-used,
although on paper it was far superior to the
Iranian air force. The air force gave little
support to lraqi troops on the ground and
seldom engaged the Iranian air force. Some
bombing raids took place on Iranian cities,
usually from great heights, plus a number of pre-
cision attacks. It is debatable whether men and
machines have been honed to a sharp edge on
the steel of battle over the counle of eight years
of war or are merely exhausted. However, a
strike by Iraqi air force Mirage F-l fighters
armed with Exocet (if any stocks of these mis-
siles are left from earlier purchases) remains one
of the geatest potential threats against warships
in the Gulf. The range of Iraqi aircraft and their
possibilities for in-flight refuelling are of course
critical in this respect and affect the operational
zones chosen by the various nations present in
the area as well as individual ships' capabilities
for self-defence. Also linked with this is the
United States Navy request for rapid delivery of
Goalkeeper 30 mm close-in weapons systems(CNS) to protect their warships from missile
attack. A number of Goalkeeper systems is
already installed on board British and Dutch
ships and trials for the United States Navy havejust come to a successful conclusion in Cali-
fornia.
12. The Iraqis have large numbers of surface-
to-surface missile launchers at their disposal and
in particular have deployed most of their 36
Scud-B launchers and the 800 associated mis-
siles in Kuwait, ostensibly with chemical war-
heads (or so an Iraqi spokesman claimed, with
chilling emphasis). It is technically possible to
equip these missiles with chemical warheads but
the intelligence services believe that lraq does
not yet have the technology to do so. Con-
versely, Iraq does have artillery with binary
chemical shells, mustard gas and nerve gas, used
to devastating purpose during the 8-year war
with lran, despite almost universal condem-
nation. In addition, Iraq has also deployed
Silkworm anti-ship missiles obtained from the
Chinese.
13. The Iraqi forces are presently using the
same strategy as during the lran-Iraq war. The
invasion of Kuwait took place at 2 a.m. on 2nd
August when three armoured divisions of the
Republican Guard Force of the Iraqi army
crossed the frontier, closely followed later that
morning by four divisions of the Republican
Guard infantry. Combat aircraft of the Iraqi air
forces, which total about 800 aircraft, bombed
and rocketed Kuwaiti airfields. At the same
time, helicopter gunships attacked Kuwait City
and landed at least a brigade of Republican
Guard special forces 
- 
with light armour 
- 
who
led the assault on the palace and on the main
government buildings. In all, that force
amounted to about 100 000 soldiers, armed with
about I 250 tanks, with many infantry combat
vehicles and with artillery.
14. The Kuwaiti army, which is barely one
tenth of that figure, was in a state of alert, but
was not deployed in defensive positions because
the Kuwaitis did not believe that one Arab
country could invade another. The troops who
led the invasion were followed by further rein-
forcements, including some who, according to
the reports received, probably belong to the Pee
ple's Liberation Army.
15. On 20th August, the Republican Guard
forces' divisions started to withdraw from their
forward deployments and were replaced by
regular army troops. The forces now in Kuwait
number some l0 regular divisions 
- 
approxi-
mately 150 000 men, I 500 tanks and 700
artillery pieces. Republican Guard units have
been withdrawn to Iraq. It has been the Iraqi
practice to withdraw Republican Guard units
after an attack. They may now either have been
withdrawn to establish a more defensive
position or 
- 
and the possibility must always be
borne in mind 
- 
they may have been withdrawn
to reform for further aggression.
16. In Kuwait itse[ the Iraqis have
strengthened their coastal defences with
Silkworm missiles, with a string of infantry divi-
sions and with field artillery units. They have
moved in their Frog battlefield missiles and a
full range of surface-to-air missiles to Kuwait, as
well as the Scud-B mentioned above.
17. With a defensive strategy, without any
military aid because of East-West agreement on
a blockade and without information and
resupply it is not very likely that Iraq will now
attack, although who can tell what might be the
desperate last resort reactions iffinally cornered.
There is always the possibility that Iraq might
try to lash out irrationally in one direction or
another. It is not capable of sustaining a war
over a long period and general war would
probably sound the death knell for lraq. Various
United States commentators have estimated
that the Iraqi air force could be destroyed within
36 hours and the bulk of Iraq's air defence
within the same time-frame.
18. Similar considerations apply to the Iraqi
navy. Although lraq possesses a number of com-
paratively modern hulls, it is not envisaged that
the force could remain effective for long, mainly
because of the reduced numbers of operational
ships available, with most still suffering the
effects of the Iran-Iraq war.
III. The rcq,onses of the United Sntes
and other nations
19. On 6th August, President Bush launched
the operation * Desert Shield " to dissuade the
Iraqis from attacking Saudi Arabia. The oper-
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ation calls for a huge and continuing air- and
sealift to deploy heavy armour and anti-tank
forces and a massive build-up of sea and air
assets in the Gulf region. The units moved, or
moving, to date are listed at appendix.
20. As a result of the resolutions adopted by
the United Nations, a large number of other
countries, traditional allies of the United States
of America and others, have answered the call to
protect the countries of the Gull especially
Saudi Arabia, and to help guarantee the
blockade imposed on the movement of military
and economic shipping to and from lraq.
21. In the first stages of deployment, the
United States was faced with moving three army
brigades, three Marine Corps expeditionary bri-
gades and six air force tactical fighter wings,
together with numerous smaller units, support
materials, spare parts and supplies. The priority
has been to rush combat equipment across the
Atlantic followed by material first for support
and subsequently for sustainment.
22. Hence the need for all types of transport
by air and sea, which also relies heavily on com-
mercial assets. Sealift involves a variety of craft,
including fast sealift ships which travel at c. 30
kts, eight chartered vessels and a number of
prepositioned ships with ammmunition,
medical equipment and supplies and fuel. On
average, it takes a fast sealift ship 14 days to
cover the I I 000 km to the Gulf and sealift
carries some 950/o of cargo and 9990 of petroleum
products, while airlift carries 99Vo of the man-
power. This has meant that the United States
has had to activate its Civil Reserve Air Fleet
(CRAF) programme, to augment military airlift
with civil aircraft.
23. Even when the " shield " is in place (and
already, according to General Colin Powell,
Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, those
United States forces deployed represent the
" population of Chattanooga, Tennessee " -
some 165 000 according to the gazeteer) there
will be a continuing need for constant and
regular support, reinforcement and sustainment.
Hence Secretary of State Baker's appeal for
allied help with sea- and airlift provision.
24. Throughout the western alliance the
critical problem of sea- and airlift remains. Suc-
cessive shifts in world markets and trading pat-
terns mean that there are barely enough cargo
hulls of the right variety available for logistic
support in emergency, whether for the tradi-
tional scenario of reinforcement and resupply
for Europe or in the current context.
25. Over recent years the Defence Committee
has sought to draw the attention of the appro-
priate authorities to the conundrum of declining
merchant shipping, coupled with increased
" flagging out " to more and more flags of conve-
nience (a theoretically United States-owned fleet
flies 35 flags besides its own and the United
Kingdom's fleet flies 45 other flags beside the
Red Ensign) and the tendency to man one's own
ships largely with foreigr nationals (making
deployment to a potential war zone an even
greater problem than it would be otherwise).
The greater distances and potential dangers
involved in conducting operations in the Gulf
are very different from the Atlantic setting and
could prove extremely costly in terms of mer-
chant shipping.
26. Included in the numbers of United States
personnel in the Gulf are thousands of United
States reservists - naval, army and air force
reserves, as well as National Guard and Air
National Guard members, equipped for the
most part with the best of modern equipment,
dedicated, well-trained and highly-motivated
individuals who have given up a grcat deal to
serve their country.
27. Little did members of the Defence Com-
mittee think when they made a study-visit to the
United States in the second half of July this
yeat, at the invitation of Secretary Cheney, that
many of those seen in training in New Orleans
or Fort Hood, Texas, would soon find them-
selves in the Saudi Arabian desert. In the wake
of the force reductions currently being nego-
tiated at the CFE talks in Vienna, the r6le of
reserves generally, both in North America and
Europe, will be of growing importance and we
have a specific lesson to be learned from what is
now taking place. The whole subject of reserves
is to be treated in a forthcoming report of the
Defence Committee (Rapporteur: Mr. De
Decker).
28. The reason for the large numbers being
deployed to the Gulf area was admirably con-
veyed by the point made by Secretary Cheney on
6th September in Virginia at the International
Institute for Strategic Studies' timely conference
on " America's r6le in a changing world':
" The worst possible sin would be to
deploy enough force to get into trouble
but not enough to counter each eventu-
ality. "
29. That philosophy is obviously being borne
very much in mind and is surely the right
approach, even should the whole affair never
reach the stage of all-out hostilities. Deterrence
and persuasion are the names of the game.
30. As well as the American concentration of
land, sea and air power, a large number of coun-
tries have promised and provided forces to
bolster the various United Nations resolutions
and help protect the Gulf states. Not counting
the WEU nations and the United States, the fol-
lowing countries are taking part: Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, Senegal,
Syria, Turkey (troops); Australia, Canada,
Denmark, Greece and Norway (naval vessels).
The total represents the largest multinational
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force since the Korean War. Details are given in
the appendices.
31. It should be stressed that the bulk of
forces on land are stationed in Saudi Arabia, at
the invitation of the Saudi authorities. The
Saudis themselves are generally in the potential
front line with those elements of the Kuwaiti
forces who managed to fight their way out after
Iraq's invasion. " Foreign' forces make up the
second echelon, to reinforce as necessary.
32. Your Rapporteur's main concern at
present, as will be elaborated below, is the
command and control arrangement for these
vast and disparate forces. To an extent there is
little problem where small numbers are con-
cerned, but potential sources of friction are
already obvious in the United States-Saudi rela-
tionship where traditional American chains of
command find it hard to accept that the national
host has his own ideas on the ultimate
reponsibility involved in guaranteeing sover-
eignty. It is to be hoped that a clearcut
organisation has now been installed in Saudi
Arabia to replace earlier uncertainties. The
Saudis rightly insist that any offensive action
conducted from Saudi soil should take place
only with their specific agreement.
33. The same problem is less likely to arise at
sea where there are few frontiers and grcater
room for manoeuvre and initiative... (com-
paratively-speaking). It will be seen from the
appendices that the United States now has the
wherewithal in the area to exercise the auton-
omous amphibious option which considerably
increases the possible courses of action avail-
able, should economic and military blockade not
prove adequate to persuade Iraq to release its
hold on Kuwait.
IY. lVestern European Union rcactions
and initiatives
34. It is of course coincidental that WEU
finds itself involved in Gulf operations for the
second time within three years, but there is def-
inite advantage in the fact, for it does mean that
the process of co-operation and co-ordination
has been far less fraught with teething problems
than was the case three years ago. This time
round it has proved possible to advance much
more quickly to a useful arrangement of mutual
benefit.
35. The first step was the meeting of chiefs of
defence staffs held in Paris on 27th August.
Whereas the ministerial meeting a week previ-
ously had been opened to other members of the
European Community (Greece and Denmark
attended and Ireland eventually decided against
attending, because of a traditional neutral
stance) plus Turkey, as a * front line " state, and
with Norway represented not at the formal
meeting but at a working lunch, it was decided
to limit the chiefs of defence staffs' meeting to
full WEU member states only.
36. In the event, four chiefs of defence staffs(Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany and Luxembourg) were present
together with six chiefs of naval staffs (France,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the
United Kingdom). Previous proposals for such
meetings had foundered on the lack of a
111u1ually-agreed agenda, but on this occasion
the brief was very clear and the chiefs of staff
examined a set of operational measures aimed at
achieving close co-ordination of activities in the
crisis atea to enforce the United Nations
embargo against Iraq and Kuwait, on the basis
of Security Council Resolutions 661 and 665.
The measures covered the following aspects:
mission definition, deployment co-ordination,
zones of action, information exchange, logistic
and operational support, mutual protection of
vessels in the area.
37. A number of counter-proposals were
made at the meeting, notably concerning a pos-
sible overall command structure for the Gulf
operation. In the event, further study and delib-
eration were necessary before there was
agf,eement on deployment in the Gulf. The
resulting compromise reached on 3lst August
divided the Persian Gulf into three distinct
operational zones for WEU purposes 
- 
one zone
in the Gulf of Oman and others North and
South of the Strait of Hormuz (but see recent
developments below).
38. In the Gulf of Oman, military force will
not be used to stop and control ships suspected
of breaking the United Nations embargo against
Iraq and Kuwait. In the area of the Strait of
Hormuz such force could be used. Each WEU
country will deploy its ships in the zone which
best matches its view of what degree of force is
acceptable to enforce the embargo.
39. Thus far it has proved impossible to
define common rules of engagement which are
normally the basis for military co-ordination
and it may take some time before it is realised
how vital the subject will be once all WEU and
other nations' ships are assembled in the com-
paratively confined waters both within and
around the Gulf area. Further consultation on
air defence for WEU ships in the Gulf and recip
rocal logistical support will probably prove nec-
essary once agreement is also reached on the
levels of acceptable force to be used to
implement the trade and arms embargo against
Iraq and Kuwait.
40. In concrete terms there are now naval
points of contact in each national capital, who
are consulted as necessary by the crisis man-
agement cell established in the French Ministry
of Defence. The naval attach6s in member coun-
tries' Paris embassies are also in regular contact
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with the French naval operations centre which
provides a daily situation report on who is
where and doing what. Although at the time of
writing the flow of information was decidedly
one way, it is to be hoped that reciprocal situ-
ation reports from national capitals will soon be
available in Paris. In addition, a system of oper-
ational co-ordination has been established in the
Gulf area, both to facilitate WEU actions and to
establish links with naval forces of other coun-
tries. After a WEU meeting on the morning of
9th September in the French embassy to
co-ordinate approaches, the first meeting was
held under joint United States-WEU-Arab
chairmanship on 9th and lOth September in
Bahrain, when it was agreed to divide the Gulf
into specific patrol areas to increase the effec-
tiveness of the blockade. Also on lOth Sep
tember a meeting was held on board the French
frigate Montcalm in the Strait of Tiran to
co-ordinate WEU and United States liaison.
Communication methods and procedures for
challenging merchant ships were also agreed to
reduce mutual interference and duplication of
effort.
41. Most western navies are used to
co-operating with each other - co.operation
which is usually a matter of common sense -
exchange of information, the sharing of logis-
tical support as necessary (for example, the
Italian support ship Stromboli is already pro-
grammed to take over from the French supply
ship Durance in furnishing support to WEU
nations in the Gulf zone. Similarly the Dutch
are to provide a fleet auxiliary to relieve one of
the British RFAs in due course), provision of
fresh water, possibly an agreement on where to
take " runs ashore' and when (so as not to
overload local hospitality) as well as the obvious
need not to interfere with manoeuvres and exer-
cises by fixing zones of operation. These WEU
co-ordination meetings are now continuing with
rotating chairmanship 
- 
France chairing at the
l4th September meeting on board the Dupleix
off Hormuz and Britain scheduled to chair the
next programmed meeting. Further regular
meetings " on the spot " are envisaged.
42. As a result of this series of gatherings by
local national commanders, WEU has declared
that it will take care of " a zorre of common
interest where the execution of the embargo is
concerned ". This zone is situated either side of
the Strait of Hormuz and in practical terms it
means that arrangements are being made to
ensure that the task of surveillance by WEU
ships is being co-ordinated as effectively as pos-
sible with logistic support (fuel, food, etc.) being
provided on a shared basis. This is a quantum
leap forward compared with the tentative
arrangements made at the height of the 1988
minehunting operations in the Gulf.
43. As to the object of the exercise - the
embargo 
- 
the main port of Aqaba, once the
lifeline for Iraq, is already virtually paralysed
and Iraqi and Kuwaiti ports are reportedly at a
standstill. It is probably true however that a con-
siderable amount of military hardware, spare
parts, etc. is still reaching Iraq by air. At the
time of writing the United Nations is deliber-
ating on the possibility of extending the mar-
itime embargo to cover air movements as
well...
44. With the European navies'presence in the
Gulf area there is now a de facto WEU force as
suggested by the Defence Committee in its 1988
report on 'Naval aviation", Document ll39
(Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson), and we should
congratulate the Council on what has been
achieved in such a short period of time.
45. The WEU member countries have
deployed, or are in the process ofdeploying, the
following assets (as at lTth September and
including the news of British and French land
and air forces):
Belgium
Two tripartite minehunters, Iris and Myo-
sotis and the support ship Zinnia, which carries
an Alouette III helicopter, have been sent to the
Eastern Mediterranean (Crete).
France
Two naval groups are present in the Gulf
atea.
The lirst group composed of the carrier
Clemenceau, with over 40 helicopters of the 5th
Combat Helicopter Regiment embarked, the
cruiser Colbert and the fleet tanker Var, is
present as operation Salamander to respond to
developments as necessary.
The second group, composed of the
destroyers Dupleix and Montcalm and the
frigates Protet and Commandant Ducoing, is
helping impose the United Nations embargo
(operation Artimon).
In the UAE, France has one reconnais-
sance squadron equipped with Milan anti-tank
missiles, one section of Mistral anti-aircraft
launchers and two sections of Crotale anti-
aircraft launchers. In Saudi Arabia there is a
command cell with 6 helicopters (2 Gazelle, 4
Puma) at Yenbo (300 km North of Jedda).
France has also agreed to send a transport
ship to the Gulf to help transport troops of the
multinational force in place.
After lraq's violation of the French
Ambassador's residence in Kuwait City on l4th
September, the French Government decided to
send ground forces to the Gulf area (Operation
Daguet). These forces are: lst Regiment of
Spahis equipped with 48 AMX-IORC tanks and
other armoured vehicles, 2nd Foreign Legion
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Infantry Regiment, 2nd Company of the 6th
Foreign Legion Engineering Regiment, a unit of
anti-aircraft artillery from the I lth Artillery
Regiment and over 30 combat aircraft (Mirage
2000 RDI, Mirage F-I-CR, Jaguar and a number
of air tankers C-135F). Over 4 000 men are to be
sent and the total of French troops in the Gulf
area will be c. 13 000 men by the end of
October.
Federal Republic of Germany
As the Federal German constitution does
not allow for operational deployment outside
the NATO area, the five minehunters and two
supply ships that left Wilhelmshaven on l6th
August will remain in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean. The Bundeswehr has also transferred l0
Fox chemical warfare-equipped reconnaissance
vehicles to the United States army for potential
use in the Gulf.
The Federal Government has agreed to
provide financial support for United States
armed forces in the Gulf area and to help defray
the cost of the United Nations embargo to coun-
tries such as Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. 1.6
billion Marks have been allocated for help with
reinforcement and resupply (sea- and airlift) and
for various items of equipment (light armoured
vehicles, detection systems, communication
equipment). 1.7 billion Marks will be available
through the European Community as financial
aid to Egypt, Jordan and Turkey.
Italy
The ltalian navy corvettes Minerva and
Sfinge set sail for the Eastern Mediterranean to
replace United States ships out of Cyprus (l6th
August). The frigates Libeccio and Orsa are
already operational in the Gulf area near
Muscat. A supply ship is also on the way and a
replenishment tanker Stromboli, (to relieve the
French tanker Durance) and 8 Tornado fighters
are also to be sent.
Italy has agreed to provide transport ships
for the multinational force in the Gulf area.
Luxembourg
Not possessing vessels to send to the Gulf
area or Mediterranean, Luxembourg is pro-
viding financial support to other WEU members
engaged with men or material. (As was also the
case in 1987/88.)
Netherlands
The Royal Netherlands navy has sent two
frigates to the Gulf area, Witte de With and
Pieter Florisz. These frigates are equipped with
the 30mm close-in weapon system Goalkeeper.
A support ship is scheduled to replace a
similar British vessel in the Gulf in due
cource.
Portugal
No armed ground forces or vessels have
yet been sent to the Gulf area or to the Mediter-
ranean, although there is the possibility of
sending a frigate to the Eastern Mediterranean.
Portugal has agreed to send transport ships to
the Gulf area and the government has also
increased the facilities for air transport of the
American forces and materials through the air
bases of Lages and Santa Maria in the Azores
archipelago.
Spain
The Spanish Navy has sent a frigate Santa
Maria, as well as two corvettes, Descubierta and
Cazadora. Other measures are being contem-
plated.
United Kingdom
Additional support vessels have been sent
out to the Gulf area and Eastern Mediterranean
to provide supply and repair facilities to the
Armilla Patrol which has been operational in the
area since long before the lran-Iraq war, and
MCMVs (mine counter-measure vessels). Oper-
ation Granby is headed by the Type-22 frigate
HMS Battleaxe and includes the I-eander+lass
frigate HMS Jupiter, the two Type-42
destroyers, HMS York and HMS Gloucester, as
well as a supply ship Olna and a fleet tanker
Orangeleaf. Three MCMVs, HMS Cattistock,
Atherstone, and Hurworth, have been deployed
with their support ship, HMS Herald. The
United Kingdom is also to send transport ships
to the Gulf.
The British Government has decided to
increase its ground forces in the Gulf area by
sending 6 0@ men of the 7th Armoured Brigade
from the British Army of the Rhine. This addi-
tional force includes the Queen's Dragoon
Guards equipped with armoured vehicles, the
Royal Scots Dragoon Guards with 60 Challenger
tanks, the Royal Irish Hussars with another 60
Challenger tanks, the Staffordshire Regiment
with armoured vehicles, the 40th Field Reg-
iment Royal Artillery (24 l55mm guns) and one
squadron from the Army Air Corps (9 Lynx and
4 Gazelle helicopters). A month will be nec-
essary to complete the deployment of this force.
A squadron of Tornado GRI aicraft may also be
made available.
Command and control
46. There remains however a specific area
which must be addressed if effective co-
operation and co-ordination is really to come
about and your Rapporteur has already men-
tioned it: command and control.
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47. A senior member of the WEU Defence
Committee, Sir John Stokes (United Kingdom),
questioning his Minister of Defence in the
House of Commons, asked on 7th September:
* It may be that we shall soon be com-
mitting troops to fight and possibly die
and we are naturally concerned that
everything possible should be done for
their security. Is there any proposal to
have a force commander-in-chief, some
sort of force structure and some sort of
liaison between the different nations
involved in the forces?'
The reply indicated that helpful discussions in
WEU had taken place on making the European
contribution effective, quoting the previous
experience in the Gulf in the minehunting field
and saying that there was a possibility of the
practice being pursued further.
48. Your Rapporteur believes that it is now
imperative that the thorny problem be tackled
properly.
49. With a multinational armada of warships
assembling in the Strait of Hormuz, the lower
Gulf and in the Red Sea, to enforce United
Nations-mandated sanctions against Iraq, good
command and control are vital. To be effective
the operations of this armada must be
co-ordinated and controlled by force com-
manders in each of these sea areas. Othenrise
there will be costly and wasteful duplication of
effort and individual units will be at risk due to
lack of organised defence against possible Iraqi
attacks. The danger of mistaken identity and
consequent combat confusion, whether at sea or
in the air, will be increased. Various WEU
nations which have already deployed ships to
the Gulf obviously did intend that their ships
would definitely take part in an integrated
system of command and control. For example,
as part of their contribution, the Dutch have
sent an air defence frigate which would prove a
much more effective asset to a composite force
than can be the case as a singleton.
50. Only the United States has deployed bal-
anced naval forces with their own integrated air
support from aircraft carriers. Lacking such
capability all West European warships in the
potential combat areas are vulnerable to air and
missile attack. Has the United States already
undertaken to provide air support and cover for
West European naval units deployed in the Gulf
and Red Sea? Should not West European naval
forces already deployed be formed into single
task groups to operate in each defined area with
co-ordinated defence under a senior officer with
a multinational staff? What urgent action is
being taken to harmonise national rules of
engagement?
51. As providers of the two largest European
contributions to sanctions enforcement, France
and the United Kingdom must take the initi-
ative within Western European Union to ensure
that our naval forces are deployed in the most
cost-effective and secure manner.
52. The present report stresses WEU's rOle
where naval forces are concerned, but should the
crisis deepen and member states decide to
deploy greater numbers of land and air forces,
then consideration must be given to doing so in
a complementary manner, again to ensure the
most cost-effective and rational solution. In any
case it is strongly recommended that the
Defence Committee monitors the situation
closely and prepares a follow-up report to the
present one to keep members of the Assembly
fully informed regarding the military aspects of
the crisis in the Gulf.
Y. Conclusions
(i) Burden-sharing and the American con-
nection
53. Your Rapporteur believes that the
European nations are making a considerable
effort to support their American ally 
- 
efforts
which are barely appreciated by the American
public which is particularly vociferous when it
comes to issues such as burden-sharing. Over the
past month scarcely a newspaper in the whole of
the United States Qtacethe International Herald
Tribune which is read mainly in Europe) has
made any reference to what the Europeans are
doing about the Gulf crisis.
54. We must all ensure, both Council and
Assembly, that we take every possible oppor-
tunity to 'sell " WEU across the Atlantic. The
message may be slowly percolating but still has a
long way to go before it is properly appreciated.
And we must try to ensure that Americans
realise that WEU is an entity in its own right
and that there is nothing to prevent them
entering into direct dialogue with either us or
the Council... (the United States Secretary of
State proposed in the North Atlantic Council on
lOth September that the WEU Emergency
Planning Committee be activated to co-ordinate
extensive air- and sealift operations). It is worth
recalling the Assembly's proposal2 that the links
with the United States should be institution-
alised by, say, opening a WEU liaison oflice in
Washington.
55. On a public relations note, it would
gxeatly assist if all member countries agreed to
present at least their naval Gulf operations con-
sistently as 'WEU operations " and perhaps a
2. *Western European Union's information policy", Doc-
ument 1205, 8th November 1989, Rapporteur: Sir William
Shelton; 'Written question 285 and letter from Mr. van
Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, to Mr. Pontillon,
Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations", Document 1232,22nd May 1990.
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useful start may be to institute a liaison between
the armed forces PR staffs of member countries.
kague tables published in the press cataloguing
individual nations' efforts certainly do not
present the best possible picture for the Euro-
peans, whereas the collective result is
impressive. This same phenomenon is illus-
trated in the report from the United States Gov-
ernment General Accounting Oflice released on
6th September and referring to the cost of Gulf
operations in 1987-88. Taken individually,
WEU nations' contributions are certainly less
than that paid by the United States (c. 4090), but
as a WEU whole they total some 600/o - the
lion's share! It is merely a matter of the proper
presentation, please...
(ii) Observation satellites
56. Over the course of the past two years, the
WEU Assembly has been instrumental in pro-
posing the creation of a WEU observation sat-
ellite agency. Both the Defence Committee(" Verification: a future European satellite
agency ", Document I159, 3rd November 1988,
Rapporteur: Mr. Fourr6) and the Technological
and Aerospace Committee ('Scientific and
technical aspects of arms control verification by
satellite 
- 
reply to the thirty-third annual report
of the Council ", Document I160, 7th
November 1988, Rapporteur: Mr. Malfatti)
have emphasised the need for such an
organisation which was also fully endorsed at
the Assembly's symposium on * Observation
satellites 
- 
a European means of verifying dis-
armament' in Rome on 27th and 28th March
1990.
57. It has been stressed throughout that such
an organisation would be of use not only for
direct verification of CFE accords but also for
crisis management in other areas. The Council is
scheduled to decide whether or not the idea is to
be pursued when it meets this autumn to con-
sider the forthcoming report of the WEU Ad
Hoc Sub-Group on Space. Your Rapporteur
trusts that the Council will not overlook the fact
that an observation satellite system to furnish
raw material to the Europeans would have been
a most useful factor both before and during the
present crisis.
(iii) The immediate future
58. While a gteat deal of praise has come the
way of WEU concerning its ability and readiness
to act over the Gulf crisis, there is also the
growing hint of criticism that no permanent
policy and implementation group has yet been
created to co-ordinate WEU actions other than
in the purely naval realm in the Gulf zone. It is
to be hoped that the Council will soon formalise
the constitution of the ad hoc group to monitor
developments on a day-to.day basis and make
the necessary recommendations for modifica-
tions to guidelines governing the tactical actions
of what are at present purely national com-
manders on the spot. The * WEU Comm'
secure communications system should suffrce
for the moment for the group's consultations but
a contingency plan to establish the group in one
place, if not already in hand, must be made now
to set up the proper machinery to be in a
position to respond quickly to possible develop
ments.
59. WEU's basis in the modified Brussels
Treaty plus its flexibility compared to other
institutions have proved its strength over the
past month. We must make certain that we build
on what has been achieved and carry through
our actions to help the United Nations' efforts
on the Gulf crisis reach a satisfactory and secure
conclusion.
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APPENDIX I
External navol forca in the Gulf area
Australia
2 frigates: Adelaide, Danrin (United States FFG 7-class)I supply ship: Success (underway replenishment tanker
Durance-class)
Belgium
2 minesweepers: Iris, Myosotis (Tripartite minehunters)I support ship: Zinnia (operated in the Persian Gulf 1987-88)
France
I aircraft carrier: Cl6menceauI cruiser: Colbert (serves as flagship of the Mediterranean squadron)
2 destroyers: Dupleix, Montcalm
2 frigates: Protet, Commandant Ducoing (Commandant Rividre-class and Type A69)I fleet tanker: Var (Durance-class; also command ship for the French Admiral in charge of the French
Indian Ocean area (Alindien))
Italy
2 frigates: Orsa and Libeccio (Lupo-class; Maestrale-class)
2 corvettes: Minerva and Sfinge (Minerva-class)
Sovia Union
I destroyer: Admiral Tributs (Udaloy-class)I supply ship
United Kingdom
guided-missile frigates: HMS Jupiter, HMS Battleaxe (Leander- and Broadsword-class (Type 22))
destroyer: HMS York (Type 42)
supply ship: Olna (Olna-class, large fleet tanker)
fleet tanker: Orangeleaf (Appleleaf-class support tanker)
United States
2 multi-purpose aircraft carriers: Independence and Saratoga (Forrestal-class)I battleship: Wisconsin (Iowa-class)
6 guided-missile cruisers: Antietam, Philippine sea, Ticonderoga (Ticonderoga-class), Biddle, Jouett
(Belknap-class), England (Leamy-class)
4 guided-missile destroyers: Goldsborough, Sampson, Tattnall (Charles F. Adams-class), Scott (Kidd-
class)
3 destroyers: Spruance, David R. Ray, John Rodgers (Spruance-class)I destroyer tender: Yellowstone (Yellowstone-class)
9 guided-missile frigates: Rentz, Taylor, Vandegrift (Oliver Hazard Perry-class), Barbey, Brewton,
Elmer Montgomery, Reasoner, Thomas C. Hart (Knox-class), Bradley (Garcia-class)
miscellaneous command ship: La Salle (converted Raleigh-class)
oiler: Cimarron (Cimarron-class)
combat store ship: White Plains (Mars-class)
ammunition ship: Flint (Kilavea-class)
fast combat support ship: Detroit (Sacramento-class)
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APPENDIX II
Exrenwl naval forces in transit to the Gulf
Canada
2 destroyers (932 soldiers on board): Terra Nova (improved
Restigouche-class), Athabaskan (DDH2 8O-class)I operational support ship: Protecteur (can carry military vehicles and bulky equipment for sealift pur-
poses; also 4 LCYPs)
Denmark
I frigate: Olfert Fischer (Niels Juel-class)
Federal Republic of Germany
5 minesweepers: Marburg, Koblenz, Wetzlar, Laboe, Ueberhorn (Lindau'class Type 331)
2 supply ships: Westerwald, Werra (Westerwald-class ammunition transport Type 760 and Rhein-class
Type 401-2-3 depot ship)
(At present it is considered that the German constitution does not allow for operational deployment
outside the NATO area, so these vessels are likely to remain in ttre Mediterranean.)
Greece
I frigate: Limnos (Netherlands Kortenaer-class, ex-Witte de With F8l3)
Italy
1 replenishment tanker: Stromboli (similar ship sold to Iraq)
Netherlands
2 frigates: Witte de With and Pieter Florisz (Jacob van Heemskerck-class and Kortenaer-class,
ex-Willem van der Zaan)
Norway
I coast guard: Andenes (Nordkapp-class, one Lynx helicopter, ASW and reconnaissance)
Spain
3 frigates: Santa Maria (Santa Maria-class), Descubierta, Cazadora (F30+lass, officially rated as cor-
vettes)I supply ship: Aragon (ex-United States Paul Revere-class, ex-USS Francis Marion LPA249 ", similar
ship sold to Egypt prior to completion)
Uaited Kingdom
1 destroyer: HMS Gloucester (Type a2)
3 minesweepers HMS Cattistock, HMS Atherstone, HMS Hurworth (Hunt+lass; 4 of the class
deployed to Persian Gulf in 1987; 2 were reported to be leased to Saudi Arabia)I support ship: HMS Herald (Improved Hecla-class, one Westland Wasp HAS I helicopter)
United States
I multi-purpose aircraft carrier: John F. Kennedy
3 guided-missile cruisers: Mississippi (Virginia-class), San Jacinto, Thomas S. Gates (Ticonderoga-
class)I destroyer: Moosbruger (Spruance-class)
2 guided-missile frigates: Reid, Samuel B. Roberts (Oliver H. Perry+lass)I combat store ship: Sylvania (Mars-class)I fast combat support ship: Seattle (Sacramento-class)
2 hospital ships: Comfort, MercyI repair ship: Saginaw (construction tender)
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4 amphibious assault ships: Guam, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Inchon (Iwo Jima-class; Okinawa served
during 1987-88 operations in the Gul0
amphibious transport docks: Nashville, Ogden, Shreveport, Trenton (Austin-class), Raleigh
(Raleigh-class)
amphibious assault ship (multi-purpose): Nassau (Tarawa-class)
landing ships: Gunston Hall (modified Whidbey Island-class), Portland, Pensacola (Anchorage-
class)
tank landing ships: La Moure County, Manitowoc, Spartanburg County (Newport-class)
vehicle cargo ships: Algol, Altair, Bellatrix, Capella, Regulus (Algol (Sl7)-class, all berthed in East
coast and Gulf coast ports)
maintenance aviation/support ship: Curtiss (T-AVB 3-class)
l3l
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APPENDIX III
Extenal air forca in thc Gulf area
France
Djibouti:
Jaguar (l l)
Atlantique-2 (l) (ATL2, maritime patrol aircraft)
Saudi Arabia:
Transall (4)L
e:fig i3i-') (relavinc French sround forces in Yenbo with Jedda)
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia:
Mirage F-l (15)
United Kingdom
Bahrain:
F-3 Tornado (12)
Rapier anti-aircraft missiles
Cyprus:
F-4 Phantom (6)
Oman:
Jaguar (12)
Nimrod (3)
vc-10 (2)
Saudi Arabia:
F-3 Tornado (12)
United Arab Emirates:
C-I30 Hercules
United States
Cyprus:
F-11I
Saudi Arabia:
lst tactical fighter wing: F-15 Eagle
4th tactical fiehter *rr 
F:lt f:fl,eo_ (total 100)
35th tactical fighter wing: F-4 Phantom
37th tactical fighter wing: F-ll7A Stealth frghters (22)
354th tactical fighter wing: A-10 Thunderbolt II (70)
363rd tactical fighter wing: F-16 Fighting Falcon (48), F-4 Phantom
552nd air warning squadron: E-3A Sentry AWACS (5)
l05th military airlift group: C-5 Galaxy
380th bomb wing: KC-135 cargo aircraft
Patriot missiles
Turkey (based at Incirlik on the Turkish-Iraqi border):
39th tactical group: F-l I I (40), F-16 (44)
United Arab Emirates:
380th bomb wing: KC-135 cargo aircraft (8)
- 
In addition there are about 240 aircraft on carriers (F-l4A Tomcat, Corsair, Intruder, FA-18
Phantom, EA-6B electronic warfare (radar jamming) aircraft, etc.).
- 
6-8 B-52 bombers are stationed at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
- 
The United States has also sent aircraft to the smaller Gulf states (details unknown) for more flexi-
bility and better protection in case of attack.
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APPENDTX IV
Foreiga tflNps stotioned in Gulf states
In Saudi Arabia
Afghanistan; 2000 (Mujaheddin 
- 
yet to arrive)Bangladesh: I 200 (yet to arrive)Egvpt: 6000 +nanHil'ffft*,,*"ti'iToJ3H"#"I3'i'miJi',;rlJi3, #l'll
arrive)
France + 100 (2 Gazelle,4 Puma 
- 
Yenbo, French Headquarters 300 km
North of Jedda); Operation " Daguet' (4 000 men, 48 tanks, 48
combat helicopters, 30 combat aircraft, one anti-aircraft company,
yet to arrive)
Gulf countries l0 000Kuwait: 7 OO0 (2 000 yet to arrive)Morocco: 2 000Pakistan: 5 000 (yet to arrive)
Senegal is sending
troopsSyria: 4 000 (l I 000 men and 300 tanks yet to arrive)Turkey: 5 000 (yet to arrive)
United Kingdom: I 700 (RAF Regiment, Royal Signals, etc.; 6 000 men, 120 Challenger
tanks, I Tornado GRI Squadron, one Scimitar armoured squadron,
one Warrior armoured squadron, 9 Lynx helicopters, 4 Gazelle heli-
copters, l0 Javelin anti-aircraft systems, yet to arrive)
United States: + l0 000:
ts! $ari.ne E_Sneditionary force - 14th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (
7th Marine E$iiilffi;;i' B;[il; t (M-60 tanks)li, M;il rxieoiti,onary sriiade )
l8l'J f-"8sff B,'J,T,fll(.quipped with sheridan right tanks)
I lth Anti-aircraft Artillery Brigade
3rd Cavalry Regiment
3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment
24th Mechanised Infantry Division (equipped with 270 M-l and M-lAl tanks)
l94th Armoured Brigade (equipped with 160 Ml and MlAl tanks)
In the United Arab Emirates
Egvpt:
France:
Syria: I 000
United States: I 000
Armoured division
340 (technicianVinstructors; reconnaissance squadron + Milan anti-tank
missile; one section of Mistral anti-aircraft launchers; two sections of
Crotale anti-aircraft launchers)
133
DOCUMENT 1243 APPENDIX V
APPENDIX V
Anud fortes of countria in the Gulf region
Bahrain
25 000 troops
39 tanks
63 aircraft
12 helicopters
20 ships
Egypt
448 000 troops
2 500 tanks
I 120 artillery pieces
500 aircraft
127 helicopters
92 ships
Iran
604 000 troops
500 tanks
800 artillery pieces
70 aircraft
I I helicopters
66 ships
Israel
l4l 000 troops
3 794 tanks
I 360 artillery pieces
676 airqaft
77 helicopters
87 ships
Jordan
82250 troops
I l3l tanks
247 artillery pieces
I I I aircraft
24 helicopters
250 patrol boats
Oman
25 000 troops
39 tanks
138 artillery pieces
63 aircraft
20 ships
Qatar
70@ troops
24 tanl6
19 arti[ery pieces
30 aircraft
15 ships
Saudi Arabia
65 700 troops
500 tanks
I 850 artillery piecesl9l aircraft
44 helicopters
2l ships
Syria
404000 troops
4050 tanks
I 500 artillery pieces
500 aircraft
127 helicopters
4l ships
Turlcey
6500@ troops
3 800 tanks
2 187 artillery pieces
366 aircraft
50 helicopters
22 ships
United Arab Emirates
43000 troops
200 tanks
80 aircraft
203 helicopters
15 ships
Yemen
54000 troops
I 144 tanks
197 aircraft
12 helicopters
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APPENDTX VI
Ira4's air forcu
Fighters
54 Mirage F-L-C/E:
Single-seat multi-rOle air superiority/ground attack/reconnaissance version with an inertial navigation
system, nav./attack central computer. Many F-l-Cs of the French Air Force were delivered or modified
to F-l-C-200-standard by installation of an 8 cm fuselage plug for a removable flight refuelling probe(like in Iraq). Mirage F-1-EQ5 and EQ-6 of the Iraqi Air force are equipped to carry Exocet anti-ship
missiles and laser-guided weapons such as the AS-30L missile and Matra 4@ kg laser-guided bomb.
They have Thomson-CSF Agave radar.
Combat radius (F-l-C-200):
- 
hi-lo-hi Mach 0.7510.88, 14 x 250 kg bombs and maximum internal fuel with reserves: 230 nml425
r{$1265 miles;
- 
lo-lo-lo 400-550 knots (460-633 mph), 6 x250 kg bombs, 2 external tanks with reserves: 325 nm/650
krtl374 miles;
- 
lo-lo I Exocet, 2 external tanks, reserves and missile flight path: 378 nm/700 km/435 miles;
- 
hi-lo-hi Mach 0.8/0.9,2x250kgbombs, 3 external tanks, reserves: 750 nm/l 390 km/863 miles;
- 
combat air patrol endurance with 2 Super 530 missiles and underbelly tank, reserves including one
attack at ceiling: 2 h. 15 min.
Total internal fuel capacity 4 300 Ul 136 US gallons; non-retractable, but removable, flight refuelling
probe on starboard side of nose optional.
245 MiG-21 'Fishbed' DF JL:
Total capacity: 2 600 U687 US gallons.
Combat radius:
- 
hi-lo-hi 4 x 250 kg bombs, internal fueL 200 nm/370 knl230 miles;
- 
2 x 250 kg bombs, drop tanks: 4OO nml740 km/460 miles.
Range (internal fuel only): 593 nm/l 100 km/683 miles; ferry range (3 external tanks): 971 nm/l 800
km/l I l8 miles.
118 MiG-23 MS'Flogger E':
Maximum internal fuel capacity: 5 750 l/l 519 US gallons.
Combat radius: 485-700 nm/900-l 300 km/560-805 miles.
25 MiG-25 'Foxbat A':
Total fuel capacity: 14 000 kgl7 4l0ll4 600 US gallons.
Normal operational radius: 610 nm/l 130 km/700 miles.
Maximum combat radius, econ. power: 780 nm/l 450 km/900 miles.
29 MiG-29'Fulcrum B':
Maximum range: I 130 nm/2 100 km/l 300 miles.
10 MiG-27 'Flogger':
Combat radius, with underbelly fuel tank, 4 x 500 kg bombs and 2 Atoll missiles, lo-lo-lo: 210 nm/390
knl240 miles.
Maximum ferry range, 3 external tanks: I 350 nm/2 500 km/l 550 miles.
77 F-7 chasse TT (China) (Mikoyan MiG-21 'Fishbed'):
Total internal fuel capacity: 2 385 11630 US gallons.
Maximum internal/external fuel capacity: 4 185 t/l 105.6 US gallons.
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Bombers
10 Su-24 'Fencer':
Internal fuel capacity: 13 000 V3 434 US gallons (4larye external tanks on wing possible).
Combat radius:
- 
lo-lo-lo: 174 nml322 km/200 miles;
- 
lo-lo-hi with 2 500 kg weapons: 515 nm/950 km/590 miles;
- 
hi-lohi 3 000 kg weapons, 2 external tanks: 700 nm/l 300 km/805 miles.
130 Su-20/22 'Fitter C':
Fuel capacity increased to 4 550 Vl 202 US gallons by added tankage in dorsal spine fairing.
Combat radius with 2 000 kg external stores, including fuel:
- 
hi-lo-hi: 370 mm/685 trral425 miles;
- 
loJoJo: 240 nml445 kil275 miles.
60 Su-25 'Froglfoot':
Combat radius: hi-lohi 2 0@ kg air-to-surface weapons and 2 external fuel tanks: 300 nm/556 krlt345
miles.
8 Tu-22 'Blinder A':
Combat radius maximum unrefuelled: I 565 nml} 900 km/l 800 miles.
4 Tu-16 'Badger A':
So^me equipped as flight refuelling tankers, using a unique wingtipto-wingtip transfer technique to
refuel other Tu-16s, or a probe-and-drogue system to refuel Tu-22As.
Tolal--capacity: 45 450V12 000 US gallons. Provision for underwing auxiliary fuel tanks and for flight
refuelling.
Range with 3 790 kg bomb load: 3 200 nm/5 9251<ml3 680 miles.
Maximum unrefuelled combat radius: I 700 nm/3 150 km/l 955 miles.
5 Xian H-6 (Tu-16 'Badger'):
May be converted to a tanker r6le.
Combat radius: 971 nmll 800 km/l I 18 miles.
Maximum range: 2 320 nm/4 300 kmlz 672 miles.
Maximum endurance: 5 h. 4l min.
Helicopters
40 Mi-24 'Hind'A/G:
Armed assault helicopter.
Combat radius:
- 
with maximum military load: 86 nm/160 l$r,lgg miles;
- 
with 2 external fuel tanks: l2l nml224 km/134 miles;
- 
with 4 external fuel tanks: 155 nm/ 288 km/179 miles;
- 
range with maximum internal fuel: 405 nm/750 fur..l461 miles.
40 SA-34 I /42M'Gazelle':
Total possible usable fuel capacity: 745 yl97 US gallons.
Range at S/L with standard fuel: 383 nm/710 klril440 miles.
Military lgals ciln ,_"_4f9. 2 pods o.f Bryndt 68 mm or FZ-275 in rockets, 4 or 6 * Hot " wire guided
missiles with APX M397 gyro-stabilised sight, 2 forward firing7.62 mm machine guns, or one-GIAT
i&d-621 20 mm gun on starboard side.
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5 Bell 209 AHIJ/TAC:
Range at S/L with standard fuel, no reserves: 343 nm/635 km/395 miles.
8 AB-212 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) (Italy):
Extensively modified version of the AB-212 intended primarily for ASW search and attack missions
and for attacks on surface vessels, but suitable also for search and rescue and utility r0les.
Maximum range with auxiliary tanks: 100 knots/185 km/I15 mph, cruise at S/L, l5Yo reserves: 360
nml667 krll4l4 miles.
Maximum endurance with auxiliary tanks, no reserves: 5 hours.
Weapons: 2 Motofides 244 AS or 2 Mk 44146homing torpedoes, or 2 Marte Mk 2 or Sea Skua-type air-
to-surface missiles.
Note
This is not an exhaustive list of Iraq's air forces but a presentation of the main characteristics of opera-
tional aircraft that can be used on air combat operations.
To better illustrate the ranges of Iraqi aircraft, the distances (in nautical miles, kilometres and miles)
between some of the main geographical points in the Gulf area are given below:
from Basra (Iraq) to Kuwait City: 73 nm/135 km/85 miles
from Basra to Doha (Qatar): 356 nm/660 km/410 miles
from Basra to Kamsan (Strait of Hormuz): 497 nml920 km/570 miles
from Kuwait City to Doha: 310 nm/575 km/358 miles
from Kuwait City to Kamsan: 478 nm/885 km/550 miles
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Eurolrcan securtty and the Gulf cdsis
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf ol the Political Committeez
by Mr. De Decleer, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnert REcoMMENDATIoN
on European security and the Gulf crisis
ExprnNetonv MruoRaNouu
submitted by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. General evolution of the situation
III. European military deployment in the Gulf
IV. The organisation of peace in the Middle East
V. Conclusions
N.B. The Rapporteur visited Cairo on l9th November 1990, i.e. after the committee had
adopted his report, and was able to meet in particular H.E. Dr. Esmat Abdel Meguid,
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, and Dr. Mouflrd
Shehab, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Shoura (Egyptian Senate). He
therefore reserves the right to present an addendum to his report at a later date.
l. Adopted in committee by 17 votes to 2 with 0 abstentions.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); Sh Geollrey Fiwberg, Mr. De Declcer (Nternate for Mrs. Staels-Dompas)(Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate:. Verbeek), Beix, B6hm, Brilo, Candal, Caro, Coleman (Alternate: Rowe), Collart,
Cuatrecasas, Eich, Fabra, Forni, Foschi (Altemate: Mezzapesa), Hitschler, Koehl, van der Linden, lard Mackie, MM. Martinez,
Martino, Miiller, Natali, P6criaux, Pieralli, de Puig, Roseta, Sarti (Alternate: Scovacricchi), Sir William Shelton, MM. Stoffelen,
Thyraud, Ward, N...
N,B. Ifte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
on Eutopcan secarity ard thc Gulf crish
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling its Recommendation 489;
(ii) Welcoming the firmness and continuity with which member countries have pursued their action
to promote the application of the embargo against Iraq decided upon by the Security Council in order
to obtain, without prior conditions, the release of all the hostages held by Iraq and the evacuation of all
Kuwaiti territory;
(iiil Considering that WEU's contribution to the naval deployment to ensure that the embargo is
respected is of considerable importance and allows the implementation of United Nations measures to
be monitored satisfactorily;
(iv) Noting with regret that it took longer than desirable to arrange this deployment;
(v) Condemning with indignation the many violations of international law and human rights com-
mitted by lraq and, in particular, the threat to use chemical weapons, non-respect of the 1949 Geneva
Convention regarding the treatment of civilians on the territory of a belligerent country and violations
of the 196l Vienna Convention on the protection of diplomats;
(vil Considering that it is still possible that the firmness, solidarity, unity and political and diplo-
matic initiative of the international community will compel lraq to obey the United Nations Security
Council;
(viil Recalling that the Iraqi aggression was also a direct attack on the still fragile new world order
that efforts are still being made to establish to replace the one that prevailed throughout the East-West
confrontation and which must be based on respect for international law, co-operation and peace;
(viii) Welcoming the fact that the Twelve, at the summit meeting in Rome on l8th October, stressed
that the organisation of a peaceful order in the Near and Middle East implied agreement extending well
beyond the setting of the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait;
(ix) Recalling its condemnation of the measures of repression used by the Israeli police in Jerusalem
on 8th October and emphasising that a settlement of the Palestinian question, in accordance with all
the resolutions of the Security Council on this matter, is essential for the establishment of lasting peace
in the region;
(x) Condemning the crimes committed in Beirut following the surrender of General Aoun, but
trusting that the end of the civil war in Lebanon should allow the militia to be disarmed and the armed
forces of Syria and Israel to be withdrawn from kbanon,
RecouurNos rHAT rnr Councu-
l. Make a critical analysis of the establishment of WEU's co-ordination of forces sent by member
countries to ensure respect for Security Council resolutions concerning lraq's aggression against
Kuwait and its violations of the law of nations;
2. Follow up without delay Assembly recommendations urglng it to set up a European observation
satellite agency;
3. Instruct the chiefs of defence staffof the WEU member countries to continue their meetings and
those of subordinate bodies in order to prepare forces for possible co-ordinated operations, providing
inter alia for:
(a) co-operation in respect of transport;
(b) the definition of joint procedures;
(c) the exchange of operational information;
(d) intercperability of the equipment and weapons of these national forces;
(e/ common exercises;
4. Pursue the reactivation of WEU;
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5. Ensure that the selective release of hostages does not weaken the determination of member coun-
tries to obtain the release of all hostages and the evacuation of Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
6. Use Europe's influence in the region to ensure that, after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from
Kuwait, negotiations are started to establish a lasting and peaceful order in the Middle East, with a
view in particular to:
(a) at agrcement between all countries in the region to renounce the possession of ABC
weapons, subject to effective international verification;
(b) an agreement between countries in the region and arms-exporting countries to limit arma-
ments in all countries in the region and to ban the sale of arms which might take levels above
the agreed limits;
7. Ask that the European Community afford assistance to countries in the region whose economy is
seriously affected by the crisis.
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Explanatory Memorandum
Qubmittcd by Mr. De Declur, Rapponeur)
I. Introduction
l. On 20th September 1990, the Political
Committee adopted the draft report by Mr.
Pieralli on European security and events in the
Near and Middle East. The accompanying rec-
ommendation was adopted by the Presidential
Committee the same day and will have to be rat-
ifred by the Assembly on 3rd December. Its rati-
fication, however, will not allow a debate to be
reopened on the substance. Moreover, it would
be difficult to contemplate the Assembly holding
a debate in December on a document completed
before 20th September. For that reason, the
Presidential Committee followed the view of the
Political Committee and included in the agenda
of the session a new report on the situation in
the Gulf so as to allow a debate to be held on the
evolution of the situation since 20th Sep-
tember.
2. Your Rapporteur therefore considered his
task was mainly to draw information from the
evolution of the crisis in the last two months
without going back over the events mentioned
by Mr. Pieralli, except where developments
might throw new light on the start of the con-
flict.
3. Your Rapporteur was able to take part in
the visit to WEU's co-ordinated deployment in
the Gulf organised by the President of the
Assembly from 26th to 30th September when he
was able to hear the view of the French chief of
defence staff, General Schmitt, before visiting
Djibouti and British, Dutch, French and Italian
naval vessels in the Gulf. He was also received
on a United States ship. He was received by
Emir Zayed in Abu-Dhabi and met Mr. Hassan
Gouled Aptidon, President of the Republic of
Djibouti. A message from His Majesty King
Hussein of Jordan to Mr. van Eekelen,
Secretary-General of WEU, on 20th September
was communicated to him and he had the
benefit of the Political Committee's long dis-
cussion with the Secretary-General on 9th
October. He is also gratified that the French
Chairmanship-in-Office, i.e. the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dumas, and the Defence
Minister, Mr. Chevdnement, informed the com-
mittees of the Assembly on 20th August and the
Presidential Committee on 22nd September of
the deliberations of the ministerial meetings on
2fth August and 20th September. He believes
this practice is an essential contribution to
exchanges between the Council and the
Assembly. Finally, on 9th October, the Secre-
tary-General of WEU, Mr. van Eekelen, briefed
the Political Committee on the activities of the
WEU Council. In the present report, your
Rapporteur will endeavour to draw his conclu-
sions from these various exchanges, without for-
getting that, particularly during the journey to
the Gull greater prominence was given to mil-
itary matters than political discussions.
II. General evolution of the situation
4. The situation on the frontiers of Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia, and in the Gulf too, has not
changed significantly since 2Uh September
1990 apart from increases in the ground and air
forces on Saudi territory. On 25th October,
American troops numbered 210 000, large
numbers of Arab forces - particularly Syrian,
Egyptian, Moroccan and Saudi - have been
added and the European countries which had
decided, after the Iraqi moves against the diplo-
matic representations of Belgium, Canada,
France and the Netherlands in Kuwait on l5th
September, to take part in the deployment of
land and air forces in Saudi Arabia, have now
implemented the major part of their decision
with France and the United Kingdom sending
the equivalent of a brigade of ground forces with
corresponding air support, Italy and the Nether-
lands fighter aircraft and Belgium cargo aircraft.
In October, the United States decided on a very
significant increase in its military deployment
and France, too, decided to increase its contri-
bution.
5. At the end of September, the naval
deployment in the Gulf seemed quite suffrcientfor applying the embargo decided by the
Security Council, with thirty-two European
combat vessels and thirty American. Some units
have since been relieved, but the size of this
force has not been changed to any great extent.
The Assembly's mission was able to note that
the naval aspect of the embargo was working sat-
isfactorily, although not without shortcomings
on land and in the air. The Security Council res-
olution allowing the embargo to be extended to
air transport raised a number of specific ques-
tions of application which do not yet seem to
have been solved completely and it is not certain
that the control of surface traffrc between Iran
and Iraq and between Jordan and Iraq is
effective enough to ensure that the embargo is
respected in full.
6. Indeed, on the one hand, there is every
indication that the drastic reduction in Iraqi
imports will not force it to capitulate. Its
domestic production is enouglr to ensure the sur-
vival of its population. The embargo will
t4t
DOCUMENT 1244
probably restrict its economy, however, and sig-
nificantly weaken its military power by pre-
venting it from receiving the spare parts it
needs, particularly to keep its aircraft in working
order. On the other hand, since, in peacetime,
oil accounts for about 900/o of Iraq's exports, the
embargo will probably place the country in an
extremely diflicult situation. The closing of the
pipelines to Syria and Turkey leaves only the
Gulf as an outlet for Iraqi oil. The plan to build
a pipeline towards the Gulf of Aqaba is a
long-term project. A connection with the Iranian
network might on the contrary be achieved in a
matter of months, but so far there is nothing to
show that Iran is prepared to give its agreement.
Finally, Iraq's reflrnery capacity is not suffrcient
for its own needs and there seems to be a
shortage of certain by-products needed for mil-
itary purposes.
7. The embargo is therefore forcing Iraq to
increase rationing which will eventually place
the government in a particularly difficult
position. So far, it has reacted by strengthening
the dictatorship and spreading extremely strong
nationalist propaganda against the countries
taking part in the embargo in order to secure the
support of the population. No one knows quite
how far it can go in this direction, nor what is
the real state of opinion in 1989-90 after ten
years of almost continuous warfare. Apart from
the opposition of intellectuals in exile and the
resistance for several decades of the Kurds, who
constitute about 150/o of the population, to the
brutal policy of Arab nationalism pursued by
Saddam Hussein's r6gime, the true state of
opposition in the country is very difficult to
assess. Nothing, however, allows it to be thought
that an internal opposition movement is ready
to overthrow Saddam Hussein and set up a new
rdgime better prepared to institute a peaceful
order in the region of the Gulf.
8. It may therefore be thought that, provided
new incidents do not spark off armed conflict,
the embargo will take quite some time to
produce decisive effects. The land, sea and air
forces now in the region will have to stay as long
as necessary with ful logistic support. In this
respect, the various logistic support and, in par-
ticular, the cargo vessels sent by European coun-
tries, whether members of WEU or not, provide
a noteworthy contribution to the joint effort,
particularly insofar as the armed forces of the
Arab countries benefit from this support.
9. In the event of it being impossible to
avoid open flrghting, the superiority of the forces
whose task is to ensure that the embargo is
respected would certainly be overwhelming at
sea and in the air, although lraq has almost
700 fighter aircraft of which it is not known
what proportion is effectively operational. The
situation would be far less favourable on the
ground in view of the size of the Iraqi army of
almost a million men with corresponding
reserves and paramilitary forces, about 5 500
tanks, 4-5 000 pieces of artillery, and various
missiles. In mid-October, it was estimated that it
had 500 000 forces deployed in the region of
Basra and Kuwait. Although it seems certain
that lraq would be defeated thanks in particular
to American superiority in observation with its
AWACs and satellite radar facilities, its data-
processing means and electronic warfare
equipment, a ground attack would probably be
quite long and costly in human lives, which all
the western countries wish to avoid. Fur-
thermore, pending the formation of a new
r6gime and the organisation of a peaceful order
in the area, it would imply a lengthy occupation
of Iraqi territory.
10. Whether or not there are hostilities, pro-
vision will have to be made for the international
forces to be kept in the area for some consid-
erable time and here Europe will have an
important r6le to play. Most states in the area
wish these forces to remain since they have no
wish to be left alone in face of lraq's military
strength should it remain intact after the con-
clusion of the present conflict. Naturally, this
concerns first and foremost the United States
which, from the very start of the crisis, showed
that it would not allow Iraq to dominate the
countries of the Gulf and quickly deployed the
only military force capable of beating the Iraqi
anny. Your Rapporteur was able to note,
however, that Europe's participation in the mil-
itary deployment, although modest on the
ground and in the air, is of considerable impor-
tance in the eyes of the'governments of the
region. This is mainly due to the fact that, unlike
the United States, Europe is not systematically
linked with Israel in its confrontation with its
neighbours and with the Palestinians.
ll. There can indeed be no doubt that the
Israeli-Arab conflict constitutes a back-cloth for
the events in the Gulf. Certainly it is in no way
the reason for Saddam Hussein's invasion of
Kuwait, but, because of the omnipresence of the
Palestinian diaspora, it maintains throughout
the Arab populations a feeling of humiliation in
face of Israeli-United States complicity in main-
taining, through strength, the Israeli occupation
of the whole of Palestine and part of Lebanon.
Ever since 1967, Europe has unremittingly
stated that a return to peace means evacuating
the occupied territories. It votes regularly in this
sense in the United Nations. This is proof of the
fact that its participation in the embargo against
Iraq is not to uphold the cause of Israel but for
reasons much closer to those that induced the
majority of the members of the Arab League to
condemn Iraq's action: respect for international
law, restoration of peace based on respect for
states and frontiers and determination to halt
Iraqi expansionism backed by significant armed
forces manipulated by an unscrupulous and
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untrustworthy dictator who is threatening all the
countries of the region.
12. Since 2nd August, Iraqi propaganda has
been concentrated on dividing and breaking the
coalition that has been formed around the
Security Council resolutions. It has tried, so far
in vain, to separate the Soviet Union and China
from the western countries. Although without
envisaging direct intervention in the conflict,
except perhaps in the event of a United Nations
force being formed, the Soviet Union has been
very firm in condemning lraq. It is certain that
it has tried to use its influence as one of that
country's main aflns suppliers before 2nd
August in order to make it return to a better
frame of mind. It has firmly denied hints in the
Soviet press in mid-October that it had pro-
posed a compromise 
- 
shaving off a fringe of
Kuwaiti territory 
- 
to obtain lraq's withdrawal.It has clearly condemned Saddam Hussein's
stubbornness and has let it be known that, while
it was determined to seek a peaceful solution to
the conflict, it would not be opposed to more
forceful action if Iraq continued to defy the
United Nations. Although not so explicit, China
has voted all the United Nations resolutions
condemning the invasion of Kuwait and the
various violations of international law com-
mitted by Iraq. There is nothing to show here
that Iraqi propaganda has had the slightest
success.
13. It is also clear that promises to free the
hostages, and indeed the release of hostages of
one country or another, are intended to weaken
the cohesion ofthe western countries. It cannot
be said that so far these measures have had
much success, but the aim is to stir up distrust
and divide the countries which are determined
to negotiate with Iraq only after its withdrawal
from Kuwait and the release of all hostages. The
Spanish, Portuguese and French hostages have
been released, but this did not change the
political and military attitude of the countries
concerned.
14. One may wonder about Iran's firmness in
view of Saddam Hussein's considerable conces-
sions in giving up all he had gained in 1988. The
evacuation of the occupied parts of lranian ter-
ritory, the release of prisoners-of-war and confir-
mation of the Algiers agreements on sharing the
Shatt-al-Arab show the value Saddam Hussein
attaches to support from Iran. Admittedly, he
obtained statements against the American mil-
itary presence in the area, but Iran seems to
have gone no further. For instance, it has taken
part in the embargo against Iraq. Your
Rapporteur does not know to what extent the
embargo is respected in local cross-frontier
trade, but so far an Iraqi proposal which would
have reduced the effects of the embargo practi-
cally to nought has not been followed up, i.e. to
build a short pipeline which would have quickly
linked lraq's network with that of Iran, thus
allowing Iraq's output to be exported through
terminals not covered by the blockade. Action
by the Syrian President, Mr. Hafez el-Assad,
among Iranian leaders seems to have played an
important r0le in diverting Iran from affording
Iraq any meaningful assistance. In this matter,
Iraqi diplomacy has so far failed.
15. This is obviously not so for a large pro-
portion of the Arab populations which have
been far more receptive to Iraqi propaganda. In
several cases, this has led the governments to
break away from Arab League decisions and
show extreme caution in applying United
Nations resolutions. This is so for Libya,
Yemen, Jordan, Sudan, Algeria and Tunisia.
The Iraqi deployment includes Yemeni,
Sudanese and Palestinian units. The most dis-
turbing case for the West is obviously that of
Jordan which, as Iraq's neighbour, applies the
embargo in principle, but shows little rigour in
implementing it. Particularly since the war
between Iraq and Iran, a large part ofthis coun-
try's economy has relied on trade with Iraq,
thanks to the growing importance of the port of
Aqaba which is linked to Iraq by a motorway.
This aspect of its economy fell sharply just when
it had to cope with a heavy influx of refugees,
particularly Indian, Pakistani, Egyptian and Sri
Lankan, fleeing Kuwait and the demands of the
Iraqi army. International assistance was slow
and inadequate and Jordan is now grappling
with a serious economic and social crisis.
16. Already in recession since 1968, Jordan's
rate of inflation reached 310/o in 1989 with a
marked drop in the standard of living of its
population leading to a serious political crisis in
April 1989. Although conservative parties
retained a majority in the elections in
November, progress was made by the Islam
opposition and the left-wing laity which has
strong support among the Palestinians. The dif-
ficulty of applying democratic practices is illus-
trated by the fact that, of 1.5 million potential
electors, only 555 000 actually took part in the
vote. This result seems above all to reflect the
fact that Palestinians are still not well-integrated
into the Hachemite kingdom. This being so, Pal-
estinians now form a majority of the population,
the monarchy has to follow liberal practices and
there is an elected parliament; hence account
has to be taken ofthe reactions ofa public that
pays heed to Iraqi propaganda. Saddam Hussein
is willingly seen as a hero of the Arab cause,
facing up to the United States and whose vio-
lently anti-Israeli utterances correspond to the
public's own feelings. Concern to ensure sur-
vival of the kingdom obviously makes King
Hussein avoid committing himself too deeply in
a conflict with his Iraqi neighbour and he is mul-
tiplying his efforts to achieve a compromise
peace with lraq. He can but be well aware,
however, that if Iraq is allowed to retain Kuwait
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and pursue its military effort, he would be one
of the first victims of Iraqi expansionism which
might easily take advantage of internal diffi-
culties in Jordan to justify an invasion or to
impose its protection.
17. It is more diffrcult to assess the impact of
Iraqi propaganda in the other Arab countries,
particularly in those taking part in the
deployment of forces in Saudi Arabia, but the
assassination in Cairo on l2th October of Mr.
Rifaat-al-Maghoub, President of the Egyptian
Parliament, even if it is not clearly attributable
to lraqi services, is illustrative ofthe heated pas-
sions now rife in the Arab world and raises the
question of the possible consequences of main-
taining western forces in the Gulf region for very
long.
18. Another consideration not to be over-
looked is the economic impact of the Gulf crisis
on all the countries in the region and in par-
ticular on those which do not have the benefit of
the considerable increase in the price of oil after
2nd August. Indeed, considerable fluctuations
brought the price per barrel which, before the
crisis, cost between $13 and $19, to more than
$a0 by 15th October. This situation is con-
tinuing, although there is no shortage on the
world market. World consumption has fallen by
about l0% due to the recession amplified by the
Gulf crisis, but reserves are abundant and the
countries so able 
- 
Saudi Arabia and the United
States in particular - have undertaken to
increase their production to make up the deficit
caused by the cut-off of Iraqi and Kuwaiti
exports. On the other hand, the situation of non-
producer countries is difficult because of the
sharp drop in trade and the loss ofrevenue due
to the return of emigrant workers from Kuwait
in areas extending well beyond the shores of the
Gulf. Your Rapporteur noted this in Djibouti. It
is for the West and Western Europe in particular
to assist these countries as necessary to ensure
that the crisis does not result in unduly trau-
matic human consequences. This obligation will
not be easy to fulfil since Europe is also in
recession, due partly to the Gulf crisis, and it has
also undertaken to afford substantial assistance
to the countries of Eastern Europe to revive
their economy. Yet it is imperative if Europe
wishes to counter Saddam Hussein's attempts to
break up the coalition of countries determined
to act to ensure respect for Security Council res-
olutions.
19. Saddam Hussein's propaganda, however,
profited from two events that it does not seem to
have provoked directly but which might open
cracks in the cohesion of the countries taking
part in the embargo.
20. The first was the confrontation in Jeru-
salem on 8th October between Jews and Pales-
tinians during which shooting by the Israeli
police caused twenty deaths and some hundred
wounded among the Palestinians. At the origin
of this affair was a religious manifestation by
extremist Jews on Temple Mount overlooking
the western wall surrounding the Al-Aqsa
Mosque. This was a traditional manifestation on
this date, and therefore in no way unforeseeable,
that was received by stone-throwing Palestinians
on the Mount. Nor was this unforeseeable for
the Israeli authorities. Their view was that this
reaction had been prepared and stones accumu-
lated in advance in the mosque. Projectiles were
also thrown at Jews worshipping in front of the
wall and this provoked intervention by the
police, who, threatened in turn, started firing
with live bullets because they had not been
issued with the plastic bullets normally used by
the Israeli army in operations to maintain order.
The number of victims and the fact that ambu-
lances were struck by bullets prove that the
Israeli police reacted with unusual ferocity.
From the information available, it is not pos-
sible to say more about provocation by one side
or the other. This incident gave new impetus to
the intifada and above all heightened passion
and hatred on all sides, thus making even more
difficult the opening of negotiations for a Pales-
tinian settlement in conformity with Security
Council Resolution 242. After its meeting on 9th
October, the Political Committee issued a
communiqud condernning the lsraeli police's
deadly action.
21. This matter was brought before the
Security Council which took several days to
adopt a resolution condemning the Israeli
reaction because of the attitude of the United
States which was opposed to any wording con-
demning Israel too strongly and implying retali-
atory measures. However, Security Council
Resolution 672, adopted on l2th October,
instructed the United Nations Secretary-General
to conduct an inquiry on the spot into the cir-
cumstances of this matter and the responsibil-
ities of all sides. The Israeli Government has
refused to receive this mission on the grounds
that, Jerusalem having been annexed by Israel
on 28th June 1967 
- 
which was not recognised
by the member countries of WEU - events in
this city were an internal Israeli matter and not a
question for the Security Council.
22. Clearly this matter does not affect directly
the conflict in the Gulf since it is between Israel
and Palestinians whereas Israel is not taking
part in the military deployment against Iraq.
However, it is not without conse,quences for the
cohesion ofthe participating countries since the
United States is extremely reserved towards any
declaration or measure which might jeopardise
Israeli interests whereas Europeans are more
anxious not to appear to uphold systematically
the cause of this country, particularly in a case
where its conduct has obviously been unduly
repressive. In general, they consider that the
return to peace in Palestine depends on the
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application of Resolution 242 of the Security
Council which calls for the evacuation of the
occupied territories (without saying whether
Jerusalem is counted), the constitution of a Pal-
estinian state and respect for secure and
recognised frontiers between Israel and its
neighbours. The shooting on 8th October led to
a recrudescence of tension between Israel and
Palestinians and resulted in several murderous
incidents and the closure to Palestinians of the
demarcation line separating the territory of
Israel and Jerusalem from the West Bank. Fur-
thermore, the assassination of Rabbi Meir
Kahane in New York on 4th November sparked
off a violent anti-Arab reaction in Israel. These
events bolster Iraqi propaganda in the Arab
countries and give credit to Saddam Hussein's
claim to be the champion of Moslem rights
flouted by Israel. They alsoarnderline the differ-
ences between Americans and their allies on the
nature of their respective relations with Israel or
with Iraq.
23. The second question running against the
countries in coalition against lraq was the liqui-
dation of the sector of Beirut held by General
Aoun's Maronite forces thanks to a joint action
conducted by Syrian and Lebanese armed forces
on l3th October. On the one hand, it seems that
Syria, which was playing an important and pos-
itive r6le in the organisation of measures against
Iraq, took advantage of the good relations thus
established with the West to eliminate the only
force still standing in its way to domination of
Lebanon. On the other hand, there are indica-
tions that, in still unclear circumstances, a large
number of General Aoun's soldiers were sum-
marily executed after having been taken
prisoner. In spite of the request for protection
addressed to the Lebanese Government, one of
the leaders of the Maronite community, Mr.
Dany Chamoun, was assassinated together with
his family on 21st October by persons wearing
the uniform of Samir Geagea's Lebanese forces
in a sector of Beirut controlled by the Syrian
army. Even if this despicable crime is believed
to have been committed by a Christian militia,
neither the legal government nor the Syrian
occupying force did anything to prevent it. One
way or another, it makes any reconciliation
between the communities in Lebanon more dif-
ficult. Finally, France granted General Aoun
himself asylum and he took refuge in the French
Embassy, but the Lebanese Government refuses
the French authorities the right to transfer him
to France. On l8th October, the French Gov-
ernment asked the United Nations Secretary-
General to inquire into the executions and
extortion of which the Syrian army is believed to
be guilty in Beirut.
24. Syrian action in Lebanon is not compa-
rable to that of Iraq in Kuwait, particularly
because it was carried out with the agreement
and presumably at the request of the legal gov-
ernment in Lebanon. However, since certain
western countries are favourably inclined
towards the Christians in kbanon, serious
action and the barbaric measures that are
reported to have ensued could well divert part of
the opinion in these countries from an under-
taking which, after all, is mainly intended to
protect Arab countries, including Syria, from the
Iraqi threat.
25. However this may be, the surrender of
General Aoun's army should terminate the civil
war in Lebanon which had been the cause or the
pretext for the occupation of part of Lebanese
territory by Israel and most of Lebanon by Syria.
If those two countries wish to show their good
faith, they should now evacuate Lebanese ter-
ritory and leave the I-ebanese authorities free to
exercise their authority. If they fail to do so of
their own accord, it will be necessary, once the
Iraqi question has been negotiated, to start nego-
tiations on Palestine, on the one hand, and
L,ebanon, on the other, in order to show that,
contrary to what Saddam Hussein claims, the
West is seeking an equitable overall settlement
for the Near and Middle East as a whole in
accordance with United Nations resolutions.
26. Thus, the maintenance of inactive mil-
itary forces in Saudi Arabia is leading to a
political evolution which, in the end, is fa-
vourable to Iraq. The annexation of Kuwait, the
flight of part of its population thus reducing the
resistance movements that had started,
imposing Iraqi nationality on those who remain,
the systematic destruction of Kuwaiti civil reg-
isters and the installation of an Iraqi population
in the country strengthened Iraq's hold over
Kuwait in September and October. Deprived of
water, electricity and supplies, the embassies in
Kuwait have had to close one after the other.
Whereas there are no signs of lassitude or
division in Iraqi opinion, fanaticised by gov-
ernment propaganda, the contrary seems to be
the case in many Arab countries and the inci-
dents in Jerusalem and Beirut suggest that the
unanimity in the West in August is not com-
pletely sheltered from such factors which will
inevitably be followed by others in the next few
months. Whatever determination there may be
to maintain the embargo until Iraq releases its
hostages and evacuates Kuwait, one may
wonder whether recourse to force will not be
neoessary to achieve this end, unless negotia-
tions are started before these two prior condi-
tions are fulfilled.
III. European military deployment in the Gulf
27. The United Kingdom and France had
maintained small naval forces in the Gulf, the
Indian Ocean and the Red Sea since the war
between Iraq and Iran. France has port facilities
in Djibouti where it maintains a well-trained
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anned force for possible action in that region.
Immediately after the Iraqi aggression, these two
countries decided to increase their naval presence
in the Gulf and France also sent a helicopter unit
on the aircraft carrier Cldmenceau which was ini-
tially disembarked in the United Arab Emirates
whereas the United Kingdom sent a few units to
Saudi Arabia which were integrated with the
American military arrangements.
28. After the NATO Council had failed on
6th August to reach a joint decision on
deploying that organisation's forces, the WEU
Ministerial Council met in Paris on 20th August
and decided to co-ordinate the naval forces sent
by member countries to help to ensure respect
for the embargo decided upon by the Security
Council (Resolution 661, 6th August 1990) in
order to obtain the evacuation of Kuwait by
Iraq, the liberation of the hostages held by
Saddam Hussein and subsequently a political
settlement of the conflict under the aegis of the
Arab kague. On 27th August, the chiefs of staff
of the member countries met in Paris to draft,
on the basis of the directive adopted by the
Council on the implementation of the embargo,
a document on co-ordination and on 3lst
August a co-ordination group was formed with a
permanent co-ordination unit in Paris and
co-ordination activities on the spot.
29. This naval deployment now associates the
WEU countries with the United States, certain
Arab countries and a few European countries
non-members of WEU. WEU's participation is
nevertheless specific since at the meeting in
Bahrain on 9th September 1990 the fleets of the
member countries were given their own control
sector on either side of the Strait of Hormuz, i.e.
east of the sector monitored by the Americans
further inside the Gulf. On l4th September, this
sector was divided between the fleets of the
WEU countries. Their specific r6le is to close
the Gulf in the east to vessels approaching from
outside which might try to break the embargo.In addition, certain countries of WEU are
helping to monitor respect for the embargo in
the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba. In all, at the
end of October, thirty-five warships from WEU
countries were taking part in these controls
alongside thirty American vessels, without
counting logistic support vessels. They fly the
flags of seven of the WEU member countries.
Luxembourg and Germany are not participating
directly in the naval action in the region but are
making a financial contribution to the joint
undertaking and Germany has also sent mine-
sweepers to the Mediterranean. Several other
European countries have sent, have decided to
send or are considering the possibility of sending
vessels to contribute to the joint operations,
particularly logistic support vessels. This is the
case for Greece, Denmark, Norway and also
Hungary, with a non-combatant land unit, and
Poland, with a hospital ship.
30. Naturally, the sending of support ships
and, a fortiori, a hospital ship, implies less
involvement than is the case for warships, but it
is nevertheless a useful contribution to the
deployment against Iraq in view of the insufli-
cient logistic means available in certain Arab
countries which have sent ground forces to
Saudi Arabia, and an appreciable symbolic com-
mitment by countries determined that Security
Council resolutions should be respected. Notjust Western Europe, but a large part of Europe
is represented, apart from the Soviet Union and
neutral countries.
31. After the l5th September move by Iraqi
forces against the diplomatic representations of
Belgium, Canada, France and the Netherlands
in Kuwait, several WEU countries also decided
to send land and air forces to the region.
Brigade-sized units of British and French
ground forces together with corresponding air
cover were or are being sent to an area some dis-
tance from the Iraqi frontier in Saudi Arabia.
Air combat units were sent by France, Italy and
the United Kingdom to the Gulf area, the Neth-
erlands is negotiating with Turkey the possible
stationing ofa squadron ofF-16 fighter aircraft
on its territory and Belgium is proposing to send
an air transport unit to support the deployment
of its allies, but this has been delayed because
of events in Rwanda. Portugal has made a
transport ship and a C-130 transport aircraft
available to the United Kingdom forces and
Spain is considering sending a medical
assistance unit.
32. Western Europe's air and land partici-
pation is therefore not negligeable. Since the
ministerial meeting on l8th September, it has
been co-ordinated by WEU but in a less elab-
orate manner than the naval co-ordination. The
French and British forces deployed behind the
forces of Arab countries are not side-by-side and
in fact their positions and deployment depend
far more on bilateral agreements with Saudi
Arabia on the one hand and with the United
States on the other than on WEU co-ordination
which in this area has not proved to be
effective.
33. Moreover, the Europeans have committed
less than 25 000 men compared with 210 000 for
the Americans, to which may be added the
forces of several Arab countries, totalling well
over 50 000 men. This ratio of forces cannot
allow Europeans to make their own views
prevail in the overall use of the land and air
forces in the region. Should lraq launch an
attack, it would first encounter the forces of the
Arab countries deployed in the front line and the
r6le of both Europeans and Americans would be
to back them up. It is planned that the overall
arrangements would then come under American
command, whereas at present each unit remains
under national command and their positioning
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is governed by bilateral agreements between
each country and Saudi Arabia. One question is
what would be the attitude of the European con-
tingents should the initiative for taking up anns
be seized by Arab or American forces. Even if
the European capitals do not wish to take part in
such an operation, it would be diflicult to
envisage their forces remaining on one side. The
Council has not yet provided the Assembly with
suffrciently detailed information about the
implications of this air and land deployment or
about the directive on logistics that it prepared
following the normalisation work that it has
been carrying out since l5th September.
34. One may wonder whether the present mil-
itary deployment in the Gulf area corresponds
effectively to the political and military objec-
tives of the participating countries. The means
available to the American command are to be
increased further during the next few weeks with
the addition of several hundred tanks with-
drawn from the NATO forces in Europe and the
United States is considering a further increase of
about 100 000 troops in Saudi Arabia. These
means seem to be quite adequate for an
offensive operation against lraq and are more
than enough for the requirements of deterrence
or the defence of Gulf countries which might be
threatened by the Iraqi army. Conversely, the
evolution of the situation makes such an oper-
ation increasingly difficult. The more it is
delayed, the more it will be hampered by the
deterioration of relations between the partici-
pating countries. It seems clear that the embargo
alone will not force Iraq to capitulate within a
reasonable lapse of time but the maintenance of
tension allows it to maintain its position. In
mid-October, major cracks began to show in the
determination of public opinion, both in the
United States, where the budget debate revealed
weaknesses in Congress's support for the gov-
ernment and where there were demonstrations
against the presence of United States forces in
Saudi Arabia on 22nd October, and in Western
Europe where similar reactions have been noted
as in several Arab countries. Clearly the mainte-
nance of static deployment is leading to wear
and tear in morale of which the United States
Government will have to take account if this
phenomenon is confirmed. Furthermore, any
reduction in the present deployment without
very substantial prior concessions by lraq would
be seen as a defeat for the United Nations, the
West, the United States and its President, and
encouragement for Iraqi expansionism and the
forces of destabilisation which have long been
active in the Near and Middle East. The West
must therefore face squarely up to the risks it
has taken in sending such a large force to Saudi
Arabia.
35. A number of comments may be made,
however, on the way in which WEU co-
ordination is prepared on land and at sea.
First, while the American decision to send forces
to support Saudi Arabia threatened by the
invasion of Kuwait was immediate and followed
by very speedy initial implementation, this was
not so for European decisions. Agreed, France
and the United Kingdom quickly reinforced
their naval presence but it took eighteen days for
the WEU Ministerial Council to meet in Paris
and, deciding on co-ordination, for the other
member countries of WEU to decide in turn to
take part in the naval deployment. It then took
twenty days for this co-ordination to be suffi-
cient in the Gulf for the Bahrain meeting at last
to be able to initiate the overall co-ordination of
naval action in the region which is essential for
ensuring that the embargo is respected.
36. Second, the move against diplomatic rep
resentations in Kuwait came on l5th Sep.
tember, but the military decisions which the
WEU countries took on l8th September were
still only partially implemented on l5th October
in spite of the small numbers of forces con-
cerned.
37. Furthermore, your Rapporteur was per-
sonally able to note that the operatives on the
spot had not received identical instructions on
the nature of their mission and on what they
would have to do at the start of hostilities. Nor
do the governments present in the same way to
their parliaments the action upon which they
have decided. For instance, the United
Kingdom, in many ministerial statements,
emphasises its forces' support for the American
deployment and the solidarity of the members of
NATO, whereas the communiqu6 issued after
the WEU ministerial meeting on 20th August
makes no mention of the American initiative.
38. These comments indicate that Europe has
been too slow in taking its decisions, that they
lack clarity, and that the implementation of
co-ordination has also been slow and, moreover,
incomplete. This situation is disturbing, because
the Gulf is of vital importance for Europe, even
more than for the United States, yet Europe has
always been preceded by the United States and
this is not without political consequences.
Indeed, your Rapporteur was able to note that
the European military presence had very special
value in the eyes of the governments and
probably of the Arab peoples because of the
attitude adopted by the European countries in
previous crises. It is regrettable that it appears to
be merely an addition to the American
deployment, particularly in air and land forces.
Again, the weakness of Europe's participation in
this deployment leaves very little possibility for
a European initiative, particularly in the event
of hostilities. If the United States decides to act,
Europe could do little to stop it but would be
carried along with the movement. If, on the con-
trary, it decided to take action, it would be
unable to do so without American partici-
pation. {t147
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39. It is obviously too late to rectify this situ-
ation, but it is time for Europe to take steps to
avoid any such recurrence in the event ofa new
crisis. For a long time our Assembly has been
asking the Council to create a European agency
for processing information obtained by satellite.
Yet again the Gulf affair has just shown that
Europe's delay in this matter has made it unduly
dependent on the United States and it can but
again ask the Council to take, at its next minis-
terial meeting, the decisions necessary for imple-
menting this proposal.
40. The slowness and imperfection of military
co-ordination encourage your Rapporteur to
make a second proposal: to prepare such
co-ordination in peacetime so that it may be
implemented immediately as necessary by the
governments so determined. The fact is that
each of our countries has air mobile forces that
can be transported very quickly over great dis-
tances. Some of them are sizeable forces with
heavy arms. This is so for France's rapid action
force stationed partly in France and partly in
Germany with signifi cant transport capabilities,
tanks and, above all, a large number of heli-
copters and about 45 000 men. In other coun-
tries, the mobile forces are just a few parachute
units with far lighter arms allowing them to
intervene anywhere, particularly if the gov-
ernment instructs them to take very brief action
but not to take place in a deployment such as
that in Saudi Arabia. The first thing for these
countries to do would be to strengthen these
units in terms of numbers, transport means and
fighting equipment.
41. Another difliculty is that no European
country would wish to ag;ree to its armed forces
intervening in operations outside the NATO
area decided by others. The difliculties of inte-
grating forces in the NATO system are well
known, and they are not confined to French
forces, and on 6th August it was seen that this
integration prevented NATO from acting
outside the area fixed by the Treaty of Wash-
ington. The question is therefore to prepare for
co-ordinated action between countries in
peacetime 
- 
although it will not be possible to
foresee which countries 
- 
and operations might
be anywhere in the world, bearing in mind,
however, that it is in the Middle East and Africa
that Europe may most probably be required to
intervene. Only WEU provides the possible
framework for such preparations and for the
prior assignment of suitable forces for such
operations.
42. Once the present crisis is over, therefore,
the chiefs of defence staff who met in the
framework of WEU for the first time since 1954
to implement WEU co-ordination in the Gulf
must continue to meet in the same framework
and set up a permanent co-ordination body.
Their first task would be to draft a text defining
the framework of co-operation between the
mobile forces of each member country in the
event of the governments deciding on joint
action. To this end, they might base themselves
on the text of the general instructions drawn up
when France withdrew from NATO's integrated
military commands so that preparations might.
be made for including French forces in the
NATO arrangements should France decide to
act alongside its allies in Europe. This text is
intended to allow the immediate implemen-
tation of cooperation without impinging upon
France's right to decide whether or not it will
participate in hostilities in which NATO might
be engaged.
43. Second, the chiefs of staff or their repre-
sentatives should work out the procedures nec-
essary for conducting possible co-ordinated
operations. They will then have to consider all
the hypothetical cases of hostilities in which any
of them might be obliged to participate in orderto plan the conditions for effective
co-ordination, since, in spite of experience
gained in 1987, it was necessary to improvise to
a very great extent in the co-ordination in
summer 1990. Finally, they will have to examine
what arms, equipment and means of transport
each one will have to provide for its mobileforce to ensure the fullest possible
interoperability of the various national units.
44. There must be no mistake, this is a very
vast undertaking because, if Europe wishes to
have a force that can act effectively, its strength
will have to be at least some 100 000 men. Not
only is this worth trying, it is essential, as long as
there is no truly European army to act outside
Europe. Neither NATO nor any European
organisation other than WEU can provide a
framework for this endeavour. Its r6le would be
to allow joint action by national forces, under
national or European command, in joint
arrangements in the event of the governments or
the WEU Council deciding to take such
action.
45. It is not without serious thought nor
without having consulted a number of senior
experts in the military hierarchy of their coun-
tries, some of whom have had considerable
experience in the problems of co-operation
between national armed forces, that your
Rapporteur is presenting-this propgsal which
seems in no way unrealistic at the presentjuncture but which on the contrary responds
fairly well to the prevailing uncertainty, since
the collapse of the Warsaw Pact military
machine, regarding the conditions in which
Europe will have to act in future decades to
ensure its security.
IY. The organisation of peue in the Middlc fust
46. Events in October 1990 show, should this
still be necessary, how much the various theatres
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of confrontation in the Near and Middle East
are interlinked by extremely complex relations.
Naturally, Saddam Hussein's propaganda,
which associates the invasion of Kuwait with
unrest in the occupied territories, the invasion
of lrbanon and criticism of r6gimes in the
Arabian peninsula, combines these very dif-
ferent matters in order to divide the countries
determined to put an end to Iraqi expansion.
This has not been without success and the West
will have to prove its good faith to the Arab
world. Without awaiting the end of the crisis,
countries participating in the deployment of
forces in Saudi Arabia must harmonise their
approach to the restoration of peace not only
between lraq and its neighbours but also
throughout the region. Failing this, differences
over the future organisation of the region may
well split up the front that has formed against
Iraqi aggression, as may be feared in the case of
the crises in Jerusalem and L,ebanon.
47. The first question concerns lraq, not
because its frontiers prior to 2nd August are in
question but because its military strength is a
permanent threat to all countries in the region
and one of the main reasons for the large arms
build-up in the area. Admittedly, except in the
event of a major military confrontation leading
to revolution, no one will be able to impose
drastic changes in Iraq's military policy. This is
not one of the United Nations' requirements.
However, Iraq signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol
banning the use of chemical weapons in interna-
tional conflicts, yet it has large stocks of
chemical weapons, has used them, at least in
repressing the Kurds, and several times has
threatened to use them in the present conflict.
This threat in itself is a violation of the Geneva
Protocol and Iraq should be called upon to
renounce the possession of chemical weapons
under international control. There would be
even greater justification for this if progress is
made in the present Geneva negotiations on the
disarmament of chemical weapons. Similarly,
international control of the non-production of
nuclear weapons by Iraq should be considered in
the context of the non-proliferation treaty. Any
withdrawal of forces now deployed in Saudi
Arabia not preceded by such measures would be
a victory for Iraq because it would thus become
the true arbitrator in the affairs of the region.
48. The present conflict should also lead to an
agreement on a general limitation of conven-
tional weapons and a treaty denuclearising the
region. This implies an agreement between all
the states concerned on the maximum level of
forces and armaments that each would be
authorised to retain under reciprocal control.
Your Rapporteur well realises the difficulty of
imposing such controlled limitation measures
on a state in a part of the world where mistrust is
so widespread. But he considers a regional
agreement on the controlled limitation of arma-
ments to be the only means of attenuating such
mistrust, terminating the arns race and
avoiding the present deployment of forces in
Saudi Arabia causing further crises. Should
there be such a withdrawal without a balance
being achieved between Iraq, which is very
heavily armed, and the other Middle Eastern
countries, the Arab countries and Iran would
believe their security to be very uncertain and
peace inadequately guaranteed.
49. It is also evident that such an agreement
cannot be reached without the participation of
Israel and the neighbouring countries, i.e.
without a general agreement on Israel's fron-
tiers. Israel has to include in its basic security
hypotheses that of a coalition between a large
number of Arab countries, including Iraq and
Saudi Arabia with which it has no common
frontiers. This assessment of the risk is making
it consider the occupied territories as part of its
security zone in view of the small size of its ter-
ritory, the length of its frontiers and the vulnera-
bility of its towns. It makes no secret of the fact
- 
and most members of the Israeli Labour Party
agree with the right-wing on this point - that it
will not agree to abandon the occupied terri-
tories unless its security is guaranteed. However,
the continued occupation of the West Bank very
largely helps to sustain international tension in
the region with the result that the Arab states
keep a very high level of armaments. This fact
has been recognised by the international com-
munity and consequently Security Council Res-
olution 242links evacuation of the occupied ter-
ritories with the existence of secure and
recognised frontiers for Israel. In spite of decla-
rations by the PLO which, since 1989, has
agreed that its claim to sovereignty over the
whole of Palestine is now null and void, there is
still real ambiguity about its true claims.
50. It is high time for this twenty-three-
year-old resolution to be implemented, on the
one hand, because Israel is increasing the
number of Jewish s€ttlements on the West Bank,
mainly with immigrants from the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, thus making it increasingly
diflicult to consider withdrawing this population
to Israeli territory, and, on the other, because
prolongation of the intifada is increasing tension
between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem
and Israel and on the West Bank and in the
Gaza Strip. Resolution 242 can be implemented
only in stages, the first of which would be to
leave the Palestinians free to appoint a repre-
sentative government for Gaza and the West
Bank with enough authority to negotiate out-
standing questions with Israel: frontiers, status
of Jerusalem, progressive withdrawal of Israeli
forces, the kind of guarantees it will be given
and the economic organisation of Palestine as a
whole. It is therefore impossible to wait for such
a settlement before starting to evacuate the
forces now deployed in Saudi Arabia and, conse-
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quently, negotiating an agreement between
countries in the region for limiting armaments.
However, an agreement on the first stage seems
essential to ensure that the Arab countries agree
to negotiate on this point as is a western-
guaranteed promise that the process started will
effectively lead to implementation of Resolution
242.
51. Conversely, there is probably no justifi-
cation for fearing a massive return of the Pales-
tinian diaspora to the West Bank when it
becomes independent again. This diaspora is
firmly settled in a number of countries,
including the Gulf countries and, to a large
extent, Lebanon and Jordan, where it has
resources, revenues and often a share of eco'
nomic and administrative authority that would
never be equalled in Palestine. Moreover, there
is every indication that it will not return there,
partly because the majority of the diaspora con-
sists of people who have never lived in Palestine
or even whose parents have never known the
land of their ancestors. From his contacts in the
Gulf countries, your Rapporteur received the
twofold impression that the Palestinians there
had settled permanently and that Palestinian
affairs were no longer a major concern for them,
whereas they found Iraqi expansionism
extremely disturbing.
52. However tragic, the situation in Lebanon
has more limited international repercussions.
There have been no settlers in the narrow strip
of territory in the south occupied by the Israeli
army since 1978 and it seems clear that it is
solely for security reasons that Israel is keeping
forces there to protect its territory against Pales-
tinian raids or a possible Syrian attack. Con-
versely, the de facto protectorate exercised by
Syria over the major part of Lebanese territory,
which has been occupied by its armed forces
since 1976, is a violation of international law
and order which should be rapidly terminated.
Naturally, it is for the Lebanese people to decide
on its own r6gime, and the prosent government,
formed under Syrian authority, does not have
the support of all the communities constituting
the Lebanese nation. Nevertheless, it alone is in
a position to end civil war, disarm the militia
and rebuild the pact between the communities
without which internal peace would be under
constant threat. If Syria's action were limited to
helping to restore order, it would make a major
contribution to peace, but it has committed so
many acts of violence and crimes and provoked
or allowed so many others that it is particularly
badly placed to play this r6le and, in its own
words, its aim seems to be the annexation of
Lebanon. The withdrawal of its armed forces is
therefore a prior condition for the restoration of
peace in Lebanon and, while it condemns and
fights Iraqi expansionism, it cannot expect to
avoid the application of principles that it is
trying to impose elsewhere. This evacuation
must also be guaranteed when the conflict with
Iraq is settled, and Israel must also promise to
evacuate the Golan Heights, a necessary
exchange for the Syrian army's leaving
Lebanon.
53. The Gulf countries, be it Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait or other emirates, have keenly felt the
threat of invasion by lraq, but, for the first time,
this threat has led to a national reaction
extending well beyond the leadership. The vio'
lence of Iraqi troops in Kuwait and the measures
taken to make the Kuwaitis flee and replace
them by imniigrants from Iraq appear to have
provoked a true national resistance movement
in the country when, not so long ago, one might
have wondered whether it really was a nation.
The many Kuwaiti refugees were well received,
particularly in Saudi Arabia, where exiled
Kuwaitis saw Emir Jaber's government in exile
as the only legitimate authority in the eyes of
exiled Kuwaitis. For instance, it is remarkable
that Kuwaiti airliners not seized by Iraq when it
attacked the country have been handed over by
their crews to the government in exile in Saudi
Arabia whereas Iraq was unable to form a gov-
ernment under its protection after the invasion
on 2nd August, which is probably why it
annexed Kuwait so quickly afterwards.
54. There seems to have been a similar phe-
nomenon throughout the countries in the region:
faced with an external threat, the population,
whatever its origin, showed solidarity and a
certain national feeling emerged. Obviously not
enough information is available to assess the
depth of this phenomenon, but your Rapporteur
has noted that the belief that authoritarian
rdgimes have been imposed on people who did
not want them is, to say the least, a simplistic
view that does not correspond to reality. Repre-
sentatives of governments of those countries he
was able to visit assured him that they were
determined to take account of this demon-
stration of national feeling and modify the
political structures of their countries to make
them more democratic and guarantee a fairer
sharing of revenue derived from oil exports for
the entire population. Such reforms will cer-
tainly be essential in maintaining cohesion and
ensuring the survival of these states.
55. However, a better distribution of oil
revenue within the emirates will obviously not
be enough to maintain peace in a region where
the countries with the largest populations have
no oil and suffer from various degrees ofunder-
development. They have already been hit hard
by the present crisis. This is the case in par-
ticular for Jordan, Egypt and Djibouti but
probably also for Yemen, Turkey and Syria, not
to speak of more distant countries such as
Pakistan, India, Sri l^anka and Bangladesh,
where the price of oil has increased consid-
erably. Trade has slowed down in the Indian
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Ocean and the Red Sea and many nationals
employed in Iraq or Kuwait have had to return
home penniless. It is essential to afford these
countries humanitarian assistance and, after the
crisis, the oil-producing countries must also
increase significantly their present level of
assistance to other countries in the region.
56. In fact, among the producing countries,
those which were relatively densely-populated
such as Iraq, Iran and Algeria could not, when
the price of oil was relatively low as was the case
prior to 2nd August, earn enough from their
exports to feed their population and pay the
interest on their external debts. The case oflraq,
whose debt was more than $70 000 million fol-
lowing the war against Iran, was particularly
serious but, since 1982, they all suffered a drop
in the standard of living, high unemployment
and a sharp reduction in investments. Con-
versely, more sparsely-populated countries such
as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab
Emirates made large profits from their oil pro-
duction and invested a large proportion in
industrialised countries with the result that
Kuwait's income from its foreign investments
exceeded its oil revenue. The sums available to
institutions for redistributing these profits, such
as the Arab Economic and Social Development
Fund, the Arab Monetary Fund, the Kuwaiti
Fund, and various Islamic banks and flrrms,
dwindled from year to year. Development
assistance afforded by the producing countries
thus fell from 4.23Vo of their GNP in 19'16 to
0.8690 in 1988.
57. It is naturally for the Arab countries to
agree on the redistribution of oil revenue among
themselves, but henceforth they will no longer be
able to ignore the need to do so. Still more del-
icate is the question of how to fix oil prices and
avoid the political upheavals that have been rife
in the Middle East for more than forty years. It
would certainly be difficult for the West to
express virtuously indignation at the use of the
'oil weapon " by the Arab states in protest at its
support for Israel in 1967 and 1973 when the
West is itself using this weapon against Iraq in
1990, the only difference being that it is doing so
in application of a Security Council resolution.
The fact that states have taken over national oil
resources in most countries in the region elimi-
nates any hope ofregulating prices and quantities
through the machinery of supply and demand. In
these circumstances, it therefore seems diflicult
to avoid negotiations between producer and con-
sumer countries for regulating output and prices.
Moreover, it is in no one's interest for prices to
be too low, since this would restrict research,
development and marketing of alternative
sources ofenergy and prevent the introduction of
any meaningful energy-saving policy.
58. It would therefore appear that, even in the
event of Iraqi expansionism being defeated and
the former dynasty being restored in Kuwait
within its previous frontiers, which is far from
certain, there will have been far-reaching
changes in the region because ofthe crisis. Even
if contacts between western armed forces and
the local populations are limited, the latter
cannot fail to be unaffected by the differences in
standards of living, customs and behaviour
which separate them from the West and the
seeds of a transformation of patriarchal Arabian
societies will have been sown. If Iraqi power is
not squashed, the Arab leaders make no secret of
the fact that they will ask the West to keep forces
in the Gulf region to protect them, thus perpetu-
ating this contact between civilisations. No one
can predict the consequences, but there is every
reason to think they will be significant.
Y. Conclusions
59. Today's new and serious crisis in the
Middle East once again has serious conse-
quences for Europe which depends on the region
for its supplies of oil, a product which is still
essential for its economy. It must be noted,
however, that Europe has managed to face up to
this crisis better than before. The fact that all
European countries have at least three months'
oil reserves allowed them to handle the inter-
ruption of imports from Iraq and Kuwait
without shortages, although prices rose sharply.
Europe stood united in the framework of the
Twelve in reacting against the Iraqi aggression,
the European members of the Security Council
voted in the same way, no European country
accepted the invasion of Kuwait and all applied
the embargo and adopted the same diplomatic
measures when certain diplomatic missions in
Kuwait were blockaded. The Chairman-in-
Office of the Community, Mr. De Michelis, was
able to speak on behalf of the Twelve in the
United Nations General Assembly, underlining
in particular that the common aim was not only
the restoration of Kuwait but a general set-
tlement of outstanding problems throughout the
Near and Middle East. In the military area,
WEU managed, more quickly than in 1987, to
organise co-ordinated action with fairly clear
political aims less than three weeks after the
Iraqi attack.
60. Although Europe's participation in inter-
national action against Iraq is still insufficient, it
is of considerable political importance because
of this relative unity and the the Arab countries'
confidence in Europe. It may thus voice its
views when the conflict is resolved and Europe
must prepare for this even if the Arab countries
will have the final say in organising peace in the
region. Insofar as they ask Europe to help to
guarantee peace for some time to come, Europe
will have a right to an opinion.
61. However, this conflict will probably not
be the last one and it is essential for Europe to
l5l
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learn the lessons from the difliculties it encoun-
tered in translating its relative unanimity into
action allowing it to play this rOle. This matter
will have shown that, in an area where NATO
could not reach an adequate political consensus
and the Twelve, although agreed on political
aims and diplomatic action, were unable to take
military action, WEU had an important r6le to
play and the governments acted to better avail
than ever before. This shows, frrst, what risks
twelve-power Europe would be taking if it fol-
lowed up certain proposals by the Commission
of the European Community aimed at associ-
ating Europe's defence too closely with an
organisation that has neither the ability nor the
necessary flexibility to co-ordinate action which,
at the present juncture, must remain a national
responsibility. The resolution on the CSCE
adopted by the European Parliament on 9th
October, which declares that " WEU should not
be revitalised ", pending the European union
being given defence powers, is diametrically
opposed to Europe's immediate interests and
the long-term interests of a future European
union. It is, on the contrary, WEIJ's activities
that allow Europe to exist and act in areas
within its purview.
62. This is why your Rapporteur, in an
attempt to draw conclusions from the military
deployment in the area of the Gulf, and particu-
larly the naval deployment co-ordinated by
WEU, proposes that preparations should be
made in peacetime to make such co-ordination
more rapid and effective in future while leaving
each country free to participate at whatever level
it thinks best in action to foster peace.
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Amendment I
3rd December 1990
Eumlrcan security and the Gulf crisis
AMENDMENT 1'
tablcd by Mr. Soell and othe$
l. In paragraph 6 (b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out * which might take levels
above the agreed limits' and insert * in the region ".
Signed: Soell, Stoffelen, Baarveld-Schlaman
l. See lOth sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendment ageed to).
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Amendment 2
3rd December 1990
Europeaa security and the Gulf crisis
AMENDMENT 2 
'
tabled by MM. Martineo Stotfelen and Scheer
2. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:
* settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the kbanese problem on the basis of the appli-
cation of the United Nations resolutions which have still not been respected, while strictly
respectingthe obligations of Article VI of the treaty governing the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons signed by the nuclear powers; "
Signed: Martinez, Stoffelen, Scheer
l. See lfth sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendment amended and agreed to).
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Amendment 3
3rd December 1990
Eumpean security and thc Gulf crisis
AMENDMENT 3I
tabled by MM. Martinez and Stolfelen
3. After paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:
* Seek the association of all countries participating in the military and political effort to ensure
the success of the embargo 
- 
and in particular the WEU member states 
- 
with the talks between
the United States and Iraq following the United Nations Security Council resolution. "
Signed: M artinez, Stoffelen
l. See l0th sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendment agreed to).
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Amendment 4
Eurugnan security and the Gulf crisis
AMENDMENT 4 
'
tabled by Mn Scher
4. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.
l. See lfth sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendment not moved).
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Signed: Scheer
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Amendment 5
3rd December 1990
Eurcpean security and tha Gulf crisis
AMENDMENT 5 
'
tabled by MM. Pieralli and De Declur
5. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:
'Considering the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 678 giving
Iraq until l5th January l99l to evacuate Kuwait before any force is used against it and wel-
coming the fact that President Bush has decided to take advantage of this respite to open talks
with Iraq and that the latter has accepted this proposal, "
Signed: Pieralli, De Decker
l. See lfth sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendment agreed to).
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Amendment 6
3rd December 1990
Europrcan seurity and the Gulf cfisis
AMENDMENT 6 
'
tabled by Mn De Declccr and otlurs
6. In the draft recommendation proper, after paragraph 2, add a new paragraph:
" Ask member states to earmark or set up, each according to its means, a force that can be trans-
ported over long distances to help to restore peace in response inter alia to requests from the
United Nations Security Council and to provide it with weapons and equipment commensurate
with the requirements of such operations;'
Signed: De Decker, Bassinet, Pieralli, Uyuendaele
t. See loth sitting 5th December 1990 (amendment agreed to).
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Amendments 7, 8, 9,
3rd December 1990
10 and ll
Eumpean security and the Gulf crisis
AMENDMENTS 7,8,9,10 and 11 
'
tabled by MM. De Declur, Pieralli and Uyttendocle
At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add:
", inter alia by systematic implementation of paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the modified
Brussels Treaty; "
At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:
" a settlement of relations between Israel and the Palestinians on the basis of implementation of
relevant Security Council resolutions; "
At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:
* full restoration of Lebanese sovereignty thanks to the disbandment of the militias and the evac-
uation of Lebanese territory by Israeli and Syrian armed forces; "
At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:
" ensuring regular supplies of oil for the international market;"
At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:
* establishing more effective solidarity between Arab oil-producing countries and those that lack
the resources essential for their economic development;"
Signed: De Decker, Pieralli, Uyuendaele
l. See lOth sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendments 7, 9 and l0 agreed to; amendment 8 withdrawn; amendment ll nega-
tived).
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Amendment 12
3rd December 1990
Eurupean security and the Gulf crisis
AMENDMENT 12 
'
tabled by MM. Pierulli and De Deckor
12. After paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:
" Use all the means at its disposal to promote a political solution to the conflict in Kuwait and to
determine the stages for the restoration of lasting peace througftout the Near and Middle East
before expiry of ihe timeJimit set by the United Nations Security Council for authorising
recourse to force. "
Signed: Pieralli, De Decker
1. See l0th sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendment agreed to).
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Document 1245 8th October 1990
Revision of the noditien Brussels Truty 
- 
reply to the second part of
the thirty-fourth annual report and the thirty-Iifth annual report of the Council
REPORT 
'
submiacd on behalf of the Political Committeez
by Sir Geollrey Finsberg, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnarr RecorararNp^lrtoN
on the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty
Expteutony MEMoRANDUM
submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. The half-yearly reports
III. Relations between the Council and the Assembly
IV. Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. De Declcer (Alternate for Mrs. Staels-Dompas)(Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Beix (Alternate: Lemoine), Biihm, Brilo, Candal, Caro, Cnleman, Collart, Cuatrecasas, Eich,
Fabra, Forni, Foschi, Hitschler (Alternate: Biichner), Koehl, van der Linden, I,ol'd Mackie, MM. Martinez (Alternate: Moya),
Martino, Miiller, Natali, P6criaux, Pieralli, Mrs. Polfer, MM. de Puig, Roseta, Sarti (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Sir William Shelton,
MM. Stolfelen, Thyraud, Ward (Alternate: Rowe\.
N.B. Tie names of those taking part in the vole are printed in italics. (
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Draft Recommendation
on the rctision of tlrc modif,ed Brassels Trcay
l. (a) The Assembly, having noted the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and the thirty-
fifth annual report of the Council, considers them to be administrative documents that provide no real
information about the activities of the WEU Council.
(b) lt neveftheless welcomes the fact that, in 1988, 1989 and 1990, it received more substantial
information from the United Kingdom, Belgian and French Chairmen-in-Oflice and from the Secretar-
ies-General, in particular through their letters to the President of the Assembly.
(c/ It therefore approves the second part of the thirty-fourth and the thirty-fifth annual report of
the Council.
(d) lt intends to follow up the Secretary-General's proposal to address its committees as and
when required.
(e/ It strongly REcoMMENos that the Council be more precise and helpful with its communica-
tions to the Assembly, in particular its replies to recommendations and to written questions put by par-
liamentarians.
ff) lt also REcoMMENDs that the Council inform it, whenever possible, of the conclusions drawn
from reports by the Special Working Group, the Defence Representatives Group and sub-groups whose
work corresponds to the agendas of Assembly sessions.
2. (a) The Assembly has noted that the Council has started to examine the terms of a revision of
the treaty, made necessary by the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU.
(D/ It considers that events in the Gulf, the CSCE as well as in Eastern and Central Europe in
1989 and 1990 have made an even more detailed examination of the terms of such a revision nec-
essary.
(c) lt proWses to examine in due course the questions raised by this revision.
(d) Atthis stage, however, in regard to Article IX of the treaty, it pnoposrs that the Council adopt
the following wording:
" The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities to an
assembly of representatives of the Brussels Treaty poweni appointed in accordance with the
same criteria as representatives to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. "
In the same way, it would be valuable if national governments made a similar report to their own par-
liaments.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Sir Geotlrey Finsberg, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. The present report is in answer to the
second part of the annual report of the Council
for 1988 (Document ll77) and the two parts of
the annual report for 1989 (Documents 1200
and 1219). The first part of the report on the
Council's activities in 1990 has not yet reached
the Assembly. Now that the Gulf question is at
the hub of governments' concerns, the reunifi-
cation of Germany is practically completed and
the various associations of European states are
preparing meetings for the last quarter of 1990
which should be of vital importance for the
future of Europe, the Assembly is expected to
answer administrative reports which make little
or no reference to these events. This illustrates,
although perhaps unnecessarily, the futility of
the task your Rapporteur has to carry out.
2. This observation is in no way intended as
condemnation of the Council's activities which
were significant in 1988 and 1989 and even
more so in 1990. What is questioned is the con-
ventional nature of a practice imposed by the
modified Brussels Treaty but which is increas-
ingly ill-suited to present circumstances. The
Council in fact communicates with the
Assembly through the quarterly meetings
between the Chairmanship-in-Office and the
Presidential Committee, in which two com-
mittees take part once a year, through addresses
by the Chairmen-in-Office at the two part-
sessions and through the Secretary-General's
letters to the President of the Assembly. It is,
moreover, gratifying that the French
Chairmanship-in-Office, after convening
extraordinary meetings of the Council on 2lst
August and l9th September 1990, invited the
Presidential Committee, on the first occasion,
and that committee and the Political and
Defence Committees, on the second, to meetings
at which it reported to them on the Ministers'
discussions on the Gulf question.
3. The Assembly for its part has endeav-
oured to follow the Council's activities and to
communicate, without delay, its opinions on the
essential matters tackled, be it changes in
Eastern Europe, at the extraordinary session of
the Assembly held in Luxembourg on 22nd and
23rd March, monitoring the CFE agreements by
means of observation satellites, at the sym-
posium held in Rome on 27th and 28th March
1990, or co-ordination of member countries'
efforts to ensure respect for the embargo against
Iraq decreed by the United Nations Security
Council, by applying the provisions of Rule 14,
paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the
Assembly for adopting recommendations,
implemented on 20th September 1990. The
Assembly was thus able to express its views on
most of the Council's activities at the appro-
priate time. However, this makes the reply to
the annual report of the Council something of an
academic exercise since it covers events dating
back to an already remote past and reported
superficially in administrative terms in the
report. The procedure worked out in 1955 to
allow the Assembly to supervise a Council
whose tasks were primarily administrative no
longer really meets the requirements of a dia-
logue which relates to the highly political activ-
ities of a Council reactivated by the guidelines
and methods it has adopted since 1984.
4. Since your Rapporteur is nevertheless
convinced that the treaty must be applied as
long as it has not been revised, he will offer the
Assembly a reply to the documents transmitted
to it.
II. The half-yearly reports
5. Having read the three documents to
which he is expected to reply, your Rapporteur
is convinced that they remain outside the Coun-
cil's political and military activities which, in
the main, have been carried out by the Council
of Ministers about which the Assembly - or at
least its Presidential Committee - has received
satisfactory information at the right time. If the
half-yearly reports are to be believed, they also
seem to have been carried out by the Special
Working Group, the Defence Representatives
Group or even meetings between the two
groups. The Assembly can but welcome the
number and importance of the questions tackled
by these various bodies, i.e.:
(a) implementation of the platform of
The Hague (Document ll77);
(b) the START and CFE arms limitation
negotiations and those on banning
chemical weapons (Documents ll77
and 12l9);
(c) co-operation in the verification ofthe
CFE agreements (Documents 1200
and l2l9);
(d) the use of space to verify the appli-
cation of future CFE agreements(Documents 1200 and l2l9);
(e) security implications of the com-
pletion of the single European market(Document 1200);
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Europe's medium-term security
requirements (Document 1200);
dangers to peace arising in regions
outside the NATO area (Document
1200);
European co.operation in training
armed forces (Documents 1200 and
t2t9);
operational concepts and require-
ments (Document 1200);
(j) defence policy
reduction in
1200);
planning after a
forces (Document
(k) demographic problems (Document
1200);
0 the open skies project (Document
t2t9);
(m) military assistance to third world
countries (Document l2l9\;
(n) discussions with the Soviet Union on
preventing incidents (Document
t2r9);
(o) military contacts with the Soviet
Union (Document l2l9);
(p) study of missiles and chemical
weapons in Middle East countries.
6. Many of the questions studied are in fact
highly topical, particularly the last one. More
than half of them have been the subject of
Assembly reports. Others might also have been
considered by WEU's parliamentary body if the
Council had given it the necessary background
information.
'1. To this list should be added that of the
studies that were requested of the Paris minis-
terial organs before they were disbanded at the
end of June 1990 and whose titles are men-
tioned in the various half-yearly reports of the
Council. Your Rapporteur counted fourteen in
Documents ll77 and 1219; Document 1200
made no reference to the activities of the Paris
ministerial organs. Most of them naturally relate
to matters dealt with by the working groups.
8. Yet the Council has not given the
Assembly the text or a summary of any of the
reports prepared by the Special Working Group
or the Defence Representatives Group or, a for-
tiori, by the Mediterranean and Space Sub-
Groups, or any of the studies assigned to the
Paris ministerial organs, or any of the conclu-
sions reached. Is it to be inferred that none of
this work was completed? That the Council con-
sidered them all so secret that it could commu-
nicate nothing to the Assembly? The absence of
such communications obviously makes infor-
mation given in annual reports purely formal
a)
G)
(h)
0
and allows few exchanges between the Council
and the Assembly on matters on the Council's
agenda.
9. Your Rapporteur noted with interest that
the Mediterranean Sub-Group " decided to
make a detailed study of problems relating to
the proliferation of ballistic missiles with special
reference to the disputes in the Middle East and
the Gulf and to capacities for manufacturing
chemical weapons " (Document l2l9 on the
second hatfof 1989). At the present juncture, it
would be important for the Assembly to know
what conclusions were drawn from this study. It
may also wonder whether the Council followed
this question with the necessary diligence and
whether, when Iraq attacked Kuwait, it was pre-
pared to act. The slowness with which WEU
co-ordination started indicates that this was not
the case.
10. Referring to what he believed WEU's r6le
should be in the next few years, the Secretary-
General, addressing the Political Committee on
9th October 1990, mentioned three essential
directions for WEU's future activities:
(i) to define Europe's security identity in
the new circumstances before 1995 
-
the time-limit for the withdrawal of
Soviet forces from the Central
European countries. Europe must
show a united front if it wishes the
United States to maintain forces in
Europe. In this connection, the con-
tinued presence in Germany of forces
from other countries, accompanied
by the stationing of German forces in
neighbouring countries, would be a
positive factor;
(ii) to define the concept of the two
pillars of the alliance, i.e. which part
of the American presence is
important and how Europe should
participate, and alSo how to organise
consultations with the United States
on all politico-military matters;
(iii) to study the Soviet Union's security
requirements in regard, for instance,
to maintaining a buffer zone in
Central Europe, in order to prepare
for and facilitate agreement on the
organisation of the continent's
security.
Your Rapporteur can but endorse such a pro-
gramme. The Assembly would obviously be
most interested to know how it is implemented
in view of the part it played in preparing the
ground, with particular regard to the symposium
organised by the General Affairs Committee in
Florence in April 1989 and Recommendations
471, 474, 479 and 480.
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IIL Relations between the Council and
the Assembly
11. Your Rapporteur has noted all the
improvements in relations between the two
WEU organs thanks to the initiatives of suc-
cessive Chairmen-in-Office and the Secretary-
General. However, as well as the delays and
shortcomings of the half-yearly reports, he also
has to stress the inadequacy of replies to recom-
mendations adopted by the Assembly. In most
cases, they have been the subject of detailed
studies by the rapporteurs who have often, in
preparing them, consulted the most authori-
tative sources in their countries, other member
countries and international organisations con-
cerned. The Assembly committees have studied
the reports and examined the draft recommen-
dations with great care. The Assembly has done
its utmost to organise serious debates, enhanced
by addresses by ministers, or even symposia to
which it has invited those most qualified to give
information and express opinions. In this, it has
been limited only by the budgetary constraints
imposed on it by the Council. However, it can
but note that the replies to these recommenda-
tions not only do not reflect a true reactivation
of WEU, they are in many cases even more
evasive than they were prior to 1985. In par-
ticular, your Rapporteur must recall that the
Council undertook to reply to Assembly recom-
mendations, even if they related to matters
handled by other bodies than WEU. This should
have applied, inter alia, to Recommendation
475 on European security and events in the Near
and Middle East, a particularly detailed text, to
which the Council's reply was extremely brief on
the basis of the argument that the matter was
being handled in the framework of European
political co-operation.
12. The Council should also be reminded that
the Assembly is a body whose responsibilities
cannot validly be delegated. Giving the Presi-
dential Committee, or other committees, infor-
mation at more or less confidential meetings
cannot relieve the Council of the need to com-
municate to the Assembly as a whole, through
statutory channels and at the right time, infor-
mation on the Council's work so that it may
effectively exercise its tasks under Article IX of
the treaty. Your Rapporteur is well aware that
this may not correspond to some concepts of
diplomacy, but was it not to break with such
practices that the signatories of the Paris Agree-
ments added to the Brussels Treaty what was to
become Article IX of the modified treaty?
The circulation since 1989 of a " L,etter from
the Assembly " compensates to a certain extent
for this lack of information given to members of
the Assembly. It is for the Council to commu-
nicate to the Assembly, at any time, such docu-
ments as it wishes to have reproduced in this
way.
IY. Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty
13. On the occasion of the accession of Por-
tugal and Spain to WEU, the Council adopted a
political declaration according to which member
states:
" ... found that a number of the provisions
of the Brussels Treaty, as modified in
1954, did not correspond to the way in
which they intend to pursue and
strengthen that co-operation, on the basis
of the Rome declaration on 27th October
1984 and of the platform on European
security interests, adopted in The Hague
on 27th October 1987.
Consequently, the member states of WEU
with Portugal and Spain consider that the
relevant provisions of the Brussels Treaty,
as modified in 1954, and its colre-
sponding protocols will be re-examined,
as appropriate, having regard for the
practice and achievements of, and the
prospects for, their co-operation in
security matters. " (Document ll7,
Appendix II)
t4. In the second part of its thirty-fourth
annual report, the Council informed the
Assembly that it was studying the revision of the
treaty. Developments in Europe in 1989 and
1990 obviously called in question the bases of
that study and everyone will understand that the
Council will be unable to complete it as long as
everything is not clear about the future of
NATO, the CSCE and the European Com-
munity. Our Assembly is no better placed to
give an opinion on this matter at present.
15. Several times in recent months, however,
the question has been raised by persons outside
the Assembly of whether the WEU Assembly
should not be composed of members of the par-
liamentary assembly of the European Commu-
nities elected in the WEU countries. On this
point, the Assembly can express its views here
and now, quite apart from any other consider-
ation.
16. In view of the nature of WEU's responsi-
bilities, your Rapporteur believes the WEU
Assembly must be composed of delegations
from the parliaments of member countries.
17. He notes that the present text of Article
IX of the treaty guarantees that the Assembly
has a satisfactory number of members and sub-
stitutes and a breakdown of seats between
member countries which has also proved satis-
factory. He thinks it undesirable to call this in
question.
18. As the work of both WEU and the
Council of Europe has increased dramatically
since 1954, members of national parliaments
have some difficulties in attending all meetings.
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At present, the treaty insists that the WEU dele-
gation be identical to that of the Council of
Europe. Your Rapporteur considers that the
work of the Assembly would be enhanced if flex-
ibility was permitted to national parliaments.
Each parliament should be allowed to appoint a
distinct delegation to WEU which could either
be the same as that to the Council of Europe or
only partly the same. There is probably some
advantage in at least two or three members
being on both delegations but the decision is
best made by national parliaments.
19. However, your Rapporteur feels that,
even at this early stage, he must place on record
his opposition to the proposals being put
forward by the Italian Chairman-in-Oflice of the
Council of Ministers of the European Com-
munity that the Community should take over
defence and security matters from WEU. Your
Rapporteur considers that the idea, whilst being
flawed and premature in any case, must await
the NATO review. He wonders, moreover, how
the neutral (soon possibly to be more than one)
nation could participate effectively in such a
body in a way which would not prejudice its
neutral status. He recalls that WEU is the sole
body entitled by solemn treaty to deal with
defence and that the modified Brussels Treaty
cannot be unilaterally abrogated but remains in
force until at least 1998 and, more probably,
until 2004.
20. He considers it is neither for the govern-
ments nor for the WEU Assembly to exclude any
national parliamentarian from national delega-
tions as this is a matter solely for parliaments.
21. He therefore asks the Assembly to rec-
ommend that the Council redraft Article IX of
the treaty in the treaty revision it has started as
under:
" The Council of Western European
Union shall make an annual report on its
activities to an assembly of representa-
tives of the Brussels Treaty powers
appointed in accordance with the same
criteria as representatives to the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe. "
22. It has indeed become apparent that there
is no longer any point in referring specifically to
* the control of armaments " in this article since
this is now a very minor Council activity and no
longer of great concern to the Assembly.
23. This proposal in no way prejudices any
attitude the Assembly may subsequently adopt
towards the revision of other articles of the
treaty. It will be able to adopt a valid attitude
only when it has been able to obtain a more
complete picture of the new European security
order, a first idea of which might emerge from
the interyovernmental meetings to be held at the
end of 1990.
l
I
I
I
I
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Enhancing WEU's public relations
8th October 1990
member
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary
and. Public Relations by Mr. Roman, Rapporteur2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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on enhancing WEU's public relations
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submitted by Mr. Roman, Rapporteur
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II. The public relations of the Council, its ministerial organs and
governments
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Debates in member parliaments
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l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Ewing (Chairman); Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: Miillel), Sjr llilliay Shelton (Vice-Chairmen);
1.7.1.7.. ,lmarali Biichner, Biihler (Alternitd: Nieget\, 'Caccia, De Bondt (Alternate: De Decker), pe Hoo_p *!.ffgt, Estggs_,
Fiandrotti, Mrs. Garcia Manzanares, MM. Gouieyron (Alternate: ColleUe), Greco, Sir Russell lohnston, Sir John Hunt, MM.
Kempinaiie, Kollwelter, Lopez Henares, Nufiez,Piuhl,kmoine, Seitlinger, Stegagnini (Alternate: Mezzapesal, Tummers, Vial-
Massat.
N.B. Tlre names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
on ealnacing llE(ls public rula/;ions
(i) 
. . 
The Assembly notes with satisfaction the increased interest shown by the media, public opinion
and in parliamentary debates in the r6le of WEU as a result of its action in ttre Gulf iegion folbwing
Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.
(rr-- 
- 
This open debate nevertheless shows that a large section of the public, if not ignorant of WEU,
still holds preconceived and mistaken ideas about 1t which, in member countriei and across the
Atlantic too, lead to a lack of credibility in the institution that does not correspond to the increase in its
activities.
(iii) 
. 
Conversely, the Assembly is gratified at being kept better informed of the Council's activities, inparticular through the information letters from the Secretary-General, in spite of the fact that their
contents in no way commit the Council.
Ql The Assembly notes with interest that, starting this year, numerous communiqu6s have been
issued at the close of meetings of the Council of Ministers and several of its organs. It considers the
Council is thus starting to keep the public better informed.
(v) 
. .However, up-heavals in Central and Eastern Europe and new threats emanating from regions
o{side 
-Eur-ope ca!! _for more systematic, coherent efforts to explain to the public the possibi'iities
offered bythe modified B-russels Treaty for establishing a new Eulopean security system; ihe Council
must not, however, transfer the burden of these efforts to members of the Assembly.(!i) The hesitation shown by the Council and member governments, failing to $asp the politicalimportance of public relations or to agree on WEU's futule r6le, might increase the now pievalent
uncertainty among the public about how Europe's future security should be guaranteed and organised.
THr AssnrasI.y THEREFoRE REcoMMENDS THAT rnr CouNcrr-
1. Include information policy in its agenda as a matter of urgency, in accordance with the sugges-
tions made QV Mr, Pontillon in Written Question 285, with a view in particular to increasing theiowinadequate financial means available to wEU and its Assembly in this area;
2. Work out, with the assistance of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, a communications
strategy allowing the public debate on European security to be intensihed and WEU's image to be
enhanced in public opinion, not only in Europe but also in North America;
3. Support and extend-^the Secretary-General's public relations work and urge member govern-
ments to intensify their efforts to explain to the public WEU's work in helping to establish-a new
security system in Europe;
4. Inform the Assembly of measures taken to attain the abovementioned goals.
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Explanatory Memorandum
Qubmitted by Mn Roman, Rapportear)
I. Introduction
1. On 27th October 1984, in the Rome dec-
laration, the ministers of member countries:
" underlined their determination to make better
use of the WEU framework in order to increase
co-operation between the member states in the
field of security policy and to encourage con-
sensus. "
2. Nearly six years later, on 27th June 1990,
during a debate on Europe in the French Senate,
Mr. Dumas, French Minister of State, Minister
for Foreign Affairs, said: " To develop Europe's
defence and security identity, should not better
use be made henceforth of Western European
Union of which we shall hold the chairmanship-
in-office as from lst July this year? " Hence a
decision taken in Rome six years ago was again
presented in the form of an open question.
3. This question still seemed open during the
first weeks following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
when the Assembly, speaking through its Pres-
ident, seemed to be the only WEU body vigor-
ously condemning this action and launching a
public appeal to the governments of WEU
member countries to invoke paragraph 3 of
Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty in
order to convene an extraordinary meeting of
the Council of Ministers.
4. We can but welcome the fact that the
WEU Council finally assumed its responsibil-
ities in face ofthe new crisis that had arisen in
the Gulf, but it may be wondered whether the
general public has understood the importance
and novelty of the first convocation of an
extraordinary ministerial meeting of the WEU
Council and the first meeting since 1954 of the
chiefs of defence staff of the WEU member
states.
5. The public image of WEU does not yet
correspond to the r6le set for the organisation in
the modified Brussels Treaty, i.e. to protect the
citizens of its member countries against any
threat to peace in the world and to make a
decisive contribution to the establishment of ajust, peaceful and secure order in Europe which
has changed fundamentally since the removal of
the Berlin wall in November 1989.
6. In these circumstances, neither the
Council nor the Assembly, insofar as it speaks
on behalf of the peoples of Western Europe in
security matters, can relax the efforts to increase
public knowledge of the r6le of the organisation
and the policy and action they are pursuing in
the interests of security, freedom and peace in
Europe and in the world. The present report
therefore proposes to examine the problems
which still face WEU in terms of its relations
with public opinion.
II. The public relations of the Council,
its ministerial organs
and member gotefliments
(i) Council of Ministen
7. First, it is satisfying that, for the first time
since 1987, a press communiqu6 was issued at
the close of the meeting of the WEU Council of
Ministers held in Brussels on 23rd April 1990.
In member countries, the press reacted to this
meeting with considerable interest. However,
the diversity of the interviews given unilaterally
at the close of this meeting by many of the min-
isters taking part led to some confusion in the
media and among the public over the position
and vocation of WEU in a changing world.
8. At the beginning of August, after the
Council's silence 
- 
which the President of the
Assembly said was a matter for concern 
- 
about
lraq's invasion of Kuwait, the public
announcement of an extraordinary ministerial
meeting of the WEU Council in Paris set off a
vast debate in the European and United States
press about the specific rOle ofthe organisation
in the new Gulf crisis. This debate went on for
several weeks and continued after the publi-
cation of the decisions taken at the ministerial
meeting on 2lst August 1990 and announced in
a Council press communiqu6.
9. In an article dated 23rd August, the
French newspaper Le Monde wondered whether
the co-ordination in the Gulf decided upon by
WEU would not one day, perhaps, be seen as the
foundation stone of a joint defence policy that
Europe has been seeking for many yeani.
10. Public interest in WEU action increased
further following the convocation of a second
extraordinary meeting of the Council of Min-
isters in Paris on 18th September 1990.
However, this welcome public debate has not
yet allowed the public to obtain a more precise
idea of WEU's general vocation in an envi-
ronment that is evolving quickly in terms of
European and international security. Some of
the utterances of member governments pub-
lished in the press are, in fact too divergent. It
would therefore be a pity if the Council did not
take advantage of WEU's positive situation to
enhance its policy for keeping public opinion
informed since, for a long time, the latter has
been waiting for an answer to the question of
how Europe's future security will be ensured and
organised.
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(ii) Permaneat Council
11. It should be realled that, further to the
report presented by the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations on Western
European Union's information policy', Mr.
Pontillon, then Chairman of that committee,
addressed a series of questions to the Council on
l6th January 1990 under the number written
question 285 2 on improving its public relations
effort following the WEU seminar on changes in
the public perception of Eurpean defence
organised in Iondon on 6th and 7th March
l 989.
12. In a letter to Mr. Pontillon dated 6th
March, Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of
WEU, proposed to * give a substantial answer to
your question in the weeks preceding the second
part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session of your
Assembly at the beginning of December 1990 ".
However, it is satisfying to note that, since
January 1990, the Permanent Council has been
issuing press communiquds at the close of its
meetings. Thus, the Council has followed up at
least one of the Assembly's proposals, i.e. * pub-
lishing guidelines for the press at the close of
meetings of the Permanent Council' (see para-
gaph 3(a) of written question 285 put by Mr.
Pontillon).
13. Press communiqu6s were issued, inter
alia, on l Tth January 1990 (appointment of Mr.
John Roper as Director of the WEU Institute for
Security Studies), 2lst February 1990 (750th
meeting of the Permanent Council), l4th March
1990 (the Portuguese Parliament's ratification
of the protocol of accession to WEU), 29th
March 1990 (Portugal's tabling of the instru-
ments of ratification of the protocol of accession
to the modified Brussels Treaty), 28th June
1990 (French Chairmanshipin-Office of the
WEU Council as from lst July 1990 and start of
the WEU Institute for Security Studies), 26th
September 1990 (contributions by Belgium,
Luxembourg and Portugal in support of WEU
operations in the Gulf) and 3rd October 1990
(statement by the permanent representative of
Germany that united Germany was a full
member of WEU).
14. These first steps by the Permanent
Council to inform the public about its activities
are gratifying. Also worthy of note is the publi-
cation of information for the press relating to
the first meeting in the history of WEU of chiefs
of defence staff of the member states in Paris on
27th August 1990 and that of an ad hoc
co-ordination group of representatives of the
ministries for foreign affairs and defence in
Paris on 3lst August 1990.
l. Document 1205, 8th November 1989.
2. Document 1232,22nd May 1990.
15. Conversely, Chapter VIII of the second
part of the thirty-frfth annual report of the
Council to the Assembly 'Relations with the
press and information' is particularly vague,
noting that * the ministerial bodies have con-
tinued to be very active in this field ".
16. What is the significance of such words as:
* Continuing to work in the same
direction and in the same ways, the minis-
terial bodies again sought to foster public
relations with the press and the many
institutions involved in the debate on the
changing state of member countries'
security policies. This continuity is largely
attributable to the basically unchanged
political and budgetary constraints to
which an intergovernmental organisation
is subject. "
17. It would be interesting to ask for details
and to know what " political and budgetary con-
straints " prevent the Council from developing a
true information policy.
18. As the first part of the thirty-sixth annual
report of the Council has not yet reached the
Assembly, it is not yet possible to assess how far
the Council will try to develop its public rela-
tions in the years ahead. Nor is it yet known
what consequences the Council will draw from
the results of the third European session of
advanced defence studies held in London from
8th to l4th July 1990.
19. The r6le of public opinion seems to have
been an important topic for certain working
groups at that session. If it is true that they
noted that public opinion and governments
lacked credibility in WEU, it is urgent to ask the
Council whether it is prepared to take steps to
remedy this situation.
(iit) Secretadot- Geurol
20. In April 1990, the Secretariat-General
issued a leaflet in English and French entitled
* Western European Union ", giving brief infor-
mation about the aims, background and
structure of the organisation. It would be
desirable to issue it in the languages ofthe other
member countries, too, so that it might be more
widely circulated.
21. The information letters from Mr. van
Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, on the
activities of the intergovermental organs show
that the Secretary-General and his colleagues are
continuing their widespread activities, pro-
viding information on the r6le and work of
WEU at meetings, conferences and seminars
organised by many institutions. It would be
useful to see how far it might be possible for
interested members of the Assembly to be able
to read the addresses made on those occa-
sions.
r70
I
DOCUMENT 1246
22. The daily press review issued by the
Secretariat-General makes a very good selection
of newspaper articles but also reproduces major
speeches by heads of government and ministers
on international political matters and, in par-
ticular, defence and security.
(iv) Governncnts of member countries
(a) Before the Gulf crisis
23. In Resolution 82 adopted on 7th June
1990 on the new r6le of national delegations in
the activities of the WEU Assembly, the
Assembly reggetted that " for some time most
WEU member governments prefer to avoid
public statements stressing the options offered "
by the modified Brussels Treaty in regard to the
future of European security.
24. Consideration of a few public statements
by the ministers concerned in the f,rrst six
months of this year allows one to go further and
note that the future r6le of WEU was increas-
ingly open to doubt. This is in any event how the
press interpreted the remarks by Mr. Eyskens,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, out-
going Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council,
and Mr. Ordoflez, Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Spain, at the press conference given at the
close of the last meeting of the WEU Council of
Ministers 3.
25. Where the United Kingdom Government
is concerned, it should be pointed out that Mr.
King, Secretary of State for Defence, gave a neg-
ative answer to Mr. Speed, who had asked him
in a debate in the House of Commons on 18th
and lgth June 1990 whether he believed WEU
would have a r6le to play out of area. How
important, therefore, was the statement by Mr.
Clark, Minister of State for Defence Pro-
curement, during the same debate, when he told
Mr. Wilkinson that the " organisation may grow
in stature and importance " ?
26. In regard to the proposal by Mr. van
Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, to set up
multinational forces from several WEU member
countries, Mr. Genscher, German Minister for
Foreign Affairs, believes these ideas should be
implemented in the framework of NATO a.
27. Thus, no government has made any
special effort to improve the public's knowledge
of specific features of Western European Union.
It will be recalled, for instance, that in a debate
in the Bundestag in October 1988 a member of
the German Delegation to the WEU Assembly
asked whether the Federal Government was pre-
pared to publish a document on the activities of
3. L,e Monde, 25th April 1990.
4. Addressing the German Foreign Policy Association in
Bonn on 28th June 1990.
WEU since 1984. Mr. Sch?ifer, Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs, answered:
* Yes. Such a booklet is already being pre-
pared. It will be issued fairly soon. The
booklet will include fundamental texts
relating to the reactivation stage in WEU
and extracts from speeches expressing the
Federal Government's position on the
reactivation of WEU. "
28. However, this booklet has not yet been
published. Mr. Antretter therefore put the fol-
lowing question in the Bundestag on 2nd August
1990:
" How is it that, according to the minutes(l l/100) of the plenary sitting of the Bun-
destag of l3th October 1988, the Federal
Government promised, through the inter-
mediary of the Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sch[fer, the early
publication of an information booklet on
developments in and the activities of
WEU since 1984 but that this booklet has
not yet been issued? When can the
Federal Government be exPected to
honour its promise? "
29. On l4th August 1990, Mr. Sch?ifer, Min-
ister of State for Foreign Affairs, answered as
follows:
* The Federal Government proposes to
publish the information booklet on WEU
when WEU's future r6le in a fast-
changing European security environment
has been clarified. It stresses the fact thatit informs the Bundestag about WEU's
activities twice a year."
The public expects such clarification on the
future r6le of WEU to be given as soon as pos-
sible.
(b) After the outbreak of the new Gulf crisis
30. Have the tone and content of public state-
ments by government representatives on the
vocation of WEU changed since Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait early in August 1990?
31. In joint statements to the French National
Assembly and Senate, meeting in extraordinary
session on 27th August 1990, Mr. Rocard,
French Prime Minister, and Mr. Dumas, Min-
ister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
asserted, in connection with Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait, that:
* European solidarity was not lacking... It
was on France's initiative that the nine
countries of Western European Union
met... They all spoke with a single voice to
implement co-ordination of their military
operations in the region... Never had
Europe been so swift to show its solidarity
and unity.'
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32. Mr. Dumas went further:
" As to the need to organise an embryo of
European defence, progress has, I agree,
been made: This is now within our reach
but it is, at the same time, a real question.
Heaven knows we have discussed it often
enough here!
A first answer, such as it is, was given by
the WEU meeting in Paris on 2lst August.
The unprecedented decisions taken there
certainly passed unnoticed in the flow of
information circulated and measures
adopted. They are nevertheless ofconsid-
erable importance: it was indeed the first
time a decision had been taken to ensure
co-ordination between the various WEU
countries on the spot, including countries
which, although not members of WEU,
were invited as observers, with regular
meetings of chiefs of defence staff to
ensure such co-ordination.
We must go further! Certain countries (i.e.
Belgium, Spain and Greece) which had
refused to follow the Americans on this
occasion nevertheless agreed tojoin us in
the framework of WEU. The crisis had
revealed the need to do so. We are
working at it; let us continue to do so.
This is one of the essential elements of
political union. "
33. On 23rd August 1990, Mr. Genscher,
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, described
the German Government's position to the Bun-
destag as follows:
" The Federal Government welcomes the
fact that Western European Union, as a
European body for discussing and
harmonising security matters, has deter-
mined its position in regard to a seriousquestion that also affects Europe's
security interests, thus asserting Europe's
security identity. The WEU member
countries thus show that they are deter-
mined to assume their responsibility in
maintaining international juridical
order. "
34. In a debate on the Gulf in the House of
Commons on 7th September, Mr. King, Sec-
retary of State for Defence, took the opportunity
of welcoming the discussions in WEU on the
European contribution to the deployment of
forces in the region concerned.
35. Without cognisance of all statements by
the governments of WEU member countries, it
is diffrcult to judge whether the Gulf crisis led
the governments to give a clearer answer to the
question facing public opinion about the need to
organise an embryo of European defence as Mr.
Dumas suggested.
36. In any event, the opinion expressed byMr. Mitterrand, President of the French
Republic, at his joint press conference with
Chancellor Kohl in Munich on lSth September
1990 is noteworthy:
* Joint defence for the Community coun-
tries and a Europe capable of ensuring its
own security are desirable aims for which
we must strive. But it has to be achieved
through prior political union. That is why
the main goal is political union. There has
to 
.be a politig,al-power capable of exer-
cising responsibilities in such a sensitive
area as security. But, in the meantime,
WEU is working more and more; I would
even say better and better. "
III. The WEU Institute for Security Studies
37. As matters now stand, it is not surprising
that great store is set upon the future contribu-
tions of the WEU Institute for Security Studies
which has been operating in Paris since lst July
1990. It is gratifying that its Director, Mr. John
Roper, has described the new institute's
vocation in the following terms:
'In the nine months from the fall of the
Berlin wall to the Gulf crisis, many of our
traditional approaches to European
security have had to be re-examined.
Our new institute, which has been created
during this period, sees as
primary tasks to stimulate
now more necessary than ever, on the
future structure of European security in
the light both of the risks and of the
potential.
We hope, within our limits, to facilitate
exchanges and promote discussion, pri-
marily among those involved in the policy
debates on security issues in the member
states of WEU and throughout Europe,
but also with our security partners else-
where in the world. "
38. Among its tasks:
* The institute will also contribute to the
strategic debate through its own publica-
tions, and more generally create networks
for exchanges between those concerned in
parliaments (in particular the parlia-
mentary Assembly of WEU), national
administrations, universities, the media
and industry 
- 
all those making up the
European strategic community.'
39. The Assembly will certainly be prepared
to back the institute, particularly in its aim of
promoting and stimulating debate, which corre-
one of its
the debate,
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sponds exactly to much of its own vocation. It is
particularly in the interests of the Assembly for
this debate to be as open and public as pos-
sible.
IY, The WEU Assembly
(i) Debata in member parlianents
40. There are a few encouraging signs in the
Assembly's efforts to improve the impact of its
work in member parliaments. For instance, on
26th April and 9th May 1990, the Belgian
Chamber of Representatives considered and
voted on several interpellations including one by
Mr. De Decker on " the necessary evolution of
Europe's security policy and of the respective
rOles of NATO, WEU and the EEC ".
41. During this debate, Mr. De Decker took
the opportunity of informing the Chamber of
the visit by the WEU Assembly's Presidential
Committee to the Soviet Union in April 1990.
After recalling the idea of a European Defence
Community (EDC) and its failure in 1954, he
said:
'Recent and coming events must lead
Western European Union to define what
we want as a European security policy. I
advocate that... in revitalising WEU a
second time 
- 
a sort of second stage since
you have just organised a conference of
member countries' chiefs of defence staff
- 
we set up the European pillar of the
Atlantic Alliance on the basis of
WEU.'
42. Following the debate, the Chamber
adopted the agenda as it stood, thereby nega-
tiving a motion worded as follows:
" The Chamber,
Deplores the fact that the ministers of
defence and foreign affairs were unable to
take advantage of their presidency of
WEU to take initiatives or make a clear
definition of Europe's security policy.
...... 
tt
43. During the debate on the defence esti-
mates in the House of Commons on 18th and
lgth June 1990, Mr. Speed, Mr. Wilkinson and
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg were among those who
spoke to underline the r6le of Western European
Union. Mr. Hill also put seven written questions
on Recommendation 479 on the establishment
of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe,
adopted at the Assembly's extraordinary session
in Luxembourg.
44. The answers Mr. Waldegrave, Minister of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
gave to these questions on 19th June 1990 were
sent to committee members on 27th June 1990.
Note should be taken of the Minister's remark in
answer to Mr. Hill's question on using the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty as a juridical basis for the
presence of forces of member states on the ter-
ritory of other member states and convening
regular meetings of chiefs of staff of member
countries:
' Formal responses to recommendations
in reports of the Western European Union
Assembly are the responsibility of the
WEU Permanent Council. We have no
plans to make a separate response. "
45. From time to time, certain governments
try to avoid giving substantial answers to ques-
tions put by parliamentarians, claiming that the
subject is the responsibility of the WEU
Council. The Committee for Parliamentary and
Public Relations should be informed accord-
ingly as soon as possible.
46. Also in the context of Recommendation
479, on 29th June 1990 twenty-nine members of
the German Delegation to the WEU Assembly(MM. Ahrens, Antretter, Bindig, Mrs. Blunck,
MM. Biihm, Btichner, Btihler, Feldmann, Mrs.
Fischer, MM. Hitschler, Htiffkes, Mrs.
Hoffmann, MM. Holtz, Irmer, Kittelmann,
Klejdzinski, Lerrzer, Mrs. Luuk, MM. Miiller,
Niegel, Pfuhl, Scheer, Schmidt, Schmitz, von
Schmude, Soell, Steiner, Wulff and Zierer), rep
resenting the CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP
political groups, acted jointly to put nine ques-
tions (without debate) in the Bundestag on
action taken by WEU to establish a just,
peaceful and secure order in Europe. The
Federal Government's answers, transmitted by
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on3fth July 1990, were sent to committee
members.
47. This was the third time since 1989 that
the German Delegation had taken such joint
action on the basis of Assembly recommenda-
tions, thus considerably enhancing the impact of
the latter's work in the Bundestag. Thanks to
certain almost identical questions put by Mr.
Hill in the House of Commons and by the
German Delegation in the Bundestag, the
Assembly knows the position of these two gov-
ernments on the reference date for denouncing
the WEU treaty.
48. Furthermore, the Federal Government
gave a clear answer to the question about the
extent to which the commitments entered into
by the Federal Republic of Germany under the
modified Brussels Treaty would also be valid for
a unified Germany:
" Under international law, the Brussels
Treaty and its protocols also apply to
unified Germany. "
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It goes without saying that these questions
concern all member countries. The French Gov-
ernment has not yet answered the written
question put by Mr. Pontillon on 29th March
1990 on the same matters.
49. At the extraordinary session of the French
Senate on the situation in the Middle East held
on 27th August 1990, Mr. Pontillon, President
of the WEU Assembly, took the opportunity to
speak in favour of making better use of WEU:
" As you can imagine, I wish to speak of
the revival of the modified Brussels
Treaty, the only diplomatic instrument
that can offset the inadequacies of the
North Atlantic Treaty and the short-
comings of the Rome Treaty in questions
of security and areas outside continental
Europe.
The meeting of ministers for foreign
affairs and defence of Western European
Union that you convened in Paris was an
initiative that gave a high profile to the
chairmanship-in-office that France has
held since lst July 1990.
This meeting, the first to be held at this
level in response to a specific crisis, had
results never yet attained in co-operation
outside the NATO area.
This success is very largely due to the fact
that it has been possible to give a firm
political and juridical basis to European
action, i.e. that of the resolutions adopted
by the United Nations Security Council.
There was probably no other principle on
which the WEU countries could have
been unanimous or which would have
allowed an ad hoc group to be organised
to co-ordinate this action or, finally,
authorised the military co-operation that
was essential both at the level of chiefs of
staff and on the spot.
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the
deployment of member countries' air and
naval forces in the Gulf may suffer from
the inadequancy ofthe accurate sources of
information required for any action of
this kind. To uphold the identity that
Europe has at last given itself, not only are
more consultations and harmonisation of
doctrines, methods of work and forces
needed, but also a minimum of inde-
pendent means such as observation satel-
lites.
This consideration should lead the WEU
Council 
- 
we hope so at least 
- 
to take
rapid action on Recommendation 482
adopted by the Assembly on 7th June
1990, urging it to 'decide as a matter of
urgency on the establishment of a WEU
satellite image-processing and interpre-
tation agency'.
As long as Europeans do not have full mil-
itary independence, it will be diffrcult to
expect to have the political independence
that is essential iftheir action is not to be
confused with that of their American
allies, whose aims are not necessarily the
same as theirs.
Above all, I wish to stress that the
cohesion shown by the WEU Ministers on
2lst August can and must be a step
towards a European union whose activ-
ities would be extended to include
security and defence.
I am glad member countries of the Com-
munity which are not members of WEU
were invited to and agreed to attend the
meeting on 2lst August and also that
Greece has decided to take part in naval
operations in the Gulf. We are also happy
that the Turkish representative took his
place at the meeting of the WEU
Council.
By escaping from the rigidity of the insti-
tutions, these initiatives open the way to
an enlargement of Europe to include
defence and to permanent co-operation
between the chiefs of staff of European
countries, at least for regions not covered
by the North Atlantic Treaty.
We are probably too involved in the
present to be able usefully to anticipate
the future. Article VIII of the modified
Brussels Treaty contains a very wide defi-
nition of security 
- 
'in whatever area this
threat should arise' 
- 
and, beyond the
strictly military dimension, of the very
aim of the threat, defined as anything
'which is a danger to economic sta-
bility'.'
50. WEU's action was the subject of speeches
by many senators during the same debate. The
same interest in strengthening the organisation's
r6le was apparent during the extraordinary
session of the French National Assembly on the
same day.
51. Reference should be made to two ques-
tions put by Mr. Seitlinger on Recommenda-
tions 474, 477 and 478 which the French Gov-
ernment answered on l6th and l8th June and
30th July 1990 and a question put by Mr. Fourrd
on 2nd April 1990 on the situation of the forty
officials dismissed by WEU, which was
answered on l8th June 1990.
52. In the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies
on l9th July 1990, Mr. Regenwetter, Mr.
Dimmer and Mr. Goerens put five written ques-
tions on Recommendations 480, 481 and 482,
the answers to which are not yet known.
53. In the Italian Senate on 5th June 1990,
Mr. Pieralli and others put a question on theD t74
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Italian Government's attitude towards WEU
Assembly recommendations on the treatment of
Kurdish minorities in Iraq, Turkey and Iran.
The answers have not yet been transmitted.
54. In the Spanish Congress of Deputies,
WEU was mentioned frequently in the debates
on the Gulf crisis on 28th August and I lth Sep
tember 1990. The Chairman of the Spanish Del-
egation, Mr. Martinez, stressed the importance
Europe attached to the reactivation of WEU
which meant " a significant step towards giving
shape to a joint security policy, the essential
condition for the existence of political Europe "
(Proceedings, I lth September 1990).
55. Although information is not yet complete,
it is already clear that initiatives by members of
the Assembly in the abovementioned parlia-
ments are on the increase.
(ii) EIIoas to develop the Assemb$'s public rcbtions
(a) An Assembly logo
56. Further to the decision taken by the Presi-
dential Committee for making the younger gene-
rations in member countries aware of the idea of
a European security identity, a competition was
organised, open to all students ofgraphic art and
communication in the nine WEU member coun-
tries. The aim of the competition is to produce a
logo representing the Assembly's identity. The
student submitting the selected entry will
receive a grant of F 45 000 to finance further
studies.
57. Proposals for a logo which reached the
Assembly's Information Service before 3lst
August 1990 will be submitted to the Committee
for Parliamentary and Public Relations for con-
sideration. The committee will propose that the
Presidential Committee adopt one of them. Par-
ticipation in the competition was gratifyingly
encouraging. In a separate note, the committee
will find all the elements it needs to be able to
make its choice. It is to be hoped that the
Assembly's impact in the media will thereby be
enhanced and strengthened.
(b) Relations with the media
58. Regarding the new crisis in the Gulf, the
President of the WEU Assembly was the first
representative of the organisation to condemn
vigorously, on behalf of the Assembly, Iraq's
invasion and military occupation of Kuwait and
to urge the governments of all WEU member
countries to invoke, if necessary, paragraph 3 of
Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty
(press communiqud issued on 3rd August 1990).
At the close of the WEU ministerial meeting on
2lst August, the President of the Assembly and
the Presidential Committee reacted publicly to
the events by issuing statements to the press. On
30th September, the President of the Assembly
issued a press release reporting on the mission of
a delegation from the Assembly which went to
the Gulf to inspect and study the WEU forces
deployed there.
59. The Presidential Committee had also
reacted immediately to the London declaration
on a transformed Atlantic Alliance issued by the
heads of state and government participating in
the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
London on 5th and 6th July 1990 by issuing a
press release on 9th July 1990 underlining the
crucial r6le that Western Europe is required to
play in the context of changes in the Soviet
Union and in Central and Eastern Europe.
According to the communiqud, 'it is up to the
Council to show how it intends to tackle the new
tasks facing WEU ".
60. During its visit to the United States in
July 1990, the Defence Committee had in-depth
talks with the most representative spokesmen of
the American media. On 19th July 1990, it
issued a press release underlining that the Amer-
icans insisted on the fact that it was now for
Europeans to take the initiative and set up a
European pillar in NATO of which WEU might
form the nucleus. The committee urged the
WEU Council to respond positively to this chal-
lenge and start the appropriate discussions
immediately.
61. It should also be noted that Mr. Pontillon,
President of the Assembly, granted an interview
to Lib6ration on 6th July 1990 under the title
* WEU can ensure the defence of Europe ". On
llth July 1990, Ir Monde published an article
by him entitled * A defence Europe " in which
he explains the r6le WEU can play now that
important decisions for the future of Europe
have to be taken.
62. On 5th June 1990, Mr. Charles Goerens,
outgoing President of the Assembly, summed up
WEU's action during his term of oflice at a press
meeting in Luxembourg which aroused consid-
erable interest in several of that country's news-
papers.
63. It may be deduced that the press and
media are always grateful to be given appro-
priate information and that they are only too
happy to publish it.
(c) Othercommunicationsactivities
64. It should be noted 
- 
with the thanks of all
members of the Assembly 
- 
that Mr. Pontillon,
President of the Assembly, took the opportunity
of the new crisis in the Arab-Persian Gulf to
inform members of the Assembly rapidly by
summing up how the latter had shown its
presence at such a crucial time. This " Letter
from the President No. I 'was circulated at the
beginning of September 1990.
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65. Understandably, various ways and means
are available to national parliaments and inter-
national parliamentary assemblies which can be
taken up only in part by the WEU Assembly in
view of the budgetary and staff limits imposed
on it. However, it is not without interest to
obtain information on the activities of other
parliaments in this area.
66. The European Centre for Parliamentary
Research and Documentation (ECPRD) should
therefore be congratulated for organising at the
Reichstag in Berlin on 3lst May and lst June
1990, at the invitation of the Bundestag, a
seminar on the public relations of parliaments
attended by parliamentary officials from the
Inter-Parliamentary Union, the European Par-
liament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, the WEU Assembly and the
national parliaments of thirteen European coun-
tries including all members of WEU except for
Luxembourg, which nevertheless answered the
questionnaire sent out in preparation for the
seminar.
67. According to the answers to this question-
naire, the percentage ofthe total budgets ofthe
abovementioned parliaments earmarked for
public relations purposes is about I or 20/o, only
the Bundestag being able to spend some 2.590 of
its total budget on public relations.
68. Since the WEU Assembly has one of the
smallest budgets, the real figures show enormous
differences between " poor " and * rich " parlia-
ments. While the WEU Assembly has earmarkedF 450 000 for public relations in its 1990
budget, the European Parliament has a total of
12 792 000 ECU for the same period. Among
the national parliaments, it is probably the Bun-
destag that has the most money to spend on
public relations, since its 1990 budget includes
the following credits:
- 
Public relations
- 
Information activities.
- 
Reception of visitors at
the Reichstag in Berlin
- 
Historical exhibition at
the Reichstag .. . ... . .
- 
Research
69. In the Bundesrat, DM I
DM 8 000 000
3 660 000
4 210 000
995 000
30 000
000 000 is ear-
facilities, broadcasting van, radio and television
studios, etc.) and makes available to the audio-
visual press almost all its debates in plenary
sitting. Technical assistance is provided for
radio and television journalists who can make
live or deferred recordings of their programmes.
For instance, these technicial facilities allowed
the direct broadcasting of a debate in the
European Parliament by a private American tel-
evision channel when the public was able to
phone in to the studio for parliamentarians to
answer questions.
72. In the Council of Europe, the work of the
Parliamentary Assembly is announced and,
depending on its importance, covered widely by
the Council of Europe's video means. A fully-
equipped television studio is available for tele-
vision channels at the Palais de I'Europe, the
seat of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg.
Before Assembly sessions, reports and/or sum-
maries of reports and the order of business are
made available to journalists. (They are sent to
media throughout Europe: written press, radio
and television and are regularly revised.) A
library and press room with all necessary instal-
lations are available at the Palais. Representa-
tives of the media can consult films, video cas-
settes and tapes and obtain technical assistance,
etc.
73. Among the national parliaments, those of
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United
Kingdom have had positive experience of the
use of audovisual means for public relations
purposes.
74. Conversely, with the exception of the
Italian Chamber of Deputies, there is little infor-
mation about success in selling parliamentary
publications. The Bundestag, for example,
whose research service produces a large number
of publications and books, is known to sell them
and collect a sort ofoflicial tax (Schutzgebiihr).
In the light of experience in the Bundestag,
which shows that in general the public is more
interested in publications sold for a small sum
than for those distributed free of charge, it might
be useful to consider to what extent the WEU
Assembly might take greater advantage from the
sale of its publications for which receipts at
present amount to F 35 000 per year. So far, it is
mainly the Assembly's Official Proceedings that
are sold with limited success.
(d) Development of relations with non-
governmental organisations
75. In Order 76,the Assembly instructed the
committee 'to examine how to organise a
working relationship between the Assembly and
appropriate non-governmental organisations
concerned with European security and defence
and report on this matter. "
marked for public relations out of a total budget
of DM 17 000 000.
70. While the French National Assembly gave
no figures for its communication budget, the
Senate said its public relations expenditure rep-
resented approximately l% of its total budget of
F I 093 million in 1988.
71. Where audiovisual means are concerned,
the WEU Assembly does not yet have any of the
means used elsewhere, for instance in the
European Parliament, which has a well-
equipped audiovisual service (cameras, editing
176
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76. The report presented by Mr. Stegagnini
on * WEU, research institutes and non-
governmental organisations concerned with
security and European defence " s showed the
wide diversity of associations and private groups
likely to be interested in the work of WEU and
its Assembly. However, because of this diversity
and the difliculty of drawing up fair, appropriate
criteria for developing privileged relations with
a number of these organisations, it is preferable
not to over-institutionalise relations with
existing institutions but to develop them on a
more pragmatic basis. It is therefore recom-
mended that the activities of all the organ-
isations mentioned in Mr. Stegagnini's report be
followed and that useful information be offered
on the Assembly's activities.
77. Consideration might also be given to the
advantages WEU might derive from encour-
aging the creation of a sort of " Modified
Brussels Treaty Association " or " European
Security Association " with the status of a non-
governmental international organisation, com-
posed of national associations in all the WEU
member countries and working on a voluntary,
private basis.
78. However, since the tasks of the newly-
created WEU Institute for Security Studies in
Paris include extending the debate on security
matters through the intermediary of various
institutions which might have considerable
impact in the media, it seems preferable to defer
consideration of the usefulness of implementing
such an idea until a later stage.
IY. Conclusions
79. Intensification of debates in national par-
liaments on European security in the light of the
situation in the Middle East, growing press
interest in WEU's activities during the weeks
following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the greater
effort being made by the WEU Assembly's
steering bodies and committees - and also the
WEU Council 
- 
to inform the public by means
of press releases and, {inally, the activation of
the WEU Institute for Security Studies are all
elements that can help to start more systematic
and incisive action to enhance public awareness
and consolidate its consensus on Europe's
security requirements.
80. The required level is far from attained,
quite the reverse. Public opinion is uncertain
about the factors that will guarantee the future
security of the populations in view of the funda-
mental changes that have taken place in Europe
since last autumn and the fact that Europe is
now faced with new threats emanating from
other regions of the world which affect
European security. WEU, and particularly its
Council at political level, must understand that
redefi ning the organisation of European security
does not call only for an effort of political
co-ordination but also means giving the public
clear, homogeneous explanations. An infor-
mation policy worthy of the name cannot only
be the task of a small working unit in the
Secretariat-General of WEU. The Council must
realise that public relations are an important
part of WEU policy and acknowledge that they
cannot be improved if the present inadequate
financial and material resources are not
increased.
81. To sum up, in order to enhance WEU's
public relations policy, the appropriate mea-
sures referred to above should be borne in mind:
(a) the importance of adopting a logo
representative of the WEU Assembly
as soon as possible;
(b) the continued need for the President
of the Assembly and the Presidential
Committee to react immediately in
response to current events because
this helps to keep parliamentarians
better informed and to measure up to
public expectations;
(c) the expediency of continuing to issue
the 'Letter from the President ";
(d) the importance of co-operating ever
more closely and flexibly with non-
governmental organisations;
(e) the need to increase financial and
material resources for the purposes of
information policy and to consider the
public as a fundamental part of
WEU's general policy.
{
5. Document 1226,25th May 1990.
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I. Intruduciion
Since the end of 1989, Central Europe has
undergone a period of widespread upheaval
which marked the end of an era. Several points
need to be made concerning the changing situ-
ation we are now witnessing.
First, a general point: the speed of the
changes, underlining once more the extent of the
upheaval and forcing us to rethink most of the
concepts we have accepted hitherto.
Second, the developments in Germany, a
perfect illustration of what has been said above:
the near-complete unification of Germany, its
place within Europe, firmly anchored in a
western security system, are all factors which
apparently betoken a peaceful future for Europe
at a time when the East is proclaiming its com-
mitment to the common values in the West.
For its part, the Soviet Union is going
through a diflicult period of profound change. It
remains the largest military power on the
European continent, but the break-up ofcentral
power, perestroika becoming bogged down, a
communist party losing its leading rOle and the
real risk of violent confrontation, cast great
doubt over the future of Soviet power.
12th October 1990
A fourth important point is that this situ-
ation is being aggravated by the resurgence of
nationalism, illustrated inter alia by the Baltic
countries' aspiration for independence and by
the claims for autonomy by the different nation-
alities in Yugoslavia 
- 
developments which
cannot be separated from the process of
democratisation sweeping across Central
Europe.
All these questions clearly open up con-
siderable scope for reflection and consultation
among the Council's working groups and the
new Institute for Security Studies. As the last
Ministerial Council on 23rd and 24th April
made clear, the events of recent months have
merely reinforced the need for co-operation and
consultation. In the view of ministers, WEU
offered undeniable assets in such a situation
since it was the only organisation competent in
matters of European security policy co-
operation.
In their deliberations on the implications
of the new European security environment, min-
isters agreed on the need to reach a CFE
agreement quickly and discussed the various
possible formulas for co-operation in order to
verify such an agreement.
Fint part of the thirty-siith annual ruport
of the Council to the Assembty of WEU
(lst January to 30th June 1990)
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Turning to the prospect of the forth-
coming NATO and CSCE summits, they also
decided to continue to reflect on the definition
of a security system appropriate to Europe's
future requirements and to its extra-European
dimensions, otr multinational military
co-operation and on the rOle ofEuropeans in an
Atlantic Alliance which had to change given the
evolution in defence doctrines and the need to
maintain deterrence at lower levels of force.
For the first time since the adoption of
The Hague platform, ministers decided to issue
a communiqud which, by setting down the main
conclusions of the ministerial discussions, tes-
tilied to their willingness to define a common
European security strategy with a view to
strenglhening the European identity and to pro.
moting the process of European integration with
a security dimension. It thus represented, in a
way, an extension of the platform.
Several points should be underlined
regarding the scope of this communiqu6:
- 
" Ministers welcomed the new impetus
being given to the CSCE process and
the prospect ofa conference ofheads of
state and/or of government taking place
by the end of 1990.
The CSCE is the framework within
which all Europeans, together with the
United States and Canada, can
establish new relations and develop co-
operative structures capable of assuring
each one of them that peace and sta-
bility will be maintained and their legit-
imate interests safeguarded. "
- 
Ministers recognised the importance of
the extra-European dimension, with
particular reference to the develop-
ments in the Mediterranean and the
Middle East.
- 
Ministers were categorical in calling for
the maintenance in Europe of United
States and Canadian forces and agreedto reflect on the usefulness of
co-operation between these contingents
and multinational units.
- 
They also recognised the need to give
active support to the process of
democratisation in Eastern Europe by
strengthening the political dialogue and
co-operation with the countries con-
cerned and by stepping up the contacts
with them. In this context, they agreed
on the " opportuneness of establishing
contacts for two-way information with
the democratically-elected governments
in Central and Western Europe ". They
instructed the Presidency and the Sec-
retary-General to organise these con-
tacts.
Assembly representatives were briefed on
the outcome of the ministerial meeting held on
23rd April by Mr. Mark Eyskens and Mr. Guy
CoEme, the Foreign and Defence Ministers rep
resenting the Belgian Presidency.
II. Auivities of the Permanent Council
Among the agenda topics for meetings ofthe Permanent Council whether in
" enlarged ', normal or " restricted " I session -
were the preparation of the work programme for
the WEU intergovernmental organs, the prepa-
rations for, and follow-up to, the activities of the
Council of Ministers and working groups, the
completion of the process of ratifying the pro-
tocol of accession of Portugal and Spain to the
modified Brussels Treaty, the interest shown by
other countries in joining WEU, the setting-up
of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, rela-
tions between the Council and the Assembly,
questions concerning the staff and management
of the WEU bodies and topical questions
relating to European security.
1, Activitias of the intergoveramental orgaes
O At each Council meeting, the Secretary-
General reported on the outcome of the working
group meetings which had taken place since the
previous Council.
(ii) The Council drew up its own work pro-
gramme; it prepared for, and provided the fol-
low-up to, the ministerial meeting, work which
was essentially carried out by the " enlarged "
Council which met twice during the period
under review.
(iit) The Council also had an exchange of
views 
- 
initiated during a restricted session 
- 
on
its own r6le and on possible ways of improving
its working methods.
(a) Examples of the subjects coming specifi-
cally within the purview of the Council are:
- 
monitoring and summarising all the
work of the WEU intergovernmental
organs and the Council's subsidiary
bodies;
- 
relations with the WEU Assembly:
keeping abreast of its work and fol-
lowing up its sessions; ensuring a
regular and effective two-way flow of
information;
- 
relations with NATO;
l. "enlarged" sessions: participation extended to the
political directors and defence ministers' representatives;
'restricted " sessions: participation restricted to the per-
manent representatives, the Secretary-General and the
Deputy Secretary-General. it\t79
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- 
institutional questions such as those
concerned with enlargement or the pos-
sible review of the modified Brussels
Treaty;
- 
relations with third countries, in par-
ticular those which had shown interest
in joining WEU;
- 
topical and political questions con-
cerned with European security.
(b) Desirous of devoting the major part of
Council meetings to the discussion of political
questions, the permanent representatives con-
sidered in a restricted session the possibility o.f
asking their deputies to prepare for Council
meetings and to deal, as far as possible, with
matters of a more technical or administrative
nature.
At a meeting chaired by the Deputy Secre-
tary-General, the deputies to the permanent rep-
resentatives accordingly drew up a draft
mandate for a working group, the final text of
which, as approved on 29th March by the
Council, reads as follows:
" The Council instructs the Group of Dep-
uties to the Permanent Representatives 
-
which shall be known as the Council
Working Group 
- 
to prepare its decisions.
The Council Working Group shall also
deal with all other questions entrusted to
it by the Council, including those within
the competence of the Institutional
Working Group.
The Ordinary Council Working Group is
therefore wound up. "
2. Acccssioa ol the Portuguesc Republic
aad the Kiagdom of Spain to WEA
(i) The Council monitored the final stages of
the process of ratification of the protocol of
accession of the Portuguese Republic and the
Kingdom of Spain to the modified Brussels
Treaty.
(ii) At its meeting on 29th March, it wel-
comed the information transmitted by the
Belgian Government to the effect that it had
received the final notification of ratification of
the protocol on 27th March 1990, this date thus
marking the entry into force of the protocol
which had been signed in London on l4th
November 1988.
(iii) Consequently, Portugal and Spain partici-
pated for the first time as full members in the
Ministerial Council of 23rd April in Brussels
and in the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary
session of the Assembly from 5th to 8th June in
Paris.
i. Interust slowa by orher couatia in WEU
The Council was kept informed of the
contacts which had taken place with the author-
ities of Greece and Turkey 
- 
countries which
had expressed their interest in joining WEU (see
Assembly Document 1219,ll, 4).
Greece(r) Following the visit by the Greek Ambas-
sador to the Secretary-General on 30th May, the
Council agreed to recommend to the Greek
authorities that they make full use of the consul-
tation procedure agreed between the Greek
Foreign Minister and the Council Presidency
and that they be invited to contact the WEU
Presidency for a meeting at ministerial level.(it) On l8th June, the Greek Foreign Min-
ister, Mr. A. Samaras, sent a letter to the Belgian
Foreign Minister and Chairman-in-Offrce of the
Council, requesting him to 'initiate the pro-
cedure envisaged ".
Turkey(iii) Belgium has briefed the Council on the
talks which took place on I lth May in Brussels
between the Belgian Foreign Minister and the
Chairman-in-Office of the Council and the
Turkish Ambassador. The latter was informed
of the outcome of the ministerial meeting on
23rd April and of the Council's willingness in
the present situation to maintain the agreed con-
sultation procedure without change.
The Council will continue to keep the
Assembly informed on this matter.
1. WEU hutitute for Suurity Sndies
(i) In the second part of the 35th annual
report, the Council informed the Assembly of
the ministerial decisions of l3th November
1989 concerning the setting-up of a WEU
Institute for Security Studies (see Assembly
Document 1219, VII).(ii) On lTth January 1990, the Council
appointed Mr. John Roper as Director of the
Institute for a three-year term (until 3oth June
1993).
On 7th February 1990, the Council, acting
on a proposal from the Institute Director, asked
the Secretary-General to appoint the Head of
Administration of the Institute; on l3th June
1990, the Council took note of the nominations
put forward by the Secretary-General on a pro-
posal from the Director for the four posts of
* research fellows'.(iit) The restricted Council meeting on lSth
April was devoted to an exchange of views
between the permanent representatives and the
Institute Director. The Director briefed the
Council on his activities thus far. He offered his
ideas about the future tasks of the Institute and
its work programme (see VII below).
L*e
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5, IYEU Aswmbly
(i) The Assembly's activities and its relations
with the Council were the subject of regular
exchanges of view between the permanent repre-
sentatives meeting in restricted session (see VIII
below).(it) At its meeting on 29th November 1989,
the Council declared itself in favour of the sug-
gestion that a management review be carried out
of the Oflice of the Clerk. On llth April 1990,
the Council received the report on the
organisation of the Office of the Clerk 
- 
carried
out by three experts appointed by the Clerk 
-
and asked that the Presidential Committee give
its opinion on it.
In letters dated lzth June to the
Chairman-in-Office of the Council and 25th
June to the Secretary-General, the President of
the Assembly noted that this report was in line
with the Assembly's proposals and he called on
the Council to authorise the creation of the posts
requested in the draft Assembly budget for 1990.
The Council will give its opinion on this
subject once it has received the opinion of the
Budget and Organisation Committee.(iii) Information of the Assembly: see point
VIII below.
6. Qlestions anceming the stalf
and lhc management of the WEU organs
(i) Paris ministerial organs(a) The Council monitored the procedure for
winding up, with effect from 3fth June 1990,
the Agencies for Security Questions (excluding
the ACA) and the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee, pursuant to the ministerial decision of
3fth November 1989 and, in particular, gave
the closest possible consideration to the
question of indemnifying those staff members
who were not to be taken on by the Institute.
Conscious of the legal, social and humanitarian
aspects of this problem, the Council considered
that the provisions of the WEU StaffRules 
- 
the
subject of an agreement between the
co-ordinated organisations - were suffrcient.
The Secretary-General and the Deputy Secre-
tary-General had frequent meetings with
members of staff of the Paris ministerial organs,
either individually or collectively.(b) Agency for the Control of Armaments(ACA)
The Council took note of the ACA report
for 1989.
During their restricted sessions, the per-
manent representatives addressed the question
of the agency's future. They agreed that, for the
time being, its activities should be main-
tained.
(ii) Secretariat-General(a) Management review of the Secretariat
General
Following the Council decision of
November 1989, a management review was
carried out of the Secretariat-General in January
1990 by two experts from the Management
Review Staff of the United Kingdom Foreign
and Commonwealth OfIice.
The Council decided, following several
exchanges of view and having received the
opinion of the Budget and Organisation Com-
mittee, to approve the proposals put forward by
the Secretary-General2 and, at the same time, to
accept the proposals by the Foreign Oflice
experts concerning the need for further
savings 3.
(b) WEU Legal Adviser
On l3th June 1990, the Council approved
the appointment to the new post of Legal
Adviser to the Secretariat-General of the
Assistant Legal Adviser to the Paris ministerial
organs, the activities of which were to cease on
30th June (excluding those of the Agency for the
Control of Armaments).
7. Topical quatioas coacened with Eumpean security
(i) One of the reasons which led to the cre-
ation of the Council Working Group (see pointYl (iii) above) was to enable the Council to
discuss in greater depth questions of a political
nature, the working group having laid the
groundwork for those Council decisions of a
more technical or administrative nature. Conse-
quently, since the inception of the working
group, there has been more substantive and
varied information and exchanges of view on
the Council's regular agenda item, * topical
questions ".
(ii) Under this item, the Council has been reg-
ularly briefed on the progress towards German
unification, and on oflicial visits by representa-
tives of the member states which have had an
impact on the course of events concerning
European security.
It is also under this item that the Secre-
tary-General has reported to the Council on his
public activities and professional engagements
(participation in seminars or conferences, visits
received or made, etc.).
2. Three new posts: a legal adviser (A4), a committee
secretary (A2), a WEUCOM operator (83/84), a regrading
from 84 to 85.
3. Deletion of the post of Head of Administration Division
on 3rd February l99l; deletion of the post of chief security
guard on the date the present holder ceases his duties;
deletion of one telephonist post following the voluntary
departure of one of the present post-holders. \{l8l
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8. Relations with NATO
O Relations with SHAPE(a) As each year, the permanent representa-
tives were invited by SACEUR to visit SHAPE
for an information visit, and to take part in
some of the exercises forming part of the obser-
vation programme for the first six months of
1990; a report on these visits was submitted to
the Council.(b) The Secretary-General reported to the
Council on his visit to Casteau, accompanied by
the Deputy Secretary-General, on the occasion
of SHAPEX 1990 entitled * European transition
- 
challenges for NATO ".(iil Presentation by the SACEUR represent-
ative on forces of WEU member states under
NATO command: implementation of Article IV
of Protocol No. II
This presentation took place during the
meeting of the Permanent Council on 2lst Feb-
ruary. It was followed by a detailed exchange of
views between the members of the Council and
the two SHAPE representatives during which
the possibilities and usefulness of setting up
multinational units were discussed.
The unanimous view was that this debate
proved the importance of maintaining and
encouraging good relations between WEU and
SHAPE.
9. Ahq questioas
(i) Possible review of the modified Brussels
Treaty
The Council agreed that this question
should be addressed within the Council by the
Council Working Group. An initial exchange of
views was planned for the beginning of the
second half of 1990.(iil Third European session of advanced
defence studies
The Council was kept informed of the
preparations for this session, which was being
organised by the United Kingdom Delegation
from 8th to l4th July at Wiston House.
The results presented to the Council
together with comments would appear in the
second part of this thirty-sixth report of the
Council to the Assembly.
III. Activities of the Special Wo*ing Group
l. During the {irst half of 1990, the Special
Working Group has continued to provide the
forum for in-depth study of the major politico-
military issues affecting European security. The
main focus of the group's work during the
period has been the impact of the changes in
Central and Eastern Europe and the CFE negoti-
ations in Vienna.
2. In accordance with the mandate from the
November 1989 ministerial meeting, the SWG
and DRG carried out a study evaluating
Europe's likely security environment during the
period 1991-1995. The joint conclusions of the
group's work were presented to the Council of
Ministers in Brussels on 23rd April 1990 along
with a series of questions for ministers to
discuss:
- 
the prospects for arms control with a
view to the holding of a CSCE summit
during 1990;
- 
how to maintain credible deterrence at
reduced levels of forces;
- 
how to make appropriate changes in
strategic doctrines, operational con-
cepts and force structures;
- 
the general implications for European
defence and security co'operation.
3. Ministers took note of the work done by
the SWG and the DRG on the European
security environment 199l-1995 and their dis-
cussions on this subject contributed to the for-
mulation of the communiqud published at the
end of the meeting.
4. The SWG has since discussed how to fulfil
the task given to WEU by ministers at their
April meeting (paragraph 9 of the Brussels
communiqud), namely, to elaborate a common
approach with regard to the 1990 summit
meetings of the Atlantic Alliance and the CSCE.
In this context, the group has begun to address a
number of themes:
- 
future security architecture for
Europe;
- 
the r6le of Europe in a changing
Atlantic Alliance;
- 
post-CFE arms control objectives.
IY. Activities of
the Defence Represcntatives Group
l. The DRG held five meetings in its own
right during the period under review, as well as
one joint meeting with the SWG. The majority
of its activities focused on two broad areas of
work in preparation for the Ministerial Council
in April.
2. The first of these involved a study, with
the SWG (see above), of the European security
environment in the period 199l-1995. As a con-
tribution to this study, the DRG produced its
own assessment of the need to maintain an undi-
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minished level of security pending full imple-
mentation of a CFE agreement, and of the
factors affecting the military balance post-
CFE.
3. The second area ofwork concerned verifi-
cation where the DRG proposed to ministers
that member countries should co-operate in:
- 
preparing a programme of trial bilateral
inspections (to commence in autumn
1990) whereby the nations participating
could gain experience qllne active and
passive aspects of a CFE verification
r6gime;
- opening a number of their national
inspection teams to participation by
inspectors from other member coun-
tries, thereby making best use of
available resources and assisting
member countries in participating fully
in the verification process;
- 
opening their inspector training courses
to nationals of other member countries,
thereby ensuring a certain commonality
of standards;
- 
indicating, if appropriate, any geo-
graphical areas on which they were
interested in focusing their verification
activities, while retaining the right to
inspect wherever they wished, thus ena-
bling them to target their training and
to identify an informal division of
labour.
4. In their communiqu6, ministers wel-
comed these proposals, as well as the fact that a
group of DRG experts had prepared a report on
shared data-processing for verification which
had subsequently been submitted to the HLTF
by WEU countries.
5. Since the April Ministerial Council, the
DRG has been concentrating on the remit in the
communiqu6 to prepare for the Atlantic and
CSCE summits by discussing the evolution of
alliance strategies, the military aspects of multi-
national forces and the military implications of
the institutionalisation of the CSCE.
6. A regular item on the DRG agenda has
been the issue of military contacts with the
Soviet Union and, in addition to a report on the
CSCE seminar on military doctrine, the group
has been briefed on visits to the Soviet Union by
Belgian, French, Netherlands and United
Kingdom Delegations.
Y. Activities of the Mediterranean Sub-Group
During the first six months of 1990, the
Mediterranean Sub-Group concentrated its
attention on three sets of problems affecting
European security.
Firstly, developments in the Maghreb and
the conflict in the Western Sahara. Members of
the group considered that it was vital to
encourage the development of the political dia-
logue and that Europe should step up initiatives
to promote regional co-operation aimed at
enhancing stability in the Western Mediter-
ranean.
Secondly, political consultation within the
group focused on events in Eastern Europe and
their implications for the Balkans. The collapse
of hitherto dominant political r6gimes, the
re-awakening of nationalism and the resurgence
of ethnic problems make any prediction about
future developments in the region both difficult
and uncertain. Analysis of the repercussions of
the current developments will remain upper-
most among the group's concerns.
Lastly, the group has embarked upon a
study of the potential threat represented by the
proliferation of ballistic missiles, particularly in
the Western Mediterranean. The group has
analysed the consequences of this proliferation
in the Mediterranean basin and in the Middle
East and expressed the hope that many more
countries will join the MTCR (Missile Tech-
nology Control R6gime).
The group finished its report on naval
deployments in the Mediterranean, the conclu-
sions of which were submitted to ministers who
took due note of them on 23rd April 1990.
YI. Aaivities of the od hoc Sub-Group
on Space
l. During this period the ad hoc Sub-Group
on Space held five plenary meetings, as well as
other meetings at expert level.
2. The sub-group has continued its work
pursuant to the mandate given by ministers in
November 1989 to outline a detailed study on
the development of a European satellite obser-
vation system with three objectives: verification
of arms control agreements, crisis monitoring
and the monitoring of environmental hazards.
3. In April 1990, ministers noted the
progress which had been made, and called for
concrete proposals to be submitted to them at
their next meeting, i.a., with a view to exam-
ining the possibility of establishing a satellite
observation agency. The sub-group is currently
working to this remit.
YII. WEU Institute for Securtty Studies
1. Establishmeat
(See II, 4 above.)
t
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2. Tosks and objeaivu
(i) The Director of the Institute has given the
Council his initial thoughts on the Institute's
tasks and work programmes.(it) Established under the aegis of the
Council, the Institute has been given two, inter-
related missions:
- 
study and research for the governments
of the member states of WEU rcpre-
sented by the Council and in consul-
tation with the Secretariat-General of
the Organisation. The independent and
objective nature of this work is laid
down in a number of the main clauses
of the ministerial decision of l3th
November 1989;
- stimulating the wider debate on
European security issues: the Institute
will develop links with the other rel-
evant institutes and centres ofresearch;
develop new structures for meetings
and dialogue with individuals or insti-
tutes from non-WEU countries, in par-
ticular with the countries of Eastern
and Central Europe; establish a data-
bank on the range of research under-
taken in Europe on security issues.
There are certainly no formal limits on
the Institute's activities: the Institute will also
contribute to the strategic debate through its
own publications, and more generally create net-
works for exchanges between those concerned in
the media, parliaments (in particular the parlia-
mentary Assembly of WEU), national adminis-
trations, universities and industry.(iii) The initial work programme will be con-
centrated around four broad areas:
- 
the European security identity;
- 
the development of European security
structures;
- 
Western European defence issues;
- 
economic and North-South dimensions
of European security.(iv) The Institute team was to take up its
duties officially on lst July 1990 and a meeting
was planned between the Council and the
Director.
YIII. Relations with the Assembly
(See also II, 5 above.)
l. Ministerial statements during Assembly
sessions(i) Extraordinary session in Luxembourg on
22nd and 23rd March 1990
The following ministers spoke during the
session and then replied to parliamentarians'
questions: the Foreign Minister representing the
Belgian Presidency, Mr. Eyskens, the German
and Luxembourg Foreign Ministers, Mr.
Genscher and Mr. Poos, and the Italian State
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Vitalone.
The Polish Foreign Minister, Mr.
Skubiszewski and Mr. Falin, Director of the
International Department of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union and member of the Supreme Soviet
responsible for international affairs, were
invited by the Assembly to give an address and
agreed to answer questions.
(iil First part of the thirty-sixth ordinary
session held in Paris from 5th to 8th June 1990
The following took the floor at the
meeting and then replied to parliamentarians'
questions: the Foreign and Defence Ministers
representing the Belgian Presidency, Mr.
Eyskens and Mr. CoEme.
The Hungarian Foreign Minister, Mr.
Jeszenszky and the United States State Secretary
for Defence, Mr. Atwood, were invited by the
Assembly to give an address and agreed to
answer parliamentarians' questions.
2. The Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen,
also gave an address on the opening day of the
first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session and
answered the questions which followed.
3. Symposium on 'Observation satellites -
a European means of verifying disarmament ",
organised by the Assembly's Technological and
Aerospa.ce Committee in Rome on 27th-28th
March.
The Council welcomed the initiative
taken by the Assembly's Technological and
Aerospace Committee in organising this sym-
posium. Apart from the Italian and Netherlands
Defence Ministers, Mr. Martinazzoli and Mr.
Ter Beek, participants included the French State
Secretary for Defence, Mr. Renon, senior offi-
cials from the member states, parliamentarians
and leading figures from industry and the uni-
versities.
The Deputy Secretary-General, in his
report to the Council on 29th March, stressed
the value and usefulness of the symposium, inter
alia to the work of the ad hoc Sub-Group on
Space. Such alignment between the activities of
the Assembly and those of the Council was par-
ticularly welcome.
4. Meetings between the representatives of the
Council and the Assembly
(i) On 7th March, a meeting took place in
Brussels between the Foreign and Defence Min-
isters representing the Belgian Presidency, Mr.
Eyskens and Mr. Co€me, accompanied by the
Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, and the
Assembly's Presidential Committee headed by
l
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Mr. Goerens. It provided an opportunity for a
spontaneous exchange of views on topical
political questions and the r6le of WEU in a
changing European environment. The Assembly
also briefed the Council on the progress ofprep-
arations for the extraordinary session in Luxem-
bourg on 22nd and 23rd March.
(ii) The Foreign and Defence Ministers repre-
senting the Belgian Presidency, accompanied by
the Secretary-General and other Council repre-
sentatives, also had a meeting on 24th April in
Brussels with members of the Assembly's Presi-
dential Committee and the Political and
Defence Committees to brief them on the
outcome of the Ministerial Council.
5. Secretary-General's informationletters to
the President of the Assembly
On l5th March and l5th May 1990
respectively, the Secretary-General, Mr. van
Eekelen, sent information letters on the activ-
ities of the intergovernmental organs to Mr.
Goerens, President of the Assembly.
6. Other forms of dialogue(t) The Council has often expressed the wish
that its dialogue with the Assembly should be
more constructive and frequent; given the Coun-
cil's interest in discussing the reports presented
at Assembly sessions, it considers it essential
that the last Council meeting before each session
be devoted to an examination of these reports
which should therefore reach it in good time.
It has been suggested that Council repre-
sentatives have more frequent informal
meetings with the parliamentarians of their
respective countries to discuss matters
addressed by the Council and the subjects to be
covered by Assembly reports.
In the same context, the Secretary-
General has, on several occasions, offered to
meet those Assembly committees who so wished
for an exchange of views on any particular
aspects of their work; if organised properly, this
two-way flow of information will inevitably
make WEU's action more coherent and enhance
its public standing.
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ANNEX
Communiqud issued after the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers
Brussels, 2jrd April 1990
l. The Foreign and Defence Ministers of Western European Union, meeting in Brussels on
23rd April 1990, were particularly pleased that the ratification of the Protocol of Accession of Portugal
and Spain to the modified Brussels Treaty had been completed.
2. Ministers welcomed the sweeping changes which had taken place in Europe since their meeting
in November 1989. The division of Europe is now being overcome. The emergence of new democracies
following free elections is opening up new prospects for broader co-operation among Europeans.
They welcomed the return to democratic standards which the elections in the GDR and Hungary
represent, and looked forward to those to be held shortly in other countries of Central and Eastern
Europe.
The prospect of the forthcoming attainment of German unity, founded on the unequivocal
expression of the wishes of the population concerned, is an opportunity for Europe as a whole and an
important step forward towards constructing a just and lasting peaceful order.
The united Germany will thus take its place alongside its fellow members of the North Atlantic
Alliance and alongside its partners who have chosen to build a European union.
3. Ministers welcomed the new impetus being given to the CSCE process and the prospect of a
conference of heads of state and/or of government taking place by the end of 1990.
The CSCE is the framework within which all Europeans, together with the United States and
Canada, can establish new relations and develop co-operative structures capable of assuring each one
of them that peace and stability will be maintained and their legitimate interests safeguarded.
4. It was with this new prospect in view that Ministers recalled the importance they attach to
building a European union consistent with the Single European Act which they have signed as
members of the European Community. They also reaffirmed the importance of the Atlantic Alliance
and Western European Union as essential instruments for the security of the member countries and as
factors for stability throughout Europe.
The continued presence of the forces of the United States and of Canada stationed in Europe
provides a necessary contribution to our common security and overall stability, together with the
contribution of WEU countries and their other European partners. Ministers reaflirmed the impor-
tance of The Hague platform and the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament of the
Atlantic Alliance.
5. Ministers stressed the importance they attach to the concluding of a CFE agreement and to the
holding of the CSCE summit before the end of the year. They regard such an agreement as an
important achievement in the process of improving security and adapting military postures to the far-
reaching changes 
- 
both military and political 
- 
which Europe is witnessing. They considered that the
momentum of the negotiation process should be maintained so as to enhance stability, promote
co-operative structures and expedite the attainment of a new peace order in Europe. Agreement on new
confidence- and security-building measures in parallel with a CFE agreement would contribute greatly
to that end.
6. European stability continues to be based on the collective and individual commitment of all
partners in the alliance. It is also an essential matter for the Europeans themselves. For the Europeans
to enhance their contribution to stability on the European continent and to the protection of their legi-
timate security interests, a greater degree of co-operation will be fundamental.
Ministers therefore recognised the need to continue working to strengthen the European identity
and to promote the process of European integration including the security dimension. This growing
identity is destined to be given concrete expression in the form of close, and even new co-operation
between the member countries.
In the field of verification of the CFE treaty and * open skies ", Ministers welcomed the specific
measures which had been adopted by WEU member countries particularly as regards the opening of
national inspection teams to include inspectors from other WEU member countries.
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On the subject of the computerised processing of verification data, Ministers welcomed the fact
that a WEU group of experts had jointly defined realistic parameters for a system of interconnected
data bases, and that this common WEU viewpoint had been taken into account by the Atlantic
Alliance.
Ministers also noted the progress which had been made in studying the possibilities for
European co-operation in the field of space-based observation systems for the purposes of arms control
verification, and also for crisis and environmental monitoring. They called for concrete proposals to be
submitted to them at their next meeting, inter alia with a view to examining the possibility of estab-
lishing a satellite verification agency.
7. Ministers recognised that European security has an extra-European dimension. As a conse-
quence the European countries follow closely developments in other regions of the world, in particular
the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
8. Peace, security and co-operation in Europe depend on an intensification of the dialogue at all
levels. With regard to the new tasks for the organisation proposed by the incoming Presidency,
Ministers agreed on the opportuneness of establishing contacts for two-way information with the
democratically-elected governments in Central and Eastern Europe. They instructed the Presidency
and the Secretary-General to organise these contacts. Ministers recognised that, by vinue of its acti-
vities, the parliamentary Assembly of WEU has an important r6le to play in opening up contacts with
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This has been illustrated by the recent extraordinary
session of the Assembly held in Luxembourg on 22nd and 23rd March. Likewise, the WEU Institute
for Security Studies, whose establishment was decided upon at the last Council, and which is to begin
operation from July this year, also has an active r6le to play in pooling ideas and in drawing together
the new strands of thinking being developed in both the East and the West.
9. Ministers congratulated the Belgian Presidency on the particularly active way in which they had
conducted the work of WEU. They hoped that, under its impetus and that of the incoming French Pre-
sidency, there would be a continued and intensive process of reflection and concertation among the
member countries, particularly with a view to the two major meetings scheduled to take place before
the end of the year, namely the CSCE summit and an Atlantic summit both aimed at giving appro-
priate responses to the changes taking place in Europe.
WEU provides an entirely suitable forum for its members to prepare a common approach to
these forthcoming meetings.
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Ropportear's Preface
In preparing this report, the Rapporteur met or received evidence from the following:
The Hague
Admiral Herbert van Foreest, Chief of the Naval Staff;
Captain J.H. Goemans, Naval Staff;
Commander J.W. Sturman, Naval Staff.
Paris
Mr. Roland Dumas, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
General Maurice Schmitt, Chief of the Defence Staff;
Mr. R6gis de Bellenet, Diplomatic Counsellor, Ministry of Defence;
Captain Gilles Combarieu, Ministry of Defence;
Captain Frangois Rouvillois, Naval Staff.
London
Mr. Willem van Eekelen, Secretary-General of Western European Union;
The Hon. Archie Hamilton, Minister of State for the Armed Forces;
Mr. Richard Hatfield, Head of Secretariat (Overseas Commitments), Ministry of Defence;
Miss Oona Muirhead, Defence Commitments Staff, Ministry of Defence;
Group Captain J.L. Uprichard, RAF, Defence Commitments Staff, Ministry of Defence;
Mr. Stephen Gomersall, Head of Security Policy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office;
Mr. Michael Ryder, Security Policy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office;
Group Captain David Bolton, Director, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies.
Madrid
Mr. Narcis Serra, Minister of Defence;
Mr. Fernando Perpina, Secretary-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Carlos Sanjuan, Chairman of the Congress Defence Committee;
Mr. Ignacio Diez-Gonzalez, Chairman of the Senate Defence Committee.
Lisbon
Mr. Joaquim Fernando Nogueira, Minister of Defence;
Mr. Joao de Deus Pinheiro, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Vitor Crespo, President of the Assembly of the Republic;
Mr. Jaime Gama, Chairman of the Parliamentary Defence Committee;
General Soares Carneiro, Chief of the Defence Staff;
General Cabral Couto, Director of the National Defence Institute;
Vice Admiral Rodrigues Consolado, Commander-in-Chief lberian Atlantic Area;
Rear Admiral Sarmento Gouveia, Home Fleet Commander.
Djibouti
Mr. Hassan Gouled Aptidon, President of the Republic;
Mr. Moumin Bahdon Farah, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation;
Mr. Abdoulkader Waberi Askar, President of the National Assembly;
General Gautier, Commander, French Forces in Djibouti;
Captain Pichon, Commander of Naval Forces in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden;
Colonel Rousseau, Commander of Land Forces;
Colonel Escoffier, Commander, Air Force Detachment;
Captain Wybo, Commanding Officer, Montcalm;
Commander Demoisson, Commanding Oflicer, Protet.
Abu Dhabi, Djebal Ali, Dubai and at sea in the Gulf
H.R.H Sheik Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates;
Mr. Hilal Lootah, President of the National Federal Council;
Captain Pezard (France), Commanding Oflicer, FS Dupleix;
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Captain Buracchia (Italy), Commander, Italian Task Group;
Commander Campregher (Italy), Commanding Offrcer, IS Orsa;
Captain Mitchell (United Kingdom), Commanding Officer, RFA Diligence;
Commander Gordon-Lennox (United Kingdom), Commanding Officer, HMS Battleaxe;
Captain van Gurp (Netherlands), Commander, Netherlands Task Group;
Commander van der Aa (Netherlands), Commanding Officer, HMS Witte de With;
Commander Nieuwenhuis (Netherlands), Commanding Oflicer, HMS Pieter Florisz;
Captain Orvis (United States), Commanding Offrcer, USS England.
The Rapporteur and the committee extend their thanks to those ministers, officials and senior
officers who gave evidence for the preparation of this report.
The opinions expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the
committee.
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Draft Remmmendation
^'#,tr;Y;f;'ff ,{:Y,,:",'f Ex,ir,#Y:"'
l. The Assembly insists that the best peaceful solution for the Gulf crisis lies in the respect of the
relevant United Nations resolutions, through the application of the present sanctions against lraq, and
RrconraeNos that the Council seek to ensure that this principle continues to govern the actions both of
member states and other allies.
2. The Assembly recalls its Recommendation 488, adopted on 2fth September 1990, viz:
" The Assembly approves the action taken by the Council in invoking Article YIII, paragraph 3,
of the modified Brussels Treaty as a result of lraq's aggression against and occupation of Kuwait.
The Assembly welcomes the Council's readiness to place WEU co-ordination in the context of
the implementation of United Nations Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665.
The Assembly supports the Council's decision, not only to convene the meeting of the Minis-
terial Council, but also to constitute an ad hoc group to cover the Gulf crisis and especially to
call the first meeting, under direct WEU auspices, of the chiefs of defence staffs.
The Assembly believes that the Council should remain open to the idea of further co-operation
and co-ordinition at different levels over all aspects of operations in the Gulf area and therefore
RrconaupNps that the necessary steps be taken to formalise the Gulf ad hoc group to consider
policy and implementation on a day-to-day basis, as long as the present crisis lasts, and urges all
WEU nations to provide maximum information to the operational cell being run in the French
Ministry of Defence.
Concerned that the proliferation of vessels in the Gulf area could lead to problems in the very
near future, the Assembly Rrcorrarrarxos that further consultations take place immediately at gov-
ernmental level to establish common command and control in the various Gulf zones already
agreed and further Recor\,rr\drNos that urgent measures be taken to harmonise rules of engagement
at least within each zone, and ensure that recognition procedures (IFF) are properly co-ordinated
between all aircraft and naval units to assure the safety of friendly forces.
The Assembly considers that WEU could play a useful r6le in helping to co-ordinate (perhaps in
conjunction with other agencies) logistic support, reinforcement and resupply for the Gulf opera-
tions and that WEU nations' assets for sea- and airlift might be provided, in some cases where
combat forces, for whatever reason, may not be available, and RTcoMMENDS that the Council
study the options for providing such assistance without delay.
Disappointed that the transatlantic presentation of WEU's contribution to support the United
Nations' efforts to solve the crisis in the Gulf has yet to have an impact, the Assembly Rrcona-
MENDs that the Council establish forthwith a liaison office in Washington to serve as a channel
for North American links and as a matter of priority to convince the United States' Adminis-
tration that direct dialogue with WEU is possible and to be welcomed, particularly at present.
The Council should make every effort to ensure that WEU is perceived as the European pillar of
the Atlantic Alliance.'
3. The Assembly welcomes the fact that the Council, working through its special Ad Hoc Group,
has already seen fit to implement at least part of the above recommendation and that WEU
co-operation both at home and in the Gulf area has improved as a direct result. The Assembly believes
that the arangements for the naval application of the United Nations embargo are now well estab-
lished and congratulates the Council on the measures taken.
4. The Assembly now considers that much more should be done to co-ordinate land and air opera-
tions and that all WEU nations should make appropriate contributions, and therefore RrcouurNps
that the Council discuss further national contributions to defensive land and air forces in the Gulf
region and in particular should call for support in the areas of logistics and medical help (the idea of a
hospital ship with a multinational WEU medical team on board deserves special consideration).
5. In the knowledge that France, ltaly and the United Kingdom are the only WEU nations with
combat aircraft in the Gulf region and concerned about the provision of adequate air cover for naval
forces in particular, the Assembly RrcorrarvteNos that the members of the Council take the decisions nec-
essary to co-ordinate air cover and extend efficient air defence protection to all WEU nations'forces.
6. Concerned that due consideration in the WEU Council has apparently not been given to the r6le
of forces, especially naval forces, should tension mount in the Gulf region and conflict break out, the
Assembly RnconueNos that the necessary political consultations should now take place to enable the
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appropriate decisions on the r6le of naval forces in particular to be implemented without delay in the
event of hostilities.
7. Convinced that the present situation admirably illustrates the case for creating a European
centre for the prevention of crises and recalling in this context two earlier recommendations: 465 (Doc-
ument 1159, Rapporteur: Mr. Fourr6), on defining the conditions for setting up a European obser-
vation satellite agency in WEU, and 481 (Document l223,Rapporteur: Lord Newall), on creating a
European verification centre under WEU auspices, the Assembly RrcouurNos that the Council at its
forthcoming ministerial meeting take the decision to set up such a centre to be used inter alia for crisis
management and verification and equip it with the necessary technical means (including access to
observation satellites) to enable it to function effectively.
8. The Assembly, believing that, even if the present crisis may prove unique as a model for
European action, certain options for the future are worth studying immediately, both in the WEU
Assembly and in national parliaments, RrcoMMENos that the Council emphasise WEU as the forum for
out-of-area co-ordination, in keeping with the modified Brussels Treaty, and examine for the longer
term the idea of creating a WEU naval on-call force for external operations, together with a possible
pooling of appropriate national air mobile assets into a European rapid action force.
9. Considering that special efforts are required to ensure that the public is kept fully informed
regarding the rationale for the WEU presence in the Gulf region, the Assembly RrcouurNos that the
Council should co-ordinate, through the Secretary-General's office, the presentation of WEU's rOle to
the media and to the public and that links between national public relations organisations in member
states' ministries of defence should be formalised and encouraged in a similar aim.
10. Noting that defence budget cuts in the majority of member countries are forcing an uncG.
ordinated reappraisal of defence priorities, the Assembly Rrcorrarrmuns that the Council institute con-
sultation within WEU on the optimum future structure of European forces, preferably before further
cuts in national defence budgets are made.
F
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submidcd by Mn De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur)
I. Intruduction
l. Since the Defence Committee's report on
the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait:
operations in the Gulf I was adopted on 20th
September 1990 first by the committee itself
and, later the same day, by the Presidential
Committee acting under emergency procedure
in the name of the Assembly, the situation in the
area has continued to evolve and the co-
operation between WEU member nations has
been further defined.
2. Given the uncertain duration and out-
come of events, the Assembly's Presidential
Committee has decided to devote the bulk of the
next plenary session of the Assembly (to be held
in Paris in the first week of December) to debate
on the Gulf issues, and has asked the Political
and Defence Committees to draft recommenda-
tions for consideration.
3. The Political Committee is therefore pre-
paring a report entitled European security and
the Gulf crisis (Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker) as a
follow-up to its original report and recommen-
dation concerning the Gulf crisis: European
security and events in the Near and Middle East,
Part II, The Kuwait crisis 2 (Rapporteur: Mr.
Pieralli). Mr. Pieralli's report set out in par-
ticular to cover the chronology of Iraqi
aggression against Kuwait, the WEU Council
decision of 2lst August 1990 and the attitudes
of the Arab countries and Israel to the crisis. The
two reports of the Political Committee are com-
plementary to the two reports of the Defence
Committee and are essential reading for an
understanding of the whole context.
4. Document 1243 attracted a tremendous
amount of interest and publicity, both in the
international specialised press and also more
generally in the media. It also provoked various
reactions not only from WEU member govern-
ments but, in addition, from other interested
parties. The Turkish authorities in particular
have confirmed that it is not planned to send
land forces to the Gulf region (Appendix IV) and
have pointed out that no foreign military air-
craft are stationed at the Incirlik air base; tem-
porary transfers there are only for training pur-
poses (Appendix III). Your Rapporteur is happy
to set the record straight and would welcome
further precisions or observations from
whatever source.
l. Document 1243, Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.
2. Doatment 1242.
II. Developments from mid-September to date
5. This present report is an updated version
of Document 1243 and takes account of devel-
opments since the middle of September, as well
as aiming to identify certain elements of the
present crisis which have implications for the
wider debate on the future organisation of
European security.
(i) Seond extruordinary muting
of tb WEU Council of Ministen,
Tuesday, 18th Septcmber 19%)
6. France, as Chairman-in-Office of the
WEU Council, called the second extraordinary
meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers in
Paris on Tuesday, lSth September. At the close
of the meeting the following communiqu6 was
issued:
" The foreign affairs and defence min-
isters of the member countries of Western
European Union, at their extraordinary
meeting in Paris,
- 
unreservedly condemn the new
breaches of international law by the
Iraqi authorities and the assault on per-
sonnel arising from the violation of dip-
lomatic premises in Kuwait city, and
following Iraq's. intolerable act of
aggression against another Arab
country; they recall that the authors of
these violations will carry a personal
responsibility,
- 
express their resolve to apply and
ensure the strict implementation of the
embargo decided on by the United
Nations Security Council in all its
forms 
- 
the only way of reaching a
political and peaceful solution to the
cnsls,
- 
decide to exchange information on all
violations of which they may be aware,
and jointly to identify any short-
comings in their embargo measures in
order to rectify them as soon as pos-
sible,
- 
welcome the fact that, since their
meeting on 2lst August last, all the
member states have made an effective
contribution to the common effort, and
that the co-ordination is proceeding
effectively with other countries' forces
deployed in the region,
t94
DOCUMENT I248
- 
decide, as far as they are concerned, to
take all further measures necessary, as
soon as possible, for the full and
effective enforcement of the embargo,
with particular attention to air traffic,
and call upon the Security Council
rapidly to adopt the appropriate deci-
sions to this end; these decisions should
apply if necessary to any countries not
complying with the embargo,
- 
endorse the decision by some member
states to reinforce their air and ground
forces in the region or to assist partners
in deploying such forces and support
the decisions taken or envisaged by the
member states with a view to further
deployments should the situation so
demand,
- decide to strengthen the WEU co-
ordination and to extend the co-
ordination at present operating in the
maritime field to ground and air forces
and, within this framework, to identify
the forms that these new deployments
will take, to seek to ensure that they are
complementary, to harmonise the mis-
sions of member states' forces and to
pool their logistic support capabilities
as required,
- 
intend to strengthen co-ordination with
other countries having forces in the
region, in particular the Arab states and
the United States of America,
- 
are resolved to continue providing
humanitarian aid to those countries
particularly affected by the crisis,
- 
underline the solidarity linking their
countries to the Arab world. "
(ii) Mecting of Deferce and Politicol Committees
followed by Presidential Committce mceting,
Thursday, 2hh September 1990
7. At the start of the meetings held by the
Defence, Political and Presidential Committees
in Paris on Thursday, 20th September, Mr.
Roland Dumas, French Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU
Council, was present in the Palais d'I6na to brief
the committees on the lSth September minis-
terial meeting and to answer members' ques-
tions. This gesture was greatly appreciated by all
those present as a welcome initiative to ensure
that the closest possible links exist between the
Council and the Assembly during these difficult
times. The session with Mr. Dumas was fol-
lowed, during the Defence Committee's own
meeting, by a comprehensive briefing on WEU
operations in the Red Sea and Gulf areas by the
naval specialists responsible for organising the
WEU operational cell in the French Ministry of
Defence.
8. It was therefore a fully-informed debate
which followed in the Defence Committee and
which resulted in the adoption of the following
set of recommendations:
* l. The Assembly approves the action
taken by the Council in invoking Article
VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty as a result of Iraq's aggression
against and occupation of Kuwait.
The Assembly welcomes the Council's
readiness to place WEU co-ordination in
the context of the implementation of
United Nations Resolutions 660, 661,
662, 664 and 665.
The Assembly supports the Council's
decision, not only to convene the meeting
of the Ministerial Council, but also to
constitute an ad hoc group to cover the
Gulf crisis and especially to call the first
meeting, under direct WEU auspices, of
the chiefs of defence staffs.
The Assembly believes that the Council
should remain open to the idea of further
co-operation and co-ordination at dif-
ferent levels over all aspects ofoperations
in the Gulf area and therefore Rrcou-
MENDS that the necessary steps be taken to
formalise the Gulf ad hoc group to con-
sider policy and implementation on a day-
to-day basis, as long as the present crisis
lasts, and urges all WEU nations to
provide maximum information to the
operational cell being run in the French
Ministry of Defence.
2. Concerned that the proliferation of
vessels in the Gulf area could lead to
problems in the very near future, the
Assembly RrcoutrlENos that further con-
sultations take place immediately at gov-
ernmental level to establish common
command and control in the various Gulf
zones already agreed and further Rrcou-
MENDS that urgent measures be taken to
harmonise rules of engagement at least
within each zone, and ensure that recog-
nition procedures (IFF) are properly
co-ordinated between all aircraft and
naval units to assure the safety of friendly
forces.
3. The Assembly considers that WEU
could play a useful r6le in helping to
co-ordinate (perhaps in conjunction with
other agencies) logistic support, rein-
forcement and resupply for the Gulf oper-
ations and that WEU nations' assets for
sea- and airlift might be provided, in
some cases where combat forces, for
whatever reason, may not be available,
and RrcorraMENDS that the Council study
the options for providing such assistance
without delay.
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4. Disappointed that the transatlantic pre-
sentation of WEU's contribution to
support the United Nations' efforts to
solve the crisis in the Gulf has yet to have
an impact, the Assembly RrcouueNos
that the Council establish forthwith a
liaison office in Washington to serve as a
channel for North American links and as
a matter of priority to convince the
United States' administration that direct
dialogue with WEU is possible and to be
welcomed, particularly at present. "
9. These recommendations were further con-
sidered on the same day by the Presidential
Committee which added the sentence " The
Council should make every effort to ensure that
WEU is perceived as the European pillar of the
Atlantic Alliance. " at the end of paragraph 4,
accepted them unanimously and in the name of
the Assembly forwarded them immediately to
the Council for action.
(iii) Assembly de@Aioa to etsniu
the WEU naval dcpbymcat in the Gulf
10. From 25th to 3fth September 1990, the
President of the Assembly, Senator Robert
Pontillon, led a delegation composed of the
Chairman of the Defence Committee, the Vice-
Chairman and Rapporteur of the Political Com-
mittee and the Rapporteur of the Defence Com-
mittee to examine the WEU naval deployment
in the Gulf area. The military liaison for the
visit was assured by the Assembly's Defence
Counsellor and the link with the French Min-
istry of Defence through the good offices of Mr.
Ch6vdnement's advisor on strategy, who also
accompanied the team.
11. On the eve of the delegation's departure, a
meeting took place with the French Chief of the
Defence Staff. As well as providing a very com-
petent briefing on WEU forces in the region,
General Schmitt's staff outlined the way ahead
as envisaged by the Rue St. Dominique. One of
the key elements where land and air units were
concerned (bearing in mind the decision of the
WEU Council of Ministers on Tuesday, 18th
September, to extend naval co-operation to land
and air components) would be to try and ensure
tight arrangements between French and British
forces in Saudi Arabia...
12. The Assembly's delegation visited
Djibouti to hear how the United Nations
embargo was being applied both in the area of
the Straits of Tiran, where WEU forces, in the
shape of French and Spanish vessels, are
co-operating with a Greek frigate, the fruit of the
original augmented WEU ministerial meeting of
2 I st August, as well as United States vessels, and
in the Bab El-Mandab waterway where French
forces (naval and maritime patrol aircraft) are
applying United Nations sanctions. The captain
of the French frigate Montcalm gave a full
account of the meetings held on board, under
WEU auspices, to resolve certain problems,
especially of communication. As will be high-
lighted further on in the report, the fact that
most United States forces present in the Red Sea
area come from the United States Sixth Fleet in
the Mediterranean or from the Atlantic means
that there have been comparatively few diffr-
culties in establishing a reasonable level of
co-operation from the outset. A great number 3
of merchant ships have been challenged in these
waters where the maritime sea lines of commu-
nication are particularly dense. The position of
the Kingdom of Jordan is germane in this
respect and your Rapporteur is grateful that
recent communications to the Assembly from
King Hussein have clarified that country's
position in relation to the embargo.
13. From Djibouti the Assembly's delegation
travelled to the Gulf states and on the way was
able to observe for itself the extent of maritime
traflic and the obvious need for a considerable
number of hulls to * cover the ground " in
ensuring that the application of the embargo is
as watertight as possible.
14. In the Gulf states the delegation was
briefed on board all WEU ships in the imme-
diate area of Abu Dhabi, Djebal Ali and Dubai(Dupleix (France), Orsa (Italy), HMS Battleaxe
and RFA Diligence (United Kingdom) and
Witte de With (Netherlands)) and sent messages
to Belgian and Spanish ships in the Gulf of
Oman. In addition, at the invitation of the
United States authorities, an American air-
defence cruiser, the USS England, was also
visited.
15. Your Rapporteur and his colleagues are
particularly grateful to all those ministers, min-
istries, ambassadors and attach6s who contrived
to authorise and make the necessary arrange-
ments for such visits, often at comparatively
short notice and in defiance of a certain number
of logistic problems. The welcome extended by
task group commanders and captains of indi-
vidual ships was exemplary and all questions
asked were answered with great frankness.
16. As a result of these contacts, the dele-
gation was able to assess the quantitative and
qualitative level of the European navies which
provide a significant presence in the Gulf region(over 50% of the combatants actually on patrol
in the area to apply the United Nations embargo
fly the ensign of a WEU member state: the vast
majority of United States vessels present have
either an amphibious or an air defence r6le). A
remarkable degree of operational co-ordination
between the navies is in evidence as a result of
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the application of well-tried methodology,
although initial problems resulting from the fact
that the bulk of United States ships have come
from their Pacific-based Seventh Fleet where
different codes, communication procedures,
etc., etc., apply have had to be solved with a
certain amount of pragmatism.
17. Certain practical difficulties which mili-
tated against the most effective solutions for
co-operation, for example in planning the roster
for f,rlling the five WEU zones at the entrance to
the Gulf (four north-west of the Strait of
Hormuz, one south-east), were highlighted
during the visit. The commonsense solutions(for the particular example, the harmonisation
of operating areas between identical meridians
for all nations present) are rarely far away, fortu-
nately, and even if diflicult for individual ships
to solve through co-operation on the spot, via
the monthly WEU nations'meetings, are usually
tackled at the regular meetings between naval
points of contact held under French chair-
manship in Paris.
The problem of identiJication
18. A major problem area brought to
members'attention in the previous report of the
Defence Committee was confirmed by the naval
specialists in the ships visited: that of identifi-
cation of aircraft. Bearing in mind the frontJine
nature of readiness (" live " ammunition in
ready-use lockers, frequent alerts and calls to
action stations, the similarity of aircraft types
likely to be encountered in the area, let alone the
major airline routes bordering the possible con-
flict zone) there is a real danger of accidental
interception and destruction of friendly aircraft
(blue on blue). A great deal of work has been
done on identification, friend or foe (IFF)
systems but a $eat deal still remains to be done
before there is complete compatibility even
between equipment of allied nations. The dis-
covery that United States forces were using a
fourth channel in their IFF procedures caused
some consternation before there was general
realisation of what was involved. While the
general picture generated by United States/
Saudi AWACS aircraft is vital for the correct
interpretation of the situation, the fact that no
one has tactical command (apart from that
between ships of the same nationality) means
that a co-ordinated and directed response to any
particular air threat is currently highly
unlikely.
Replacement and resupply
19. As the modern equivalent of the " phoney
war' continues in the Gulf region and as crews
become weary and nerves stretch it will be of
increasing importance to ensure that procedures
are adhered to and alert states maintained. The
regular rotation of ships and crews will in itself
of course provide part of the solution. By all
accounts this aspect is well in hand as is the
planning for continued logistic support
throughout the area. It is in this domain that
further contributions by those present will be
vital over the months to come or where those
nations politically reluctant to commit com-
batants might possibly be persuaded to play a
part.
20. Likewise, there may be a need for ships
for escort duty for supply and replenishment
ships transiting the eastern Mediterranean and
Red Sea areas especially given the potential
ranges of some Iraqi missiles. In the Mediter-
ranean one would like to envisage that NATO
would be empowered to act (there is no problem
of " area " here), but the controversy at the time
of writing concerning a possible visit by
the NATO on-call force Mediterranean(NAVOCFORMED) to Alexandria in Egypt
does not presage better things to come...
Rules of engagement
21. In spite of the fact that, as a result of
agreement following the WEU chiefs of defence
staffs' meeting at the end of August, common
directives were issued to local commanders, no
formal attempt has been made by the govern-
ments concerned to co-operate in the formu-
lation and updating of rules of engagement for
their vessels. A certain amount of comparing of
notes in an informal way by those present in the
Gulf area is believed to have taken place, espe-
cially by those programmed to operate in the
same or adjacent WEU sectors, but this cannot
replace the formal consultation which your
Rapporteur believes essential. With the evo-
lution of the situation, it is probably time also to
update the chiefs of defence staffs' directives.
Crisis management/observation satellites
22. One implication of such a move on rules
of engagement concerns the gathering of the
intelligence on which the modification of the
rules is based. The Assembly has highlighted the
need for European observation satellites time
and time again and, as well as adopting Recom-
mendation 465 (Document I 159, Rapporteur:
Mr. Fourr6) on defining the conditions for
setting up a European satellite agency in WEU,
has also suggested the creation of a European
verification centre a, primarily for the imple-
mentation of the imminent Vienna CFE
agreement, but also more generally for the man-
agement of crises and the prevention of risks.
How very useful it would have been for the man-
agement of the present crisis to have had such a
centre up and running! We must convince the
Council that, at their ministerial meeting in
4. Recommendation 481 (Document 1223 - Vienna, dis-
armament and Western European Union, Rapporteur: Lord
Newall).
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Paris on l0th December 1990, they should take
a positive decision to set up the centre, to be
used inter alia for crisis management and verifi-
cation. It must be given the necessary technical
means (including access to observation satel-
lites) to enable it to function effectively.
Command and control
23. While there has been some movement
affecting the co-operation between WEU forces
as a result of the Assembly's recommendations
and after the delegation's visit to the Gulf area,
there is very little to report in the domain of
command and control. The level of practical
co-operation is very good indeed and perhaps
sufficient for the current situation, but your
Rapporteur must draw both the committee's
and the Assembly's attention yet again to the
critical question: what happens if hostilities
break out? This concern has been voiced by vir-
tually all those who have been called to give evi-
dence to the Assembly's committees over the
past few weeks. All are generally agreed that
something must be done to produce a unified
command structure but our governments seem-
ingly continue to fight shy of the necessary delib-
erations.
24. Opinions between the WEU member
countries are obviously divided, but a number
of governments now believe that the necessary
arangements should be made. The same gov-
ernments also consider that Western Europe is
missing an ideal opportunity to demonstrate its
resolve to assert itself further in terms of
security and defence, with obvious implications
for the future. The Assembly's recommendationin September was to " establish common
command and control in the various Gulf zones
already agreed... ". That recommendation stands
and needs urgent implementation at the highest
political levels if the danger of unconcerted
action and maybe tragic loss of life is to be
avoided should the shooting start...
III. Iraq: the military forces and policy options
25. Analysis of armed forces is always dif-
ficult and often open to speculation. However,
in the case of Iraq, information given by its
major arrns suppliers and studies on Iraqi
warfare during the eight years' war with Iran
help clarify the capabilities and strategies of the
Iraqi armed forces as well as the resulting policy
options.
26. In quantitative terms Iraq is very strong:
(i) Army
1 000 000 troops: Republican Guards
People's Liberation Army
5 500 tanks: 2 500 Soviet T-54 and T-55
I 000 Soviet T-62
, ;33 3il1'":!-l?'rand r-6e
3 000 artillery pieces
200 multiple rocket launchers
66 surface-to-surface missile launchers
(30 Frog 7, 36 Scud-B, T-7)
160 armed helicopters (including c. 40
Soviet-made Hind attack heli-
copters)
180 surface-toair missile systems
(ii) Air force
800 aircraft including:
16 Soviet Badger and Blinder bombers
4 Ch.H-6D anti-ship bombers
94 French Mirage F-l (some with Exocet)
l0 French Mirage F-l from the Kuwait Air
Force
70 MiG-21 multi-r6le fighters
70 MiG-23 Flogger fighters
25 MiG-25 Foxbat fighters
l8 MiG-29 Fulcrum attack fighters
30 Su-7 ground-attack fighters
50 Su-20 ground-attack fighters
30 Su-25 close support fighters
120 Chinese J-6 and J-7 fighters
(iii) Navy
5 frigates (including the ltalian-built Lupo
class)
38 patrol and coastal vessels
8 mine warfare vessels
6 amphibious vessels
(iv) Arms deployed in Kuwait and South lraq
470 000 troops in Kuwait
I 15 000 troops along the southern Iraqi
border
3 700 tanks in Kuwait
1200 armoured vehicles in Kuwait
700 artillery pieces in the area
27. The Iraqi army is composed of the Repub-
lican Guards and the People's Liberation Army.
The Republican Guards (12 000-15 000 troops)
are the 6lite troops of the Iraqi army. They are
experienced and well-equipped with modern
T-72 tanks. The Republican Guards are pre-
pared for quick offensive action and launched
the 2nd August attack on Kuwait. Within a short
period three mechanised armoured divisions
and four infantry divisions had invaded and
taken Kuwait.
28. The second 6chelon is the People's Liber-
ation Army which consists of conscripts and vol-
unteers. The People's Liberation Army is com-
paratively lightly-armed, with low military
skills, negligible mobility, and is not equipped to
fight by night.
29. The Iraqi air force has extensive assets,
although its effectiveness, in spite of being
equipped with modern French Mirage F-l and
Soviet MiG-29 aircraft, is doubtful because of
low training standards and poor serviceability
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resulting in fewer operational aircraft. During
the Iran-lraq war the air force was under-used,
although on paper it was far superior to the
Iranian air force. The air force gave little
support to Iraqi troops on the ground and
seldom engaged the Iranian air force. Some
bombing raids took place on Iranian cities,
usually from great heights, plus a number of pre-
cision attacks. It is debateable whether men and
machines have been honed to a sharp edge on
the steel ofbattle over the course ofeight years
of war or are merely exhausted. However, a
strike by Iraqi air force Mirage F-l fighters
armed with Exocet (and it is estimated that at
least 100 Exocet missiles remain from earlier
purchases, plus whatever was captured in the
assault on Kuwait) remains one of the greatest
potential threats against warships in the Gulf.
The range of Iraqi aircraft and their possibilities
for in-flight refuelling are of course critical in
this respect and affect the operational zones
chosen by the various nations present in the area
as well as individual ships' capabilities for self-
defence. Also linked with this is the United
States Navy request for rapid delivery of Goal-
keeper 30 mm close-in weapons systems (CIWS)
to protect their warships from missile attack. A
number of Goalkeeper systems is already
installed on board British and Dutch ships and
trials for the United States Navy were success-
fully concluded in California in the summer.
30. The Iraqis have large numbers of surface-
to-surface missile launchers at their disposal and
in particular have deployed most of their 36
Scud-B launchers and the 800 associated mis-
siles in Kuwait, ostensibly with chemical war-
heads (or so an Iraqi spokesman claimed, with
chilling emphasis). It is technically possible to
equip these missiles with chemical warheads but
the intelligence services believe that Iraq does
not yet have the technology to do so. Con-
versely, Iraq does have artillery with binary
chemical shells, mustard gas and nerve gas, used
to devastating purpose during the 8-year war
with lran, despite almost universal condem-
nation. In addition, Iraq has also deployed
Silkworm anti-ship missiles obtained from the
Chinese.
31. The Iraqi forces are pres€ntly using the
same strategy as during the Iran-Iraq war. The
invasion of Kuwait took place at 2 a.m. on 2nd
August when three armoured divisions of the
Republican Guard Force of the Iraqi army
crossed the frontier, closely followed later that
morning by four divisions of the Republican
Guard infantry. Combat aircraft of the Iraqi air
forces, which total about 800 aircraft, bombed
and rocketed Kuwaiti airfields. At the same
time, helicopter gun ships attacked Kuwait City
and landed at least a brigade of Republican
Guard special forces 
- 
with light armour 
- 
who
led the assault on the palace and on the main
government buildings. In all, that force
amounted to about 100 000 soldiers, armed with
about I 250 tanks, with many infantry combat
vehicles and with artillery.
32. The Kuwaiti army, which is barely one-
tenth of that figure, was in a state of alert, but
was not deployed in defensive positions because
the Kuwaitis did not believe that one Arab
country could invade another. The troops who
led the invasion were followed by further rein-
forcements, including some who, according to
the reports received, probably belong to the Peo-
ple's Liberation Army.
33. On 20th August, the Republican Guard
divisions started to withdraw from their forward
deployments and were replaced by regular army
troops. Two months later on 20th October the
forces now in Kuwait number approximately
470 000 men, 3 700 tanks and 700 artillery
pieces. Republican Guard units have been with-
drawn to lraq. It has been the Iraqi practice to
withdraw Republican Guard units after an
attack. They may now either have been with-
drawn to establish a more defensive position or
- 
and the possibility must always be borne in
mind 
- 
they may have been withdrawn to
reform for further aggression.
34. In Kuwait itself, the Iraqis have
strengthened their coastal defences with
Silkworm missiles, with a string of infantry divi-
sions and with field artillery units. They have
moved in their Frog battlefield missiles and a
full range of surface-to-air missiles to Kuwait, as
well as the Scud-B mentioned above.
35. With a defensive strategy, without any
military aid because of East-West agreement on
a blockade and without information and
resupply, it is not very likely that Iraq will now
attack, although who can tell what might be the
desperate last resort reactions iffinally cornered.
There is always the possibility that Iraq might
try to lash out irrationally in one direction or
another. It is not capable of sustaining a war
over a long period and general war would
probably sound the death knell for Iraq. Various
United States commentators have estimated
that the Iraqi air force could be destroyed within
36 hours and the bulk of lraq's air defence
within the same time-frame. Of course, even
without war, air forces must keep flying to
maintain readiness which implies that the Iraqis
are using spares on a regular basis. Items such as
tyres and lubricants should therefore soon be in
short supply and diffrcult to replace (which is
why Iraq is reported to be reducing the usual
number of exercises and manoeuvres in an effort
for economy). It is therefore highly likely that
the embargo itself would suffice to diminish the
air threat.
36. Similar considerations apply to the lraqi
navy. Although lraq possesses a number of com-
paratively modern hulls, it is not envisaged that
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the force could remain effective for long, mainly
because of the reduced numbers of operational
ships available, with most still suffering the
effects of the Iran-lraq war.
IY. The responses of the United States of America
and other nations
37. On 6th August, President Bush launched
the operation Desert Shield to dissuade the
Iraqis from attacking Saudi Arabia. The oper-
ation calls for a huge and continuing air- and
sealift to deploy heavy arnour and anti-tank
forces and a massive build-up of sea and air
assets in the Gulf region. The units moved, or
moving, to date are listed at appendix.
38. As a result of the resolutions adopted by
the United Nations, a large number of other
countries, traditional allies of the United States
of America and others, have answered the call to
protect the countries of the Gulf, especially
Saudi Arabia, and to help guarantee the
blockade imposed on the movement of military
and economic shipping to and from lraq.
39. In the first stages of deployment, the
United States was faced with moving three army
brigades, three Marine Corps expeditionary bri-
gades and six air force tactical fighter wings,
together with numerous smaller units, support
materials, spare parts and supplies. The priority
has been to rush combat equipment across the
Atlantic followed by material first for support
and subsequently for sustainment.
40. Hence the need for all types of transport
by air and sea, which also relies heavily on com-
mercial assets. Sealift involves a variety of craft,
including fast sealift ships which travel at
c. 30 kts, chartered vessels and a number of
prepositioned ships with ammunition, medical
equipment and supplies and fuel. On average, it
takes a fast sealift ship 14 days to cover the
11 000 km to the Gulf and sealift carries some
950/o of cargo and 99% of petroleum products,
while airlift carries 99% of the manpower. This
has meant that the United States has had to
activate its Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) pro
gramme, to augment military airlift with civil
aircraft.
41. Even when the * shield' is in place
(recent reports indicate that United States man-
power is now some 210 000 strong) there will be
a continuing need for constant and regular
support, reinforcement and sustainment. Hence
Secretary of State Baker's appeal for allied help
with sea- and airlift provision. An added com-
plication is the necessity now to replace certain
of the original elements, rapidly deployed at the
start of the crisis, with more robust forces.
42. Throughout the western alliance the
critical problem of sea- and airlift remains. Suc-
cessive shifts in world markets and trading pat-
terns mean that there are barely enough cargo
hulls of the right variety available for logistic
support in emergency, whether for the tradi-
tional scenario of reinforcement and resupply
for Europe or in the current context. For
example, where the British forces coming to
Saudi Arabia from Germany are concerned,
some 33 hulls have proved necessary.
43. Over recent years the Defence Committee
has sought to draw the attention of the appro-
priate authorities to the conundrum of declining
merchant shipping, coupled with increased
* flagging out'to more and more flags of conve-
nience (a theoretically United States-owned fleet
flies 35 flags besides its own and the United
Kingdom's fleet flies 45 other flags beside the
Red Ensign) and the tendency to man one's own
ships largely with foreign nationals (making
deployment to a potential war zone an even
greater problem than it would be otherwise).
The greater distances and potential dangers
involved in conducting operations in the Gulf
are very different from the Atlantic setting and
could prove extremely costly in terms of mer-
chant shipping.
44. Included in the numbers of United States
personnel in the Gulf are thousands of United
States reservists 
- 
naval, army and air force
reserves, as well as National Guard and Air
National Guard members, equipped for the
most part with the best of modern equipment,
dedicated, well-trained and highly-motivated
individuals who have given up a grcat deal to
serve their country.
45. Little did members of the Defence Com-
mittee think when they made a study visit to the
United States in the second half of July this
year, at the invitation ofSecretary Cheney, that
many of those seen in training in New Orleans
or Fort Hood, Texas, would soon find them-
selves in the Saudi Arabian desert. In the wake
of the force reductions currently being nego
tiated at the CFE talks in Vienna, the r6le of
reserves generally, both in North America and
Europe, will be of growing importance and we
have a specific lesson to be learned from what is
now taking place. The whole subject of reserves
is to be treated in a forthcoming report of the
Defence Committee (Rapporteur: Mr. De
Decker).
46. The reason for the large numbers being
deployed to the Gulf area was admirably con-
veyed by the point made by Secretary Cheney on
6th September in Virginia at the International
Institute for Strategic Studies' timely conference
on America's rdle in a changing world:
'The worst possible sin would be to
deploy enough force to get into trouble
but not enough to counter each eventu-
ality. "
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47. That philosophy is obviously being borne
very much in mind and is surely the right
approach, even should the whole affair never
reach the stage of all-out hostilities. Deterrence
and persuasion are the names of the game. Mr.
Cheney is recently reported as saying that there
should be a doubling of United States forces in
the area in order to ensure success in any armed
confrontation with Iraq.
48. As well as the American concentration of
land, sea and air power, a large number of coun-
tries have promised and provided forces to
bolster the various United Nations resolutions
and help protect the Gulf states. Not counting
the WEU nations and the United States, the fol-
lowing countries are taking part: Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, Senegal,
Syria (troops); Argentina, Australia, Canada,
Denmark, Greece and Norway (naval vessels).
The total represents the largest multinational
force since the Korean war. Details are given in
the appendices.
49. It should be stressed that the bulk of
forces on land are stationed in Saudi Arabia, at
the invitation of the Saudi authorities. The
Saudis themselves are generally in the potential
front line with those elements of the Kuwaiti
forces who managed to fight their way out after
Iraq's invasion. " Foreign " forces make up the
second 6chelon, to reinforce as necessary.
Y. Westen European Union
rcoctions oad initiatives
50. It is of course coincidental that WEU
finds itself involved in Gulf operations for the
second time within three years, but there is def-
inite advantage in the fact, for it does mean that
the process of co.operation and co-ordination
has been far less fraught with teething problems
than was the case three years ago. This time
round it has proved possible to advance much
more quickly to a useful arrangement of mutual
benefit.
51. The first step was the meeting of chiefs of
defence staffs held in Paris ot 27th August.
Whereas the ministerial meeting a week previ-
ously had been opened to other members of the
European Community (Greece and Denmark
attended and Ireland eventually decided against
attending, because of a traditional neutral
stance) plus Turkey, as a front line state, and
with Nonryay represented not at the formal
meeting but at a working lunch, it was decided
to limit the chiefs of defence staffs' meeting to
full WEU member states only.
52. In the event, four chiefs of defence staffs
(Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany
and Luxembourg) were present together with six
chiefs of naval staffs (France, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom). Pre-
vious proposals for such meetings had
foundered on the lack of a mutually-agreed
agenda, but on this occasion the briefwas very
clear and the chiefs of staff examined a set of
operational measures aimed at achieving close
co-ordination of activities in the crisis area to
enforce the United Nations embargo against
Iraq and Kuwait, on the basis of Security
Council Resolutions 661 and 665. The measures
covered the following aspects: mission defi-
nition, deployment co-ordination, zones of
action, information exchange, logistic and oper-
ational support, mutual protection of vessels in
the area.
53. In concrete terms there are now naval and
logistic points of contact in each national
capital, who are consulted as necessary by the
crisis management cells established in the
French Ministry of Defence. The naval attach6s
in member countries' Paris embassies are also in
regular contact with the French naval operations
centre which provides a daily situation report on
who is where and doing what. A number of
member states are in the process of appointing
special liaison officers to Paris to ensure that
dedicated links with national capitals are imme-
diate. In addition, a system of operational
co-ordination has been established in the Gulf
area, both to facilitate WEU actions and to
establish links with naval forces of other coun-
tries. After a WEU meeting on the morning of
9th September in the French embassy to
co-ordinate approaches, the first meeting was
held under joint United States-WEU-Arab
chairmanship on 9th and lfth September in
Bahrain, when it was agreed to divide the Gulf
into specific patrol areas to increase the effec-
tiveness of the blockade. Also on l0th See
tember a meeting was held on board the French
frigate Montcalm in the Strait of Tiran to
co-ordinate WEU and United States liaison.
Communication methods and procedures for
challenging merchant ships were also agreed to
reduce mutual interference and duplication of
effort.
54. Most western navies are used to co-
operating with each other 
- 
co-operation which
is usually a matter of common sense 
- 
exchange
of information, the sharing of logistical support
as necessary (for example, the Italian support
ship Stromboli took over from the French
supply ship Durance in furnishing support to
WEU nations in the Gulf zone. Similarly the
Dutch are to provide a fleet auxiliary to relieve
one of the British RFAs in due course), pro-
vision of fresh water, possibly an agreement on
where to take " runs ashore " and when (so as
not to overload local hospitality) as well as the
obvious need not to interfere with manoeuvres
and exercises by fixing zones ofoperation. These
WEU co-ordination meetings are now con-
tinuing with rotating chairmanship - France
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chairing at the September meeting on board the
Dupleix off Hormuz and Britain chairing the
October meeting on board the RFA Fort
Grange. Italy will chair the November WEU
meeting. The pattern of such meetings is well
established: WEU caucus normally to begin
with, " all comers' (United States, Australia,
Canada, etc.) subsequently. The WEU chairing
nation then usually takes care of the
coordinating r6le for the following month.
Further regular meetings on the spot are
envisaged.
55. The WEU member countries have
deployed, or are in the process ofdeploying, the
following assets:
Belgium
Two tripartite minehunters, Iris and Myo-
sotis, and the support ship Zinnia, which carries
an Alouette III helicopter, have been sent to
Fujairah in the Gulf of Oman. The frigate
Wandelaar is now helping French units to apply
the embargo in the Bab El-Mandab Straits and
four C-130 transport aircraft have been offered
" for WEU purposes " once opdrations in
Rwanda are complete.
France
Now that the Cl6menceau group has
returned to Toulon, France has the following
ships taking part in Operation Artimon to help
apply the embargo:
(a/ Straits of Tiran: Commandant
Ducuing (frigate);
(D/ Straits of Bab El-Mandab: Doudart de
Lagree (frigate) and La Rieuse (patrol
craft);(c) Gulf: Montcalm, La Motte Piquet
(frigates), Marne (support ship).
In the Red Sea the frigate Commandant
Bory is escorting transport ships bringing rein-
forcements to Yanbu for Operation Daguet.
Other naval vessels in the general area are
the frigates Du Chayla and Protet and the
support vessels Durance and Var.
The normal levels of forces in Djibouti
have been augmented with Mirage F-l-C inter-
ceptors for air defence and a second Atlantic
maritime patrol aircraft.
In Abu Dhabi, France has one squadron
of Mirage F-l aircraft, a reconnaissance
squadron equipped with Milan anti-tank mis-
siles, one section of Mistral anti-aircraft
launchers and two sections of Crotale anti-
aircraft launchers.
French ground forces in Saudi Arabia(Operation Daguet) are: lst Regiment of Spahis
equipped with 48 AMX-I0RC tanks and other
armoured vehicles, 2nd Foreign kgion Infantry
Regiment, 2nd Company of the 6th Foreign
kgion Engineering Regiment, a unit of anti-
aircraft artillery from the l lth Artillery Reg-
iment and over 30 combat aircraft (Mirage 2000
RDI, Mirage F-I-CR, Jaguar and a number of
air tankers C-135F).
Germany
As the Federal German constitution does
not allow for operational deployment outside
the NATO area, the five minehunters and two
supply ships that left Wilhelmshaven on l6th
August will remain in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean, based in Crete. The Bundeswehr has
transferred 60 Fox chemical warfare-equipped
reconnaissance vehicles to the United States
Army for use in the Gulf.
The German Government has agreed to
provide financial support for United States
armed forces in the Gulf area and to help defray
the cost of the United Nations embargo to coun-
tries such as Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. DM 1.6
billion have been allocated for help with rein-
forcement and resupply (sea- and airlift) and for
various items of equipment (light armoured
vehicles, detection systems, communication
equipment). DM 1.7 billion will be available
through the European Community as financial
aid to Egypt, Jordan and Turkey.
Italy
The Italian Navy corvettes Minerva and
Sfinge sailed to the Eastern Mediterranean to
replace United States ships (l6th August). The
frigates Libeccio and Orsa are operational in the
Gulf area. A supply ship is also on the way and a
replenishment tanker Stromboli relieved the
French tanker Durance. Eight Tornado fighters
for air defence of Italian naval forces are now
stationed in Abu Dhabi.
Italy has agreed to provide transport ships
for the multinational force in the Gulf area.
Luxembourg
Not possessing vessels to send to the Gulf
area or Mediterranean, Luxembourg is pro-
viding financial support to other WEU members
engaged with men or material (as was also the
case in 1987/88). Some $2 million have been
pledged so far.
Netherlands
The two Royal Netherlands Navy frigates
in the Gull Witte de With and Pieter Florisz,
will be replaced by the Jacob van Heemskerck
and Philips van Almonde at the end of the year.
The support ship Zuiderkruis will be replacing a
British fleet auxiliary.
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Portugal
Portugal has agreed to send transport
ships to the Gulf area and the government has
also increased the facilities for air transport of
the American forces and materials through the
air bases of Lages and Santa Maria in the Azores
archipelago. A C-130 aircraft has been ferrying
refugees from Jordan to Egypt and a medical
team is deployed in the area.
Spain
The Spanish Navy has a frigate Santa
Maria on patrol in the WEU Gulf areas, as well
as two corvettes, Descubierta and Cazadora, in
the Red Sea. These ships are all to be relieved in
the coming months and Spain has declared its
readiness to consider logistic and medical
support if requested by the WEU.
United Kingdom
Operation Granby includes the frigates
HMS Battleaxe, HMS Brazen and HMS
London, the Leander-class frigate HMS Jupiter,
the two Type-42 destroyers, HMS York and
HMS Gloucester, as well as a supply ship Olna
and a fleet tanker Orangeleaf. Three MCMVs,
HMS Cattistock, Atherstone, and Hurworth,
have been deployed with their support ship,
HMS Herald. The heavy repair ship RFA Dili-
gence has arrived in Jebal Ali from the
Falklands and the destroyer Cardiff is en route
from the United Kingdom, as is RFA Argus(normally equipped for helicopter operations,
but now rigged as a medical receiving station
with teams of medical specialists on board).
Ground forces in Saudi Arabia will com-
prise 6 000 men of the 7th Armoured Brigade
from the British Army of the Rhine. This force
includes the Queen's Dragoon Guards equipped
with armoured vehicles, the Royal Scots
Dragoon Guards with 60 Challenger tanks, the
Royal Irish Hussars with another 60 Challenger
tanks, the Staffordshire Regiment with
armoured vehicles, the 40th Field Regiment
Royal Artillery Q4155 mm guns) and one
squadron from the Army Air Corps (9 Lynx and
4 Gazelle helicopters). The force will be com-
plete by mid-November and will also include the
39th Engineer Regiment, 22nd Field Hospital,
l6th Field Ambulance unit and Royal Signals
satellite link detachments.
The Royal Air Force has two squadrons of
Tornado F3 ADV in Dhahran, a squadron of
Tornado GRI IDS in Tabuk (Saudi Arabia) and
another in Bahrain, where there is also a Jaguar
squadron and two Rapier detachments. Four
Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft are based in
Sib (Oman).
VI. Outstanding issues
(i) National contributions
56. While there are obviously various
political considerations in member nations
which may preclude one or other country from
sending combat forces to the Gulf region, there
are nevertheless a series of imperatives as to why
all member states should review their positions
in an effort to see whether more might be con-
tributed. After all, the reason for the WEU
alliance to react to the crisis as it has is a
common denominator. This is the first time in
the history of the United Nations that one
member has attacked and tried to annex another
and all our countries are affected in a very
similar way when it comes to such a threat to a
large percentage of our oil supplies. Hence the
need for solidarity between us.
57. Even if a particular country wishes not to
become involved to any great extent militarily,
there are ample opportunities to work together
with others, especially, for example, in the areas
of logistics and medical help. This wider forum
is now being addressed but it would be of great
help if more offers were made spontaneously
instead of having to be coaxed forth.
58. One current idea which would appear to
lend itself to the WEU concept is the provision
of a hospital ship for the Gulf region 
- 
with each
nation contributing whatever medical resources
possible: both personnel and equipment would
be needed.
59. The formula used by the Belgian Gov-
ernment, by which WEU was offered four C-I30
transport aircraft, is ideal in the given situ-
ation.
(ii) Air coyer and air operutions generally
60. France,Italy and the United Kingdom are
the only WEU nations with combat aircraft in
the Gulf region. At present all these aircraft have
purely national missions - providing air cover
as necessary for their own national forces. This
means that some forces are well protected
whereas others have to rely entirely on allies for
that protection. Your Rapporteur feels that con-
sideration must be given urgently to a reap-
praisal of the possibilities for increased
co-operation with the institution maybe of spe-
cific WEU zones of operation in the air just as
there are at sea.
61. In this context it is hoped that a sector
may be found for the Dutch F-l6s which would
prove an invaluable asset to co-operate with the
French and Italians.
62. Another way in which countries with
limited possibilities might act nevertheless is in
the realm of providing replacement aircraft to
allow indepth maintenance of both men and
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machines as the crisis continues. For example,
the United Kingdom's Nimrod aircraft based in
Oman are flying twice as many hours as normal:
bringing in another country's P3 MPA aircraft
for a spell would allow much-needed rest and
maintenance... If some forces are already
stretched now, what would happen if conflict
came?
(tii) Fonoatd ploniag
63. Obviously planning ahead is a function of
an individual nation's willingness to participate
but if conflict should break out it would benefit
all concerned to have made various contingency
plans. An outstanding question @ncerns the r6le
of naval forces in time of tension and once hostil-
ities have broken out. There would be a myriad
ofjobs to be done: escort duty for the tankers still
delivering essential oils and fuels, escorts also for
high-value targets bringing reinforcements and
resupplying those already in place, perhaps also
escorting amphibious shipping on its way north-
westwards (depending on what happens in
relation to the military option). Mine-hunting
and -sweeping would be another consideration.
As well as the United States, Belgrum and Britain
have specialist ships in the area: have any plans
been made for co-operation between these ships
or allocation of zones decided now that the risk
of mines has been emphasised in reoent
briefings? (See Appendix V for lraqi capabilities
in mine warfare.)
64. Our governments must obviously consult
formally where co-operation is concerned 
- 
but
that consideration of possible war missions and
decisions such as whether to stay and fight or cut
and run should be prepared well in advance:
they would come too late if left until the day
when conflict begins.
(b) Pablici0
65. In Document 1243, emphasis was placed
on links with the United States in presenting
WEU Gulf actions, but there is a wider public
which deserves better and more frequent infor-
mation. As defence budgets in national capitals
decline as cuts begin to take effect, it becomes
increasingly important to present actions as a
question of priorities.
66. It might well be that the Council could ask
the Secretary-General to co-ordinate the presen-
tation of WEU's r6le to the media and to the
public in member countries, ensuring a tight
liaison between the national public relations
organisations which exist in all defence minis-
tries and maybe formalising such links for the
future.
67. Not least of the considerations as already
stressed in Document 1243 is that of convincing
Americans (especially those in Congress) that
the Europeans are bearing their share of the
burden and now is the ideal time to illustrate the
European r6le in the most graphic way possible.
YII. I*ssons for thc future
68. The present Gulf crisis, unique in its
genre, may not prove the ideal model for
shaping European forces for the future, but there
are a number of lessons to be drawn from it
which are already obvious.
69. In these days of never-ending debates on
future defence and security structures, at a time
when defence cuts are starting to hit both in
terms of personnel and equipment, there has to
be a gerteral consensus within the WEU Council
that WEU is proving its worth as the best
present forum for out-of-area co-ordination. The
modified Brussels Treaty with its many facets,
not least of which is the famous Article VIII, has
provided a basis for concerted European action
which should now be formalised with reinforced
decision-making and even operational powers
for the future.
70. In addition to the main requirements for
European forces over the coming decades:
mobile, flexible, rapidly-deployable, it will be
essential to seek as much co-operation as pos-
sible between all our countries in WEU.
Whether it be procurement policies, joint opera-
tions or multinational units, we must keep open
minds as to the modalities, but amongst those
we should now start considering is the idea of
creating a WEU naval on-call force for external
operations (a WEU/Armilla patrol for perpetu-
ating a European presence in the Gulf area,
without keeping vast armies on land, might be a
natural progression from present arrangements).
71. In addition, a possible pooling of appro-
priate national air-mobile assets into a multina-
tional European rapid action force for opera-
tions beyond the Atlantic area should be studied
as a matter of urgency in the WEU Council's
Defence Representatives Group. The Defence
Committee itself will be investigating the subject
and making recommendations in a forthcoming
report, to be entitled 'Arms control: force
reductions and the r6le of multinational units "(Rapporteur: Mr. Uyttendaele).
YIII. Conclusion
72. The above considerations are of course
relevant for the longer term. For the immediate
future, it is essential that the watchword remains
as stated in the final paragraph of Document
1243:
* We must make certain that we build on
what has been achieved and carry through
our actions to help the United Nations'
efforts on the Gulf crisis reach a satis-
factory and secure conclusion. "
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APPENDIX I
Naval actions lialud to the application of the embargo since
the adoption of Uniud Naions Resolution 665
(period covered: 26th August-lst November /,990)
Numbers of merchant ships
Challenged Boarded Diverted Warning shots
l. Strait of Tiran
WEU units(France- Snain) s92
919
t 654
8
3 916
2 180
43
269
ll
1
l8
68
0
4
0
0
I
ll
0
2
I
0
I
6
Other units
(Greece, United States) .
2. Strait of Bab El-Mandab
WEU units(Belgium, France)
Other units(IInited States) . 
-
3. Strait of Hormuz
WEU units(France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain
United Kingdom)
Others units(Australia, Canada, United States) ... .
Torms
(as at lst November 1990) 9 269 410 l6 r0
20s
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19th Septcnbr
Argentina
Argentina undertook to send a task force
to the Gulf composed of two of its most modern
ships armed with Exocet missiles, a battalion of
about 450 paratroopers, a Hercules C-130 and a
Boeing 707 of the Argentinian air force. This
task force is reported to be financed by
Kuwait.
2hh September
France
The Ministry of Defence chartered nine
ships to transport troops, equipment and rations
for Operation Daguet, i.e. car ferries, cargo
ships, container ships and roll-on, roll-off cargo
ships with a gross registered tonnage of 60 000
tons.
Four convoys are planned: Ang6la, Alice,
Arlette and Am6lie. The first convoy consisted
of a car ferry and two accompanying cargo ships.
Japan
Three ships for transporting equipment
were made available to the multinational force
deployed in the region of the Gulf.
Iraq
Iraq is now believed to have 360000
troops in Kuwait, supported by 2 800 tanks,
I 800 light armoured vehicles and I 450 pieces
of artillery.
21st Septembcr
Spain
Spanish ships were deployed in their
zones ofoperation. The corvettes Cazadora and
Descubierta were in the Red Sea in the Strait of
Tiran and the frigate Santa Maria in the Gulf of
Oman.
25th Scptembet
Bangladesh
It was announced that 5 000 troops will be
sent to join the 2 000 already in Saudi Arabia.
l. See also Appendices I (External naval forces in the Gulf
area) and II (External naval forces in transit to the Gulf) in
Document 1243.
APPENDIX IT
Updated position of present or future forces
in the region of the Gulf t
Egvpt
It was decided to send 15 000 troops and
300 tanks tojoin the 5 000 troops in the special
light brigades already present since the
beginning of the Gulf crisis. It is expected to
reach a total ofabout 35 000 troops in the near
future.
Czechoslovakia
President Havel proposed sending 200
troops equipped for chemical warfare if Saudi
Arabia so requested.
26th Septembr
WEU
At the meeting of the Permanent Council
of WEU on 26th September, the representatives
of Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal informed
the Council of their decision to contribute to thejoint effort. Belgium decided to send a frigate
and four Hercules C-130 aircraft, Luxembourg
offered to contribute about $2 million to cover
the cost oftransport and Portugal offered to help
with air transport (a Hercules C-130 is trans-
porting refugees between Amman and Cairo), a
transport ship and medical supplies (a medical
team is already in the area).
28th September
Iraq
Iraqi forces in and around Kuwait were
believed to number 430 000 troops plus 3 500
tanks, 2 500 armoured transport vehicles and
I 700 pieces of artillery.
Italy
Italy decided to send eight Tornados from
the air base at Gioia del Colle (Bari) to Abu
Dhabi to protect Italian naval units in the Gulf.
These aircraft will be refuelled in flight by Royal
Air Force VC-10s.
Netherlands
The squadron of F-16 fighters planned to
strengthen the air embargo decided upon by the
United Nations Security Council will not be
deployed in Turkey.
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29th September
Canada
To ensure the air protection of its ships in
the Gulf region, Canada decides to send a
squadron of eighteen CF-18 fighters and 450
men belonging to the 409th Tactical Fighter
Squadron.
Egvpt
In addition to forces already present
(some 20 000), I 500 troops, tanks, armoured
vehicles and air defence systems are to be
deployed with the Arab multinational force in
Hafar al Batin (Saudi Arabia).
Netherlands
Ships are to leave to relieve ships already
in the Gulf, i.e. the frigates Jacob van Heem-
skerck and Philips van Almonde (Kortenaer-
class) and the fast combat support ship Zui-
derkruis. These ships are to be based at Mina
Jebel Ali, south of Dubai.
Taiwan
An initial contribution of $100 million
was proposed to assist American forces in the
Gulf.
lst Ocaber
Argentina
In spite of opposition from some political
fractions and public opinion, the Argentinian
task force left the naval base of Punta Alta (800
km south of Buenos Aires) for Oman. The task
force is composed of the destroyer Almirante
Brown and the corvette Spiro carrying Exocet
missiles and an Alouette helicopter. It left on
26th September.
Romania
Though not officially confirmed, this
country is believed to have proposed to accom-
modate American troops on their way to and
from the Gulf in tourist resorts along the Black
Sea. This offer is also reported to be extended to
British and Canadian troops.
Eastern European countries
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania
were reported to have offered to send medical
supplies to help the multinational forces in the
Gulf. Bulgaria is even reported to have proposed
sending 400 troops, but this has not been con-
firmed.
3d Oaober
United States
United States naval forces are:
- 
in the Gulf: an aircraft carrier, the USS
Independence, a combat ship, three
cruisers, one destroyer, three frigates,
three amphibious craft, one auxiliary
vessel, command vessels (La Salle, Blue
Ridge), plus two hospital ships(Comfort, Mercy) and two air force
logistical support ships (Curtiss,
wrigh0;
- 
in Bahrain: I heavy cargo ship Super
Servant III, four mine hunters Avenger,
Adroit, Impervious, kader;
- 
in the north of the Gulf of Oman /
Arabian Sea; thirteen amphibious craft,
five auxiliary vessels, two frigates and
one destroyer;
- 
in the Red Sea: one aircraft carrier USS
Kennedy, three cruisers, three frigates,
two auxiliary vessels;
- 
in the Eastern Mediterranean: one air-
craft carrier USS Saratoga and its
combat group, one cruiser (BelknaP)
and four amphibious craft.
&h Oaober
According to the IISS Military Balance
1990-1991, on lst June 1990 the Iraqi anny con-
sisted of,(i) Army
- 
955 000 troops;
- 
7 army corps;
- 
7 armoured divisions;
- 
40 infantry divisions;
- 
6 divisions of the Republican Guard.
Equipment:
- 
5 500 heavy tanks (T-72,62,55,54);
- 
100 light tanks;
- 
2 500 reconnaissance vehicles;
- 
7 500 infantry/transport armoured
vehicles;
- 
3 000 towed artillery;
- 
500 self-propelled artillery;
- 
200 rocket launchers;
- 
86 surface-to-surface missile launchers(50 Frog-7, 36 Scud-B Abbas,
Hussein);
- 
4 000 anti-aircraft defence guns;
- 
600 surface-to-air missile launchers;
- 
489 helicopters (various types),
including 159 armed.(i, Navy
- 
5 000 men (based in Basrah and Umm
Qasr);
- 
5 frigates;
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- 
38 patrol and coastal combatants;
- 
8 mine warfare vessels.(iii) Air force
- 
40 000 men;
- 2 Tu-22 Blinder and Tu-16 Badger
squadrons;
- 
22 fighter-bomber squadrons of
MiG-I9s, -23s; Mirages; Sukhoi'-7s,
-20s, -24s and -25s;
- 
17 fighter aircraft squadrons of
MiG-I9s, -21s, -25s, -29s and Mirage
F-ls;
- 
I reconnaissance squadron of MiG-2 I s,
25s;
- 
2 transport squadrons of An-2s, -12s,
-24s, -26s and ll-76s.
7th Oaobcr
Uniled Kingdom
RAF Jaguar aircraft are redeployed to
Bahrain from Oman.
16th (ktobcr
United Kingdom
First contingent of the United Kingdom's7th Armoured Brigade arrives in Saudi
Arabia.
Japan
In Japan, against mounting opposition,
the government introduces a bill to parliament
to allow forces to be sent abroad. (Such moves
have since been condemned by China.)
lEth (htobet
Spain
In Spain it is announced that the.frigate
Numancia is to sail for the Gulf from Ferrol as a
replacement and that the corvettes will be
relieved in the Red Sea on 9th November by the
Diana and Cristina.
2hh (htobr
Iraqi deployment in Kuwait: about
470000 troops.
In the front line (Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian
frontier): 24 divisions with:
- 3 700 tanks (two-thirds of the Iraqi
total);
- 
2 300 infantry combat vehicles;
- 
2200 pieces of artillery including 2bat-
talions of Frog-7 surface-to-surface mis-
siles (USSR, range 70 km, accuracy
400 m).
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In reserve: 4 reinforcement divisions.
Behind the lines:
- 
3 divisions of the Republican Guard
(crack units);
- 
5 infantry divisions.
These forces are protected by the Iraqi air
force. In Kuwait, the Iraqis have also laid mine-
fields and buried most of their armoured
vehicles. Facing the French Daguet force and
Arab troops in Saudi Arabia, Iraq has deployed
the l6th Infantry Division of 13000 troops
with:
infantry regiments;
tank regiment;
surface-to-surface artillery regiment;
engineering battalion;
anti-tank weapons battalion;
reconnaissance battalion;
surface-to-air weapons battalion.
Along the Turkish-Iraqi frontier, Iraq now
has 250 000 troops with armoured vehicles,
heavy artillery (and missiles?). The Iraqi
deployment has been reinforced with 2 infantry
divisions and I armoured division from the
frontier with Iran. The deployment along the
frontier with Syria has also been reinforced with
3 infantry divisions.
21st Octobt
Iraq
Iraq is reportedly trying to make the
c. 150 Hawk missiles captured in Kuwait opera-
tional.
25th (htobcr
United States
United States Defence Secretary Cheney
suggests that a further 100 000 troops (besides
the 240 000 already in or on their way to Saudi
Arabia) would be necessary to mount an
offensive action against Iraq.
31st Octobcr
France
2 squadrons of AMX-I0RC tanks (270
men) of the lst Foreign Cavalry Regiment
(based in Orange) left France for the Yanbu gar-
rison in Saudi Arabia. Units of the lst Regiment
of Spahis will join them later, thus completing
the Daguet force.
Consideration is also being given to
sending 155 mm towed artillery.
Portugal
A Portuguese transport ship was reported
loading material at the Marchwood military port
in the United Kingdom.
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APPENDIX ITI
Ahied air Inwer in the Gulf area2
Currently deployed in the area are:
- 
271 air superiority fighters;
- 595 dedicated and multi-r6le offensive
strike aircraft;
- 
64 electronic warfare and reconnais-
sance aircraft;
- 
hundreds of attaclg assault and scout
helicopters;
- 
transport and tanker aircraft;
- 
support aircraft.
(a) Unitcd Stata
1. Air superiority fighters (132 aircraft):
- 
48 F-I5C/D (from the 27th and Tlst
TFS, lst TFW, Langley AFB) based at
Dhahran since the beginning of the
crisis;
- 
24 F-[1C/D (60th TFS, 33rd TFW,
Englin AFB, Florida) reported to be
deployed;
- 
60 F-l4A (based on USS Saratoga,
Independence and John F. Kennedy).
2. Dedicated offensive aircraft (260 + 26
B-52G):
- 
22 F-ll7A Stealth fighters (37th TFW,
Tonopah Test Range, Nevada) at bases
on the Arabian Peninsula;
- 
50 A-6E (aircraft carriers);
- 
20 A-6E (with USMC-MEF (Marine
Expeditionary Force));
- 
38 F-lllF (48th TFW, Lakenheath,
United Kingdom) at an undisclosed
base in Saudi Arabia;
- 
24 A-78 (USS John F. Kennedy);
- 
60 Av-8B (with the USMC-MEF);
- 
48 A-l0A (354th TFW, Myrtle Beach
AFB, South Carolina) reported to be at
Al Jabayl in Saudi Arabia;
- 
26 B-52G (Loring AFB, Maine, Castle
AFB, California) reported to have
deployed to Diego Garcia.
3. Multi-r6le combat aircraft (180):
- 
24 F-l5E (336th TFS, 4th TFW,
Seymour Johnson AFB, North Car-
olina) based at Thumrait, Oman;
- 
44 F-l6ClD (l7th, 33rd TFS, 363rd
TFW, Shaw AFB, Georgia) based at Al
Dhalia, Sharjah, UAE;
- 
24 F-t6CtD (6l4th TFS, 40lst TFW,
Torrejon AB, Spain) deployed at Doha,
Qatar;
- 
40 F/A-18 (aircraft carriers);
- 
48 F/A-r8 (USMC-MEF).
4. EW and reconnaissance aircraft (54):
- 
12 F-4G Wild Weasels (35th TFW,
George AFB, California) at an
unknown location;
- 
12 EF-lllA (336th TFW, Mountain
Home AFB, Idaho);
- 
l8 EA-6B (aircraft carriers and USMC-
MEF);
- 
12 RF-4C (106th TRS, Birmingham,
Alabama ANG).
5. Airborne command, transport and tanker
aircraft include:
- 
C-130 Hercules aircraft;
- 
E.2C AWACS aircraft (United States
Navy);
- 
R3A AWACS aircraft;
- 
KC-I3S tankers;
- 
KC-10;
- 
KC-130 (United States Navy and
USMC);
- 
MC-130 special operations aircraft;
- 
MH-53 special operations aircraft.
The USAF 507th Tactical Air Control Wing
(Shaw AFB) provides forward air control, com-
munications and mobile radars for ground-
controlled interception support.
6. Maritime patrol aircraft and
anti-submarine aircraft include:
- 
30 USN carrier-borne S-3A/B Viking;
- 
P-3C (United States Navy).
USMC units reported to have been
deployed:
- 
2nd Marine Aircraft Wing (Fleet
Marine Force Atlantic);
- 
3rd MAW (FMF Pacific).
7. Helicopter assets include attack heli-
copters:
- 
AH-64A Apache;
- 
Bell AH-IW Super Cobra.
8. United States Army aviation units include
elements of the:
- 
lOlst Aviation Brigade;
- 
United States Army Europe's l2th
Combat Aviation Brigade;
- 
3rd Armoured Division,
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plus the regular units deployed with the:
- 
82nd Airborne Division;
- 
lOlst Airborne Division;
- 
24th Mechanised Infantry Division;
- 
lst Cavalry Division (with an addi-
tional brigade from the 2nd Armoured
Division) now deploying.
(b) Unitd Kiagfum
1. Air superiority frghters (18):
- 
l8 Tornado F3 with latest version of
Foxhunter Al24 radar (23, 25
Squadron, RAF Leeming) at Dhahran
Air Base, Saudi Arabia.
2. Dedicated offensive aircraft (36):
- 
24 Tornado IDS (RAF, Germany) in
Bahrain;
- 
12 Jaguar GR-IA (RAF Cottishall
wing) in Muharraq, Bahrain (4 with tac-
tical reconnaissance pods).
3. EW and reconnaissance aircraft (6):
- 
6 TR-IA (l7th Reconnaissance Wing,RAF Alconbury) at undisclosed
location.
4. Airborne command, transport and tanker
aircraft include:
- 
C-130 Hercules;
- 
VC-10 tankers.
5. Maritime patrol aircraft and anti-
submarine aircraft:
- 
3 Nimrod MR2 (RAF Kinloss Wing) at
Seeb, Oman.
(c) Suuli Ardia (RS/F)
l. Air superiority frghters (84):
- 
60 F-ISC/D (from 5, 6 and 13
Squadrons) based at Taif, Khamis
Mushayt, Dhahran AFBs;
- 
24 Tornado ADV (29 Squadron) based
at Dhahran AFB.
2. Dedicated offensive aircraft (30):
- 
30 Tornado IDS (7 Squadron).
Multi-r6le combat aircraft (75):
- 
45 F-5E (3, 10, 15 and 17 Squadrons) atTail Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk
AFBs;
- 
30 Hawks (with Kuwait AF).
4. Airborne command:
- 
E-3A AWACS (with USAF).
(d) Froae
l. Air superiority fighters (4):
- 
4 plus Mirage 2000 deployed at Hufuf
(East of Dhahran).
2. Dedicated offensive aircraft (8):
- 
8 Jaguar NE at Hufuf.
3. EW and reconnaissance aircraft (4):
- 
4 Mirage FI-CR (ER 33, Strasbourg) at
Hufuf.
4. Tanker aircraft:
- 
KC-I35.
5. Helicopter assets:
- 
5th Combat Helicopter Regiment (48
helicopters).
(c) Uhcn
Canada
Air superiority fighters (18) to be
deployed:
- 
l8 CF-18 (409 Squadron, I CanadianAir Division from Baden-Sollingen,
Germany) to be deployed to provide air
cover for Canadian ships in the Gulf.
Italy
Dedicated aircraft for air defence (8):
- 
8 Tornado IDS in Abu Dhabi.
Kuwait
l. Air superiority fighters (15):
- 
l5 Mirage F-l CK/BK which escaped to
Saudi Arabia in August;
2. Multi-rdle combat aircraft (30):
- 
30 Hawks (with RSAF).
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APPENDIX IV
Ahied ground forces in the Gulf area3
(a) Arub-Muslim fotca
(i) Saudi Arabia
75 000 regulars (Army and National
Guard) and 550 tanks.
l. The army comprises:
- 
2 armoured brigades:
- 
the King Fahd Brigade Group
equipped with M-60A3 tanks and
M-l l3 APCs, and
- 
the Khalid Bin Waleed Brigade
Group equipped with AMX-30 tanks
and AMX-10 APCs;
- 
4 mechanised brigades;
- 
1 infantry brigade;
- 
I airborne brigade;
- 
3 Royal Guard battalions.
2. The National Guard comprises:
- 
2 mechanised brigades equipped with
V-150 Commando APCs;
- 
2 infantry brigades.
(ii) Other members of the GCC(Bahrain, Oman, UAE, Qatar)
- 
55 000 ground troops (altogether);
- 
300 AMX-30, M-60, OF-40 and
Chieftain tanks.
A l0 00O-strong force including Saudi elements
is deployed at Hafi-Al Batin (North East Saudi
Arabia). This force includes elements of the
Kuwaiti Army including a depleted armoured
battalion equipped with Chieftain tanks.
(iiil Eeypt and Syria
Each committed a division to the multi-
national force in Saudi Arabia.
EgYPt:
- 
3rd Mechanised Division (15 000 men
and 300 M-60 MBTs);
- 
special forces;
- 
chemical defence units.
Syria:
- 
4 000 troops;
- 
one armoured division (15 000 men
and 270 tanks) is pledged.
3. See also Appendix IV (Foreign troops stationed in Gulf
states) in Document 1243.
(iv) Others
Morocco:
- 
I 700 troops (one airborne brigade).
Pakistan:
- 
5 000 troops (one infantry brigade
group).
500 Afghan Mujaheddin
(b) llesten forces
(i) United States
All United States forces in the Gulf are
commanded by General Schwartzkopf. United
States Army units are subordinate to Lieutenant
General John Yeosock (3rd Army Head-
quarters). Marine Corps Units come under Lt.
General Walter Boomer (I Marine Expedi-
tionary Force).
3rd Army
The most powerful units are:
l. lst Cavalry Division (Fort Hood, Texas)
with 2 active army brigades and a brigade from
the 2nd Armoured Division (Fort Hood).
The lst Cavalry Division has:
- 
6 armoured battalions;
- 
4 mechanised battalions with 350 M-l
tanks and 220 M-2 Bradley IFVs.
The Division's artillery component has:
- 
72155 mm M-109 SP howitzers;
- 
12 8 inch (203 mm) M-l l0 SP (self-
propelled) howitzers;
- 
I battery of 9 MLRS (Multiple Launch
Rocket Systems).
The Combat Aviation Brigade of the
Division has:
- 
130 AH-64A Apache attack heli-
copters;
- 
OH-58 scout helicopters;
- 
UH-60 assault helicopters.
2. 24thlnfantry Division (mechanised; Fort
Stewart, Georgia) with 2 active brigades and the
l97th Infantry Brigade (mechanised; Georgia)
attached.
The 24th Infantry Division has:
- 
5 armoured battalions;
- 
5 mechanised battalions with 290 tanks
and 275 Bradleys.
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The Division's artillery component and Combat
Aviation Brigade are the same as the lst Cavalry
Division.
3. 3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment 
- 
the
only unit equipped with 120 mm armed M-lAl
MBTs (Fort Bliss, Texas):
- 
5 000 personnel
- 
130 M-lAl;
- 
I l0 Bradley Cavalry Fighting Vehicles;
- 
24 i0,,'-109.
Helicopters (80):
- 
oH-58;
- 
AH.64A;
- 
uH-60.
4. lOlst Airborne Division (air assault; Fort
Campbell, Kentucky) and 82nd Airborne
Division (Fort Bragg, North Carolina):
- 
ligbt infantry formations;
- 
anti-armour capability with more than
150 TOW missile launchers.
Each division has:
- 
3 infantry brigades;
- 
9 105 mm howitzer batteries.
The 82nd includes the 3rd Battalion 73rd
Armour equipped with M55l light tanks. The
mobility of the l0lst is provided by the l0lst
Aviation Brigade equipped with helicopters:
- 
OH-58 scout;
- 
AH-64A attack;
- 
UH-60 assault;
- 
CH-47 transport.
5. Support units:
- 
m Corps
Oklahoma):
howitzers;
Artillery (Fort Sill,
M-109 and M-110 SP
- 
I lth Air Defence Artillery Brigade(Fort Bliss, Texas): Patriot launchers;
- 
lzth Combat Aviation Brigade and
227th Aviation Regiment from United
States Army Europe: OH-58D,
AH-64A, UH-60 helicopters;
- 
7th Medical Command (Germany);
- 
lst Corps Support Command (Fort
Bragg, North Carolina);
- 
l3th Corps Support Command (Fort
Hood, Texas).
Note
1. The 350 M-l tanks deployed in combat-
ready units in Saudi Arabia are to be exchangedfor more advanced M-lAl tanks from
prepositioned stores in Western Europe. The
M-lAl has an integrated NBC weapon pro-
tection system, a 120 mm smoothbore gun (com-
pared to the M-l's 105 mm), improved surviva-
bility and improved suspension and track
systems.
2. The air defence of the 3rd Army is pro-
vided by (hardware):
- 
35 Patriot launchers;
- 
75 Vulcan close-in weapon systems(cISw).
I Marine Expeditionary Force
This comprises:
- 
lst Marine Expeditionary Brigade
(Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii);
- 
4th MEB (Norfolk, Virginia);
- 
7th MEB (Twenty-nine Palms, Cali-
fornia).
Each MEB includes:
- 
17 000 marines;
- one gr.ound combat element;
- 
one air combat element;
- 
one service support element.
lst MEB and 7th MEB are deployed in
Saudi Arabia. 4th MEB remains embarked (with
the USS Independence Battle Group).
Available in the Eastern Mediterranean:
- 
Marine Amphibiou-s-Ready.Group 3-90
comprising the 26th Marine Expedi-
tionary Unit (22000 men) embarked
on four amphibious ships.
MEF land systems hardware:
(a) vehicles:
- 
140 M-60A1 tanks;
- 
I7O LAV;
- 
300 amphibious assault vehicles.
(b) artillery:
- 
4 105 mm towed howitzers;
- 
90 155 mm towed howitzers;
- 
6 155 mm SP howitzers;
- 
6 8 inch (203 mm) SP howitzers.
(c) air defence:
- 
15 Hawk launchers.
Note
1. As the 140 M-601A of the lst and 3rd
Tank Battalions are the only MBTs integral to I
MEF, the United Kingdom's 7th Armoured
Brigade will be attached to it.
2. In addition, units of the United States
Seal (sea-air-land) and Green Beret special
forces teams are reported to be in the area.
(ii) Uniled Kingdom
The 7th Armoured Brigade comprises:
- 
one armoured reconnaissance squadron;
- 
2 armoured regiments each with 57
2t2
Challenger lMK3 MBTs;
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- 
one armoured infantry battalion
equipped with Warrior IFVs;
- 
one artillery regiment with 24 M-109
SP howitzers (155 mm) and 36 Javelirt
surface-to-air missile launchers.
In addition, units of the Special Air
Service and Special Boat Squadron are reported
to be in the area.
(iii) France
The French ground component consists of
a composite force drawn from 3 divisions of the
FAR. The 5 OOGman force is deployed at Hafar-
al-Batin (300 km north of Hufuf).
It consists ofi
- 
HQ element from the 6th Light
Armoured Division;
- 
lst Spahis Regiment (AMX-I0RC
armoured reconnaissance vehicles);
- 
5th Combat Helicopter Regiment (48
helicopters including " HOT " and
20 mm cannon-armed Gazelle and
Puma support helicopters);
- 
2 Foreign Legion Infantry Regiments(VAB wheeled APCs, Milan AT (anti-
tank) missiles);
- 
I lth Marine Artillery Regiment (155 mm
towed howitzers, 20 mm anti-aircraft
guns, one SAM battery);
- 
onelight reconnaissance squadron from
the l lth Parachute Hussar Regiment
(deployed in the UAE).
(iv) Others
Bangladesh
2 000 troops (infantry and engineers).
Czechoslovakia
200-man chemical defence unit (?).
Poland
Pledged to send a field hospital and a hos-
pital ship.
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Iraqi mine cqability
(a) Some availdb types
1. Supplied by the USSR:
- 
AMD/KMD-series - bottom influence
mines;
- 
Krabs-type;
- 
M08 (as in 1908);
- 
MKB-series.
2. Supplied by ltaly:
- 
MISAR-Manta bottom influence
mine 
- 
operates at depths of up to
100 m and has a 140 kg warhead.
Plastic-cased it is diffrcult to detect.
3. Iraqi-manufactured (based on Soviet
designs):
- 
Al Muthena 
- 
moored contact mine(AM-35- and AM-45-series with 35 kg
and 45 kg warheads). Manufactured
with anchor and cable and also as a
drifting mine;
- 
Sigeel - bottom-moored contact mine
with a 400 kg warhead;
- 
Sumer acoustic/magnetic bottom
mine;
- 
Alkaakaa-16 floating/submersible
mine designed to destroy offshore
t.
structures. It is a 3.4 x 3.4 x 3 m, 16 t
mine with a 13 t warhead and deto-
nation by timer or remote control.
(b) Miuloyins cawbiliv
By air:
Several helicopters:
- 
Super Frelon (A6rospatiale, France);
- 
Mr-8/Mr-17 (USSR).
Several aircraft:
- 
Tu-16 Badger (USSR);
- 
Tu-22 Blinder (USSR).
By sea:
- 3 Polnochny landing craft (USSR);
- 
I T-43+lass ocean minesweeper
(USSR);
- 
3 Yevgenya-class inshore minesweepers
(usSR);
- 
3 Nestin-class minesweepers (Yugo-
slavia).
Other ships available including some air cushion
vehicles type SR-N6 (United Kingdom-built)
captured during the invasion of Kuwait.
2.
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Amendments I and 2 3rd December 1990
Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait:
continaing operations in the Gulf region
AMENDMENTS I and 2'
tablcd by Mr. Lambie
l. Leave out paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper.
2. Leave out paragraph l0 of the draft recommendation proper.
Signed: Lambie
l. See l0th sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendments negatived).
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Amendment 3
3rd December 1990
Consequences of the invacion of Kuwait:
continuint operations in the Gulf region
AMENDMENT 3 
'
tabled by Mr. Stolfelcn aad uhen
3. In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after " Brussels
Treaty ".
Signed: Stolfelen, Martinez, Soell
l. See l0th sittin& 5th December 1990 (amendment negatived).
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Amendment 4
3rd December 1990
Consequences'of the invasion of Kuwait:
continuing olorations in the Gulf region
AMENDMENT 4 
'
tabled by Mn Martinez and otlurs
4. In paragraph l0 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after * European
forces'.
Signed: Martinez, Stolfelen, Soell
l. See l0th sitting, 5th December 1990 (amendment negatived).
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I. Updated data on CI in the Gulf region
i0th September
According to the Director for C3I on thejoint staff of the United States forces in theGull Lieutenant General James Cassidy, to
ensure adequate satellite communications for
United States troops in Saudi Arabia, the
Defence Department has rented capacity on
satellites operated by the Intelsat (civilian-run,
Washington-based) organisation.
Military commanders in Saudi Arabia are
relying heavily on GPS receivers. The Global
Positioning System consists of l4 satellites
which continually broadcast accurate naviga-
tional information to users below.
15th October
Allied forces in Saudi Arabia have esta-
blished a management panel which will reserve
radio frequencies for each of the numerous com-
munications systems to speed up communica-
tions and avoid accidental jamming.
The panel includes representatives from
Saudi Arabia and all countries sending forces to
the region.
4th December 1990
lst Novcmbcr
Britain's Gulf operation 'Granby " is
being directed from the bunker known as the
Primary War HQ at RAF High Wycombe in
Buckinghamshire.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine is the
Joint Military Commander of all British forces
in Operation Granby. He is responsible to the
Secretary of State for Defence and oversees the
operation from the United Kingdom.
6th Novembcr
The United States and Saudi Arabia
reached agreement on the operational command
and control of troops if military action is needed
against Iraq.
The agreement was reached during talksin Djeddah (Saudi Arabia) between United
States Secretary of State James Baker, King
Fahd and senior Saudi ministers.
Under the agreement, United States and
Saudi forces will operate under a joint command
in defence of the Kingdom. For military action
beyond Saudi borders, United States troops
would operate under American commanders
after the operation was approved " at the highest
political level " of both governments.
Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait:
continuing operations in the Gulf region
ADDENDUM
submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur
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I(hh November
The Headquarters of RAF Strike
Command (High Wycombe, United Kingdom)
has been augmented by 200 army and navy per-
sonnel to become the joint HQ for Operation
Granby.
|lth Novcmber
When a second British armoured brigade
arrives in Saudi Arabia, a divisional head-
quarters will have to be set up in the area for
command and control.
Lieutenant General Sir Peter de la Billidre
will remain overall Commander of the British
ground forces. But another senior officer will be
appointed under him, operating from the divi-
sional headquarters.
17th November
Air Vice Marshal William Wratten will
succeed AVM Sandy Wilson as Air Commander
British Forces Middle East. He will assume the
post of Deputy to Lieutenant General Sir Peter
de la Billi0re, British Forces Commander
Middle East.
19th Noscmhr
According to John Davis, Chief Scientist
in the United States Navy's Space and Elec-
tronic Warfare Branch, forces in the United
States " Desert Shield " operation are rapidly
exhausting the capacity in the * Fleet Satellite
Communications' satellites. There is an
increased need for military communications as
the satellites are being used by all United States
units in the Gulf region (army, navy, air force
and marines).
Options under study by the Defence Com-
munications Agency include the use of the
NATO 4 satellite slated for launch in December,
movement of a United States Defence Satellite
Communications System 3 satellite to a perch
over the Persian Gulf or leasing of additional
communications capacity from civilian satel-
lites.
As another option, the United States
might push for activation of an already orbiting
NATO satellite.
The Defence Department is relying
heavily on support from industry to meet the
increased demand for communications caused
by the accelerated troop build-up in Saudi
Arabia, according to Defence Department offi-
cials.
IL Chronology of the latest events
%h Oaober
Egvpt
The Commander of the Egyptian forces in
Saudi Arabia, Major General Mohammed Ali
Bilal, said that " Egyptian forces will not join
any attack on Iraq'.
27th Oaober
France
It is planned to relieve French forces basedin Saudi Arabia in January/February 1991.
Operation Daguet has been strengthened
with the arrival of 500 additional troops, 22
anti-tank helicopters (HOT missiles) and 24
AMX- I 0-RCs (reconnaissance).
2%h Ocrobcr
France
Three French soldiers on a reconnaissance
mission were captured, with their equipment, by
Iraqi troops in circumstances that are not yet
clear.
The three soldiers, one oflicer and two
non-commissioned officers, belong to the l3th
Regiment of Parachute Dragoons 
- 
an intelli-
gence unit 
- 
and have been " returned " to the
French Charge d'Affairs in Baghdad with their
equipment.
ilst Octobr
United States
The number of United States servicemen
killed accidentally since Operation Desert Shield
began in August has reached 48.
The United States forces started a large-
scale beach assault exercise. The lGday exercise
code-named " Sea Soldier II " involves elements
of the:
- 
4th Marine Expeditionary Force;
- 
Amphibious Task Group II,
with 26 aircraft, 75 helicopters and 17
ships.
2nd Novenbcr
Spain
According to military and diplomatic
sources, there is no question of sending troops
from the Spanish anny to the Gulf unless hosti-
lities break out. Even then, however, such a
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deployment would be improbable for logistic
and internal political reasons.
The army headquarters has drawn up
plans for possible military intervention and
taken measures should the government decide to
extend Spain's participation beyond the
deployment of three naval units in the Gulf.
ird Novenber
France
The army headquarters is preparing to
send 155 mm towed artillery belonging to the
I lth Marine Artillery Regiment (St. Aubin) to
strengthen Operation Daguet.
The French army in Saudi Arabia has
moved 20 to 30 km further south.
Sth November
Syria
The first contingent of the 9th Armoured
Division arrived in Yanbu (Saudi Arabia). This
contingent of 2 500 to 3 000 soldiers with 100
T-62 tanks and several armoured anti-aircraft
vehicles (with 4 ZSU-Z3-B tracked, radar-guided
anti-aircraft guns (USSR)) under the command
of Major General Ali Mabib will be deployed
near the Saudi-Kuwaiti border.
Syria already has 3 000 ground troops in
Saudi Arabia and I 000 more in the United
Arab Emirates.
Uniled Kingdom
The cost of the British deployment in the
Persian Gulf is expected to exceed f,600 million($t.tZ billion) by the end of the financial year(3lst March l99l).
Uniled States
The United States army is reviewing ways
to deploy more modern M2 and M3 Bradley
IFVs to United States troops in Saudi Arabia.
There are 615 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles
fielded to the Middle East, all of them older M2
and M3 or M2Al or M3Al versions, and none
more survivable than the M2A2 and M3A2
version.
6th November
Western European Union
WEU co-ordination meeting on board the
Italian ship Stromboli in the Gulf.
United States
The Defence Department has decided to
call up major combat units from the reserves
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totalling thousands of men to join the United
States forces in the Gulf in the next few
months.
More than 34 000 reservists have already
been mobilised to perform military support
r6les in the United States and in the Gulf region.
These include physicians, port handlers,
cargo plane pilots and water purification specia-
lists. Congress extended combat reservists'
180-day call-up limit to 360 days, allowing srifli-
cient time to train them.
7th November
Japan
Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu abandoned
a plan to send Japanese troops to the Gulf and
called on a frosh plan to aid the international
effort in the Gulf region by sending an * all-
civilian force " (medical personnel and others).
$th Noyember
Netherlands
The Netherlands said it had rejected a
British request to send more troops to the Gulf.
Britain asked it to contribute a decontamination
company and an engineer support unit.
It would consider the request " only if
there is a United Nations resolution supporting
such an action ".
United Nations
Medicines provided to Iraq under an
exemption from the United Nations embaryo
could be used for chemical and biological
warfare, the Chairman of the United Nations
Sanctions Committee, Madatta Rasi, Finnish
Ambassador, said.
The Chairman also said that she was
concerned about the large amount of medicines
being shipped to Iraq, although she had no evi-
dence that drugs were being misused.
United States
More than 2 000 American soldiers have
been airlifted to hospitals in Germany since the
military build-up in the Gulf began in August.
Most had suffered heat-stroke and minor
injuries. Oflicers said that the number reporting
sick dropped as the weather cooled down.
9th Novembcr
Egvpt
President Mubarak announces that
another armoured division of 4 000 troops and
400 tanks will be sent to Saudi Arabia towards
the end of November.
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Spain
The three Spanish naval units, the frigate
Numancia and the corvettes Diana and Infanta
Cristina, sent to replace the units already in the
Gulf, arrived in Port Said (Egypt) on 7th
November.
United States
The Department of Defence announces
that 824 reserve marines including 600 combat
troops have already been recalled for active
servlce.
lhh Novembr
Greece
Military hospitals in main Greek cities
and on the island of Crete have been placed on
alert to deal with possible casualties in the event
of a war in the Gulf.
Iraq
According to United States sources, Iraq
has now 2 200 APCs and IFVs in Kuwait and
contiguous areas to the north and west. Tanks
now number 3 500 and artillery pieces 2200.
General Hussein Rachid, deputy Chief-of-
Staff of the Presidential Guard, is appointed as
the new Army Chief-of-Staff.
He commanded the Iraqi forces who
drove Iranian forces out of the southern
peninsula of Fao in April 1988, the battle which
marked the start of a large-scale Iranian with-
drawal.
Portugal
The naval support ship Sao Miguel will
carry food and equipment to the United
Kingdom forces in Saudi Arabia.
Senegal
The Senegalese military contingent of 500
troops in Saudi Arabia is under the command of
Colonel Mouhamadou Keitd.
Uniled Kingdom
British forces are training for a possible
offensive operation to force an Iraqi withdrawal
from Kuwait.
The 8 000-strong 7th Armoured Brigade
Group has been augmented by a squadron of 15
RAF Puma support helicopters transported to
the Gulf by USAF C-5 Galaxies.
A detachment of C-130 Hercules trans-
ports is expected to be deployed later in
November. The Chinook helicopters of the 7th
squadron (Odiham, United Kingdom) have
been painted in desert colours.
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The United Kingdom army and air force
contributions consist of:
- 
7th Armoured Brigade Group and a
Puma squadron (attached to I Marine
Expeditionary Force in Saudi Arabia);
- a reinforced squadron of Tornado F3
air defence fighters and an RAF
regiment ground defence squadron (in
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia);
- 
a reinforced squadron of Tornado GRI
strike aircraft (in Tabuk, Saudi
Arabia),
in Bahrain (Muhanaq):
- 
a reinforced squadron of Tornado
GRI;
- a reinforced squadron of Jaguar
fighters;
- a detachment of VC-10 air tankers;
- 
RAF Regiment Rapier squadron and
ground defence squadron;
- 
22nd Engineer Regiment;
- 
33rd Field Hospital,
in Oman (Seeb):
- 
a Nimrod maritime reconnaissance/
ASW squadron;
- 
VC-10 air tankers.
Royal Navy forces:
- 
7 Royal Navy destroyers and frigates;
- 
4 mine counter-measures vessels(MCMv);
- 9 Royal Fleet Auxiliary Ships.
Britain's 3 MCMVs in the Gulf,
Atherstone, Hurworth and Cattistock, have
begun searching for mines following a request
from the United States navy.
Uniled States
Two United States military bases at
Gournia and Souda on the north-western part of
Crete haVe been stocked with pharmaceuticals
and medical equipment, while United States
army units trained to deal with chemical warfare
conditions have been transferred to Crete ready
to move into the Gulf if needed.
llth Notember
United States
President Bush has ordered up to 200 000
reinforcements be sent to the Gulf.
According to Defence Secretary Dick
Cheney, half of all United States land forces in
, Europe are being sent to the Gulf. About
200 000 United States army troops are stationed
in Europe.
Once the additional forces are in place,
the United States will have about 430 000 sol-
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diers, airmen and sailors in the Gulf region(more than in Europe during the cold war).
The all-United States force will be joined
by up to 100 000 allied and Arab troops making
a total of 530 000 men (lraq has 430 000 men in
Kuwait, almost 500/o of total Iraqi forces).
The military now has more than 100
cargo ships dedicated to the supplyJine feeding
and provisioning the forces in the Middle East.
A new major deployment will add to the strains
on that supply-line.
. 
According to three senior United States
marine corps generals, stockpiles should be
increased before any American offensive is
launched against lraq. They also cautioned that
war in the Gulf would be costly.
40 000 more Marines are to join the
45 000 already deployed in Saudi Arabia and on
ships in the region.
The marines notified about 800 combat
reservists that they will be called to active duty -
some should be sent to Camp Lejeune (North
Carolina) or Camp Pendleton (California).
12th Novembr
Western European Union
WEU/United States/other navies co-ordi-
nation meeting on board the USS Blue Ridge in
the Gulf. (Next meeting programmed for
December on board the Dutch ship Zni-
derkruis.)
United Kingdom
Tom King, the Defence Secretary,
confirmed that the government was considering
sending more combat troops to Saudi Arabia.
The options presented include an air-
borne brigade but it is considered more likely
that armour will be sent to boost Britain's
military presence, already totalling 16 000 men
and women (soldiers, sailors, airmen).
Since the arrival of the 7th Armoured
Brigade, l5 Puma helicopters have been sent for
casualty evacuation and the Royal Fleet Auxi-
liary Ship Argus has set sail as an additional hos-
pital facility.
United States
Elements of the new deployment are:
- a full anny corps from Europe with 2
armoured divisions and one armoured
cavalry regiment.
A corps comprises 110 000 men, I 000
tanks and several hundred APCs.
The Army VII Corps is being sent from
Germany.
- 
lst and 3rd Armoured Divisions'
- 
Znd Brigade of the 2nd Armlured
Division;
- 
2nd Armoured Cavalry Regiment;
- 
2nd Command and Supply Corps.
It will deploy with:
- 
air assault helicopters;
- 
hundreds of artillery pieces;
- 
broad range of support troops and
equipment;
- 
one additional mechanised division:
the lst Infantry Division from Fort
Riley (Kansas, United States) with 400
tanks, APCs and 16 500 soldiers;
- 
3 brigades (48th and 256th Mechanised
Infantry, l55th Armoured Brigade) of
Army National Guard combat troops,
each one with 3 000 men and hundreds
of tanks and armoured vehicles. These
brigades will be sent to Fort Inrin (Cali-
fornia) for training and evaluation
before decision to dispatch them to the
Gulf. This deployment will essentially
be a test of the military's increasing
reliance on the National Guard and
reserves;
- 
3 aircraft carrier groups (USS Ranger
(Forrestal-class), USS America (Kitty
Hawk-class), USS Roosevelt (Niuntz-
class)), with (each) I aircraft carrier and
7 escort and support ships. One aircraft
carrier has a crew of 5 500 men and
carries 80 jets (F-14 fighters, F-I8 figh-
ter-bombers, A-6 bombers). Escort: one
guided-missile cruiser, several des-
troyers, frigates to provide air and sub-
marine defence for the battle group;
- battleship Missouri with its escort (to
complement the battleship Wisconsin).
These battleships have a crew of I 500
sailors. They are equipped with cruise
missiles, 9 l6-inch (410 mm) guns,
several weapons for attacking shore
targets;
- 
Amphibious Group III (San Diego,
California);
- 
2nd Marine Expeditionary Force from
Camp Lejeune (North Carolina) and
5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade from
Camp Pendleton (California), totalling
60 000 men;
- 
Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron I(Norfiolk, Virginia).
More than half of the total 197 000-man
strengh of the United States Marine Corps will
be present in the Gulf (46 000 already in the
region, plus 60000 to arrive).
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More land systems hardware deployed:
- 
221 Ml (army);
- 
165 M2 Bradley IFVs;
- 
115 M3 Bradley IFVs;
- 
400 Ml 13 APCs;
- 
5 LAVs (USMC-MEF);
- 
75 155 mm SP (self-propelled)
howitzers;
- 
l0 Patriot air defence missile launchers;
- 
55 Vulcan CIWS (close-in-weapon
system);
- 
40 Army Apache helicopters.
13th Notemhr
Western European Union
WEU naval points of contact co-ordi-
nation meeting, Paris.
Egvpt
President Mubarak of Egypt has said his
country would not enter lraq if western troops
attacked according to an interview published in
* Mayo ", the newspaper of the ruling National
Democratic Party.
Egypt has been calling for a peaceful
solution, but only on condition that Iraq with-
draws and the Kuwaiti Government is restored
to power.
France
An agreement is to be concluded with
Saudi Arabia on the missions assigned to the
Mirages and Jaguars stationed in Hufuf since
October.
The 16 French Mirages and 8 Jaguars,
accompanied by 2 C-135 in-flight refuelling air-
craft, carry out training and reconnaissance mis-
sions. Once the agreement has been signed, they
will be able to conduct combat patrols lasting
3 to 5 hours to monitor a specific area of Saudi
air space.
United Kingdom
There will be a substantial addition to
ground forces, maybe a further tank regiment
and a further armoured infantry battalion,
totalling about I 500 men, 57 Challenger tanks
and 48 Warrior IFVs.
Other additions might include self-pro-
pelled artillery and Royal Engineers. There may
well be more combat aircraft.
|lth Notcmbr
Spain
The Numancia, Diana and Infanta
Cristina units reach their destination in the Gulf
region.
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The frigate Numancia is to control the
access to the Strait of Hormuz (Oman Sea). The
corvettes Diana and Infanta Cristina (Descu-
bierta-class) control the access to the Strait of
Tiran (in the north of the Red Sea).
United Kingdom
The 7th Armoured Brigade was declared
operational after completing their final work-up
exerclse.
Significant modifications have been made
to their equipment for desert fighting, including
fitting engine sand filters to the Challenger
tanks. The brigade benefited greatly from the
experience of the United States troops who
arrived in August.
15th NoYcnbr
Niger
The intervention battalion of 481 soldiers(Operation Zoumounchi) leaves to join the
multinational forces in Saudi Arabia. The bat-
talion of 2l officers, I l0 non-commissioned
offrcers and 350 privates is comprised essen-
tially of volunteers. This is the first time Niger
has sent troops abroad.
Pakistan
Pakistan is committed to send an addi-
tional 3 000 troops to Saudi Arabia, bringing its
strength there up to an infantry brigade with
support units. The second contingent is ready
but has not yet departed.
l6th Notcmber
Argentina
Argentina is currently negotiating the
assignment of two air force transport planes and
ground troops with Saudi Arabia.
Bulgaria
Bulgaria is reported to be training a
volunteer unit of medics with a chemical pro-
tection subdivision for deployment in the
Gulf.
United Kingdom
British tank units in Germany have been
put on notice to be ready to leave for Saudi
Arabia. The reinforcements will join the 7th
Armoured Brigade in north-east Saudi Arabia.
Reports suggested that the 4th Armoured
Brigade, or elements of it, would be sent.
If a full brigade is sent it will include:
- one regiment of 60 Challenger tanks;
- 
one infantry battalion of 650 men
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equipped with Warrior and other
armoured vehicles;
- 
probably an artillery regiment with 155
mm howitzers.
Such a brigade would consist of at least
6 000 men.
The 4th Armoured Brigade had already
been selected as the replacement unit for the 7th
Armoured Brigade after six months.
United States
The United States and Saudi Arabia
started a major military exercise with I 100 air-
craft, 16 ships and more than I 000 Marines.
The six-day amphibious exercise called
" Operation Imminent Thunder' began in
Eastern Saudi Arabia. Royal Saudi air force,
navy and marine units of the Kingdom were also
taking part in the exercise. The previous amphi-
bious training was the lO-day operation " Sea
Soldier II " that ended on 8th November. The
exact location of these exercises has not been
revealed (according to non-official sources " Sea
Soldier II " was carried out in Oman).
The first of several hundred late-model
MlAl Abrams tanks rolled off an American
cargo vessel at a Saudi port. Nearly 200 tanks
arrived on the Cape Ducato after a three-week
voyage from the German port of Bremer-
haven.
Defence Secretary Dick Cheney has
authorised the activation of 72 500 more
military reservists. The Defence Department's
new ceiling of 125 000 reservists who can be on
active duty at one time represents more than
three times the number of reservists sent to par-
ticipate in the Vietnam war.
The army was given authority to activate
55 000 more reservists while the USMC can call
tp 12 000 and the air force 5 500. The navy's
authority to activate 3 700 more personnel for a
total of l0 000 remains unchanged.
The required 90 days stint for the 35 562
reservists already taking part in Operation
Desert Shield was extended by up to 90 more
days. The first unit becomes eligible for
extension on 22nd November.
17th November
Iran
The country announced the biggest
exercise the navy has staged since the war with
Iraq. It is to be held in the Gulf in December
and will involve 50 ships.
Kuwait
Hawk missiles captured by Iraq during its
invasion of Kuwait may not be operable because
technicians disarmed most of them, according to
Kuwait's Defence Minister (in exile), Sheik
Nawaf-al-Ahmed al-Sabah.
Saudi Arabia
The Kingdom has accepted Czechos-
lovakia's offer to send NBC defence experts to
the Gulf region. An oflicial invitation was issued
to 179 volunteer soldiers.
United Kingdom
The Royal Navy is " ready " for war in the
Gulf, according to the Senior Naval Officer
Middle East, Commodore Paul Haddacks.
All Royal Navy ships in the region are in
" defence watches " one stage below " action sta-
tions ".
Damage control and casualty evacuation
exercises had been conducted in the Gulf. The
naval gunfire support and air defence readiness
had also been tested.
2Ath November
Western European Union
WEU military points of contact meeting,
Paris.
Iraq
Iraq said that it was sending 250 000
more troops to bolster its armies in occupied
Kuwait. The Iraqi press agency said 150 000 of
the reinforcements were reservists and that
some of the extra troops would come from seven
divisions that would immediately be mobilised
and sent to Kuwait.
About 425 000 troops with 3 700 tanks
are already deployed in the region.
The Iraqi army is continuing to
strengthen its positions in Kuwait. The Iraqi
obstacle belt north of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border
consists of minefields, anti-tank ditches,
concrete dragons' teeth and small sand hills
(" berms "). Some of the anti-tank ditches are
filled with oil, which could be set alight to create
a smoke-screen.
The obstacle belt is covered by a first
echelon of I I to 12 infantry divisions with
dug-in tanks. Behind is a second echelon of three
to four mechanised or armoured divisions in
prepared defensive positions.
The third echelon, a tactical reserve of
two to three mechanised or armoured divisions,
has been moved to positions west of Kuwait
City.
The Strategic Reserve held in positions
astride the Iraqi border with northern Kuwait
comprises five Republican Guard armoured
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divisions equipped with Soviet-made T-72
tanks.
Iraqi units are well-dispersed, with
equipment dug in and camouflaged according to
intelligence sources.
Netherlands
In Rotterdam, the United States army
began loading hundreds of jeeps, trucks and
armoured vehicles on board the first of more
than 20 ships sailing for the Gulf. These train-
loads of equipment arrived from a United States
army base in Mtihringen (Germany) and were
being loaded onto the United States navy cargo
ship, Algol.
21th Noycmber
Australia
The HMAS Brisbane guided-missile des-
troyer and the HMAS Sydney guided-missile
frigate have left for the Gulf to replace the fri-
gates Adelaide and Darwin.
The tanker Weshalia will later replace the
supply ship Success.
France
According to the Defence Minister, Jean-
Pierre Chevdnement, the French deployment to
the Gulf will have cost about 250 million dollars
by the end of the year 1990.
Iraq
The Iraqi authorities announce the for-
mation of a People's Army Command (para-
military militia) in occupied Kuwait.
Kuwait
Kuwaiti military units are under training
by teams from the United States special forces.
Kuwait has reformed two armoured bri-
gades in Saudi Arabia but only one has tanks.
This brigade, named the " Martyrs' Brigade ", is
equipped with United Kingdom-built Chieftain
tanks. There is little ammunition and few spare
parts.
A delivery of Yugoslav M-84 tanks (a
T-72 derivative) is expected. Kuwait has 200 of
these tanks on order.
Niger
The intervention battalion of * Operation
Zoumounchi " is in Saudi Arabia under the
command of Colonel Amadou Seyui, a French-
trained officer.
Philippines
President Aquino refused a request by a
special envoy of the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh
Jaber Ahmed Al-Sabah, to send troops to the
Gulf, but she promised to send a medical team.
Switzerland
Citing a 1972 law prohibiting anns
exports to * areas of armed conflict ", Swit-
zefland has banned weapon sales to all Gulf
states.
Uniled States
United States forces in Saudi Arabia are
facing a problem ofshortage ofspare parts, par-
ticularly aircraft, according to a briefing paper
for the Defence Secretary Dick Cheney.
According to the Defence Department,
multinational naval forces have intercepted
3 592 ships since the beginning of the naval
blockade in August. There have been 412
boardings and 16 ships have been diverted.
The exercise " Operation Imminent
Thunder " has ended. It was a combined
training exercise involving an amphibious
landing on the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia
(160 km south of the Kuwaiti border).
It was a joint Saudi-American exercise,
with Royal Saudi air force, navy and marine
units and American forces from:
- 
lst and 4th Marine Expeditionary
Brigade;
- United States navy units:
- 
La Salle (miscellaneous command
ship, converted Raleigh-class);
- 
Midway (multi-purpose aircraft
carrier, with aircraft from Carrier Air
Wing V);
- 
Wisconsin (battleship, Iowa+lass);
- 
Bunker Hill, Mobile Bay, Worden
(guided-missile cruisers, Ticonderoga-
class and kamy-class);
- 
O'Brien, Fife, MacDonough, Curtis
Wilbur (destroyers, Spurance-class;
guided-missile destroyers Arleigh
Burke-class and Coontz-class);
- 
Nicholas (guided-missile frigate,
Oliver Hazard Perry-class);
- 
Nassau, Guam (amphibious assault
ships, Tarawa-class and Iwo Jima-
class);
- 
Trenton (amphibious transport dock,
Austin-class);
- 
Pensacola, Gunston Hall (dock
landing ships, Anchorage-class and
Whidbey Island-class);
- 
United States air force units:
- 
lst Tactical Fighter Wing (F-l5s);
- 37th Tactical Fighter Wine (F-ll7s);
- 
552 AWACS Wing;
- 
23rd Tactical Fighter Wing (A-l0s);
- 354th Tactical Fighter Wing (A-lOs).
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25th Novem0rl
Iraq
To strengthen military arrangements in
Kuwait and southern lraq, the Command
Council of the Revolution the highest
authority orders the call-up before 15th
December of 60 000 farmers, hitherto in reserve
and exempted from mobilisation.
26th November
Iraq
According to American defence and intel-
ligence analysts, Iraqi commanders are working
to develop low-tech defences against the techno-
logical superiority of the multinational forces in
Saudi Arabia.
The experts also said that the passage of
time is degrading lraqi military capability and
some advanced weapons, due to the loss of
foreign experts and access to spare parts.
Pakistan
Pakistan is planning to boost its com-
mitment to the multinational force in Saudi
Arabia by sending troops to the United Arab
Emirates.
Pakistan already has 5 000 soldiers in
Saudi Arabia.
United Kingdom
An additional 14 000 troops will be sent
to Saudi Arabia. The move places almost half of
the BAOR (British Army of the Rhine) in Saudi
Arabia. Equipped with tanks, artillery and heli-
copters, a total force of 25 000 ground troops
will operate alongside the United States lst
MEF in north-east Saudi Arabia.
With air and naval forces, the total
strength of the United Kingdom deployment
will exceed 30 000.
27th November
France
France is giving the Kuwaiti Government(in exile) spare parts to make 15 French-built
Mirage jet fighters operational. Exocet and HOT
missiles are not included in these deliveries
according to official sources.
Uniled Kingdom
The 14 000 extra British troops being dis-
patched to Saudi Arabia and the heavy armour
accompanying them will not be fully operational
until several weeks into the New Year (1991)
because of logistical and training problems.
This disclosure was made at the first joint
press conference held by the British- and Saudi-
based commanders of the British force.
28th November
Persian Gulf
American and Spanish warships in the
Red Sea fired warning shots across the bows of
an Iraqi freighter which ignored requests to stop.
The French destroyer Dupleix joined the
efforts to stop the freighter Khawla Bint al
Zawrah in an operation which naval oflicers say
typifies the close co-ordination achieved
between the navies patrolling the region.
The ship was not carrying any cargo
which violated the United Nations embargo and
was allowed to proceed.
29th Novembcr
Brazil
This country, which has not yet sent any
troops to the Gull is considering taking part in
the military deployment on a defensive basis.(This has not yet been officially confirmed.)
France
Mr. Roland Dumas, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, again expressed France's position
towards the question of recourse to force, consi-
dering it would in no way be automatic once the
expiration of the time limit set for Iraq has
elapsed.
Speaking about the command question,
Senator Robert Pontillon, President of the
Assembly of Western European Union, says he
sees no difficulty in French troops fighting
under American command.
Iraq
The tour of inspection of lraq from l8th
to 22nd November by experts from the IAEA
(International Atomic Energy Agency) revealed
no diversion of fissile material for military pur-
poses.
Iraq reaffrrms its intention to resist by
every means any military action designed to
make it withdraw its armed forces from Kuwait.
Before the adoption of Resolution 678, Pre-
sident Saddam Hussein asserted that the Iraqis
would fight in a manner that would honour
Arabs and Moslems and that his country would
not bow to international pressure. The Deputy
Minister for Military Industry, Amer Rachid
Labidi, affirmed in an interview granted to the
Tunisian weekly Maghreb that lraq had tech-
nology capable of surprising the enemy and thatit had a full, integrated deterrent force to
counter an attack.
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Saudi .4rabia
Pending the adoption by the United
Nations Security Council of the resolution
authorising possible recourse to force against
Iraq, the Saudi army is placed in a state of
maximum alert in case of Iraqi provocation
along the frontier between occupied Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia.
United Kingdom
British troops in Saudi Arabia were
placed on alert in case there should be Iraqi pro-
vocation following the adoption of Resolution
678 by the United Nations Security Council.
United Nations Security Council
The Security Council adopts Resolution
678 authorising recourse to force to rid Kuwait
of the Iraqi military presence if Iraqi troops are
not withdrawn before l5th January 1991.
This resolution calls for total, uncondi-
tional withdrawal from Kuwait and " authorises
member states co-operating with the Govern-
ment of Kuwait... to use a// necessary means to
uphold and implement the Security Council
Resolution 600 " (adopted on 2nd August 1990
and calling for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces
from the Emirate of Kuwait).
The vote was taken at 10.30 p.m. GMT.
Twelve countries voted for the resolution(France, the United States, the United
Kingdom, the Soviet Union (permanent
members of the Security Council), Canada,
Colombia, the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Finland,
Malaysia, Romania and Zdire. Two countries.(Cuba and Yemen) voted against and China (a
perrnanent member) abstained.
Except for the Ivory Coast and Yemen,
which were represented by an ambassador, the
ministers for foreign affairs voted in person.
United States
The Senate Armed Forces Committee
started hearings to allow a better de{inition of
the reasons for and aims of the United States'
commitment in the Gulf and the attitude of
Congress to President Bush's policy in the
cnsrs.
President Bush calls Resolution 678 a
very powerful declaration and says he hopes we
are closer to peace.
The United States has also decided to
settle part of its debt to the United Nations and
hands a cheque for $ 186 million to the Secretary-
General, Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar.
The United States deployment is
continued in Saudi Arabia, having to be opera-
tional before l5th January. The troops who
arrived in August will then need to be relieved,
while the new arrivals will not yet be combat-
ready or accustomed to the Saudi theatre of ope-
rations.
It should be noted that the American
contingent is not wholly composed of fighting
units, more than half the forces present being for
logistic, mechanical, medical and administrative
support.
3(hh Noycmbr
United States
President George Bush called for talks
with Iraq after the vote of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 678, approving the
use of force to free Kuwait from Iraqi occu-
peition.
Joseph Wilson, American Chargd d'Af-
fairs in Baghdad, had delivered the invitation to
talks to the No. 2 official in the lraqi Foreign
Ministry. In return he was given a series of ques-
tions that President Hussein wanted answered
about the nature of the discussions.
lst December
Iraq
President Saddam Hussein accepted the
proposal from President George Bush for the
United States Secretary of State and Iraqi
Foreign Minister to travel to each other's
capitals to discuss a peaceful solution to the
cnsrs.
2nd December
Iraq
President Hussein estimated in a tele-
vision interview to the French second channel,
Antenne 2,that the chances offinding a peaceful
solution to the crisis were * 50-50 " and said it
would largely depend on whether United States
Secretary of State James Baker was ready to
engage in a " real dialogue ".
He called for guarantees from Washington
that the United States would * not resort to
force before 25th March " (because of the Iraqi
decision to release all the western hostages over
a three-month period starting on 25th December
- 
March is also a period of Islamic religious
holidays).
United States
After an exchange of notes between the
United States and Iraq on how the two nations
will conduct discussions on the Gulf crisis,
Secretary of State James Baker said during a
television interview that if Saddam Hussein
complied with United Nations resolutions and
withdrew from Kuwait he would avoid an
American military attack.
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He also said that the administration is
willing to hold discussions with Iraq to avoid
war, but that it is not willing to negotiate the
fundamental demands of the United Nations.
III. Updated data on military technology
and weaponry in the Gulf
Sth October
United States
Responding to the United States troop
deployment in the Persian Gulf, the House has
added unrequested money for fast sealift and
prepositioned equipment as well as requested
funding for the C-17 transport, the Advanced
Tactical Fighter and the Milstar communica-
tions satellite.
Citing the threat from Iraqi missiles, the
House provided money for the creation of a new
Tactical Ballistic Missile Defence Programme,
which would be independent of the Strategic
Defence Initiative.
The ballistic missile threat from Iraq is
generating intense demand for the United States
Patriot anti-aircraft and anti-tactical missile(ATM) system.
According to the IISS, Iraq has 30
Soviet-made Frog-7 surface-to-surface missiles,
36 Soviet-made Scud-Bs and Iraqi-modified bal-
listic missiles called the " Sijil ", the * Abbas "
and the " Hussein ". In addition, Iraq claims to
possess a new missile called * Al Hijara " ( " the
stone " ).
Patriot is seen as the only existing system
for ATM area defence with proven capabilities.
The system consists of a fire unit with ground-
based phased array radar, a command and
control station and eight missile launchers, each
with four missiles 
- 
32 missiles in all.
17th November
France
A French official report submitted to the
French Parliamentary Defence Committee
warned that the Gulf crisis may result in both
France and the United Kingdom permanently
losing markets in the Gulf area to United States
suppliers.
French intelligence has reported that
some of the more sophisticated equipment in
the Iraqi armed forces, such as French-built
advanced radar systems, is suffering from a lack
of spare parts and poor maintenance.
A French industrial source (non-iden-
tified) asserted that some French-made compu-
terised systems employed by the Iraqis were ren-
dered useless early in the Gulf crisis by
implanted computer viruses.
I9th November
Uniled States
With oflicial government approval, non-
lethal weapons could be deployed on a large
scale early next year in the Gulf and used to
defeat Iraqi forces in Kuwait.
Briefings for Defence Secretary Dick
Cheney and Brent Scowcroft, National Security
Adviser, are planned for early December.
United States Government facilities are
testing non-lethal military systems that could
render Iraqi equipment useless and immobilise
enemy troops without killing them. The
weapons could be used by United States special
forces in the area.
Deployment of such systems in the Gulf
will require Administration approval and
Congressional funding. Such action would be
unlikely until Congress returns in January.
Among the available technologies are:
- 
low-energy laser rifles to temporarily
blind troops and disable optical and
infrared systems;
- 
infrasound waves to temporarily diso-
rientate and incapacitate humans for
crowd control and psychological opera-
tions;
- 
chemical agents that would change
molecular or base metals or alloys on
critical aircraft, ships and trucks.
Operation Desert Shield, which involves
hundreds of aircraft and dozens of ships from
the United States and other nations, is facing the
problem of HERO (Hazard of Electromagnetic
Radiation to Ordnance).
HERO is created by the electronic emis-
sions and the electric energy generated by radar,
radio and microwaves. It is known that during
the Libyan air strike in April 1986, HERO
caused an American fighter bomber to crash and
caused the accidental bombing of friendly
embassies and residences.
The wrong touch or rub can result in a
discharge of static electricity causing a weapon
to launch or explode.
Lightning can knock an aircraft out of the
air or set off a bomb or rocket. Heat generated
by electromagnetic radiation can ignite volatile
chemicals.
HERO could burn out, short, or scramble
any smart electronic or electric component such
as the electroexplosive device (EED). This device
is used as a fire trigger. Its functions are to launch
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a missile or rocket and detonate its warhead, fire
guns, drop bombs and fuel tankq eject pilots and
control aerial refuelling. Operation Desert Shield
could not operate without it.
Electronic safety devices designed to
protect against accidental launch or detonation
offer little protection against HERO because of
their electronic nature.
A three-year classified study of HERO
called the * Joint Electromagnetic lnterference
Study " is being conducted by the Pentagon
under the supervision of United States air force
Colonel Charles Quisenberg.
The army is considering the * HARPY "
drone because forces in the region lack the capa-
bility to disable enemy radar for extended
periods over a large battlefield area, according to
United States military sources (non-identified).
'HARPY " is a groundJaunched, propel-
lerdriven drone capable of loitering over the
battlefield for three to four hours as it hunts for
enemy radars. Its extended loitering capability
allows it to continuously monitor enemy radars
for rapid suppression.
Its long flight range enables safe
deployment in the near area of an army corps.
The " HARPY " is produced by Tel Aviv-
based Israel Aircraft Industries. United States
army and industrial sources also warn that if it
satisfies military needs, deployment of the
* HARPY " system could create a political
problem for the multinational coalition that
includes forces from Syria and Egypt.
25th Notenbr
United States
The United States army is studying ways
to field an Israeli antiradar drone for use against
Iraqi air defence radars in the Gulf.
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APPENDIX I
Naval actions lintud to the application of the embargo since the adoption of
United Nations Resolution 665
(at 3rd December 1990)
Number of merchant ships
Country Challenged Boarded Diverted Warning shots
Belgium 859
3 663
l 280
448
I 2tt
l 812
3
63
6
I
46
l5
0
I
0
0
0
I
0
2
0
0
I
0
France
G
Italv
Netherlands
Pnrtrroel
Snain
United Kingdom
Torer WEU . 9 273 134 2 3
Arsentina xl
x
x
0
73
0
3 948
x
5
6
0
44
0
316
x
0
0
0
I
0
t7
x
0
0
0
I
0
9
Arrs.frcli
C.anede
f)enmark
Greece
Norrrrav
United States
TomT ALLIES 4 021 37t l8 l0
Ovrutt rorAl . t3 294 505 20 l3
l. No data available.
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Naval forces in the Gulf region
(at 3rd December 1990)
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APPENDIX III
United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990)
Adopted by thc sar;urio trm:rr;i;e63rd meotins,
The Security Council,
Recalling and reaflirming its Resolutions 660 (1990) of 2nd August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6th
August 1990,662 (1990)of gthAugust 1990,664 (1990)of l8thAugust 1990,665(1990)of 25th
August 1990, 666 (1990) of l3th September 1990,667 (1990) of l6th September 1990,669 (1990) of
24th September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25th September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29th October 1990 and 677
(1990) of 28th November 1990,
Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq refuses to comply with its obligation
to implement Resolution 660 (1990) and the above-mentioned subsequent relevant resolutions, in fla-
grant contempt of the Security Council,
Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the mainte-
nance and preservation of international peace and security,
Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
l. Demands that Iraq comply fully with Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolu-
tions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of
goodwill, to do so;
2. Authorises member states co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before
l5th January l99l fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use
all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolu-
tions and to restore international peace and security in the area;
3. Requests all states to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of
paragraph 2 of the present resolution;
4. Requests the states concerned to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the progress of
actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present resolution;
5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
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- 
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'
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Rapprteut's Prefocc
In preparing this report, the Rapporteur had interviews with the following experts:
Moscow, 24th-27th September 1990
1. US.SR State Planning Committee
Yuri A. Glybin, Deputy Vice-Chairman, Head of the Department of the Defence Complex.
2. USSR Supreme Soviet
Leonid Sharin, Acting Chairman of the Committee on Defence and State Security.
Stanislav P. Golovin, Member of the Congress of the USSR, Secretary of the Committee on
Defence and State Security.
3. Institute of World Economy and International Relations
Professor Evgeny V. Bougrov, Head of Section.
4. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Konstantin P. Ovtchinnikov, Deputy Director, Department of International Economic Rela-
tions.
Alexandre A. Zhitnikov, Counsellor, Department of International Economic Organisations.
Yuri V. Maltsev, Expert, Directorate of International Scientific and Technological
Co-operation.
5. P. O. Sukhoi Design Bureau
Mikhail P. Simonov, General Designer.
Birrningham, 17th October 1990
University of Birmingham, Centre for Russian and East European Studies
Philip Hanson, Professor of Soviet economics.
Julian Cooper, kcturer in Soviet technology and industry, Director of the Centre for Russian
and East European Studies.
Paris, 19th October 1990, OECD
Hans J. Blommestein, Head non-OECD economies unit,
Economics and Statistics Department.
Paris, 25th October 1990
The American University of Paris
Georgy Skorov, Professor of Economics, Institute of USA and Canada, USSR Academy of Sci-
ences, Moscow.
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Druft Recommcndation
on bnveniya 
- 
coavcnion in Soviat military industry
The Assembly,
O Aware of the far-reaching changes taking place in the USSR, in particular since the Reykjavik
agreement;(iil Convinced that the doctrine of reasonable suffrciency in defence being introduced by the Soviet
Union will have immediate repercussions on military production;(iiil Aware that the INF Treaty and the imminent agreement on conventional forces in Europe (CFE)
will reduce even further the quantitative demand for military equipment;(iv) Considering that, through conversion, the Soviet Union is making a sincere effort to use for
civilian purposes the human and material resources thus being released;(v) Aware that the Soviet authorities consider conversion to be an important means of improving
the living standards of the population;
(vil Recalling that the preamble to the Brussels Treaty refers to economic, social and cultural ties as
means for fortifying and preserving the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty;
(viil Recognising that it is too early to assess the full significance of economic and political reforms
now taking place in the Soviet Union;
(viii) Convinced that in the post cold war era strong social, economic and cultural ties between
Western European nations and the Soviet Union will greatly contribute to reinforcing peace and
security in the whole of Europe;(ix) Recognising that, in a first phase of the Soviet Union's transition to market economy, direct
exchanges between companies, experts and politicians will be crucial;
(x) Aware that, notwithstanding existing uncertainties, both the Federal Republic of Germany and
France have recently concluded bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union on partnership and
co-operation,
RBcouunNps rHAT rHe CotrNc[
1. Urge member governments to promote the extension of existing and the establishment of new
exchange programmes so as to enable both Soviet and Western European experts to learn more about
each other's social, economic and cultural systems;
2. Urge those member governments which have not yet done so to conclude formal bilateral agree-
ments on good neighbourliness, partnership and co-operation, based on the new pattern of interna-
tional relations in Europe and modelled on two such agreements as recently concluded by WEU
member states;
3. Appoint a special committee of experts from national administrations with the task of studying
conversion problems and exchanging experience and advice with their opposite numbers in the Soviet
Union.
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I. Introduclion
1. Since 1985, when President Mikhail
Gorbachev first acceded to the highest political
functions, Soviet authorities have increasingly
expressed their concern over the lamentable
state of the national economy. They were also
worried about the share of gross national
product appropriated by the military. A growing
number of them took the view that the defence
industry, with its traditional high standards as
regards skill, productivity and quality control,
could make a major contribution to improving
the living conditions of the Soviet citizen and to
the Soviet economy in general.
2. In fact, this serious concern over the arms
race and its consequences for the state budget
was one of the incentives that led to the con-
clusion of the INF Treaty in 1987. In December
1988, Mikhail Gorbachev made a new break-
through when, in an address before the United
Nations General Assembly, he announced
drastic reductions in the manpower and
equipment of the Soviet armed forces. There
will be still more reductions to come once a CFE
agreement has been concluded as a result of the
Vienna negotiations.
3. Both earlier events were bound to have
repercussions on the Soviet defence industry to
such a degree that, from the very first reductions
in defence orders, the state was involved in con-
version, an effort to use for civilian purposes the
capacity thus made available.
4. This conversion activity fits wonderfully
into the concept that the signatories of the
Brussels Treaty had in mind when they referred
to improving the social, economic and cultural
conditions of their populations as a means of
ensuring lasting peace. It can be considered a
first indication that the cold war armaments
culture is changing into a disarmament culture
in the conviction that improved social, eco-
nomic and cultural conditions of a population
are a more valuable contribution to peaceful and
stable international relations than too many
arms and poor living conditions.
5. N. Gybenko, Minister of Culture of the
USSR, gave a striking example of how far this
new attitude has already penetrated Soviet life
when he said:
" If the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union is proposing a conversion pro-
gramme, it would be fine if the arma-
Expbnatory Memorandum
(submittcd by Mn Tummen, Rqporteu)
ments industries care for the protection
culture...They should return to culture
their architectural masterpiece built by
Stassov...I mean the building of the ware-
house of the army supply corps which is
now being used as a garuge by the Min-
istry of Defencer.
6. The Technological and Aerospace Com-
mittee is particularly interested in the Soviet
conversion effort for several reasons, some of
which go beyond its interest in technological
developments.
7. In the first place, it is of course interesting
to see how the Soviet defence industry 
- 
until
now always pampered with orders and priority
treatment 
- 
will find ways to respond to a new
challenge under different circumstances.
Second, the degree to which the conversion idea
is implemented will be a measure of the sin-
cerity of the Soviet Union's ambition to replace
military by civilian production. A third reason is
to determine what western countries, in par-
ticular the member states of Western European
Union, can do and, in some cases, are doing to
respond to Soviet efforts to involve foreign
countries in its conversion effort.
8. In this report, therefore, an attempt will
be made to describe the state of conversion, the
many connected issues at present and possible
future developments. It should be said that the
entire economic, social and political situation is
in too great a state of flux to allow an observer to
make final statements. Certainly, experts and
politicians in the Soviet Union agree that the
overall situation in the country is seriously com-
plicated and calls for commensurate decisions,
but there is still much discussion about the best
way towards improvement. There can be no
question, however, that the West can and should
help. At the moment, financial aid would not be
the right thing. This was confirmed only when
the European summit meeting in Rome on 27th
and 28th October 1990 took note of the fact that
the European Commission deemed it too earlyto present operational proposals for EEC
support and in particular financial aid for the
Soviet economic reform programme. This report
will try to formulate some proposals for ade-
quate participation and co-operation in the
Soviet efforts to improve the living conditions
of the population.
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II. Defence spending
in the Sovia Union
9. L,enin's new economic policy and the
beginnings of the first five-year plan (1928-
1932), when the mainly agricultural Soviet
society was dependent on the capitalist coun-
tries for capital and know-how, met with a
certain response in the West. Machinery could
be imported, and engineers and other techni-
cians from western countries went to work in the
Soviet Union. But this situation changed rapidly
when the world-wide depression took substance.
The Soviet Union had less resources to buy
machinery and equipment because of the
declining price of its chief export product,
cereals. The economies of western countries
were too much in trouble to allow them to help
others and Japan and Germany showed
increasing hostility towards the Soviet system.
This all contributed to an increasing isolation of
the Soviet Union on the world scene.
10. At the same time it was Stalin's declared
objective to make his country self-suffrcient
both militarily and industrially, the heavy
industry being basic to war production. From
the beginning of the first five-year plan in 1928,
military spending has therefore been one of the
highest priorities of the Soviet Government.
This policy has certainly been pursued at the
expense of the production of consumer goods
and of the living standard of Soviet citizens in
general.
ll. Not only for western observers, but also
for Soviet experts it is extremely difficult to
assess to what extent military expenses have laid
a claim on the Soviet state budget, and this issue
is still subject to discussion. For many years, the
Soviets have been extremely elusive on this
subject, but their attitude is changing now, also
because of intense pressure from within the
country.
L2. The first meaningful Soviet flrgures were
made public by President Gorbachev, who, in
the Congress of People's Deputies on 3fth May
1989, stated that the defence budget for 1989
was 77.3 billion roubles. Prime Minister Nikolai
Ryzhkov announced more details to the Con-
gress in June 1989, as illustrated in the following
table 2:
OfficA Sotia military expeeditury 1989-X)
(Billions of current roubles)
1989 Percentage
share 1990
Percentage
share
Percentage
change
1989-90*
Personnel, O&M
Pensinns
20.2
2.3
32.6
4.6
15.3
2.3
26.t
3.0
42.2
6.0
19.8
3.0
19.3
2.4
31.0
3.7
13.2
1.3
27.3
3.4
43.7
5.2
18.6
1.8
4.5
+ 4.4
4.9
- 
19.6
- 
13.7
- 
43.5
Procrrrernenf
Construction
R&D
Others
Total** . 77.3 100.0 7 t.0 100.0 8.2
Military space 3.9
* (-) reduction; (+) increasert Items may not add up to totals due to rounding off.
13. Even if this sign of more openness was
acclaimed, observers from both the Soviet
Union and western countries expressed crit-
icism. They said that it was not made clear if the
budget was expressed in constant or current
prices and what kind of budgetary index had
been used. It is still open to doubt if the pro-
duction of both nuclear weapons and fissionable
material has been included. The figure for mil-
itary research may not reflect the full truth, as
part of this research may have been included in
the budget of the Academy of Sciences and other
administrations. No specific mention has been
made of the substantial military aid given to
foreign countries. A major problem in particular
is the arbitrary method used to determine the
price of weapon systems, which is believed to be
at an artificially low level, thus distorting the
procurement budget. Moreover, the Soviet
Union does not use constant prices, as western
countries do to measure real trends.
238
2. Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1990, page 163.
DOCUMENT I249
14. Recent NATO estimates of Soviet
military expenditure vary from 130 to
140 billion roubles for the year 1987. This
leads together with the percentage break-
down by resource category to the following
table:
NATO cstimates of Soviet military etpeaditarc, 1987 1
Item low
estimate
Percentage
share
HiCh
estimate
Percentage
share
Personnel (including pensions)
o&M
10.4
39.0
52.0
2.6
26.0
8
30
40
2
20
tt.2
42.0
56.0
2.8
28.0
8
30
40
2
20
Procrrrement
Construction
R&D
Total 130.0 100.0 140.0 r00.0
15. Julian Cooper, Director of the Centre for
Russian and East European Studies of Bir-
mingham University, gives a slightly lower
figure of 120 billion roubles for 1989.
16. In its Yearbook 1990, SIPRI estimates
Soviet military expenditure for 1988 at 9G100
billion roubles, but it has recognised since thatits estimates missed solid ground and has
announced a revision of the methods and basic
figures used.
17. Altogether, at the moment it is almost
impossible to make a reliable comparison with
western defence budgets. However, most
observers agree that the percentage breakdown
given by the Soviets when they presented their
defence budget in different chapters in 1989
reflects the truth. This reveals that two-thirds is
put on equipment and one-third on operational
costs, just the reverse of the United States
budget. But here again, the situation is obscure
if one takes into account that the armed forces
can fulfil a number of basic needs by their own
means as is the case for all clothing and some
food. Moreover, building companies of the
armed forces are building apartments for both
military and civilians while they are also
involved in building roads and railroads. Army
personnel and transport means are also playing
an indispensable r6le in the yearly harvesting of
crops.
18. The share of gross domestic product spent
on the military is another question which is still
subject to debate.
19. Based on offrcial data, the military share
of national output was about 8-990 in 1989, but
this is thought to be unrealistic given the size
and strength of the Soviet armed forces.
3. Source: Wilkinson, C., Soviet defence expenditure: past
trends and prospects, NATO Review, No. 2 (April 1989),
pagps 16-22. This article also gives a brief outline of the
method used by NATO experts to estimate expenditure in
each of the main expenditure categories.
20. Most western experts estimate the Soviet
military burden at around 120,/o, or roughly
double that of the United States 4.
21. Another Soviet economist, Alexei Kireev,
estimates the military expenditure at l04-l2l
billion roubles and at 12-14% of the GNP.
Others, such as V. Seljunin and V. Chanin, go as
far as estimating the defence share of the GNP
at between 20 and 30P/o 5.
22. It should be mentioned here that it is dif-
ficult to determine the exact volume of the
Soviet GDP, due to the inadequacy of Soviet
statistics. For the sake of consistency, however,
it is assumed here that the Soviet GDP can be
estimated at around 900 billion roubles 6.
23. On 15th October 1990, the Soviet dele-
gation to the United Nations for the first time
presented a detailed report on the military
budget of the USSR for 1989, with a breakdown
of the amounts earmarked for army, navy, air
force, foreign military aid and the resources for
procurement of aircraft, missiles, nuclear war-
heads, ships and other equipment 7, but at the
time of writing this report no further details
were available.
III. The stracturc of dcfence industry
in the Sovia Union
24. Under the supervision of the Commission
for Military Industrial Questions (VPK, Kom-
missija po voenno-promyshlennym voprosam)
4. NATO experts, using current prices, estimate the Soviet
defence burden at 15 to 17% of GDP in the mid-1980s(Wilkinson, see note 3).
5. Hans-Henning Schrdder, Teil I, pages 34-36 (see selected
bibliography).
6. A discussion of this question, referring to further liter-
ature, can be found in SIPRI Yearbook 1990, page 166,
footnote 44.
7. I-e Monde, lTth October 1990.
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of the USSR Council of Ministers, chaired by
Deputy Prime Minister lgor S. Belousov, eight
different ministries (Ministerstva Oboronnych
Otraslei Promyshlennosti (MOOP), also called
the defence complex) are responsible for the
development and production of practically all
weaponry and other military equipment. These
ministries are the following:
- 
Minradioprom (Ministry of the Radio
Industry)
- 
Minpromsvyazi (Ministry of the Com-
munications Equipment Industry)
- 
Minelektronprom (Ministry of the Elec-
tronics Industry)
- 
Minobchtchemash (Ministry of General
Machine-building)
- 
Minaviaprom (Ministry of the Aviation
Industry)
- 
Minsudprom (Ministry of the Ship
building Industry)
- 
Minoboronprom (Ministry of the
Defence Industry)
- 
Minmash (Ministry of Machine-
building)
25. Until last year, there was a ninth ministry,
Minsredmash (Ministry of Medium Machine-
building), mainly concerned with nuclear war-
heads and nuclear energy, but this was abolished
in July 1989.
26. At the same time, the machine and
equipment complex of the Bureau of the
Council of Ministers for Machine-building, a
civilian industry branch, is strongly connected
with the military sector. It provides the military
sector with all those goods which it does not
produce itself, such as tools, machinery, means
of transportation and electric equipment. It also
produces equipment for purely military use such
as armoured cars, automobile chassis, caterpillar
tracks, artillery equipment, etc.
27. According to Soviet figures, the machine-
building industry turned out 28% of the total
industrial production in 1986, which can be split
up as follows:
%
Output of machine-building indus-
tries in 1986 28
Machine and equipment complex
- 
specialised capacities (excluding
specifically military products, but
including dual-use products)
- 
specifically military products
- 
civilian products alien to the
complex (mining materials, repairs,
metal constructions, etc.)
Defence complex
- 
military products
- 
civilian products
ll
2
9
4
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28. Altogether, the total production for mil-
itary and space purposes in the Soviet Union
can be estimated at roughly l0-l l% of the total
industrial production, or between 89 and 96
billion roubles 8.
29. In many respects, the defence complex
has long been a privileged branch ofthe Soviet
industry. It had primary access to raw materials,
energy and all the other resources it needed,
including financial resources. The best scien-
tists, engineers and workers were employed in
the defence industry, and often they got better
payment and social amenities than elsewhere.
30. As it was a particularly closed producer-
consumer circuit without any interference from
without, the central planning and administrative
command system, a main pillar of the tradi-
tional Soviet economic system, worked almost
to perfection in the defence complex.
IY. Mqior toosons for convenion
in the defencc industry
31. The 1987 INF Treaty was a first and
important breakthrough in Soviet foreign policy.
It can be considered as the first result of deep
reflection within the Soviet leadership over the
share ofdefence spending in the national budget
and its consequences for the economy and for
the living standards of the population.
32. Only four enterprises e were concerned
with the consequences of cancelling the
intermediate-range missile programme. Never-
theless a media campaign promoted the idea
that defence production capacity could be made
available for civilian purposes.
33. Seen from a historical perspective, it was
only the overture for much larger operations.
Gradually, a nationwide debate started over the
poor performance of the economy. The popu-
lation complained that after three years of
restructuring since Mikhail Gorbachev came to
power, with increasing shortages.and rising con-
sumer prices, no improvement in living condi-
tions could be perceived. Since the introduction
of the first tentative economic reforms,
including measures like a state quality control in
the industry, people were also afraid of losing
their job or having their wages cut.
34. These phenomena were a@ompanied by a
growing surplus in purchasing power. According
to earlier oflicial figures, between 1986 and
8. Le Courrier des Pays de I'Est, March 1988, page ll;
Julian Cooper, RUSI Journal, autumn 1990, page 51.
9. These were: the Votkinsk machine-building works in the
Udmurt Atonomous Republic, the Barrikady works in
Volagrad, the Petropavlovsk heavy machine-building works
in Kazakhstan and the M. I. Kalinin machine-building works
in Sverdlovsk.
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1988 the income of the population increased by
l6.7Vo while sales of consumer goods increased
by l3o/o only, mainly through ineffrciency and
shortages. Altogether this led to a surplus in pur-
chasing power of 35 billion roubles in 1987 and
of 45 billion roubles in 1988 
'0.35. These figures were, however, seriously
criticised and the latest Soviet statistics and
official statements are much more alarming
indeed. Goskomstat, the USSR State Com-
mittee for Statistics, has put the difference
between goods and services offered and salaries
paid, or the " non satisfied demand " as it is
called in the Soviet Union, at 165 billion roubles
in 1989, an increase of 160/o as compared with
142 billion roubles in 1988. During the same
period, wages increased by llso/srr.
36. The Soviet Government had already been
alarmed by the desperate state of the mechanical
industry, which, in the USSR, comprises the
industries for building machines, equipment,
electrotechnics, electronics and informatics.
There was an urgent need to modernise this
branch of industry where wastage and obsoles-
cence had reduced output and the ability to
meet the needs of new technologies in pro
duction and application. The flrve-year plan for
1986-90 therefore included the modernisation of
this branch as one of its priorities, but the first
results of this effort were rather dis-
appointing'2.
37. When, in the later 1970s, the symptoms of
a growing national economic crisis became ever
more apparent, western observers already
noticed a slower rise in Soviet defence expend-
iture. But it took until the XIXth Conference of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (28th
June-lst July 1988) for the Soviet leadership to
seize the opportunity to announce new priorities
in the distribution of the country's resources.
38. General Secretary Gorbachev made it
clear that the seriousness of the country's stag-
nation had been underestimated. State expend-
iture had grown more rapidly than income. The
budget deficit put the market under pressure,
undermined the stability of the rouble and the
overall circulation of money and stimulated
inflation13. He denounced the shortfall in the
production of foodstuffs and also the lack of
living accommodation and consumer goods.
10. Hans-Henning Schriider, Teil I, pages 1l and 15.
I l. Lr Courrier des Pays de I'Est, No. 349, April 1990, pages
IG,II.
12. Le Courrier des Pays de I'Est, No. 327, March 1988,
pages 3-21.
13. While offrcially the 1989 budget deficit for the USSR
was said to be 36.3 billion roubles, Soviet economists put
this ligure considerably higher and they estimated the deficit
for the 1990 budget at around 100 billion roubles. (Hans-
Henning Schrrider, Teil I, pages 24-29). As for its relative
magnitude, the budget deficit is offrcially estimated at the
moment to be more than 100/o of the gross domestic product
(International Herald Tribune, 20th-2lst October 1990.)
39. In the short term he wished to create a
modern and performing consumer goods
industry. This should be brought about not only
through the existing light industry, but also
through the defence industry, which should con-
siderably increase its contribution to the pro-
duction and delivery of consumer goods.
40. This redistribution of resources, in which
the defence industry should also be involved,
was designated the " social reorientation of the
economy ".
41. Inevitably, this would have consequencesfor the defence structure. The conference
decided that the entire defence structure should
be oriented towards qualitative parameters as
regards technical equipment and military
science as well as the size of the armed forces.
The new strategic concept required the armed
forces to comply with quality rather than
quantity and their strictly defensive character
was emphasised. In practice, this was meant to
lead to a reduction in the armed forces and the
so-called doctrine of reasonable sufficiency in
defence.
42. At the end of the same year) a new and
decisive step was taken by General Secretary
Gorbachev. In his address to the General
Assembly of the United Nations on 8th
December 1988, he said:
" Today I am able to inform you of the
fact that the Soviet Union has decided to
reduce its armed forces. Over the next two
years their strength will be reduced by
500 000 men, and substantial cuts will be
made unilaterally, regardless of the talks
on the mandate of the Vienna
meeting. "
43. All in all, the Soviet Union was to reduce
its armed forces in the western part of the
country and on the territory of its allies by
10000 tanks,8500 artillery systems and 800
combat aircraft.
44. He then called the world's attention to an
urgent problem, the change from an arns
economy to a disarmament economy. The mil-
itary industry should be converted and he said
that the Soviet Union was prepared:
- 
to draft and present its own internal
conversion plan as part of its economic
reform effort;
- 
to prepare plans for the conversion of
two or three defence plants as an exper-
iment during 1989;
- 
to make public its experience in
re-employing defence personnel and
using defence facilities and equipment
in civilian production.
24r
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45. These announcements were followed by a
resolution adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR on 21st March 1989, according to which
in l99l the defence budget should be reduced by
14.20/o, while expenditure for arms and military
equipment should be reduced by 19.50/o as com-
pared with 1988.
46. In the accomplishment of these plans,
SIPRI has observed positive developments,
especially as regards the reduction of total
defence expenditure, but it says that the
achievement of the 19.50/o reduction in arms and
military equipment remains to be seen, since
this would leave a reduction of the order of
I 1.590 in l99l if the actual reduction rate for
1989-90 is taken into considerationra.
Y. Different methods of conversion
47. When speaking of conversion in the
defence industry, it should be noticed that there
does not exist a clear definition of this term
which is being accepted by all experts.
48. In general terms, everybody agrees that it
is the conversion of industrial capacity in
research, development, production and mar-
keting from the military to the civilian sector.
49. In a recent Soviet handbook for political
economy, conversion is defined as follows:
* 
...the change of proportion in the distri-
bution of financial, human and material
resources between the civilian and the
military sphere, the diversion from the
production of armaments and other forms
of military activity to peaceful lines. " 15.
50. Another Soviet economist, Alexei Kireev,
has defined conversion as follows:
* the organised transition, during the
process of real disarmament, of military
production and other types of military
activities to civilian production; the corre-
sponding change in proportion of the dis-
tribution of financial, human, material
and intellectual resources between the
civilian and military sector. "
51. At the same time, Kireev excludes as alien
to conversion a number of civilian activities of
the defence complex and the military, even if
they are being extended as a consequence of the
disarmament process 16.
52. In this report, the abovementioned defi-
nition as specified by Kireev is considered to be
useful as a guideline, but in a broad interpre-
14. SIPRI Yearbook 1990, pages 167-171.
15. Hans-Henning Schriider, Teil II, page 48.
16. Alexei Kireev, La conversion en URSS, in Vie Interna-
tionale, May 1990.
tation so as to be able to include activities which
might be considered marginal to the proper con-
version effort. It should be noticed here that the
replacement of military production capacity by
civilian production capacity 
- 
often called " real
conversion' 
- 
in specific enterprises may vary
from 5 to 10090. Other parallel activities are
worth mentioning. One of these is that enter-
prises may increase their traditionally existing
output of civilian products irrespective of
changes in the volume of their military pro-
duction.
53. A different development, almost contrary
to the idea of conversion, is the policy of placing
civilian enterprises under the authority of the
defence complex in order to improve their effi-
ciency and output. The leading idea here has
been to use existing human and material defence
complex resources for the improvement and
extension of civilian production, which is not
alien to conversion.
54. Even if the two last mentioned activities
cannot be said to be part of the proper con-
version effort, they will be dealt with in this
report since they may help to clarify the r6le of
the defence complex in the Soviet industry.
55. Before going on, however, it may be inter-
esting to give one more quotation from the
abovementioned 1988 Soviet textbook:
" In socialist countries, conversion ben-
efits from the lack of social strata and
groups, which are interested in the arms
race, from the collective property of pro-
duction means, from production man-
agement and the development of the
social sphere on the basis of economic
plans. It goes without saying that these
social-economic prerequisites and levers
do not automatically exclude practical
problems in the process of conversion.
Without structural changes of production,
without changes in investment policy,
without retraining and re-employment of
cadres, it will not work. " 17
56. Only two years later, belief in socialist
economy and its benefits largely disappeared,
but the author was right in saying that con-
version would meet a number of practical
problems. The aim of this report will be to
address some of them.
YI. Existing civiliaa production
of the Sovia dcfeace industry
57. However much upheaval the idea of con-
version has caused in western media and public
I 7. Political Economy. Textbook for higher education estab-
lishments, edited by V.A. Medvedev, Moscow 1988, as
quoted in Hans-Henning Schrdder, Teil II, page 48.
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opinion, it is not an unfamiliar process inside
the Soviet Union. For many years, the Soviet
defence industry has been turning out civilian
products. A number of consumer goods such as
television sets, video and audio equipment,
refrigerators and sewing machines have even
been produced exclusively or almost exclusively
by the defence industry. As early as 1971,
General Secretary Brezhnev stated that civilian
products constituted 400/o of the total output of
the defence industry. This percentage remained
at about the same level until 1988. Soviet
authorities claim that in the conversion
framework this percentage will climb to 500/o in
1990, 53Vo in l99l and ultimately to at least
600/o in 1995, the last year of the thirteenth
five-year plan.
58. Last year, the Soviet monthly Vestnik
Statistiki published for the first time figures on
civilian production in the defence industry,
giving an idea of the quantities involved (see
Appendices I and II). They should, ofcourse, be
considered with some caution, since, in Soviet
statistics, which are part of a central planning
and control system, " each figure... is the
product of an average between the requirements
ofauthorities and reality, or rather expresses the
maximum of travesty of reality which is com-
patible with probability " r8. It should also be
noted that these figures cannot reflect the
impact of the conversion effort, since they refer
to 1987 and 1988, while the first larger-scale
decisions were taken only in the course of 1988.
The only consumer goods showing a significant
increase in production were fairly new products
such as colour television sets and video
recorders.
59. A recent study by Julian Cooper on the
output of civilian products of the Soviet defence
industry over the years 1965-85 mentions 
- 
on
top of the products in Tables I and II at
appendix 
- 
such divergent products as crude
steel, metal-cutting machine tools, tractors, irri-
gators, railway freight wagons, tramcars, pas-
senger cars, personal computers, cameras and
furniturete.
60. Very recently, an important redistribution
ofcivilian production capacity has enlarged the
civilian production of the Soviet defence
complex. As mentioned above during the 1980s(paragraph 36), the Soviet Government had
become aware of the desperate state of the
civilian machine-building industry, which, due
to obsolescence, inefficiency and a number of
other reasons, was by no means able to satisfy
the existing demand for its products.
18. Alain Besangon as quoted in Est et Ouest, August-
September 1989, page 12.
19. Julian D. Cooper, The scales of output of civilian
products by enterprises of the Soviet defence industry,
Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of
Birmingham, August 1988.
61. A modernisation programme was set up
for the 1986-90 five-year plan, but the appar-
ently disappointing early results of this pro-
gramme led to more radical decisions. It was
thought that the defence complex, with its
highly-qualified workforce, priority access to
financial and material resources and greater effr-
ciency, could help to quicken the pace of
modernisation and expand output. In 1987, the
decision was taken to dissolve the civilian Min-
istry of Machine-building for the Light and
Food Industries and to transfer many of its
enterprises to the defence complex. This led to
the acquisition by the defence complex of
around 230 mostly very backward civilian enter-
prises employing more than 300 000 workers
with a total annual output of about 5 billion
roubles, the modernisation of which required
and indeed got a lot of attention.
62. This process was taken further when in
1989 the medical equipment industry was trans-
ferred to the defence complex, and in particular
put under the responsibility of the Ministry of
General Machine-building.
YII. Conversion in the defence complex,
the first stage
63. In early 1989, when the first consequences
of reduced and cancelled orders became known
in the defence industry, a rather chaotic process
started, often amidst a sudden decline in pro
ductivity and many connected problems such as
idle and alarmed work forces and declining
profits. Overnight, prospering enterprises had to
scramble for work and desperately accept any
order and instruction from authorities even if
such orders were totally alien to their specific
know-how or their existing assembly lines.
64. Five of the then nine defence industry
ministries 
- 
aviation, defence, general machine-
building, radio industry and shipbuilding - were
in particular asked to start the production of
food-processing equipment. The following para-
graphs will give an overall picture of this f,rrst
stage ofconversion as far as new production and
demands are concerned 20.
(i) Minaviaprom (Ministry of the Aviation Industry)
65. The Ministry of the Aviation Industry is
first responsible for the production of military
aircraft and helicopters, air-to-air and air-to-
ground missiles and other armaments. It is also
responsible for the production of civilian air-
craft and helicopters. At the same time, for
many years it has been involved in the pro-
duction of the following mass consumer goods:
20. For a more detailed account, see Hans-Hanning
Schr<ider, Teil III.
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refrigerators, freezers, tape recorders, washing
machines, vacuum cleaners, furniture, radios
and watches. The conversion programme has
had an immediate effect on firms under this
ministry and some examples should be men-
tioned here.
66. The engineering factory Kujbyshev had to
face a reduction in military orders of 8.290 in
1989 and of 22.40/o in 1990. Instead of weapons,
it was instructed to produce light machines and
production machines for the food industry to a
value of 2.18 million roubles.
67. The aircraft factory Znamja Truda, which
produces MiG-29s, faced important reductions
in aircraft manufacturing. Instead it had to
prepare the production of kitchen machines,
vegetable choppers, chandeliers and toys.
68. The P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau said it
was confronted with a reduction in credits of up
to 5090 while officially the reduction rate had
been fixed at 1070. It was further instructed to
design automated salt and sugar packing-
machines and vegetable-washing machines for
the food-processing industry.
69. Among other products which the ministry
was ordered to turn out were pasta production
machines, mowers and small tractors.
(ii) Miniborunprum (Miaistry of the Defeace lrrdustry)
70. It produces all equipment and weapon
systems for the army, from tanks to guns and
hand weapons. In addition, it has always pro-
duced a large spectrum of capital goods and con-
sumer goods, such as tractors, diesel engines,
motorcars and cameras. Furthermore, as the
leading agency, it is responsible for the overall
production of cameras, cinecameras and prejectors, hunting and sporting weapons, binoc-
ulars and camera lenses. A 1988 conversion
order to manufacture production lines for hypo-
dermic needles ended in a fiasco.
71. In factories taken over from the Ministry
of Machine-building for the Light and Food
Industries, it was to produce installations for
making sugar lumps, bottling units for mineral
water and fruit juices and tin-manufacturing
machines. The Votkinsk factory, former manu-
facturer of SS-20 missiles, is now turning out
installations for milk pasteurisation and tank
lorries for juice and milk. It is now also believed
to be producing programme-controlled machine
tools and installations for the production of
baby food, besides washing machines and
prams.
(iii) Minobchtchemach(Ministry of General Maohine-building)
72. This ministry is responsible for solid and
liquid propulsion rockets, cruise missiles and
the accompanying fire control systems and for
all Soviet space launch systems. In the civilian
sector, it produces the usual range of products
such as television sets, washing machines, refrig-
erators, tramcars, tractors and even crude steel
and metal-cutting machine tools. In 1989 it was
charged with the lead responsibility for the
medical equipment industry. At almost the same
time, in the framework of conversion it was
instructed to develop, among other things, milk-
processing machines. It was also required to
co-ordinate the production of small-size bak-
eries, but while, according to the planning, thirty
should have been produced in 1988 and 600 in
1989, only two had been f,rnished by February
1989.
(iv) Minradioprum (Ministry of thc Rodio htdustry)
73. The firms under Minradioprom produce
radio and communications equipment, spe-
cialised computers, fire control systems and
lasers for the armed forces.
74. In the civilian sector it is the prime pro-
ducer in computing techniques, air traffic
control systems, entertainment electronics and
installations for computer-aided design in the
industry. The conversion brought no surprises
for this branch of the defence complex, since it
was instructed to increase civilian production in
its own familiar area of interest.
(v) Minsudprum (Ministry of thc ShipbuiWing Industry)
'15. This ministry is responsible for devel-
oping and building all naval vessels and corre-
sponding weapons systems including radar
installations and sonar equipment. It is also
charged with the co-ordination of civilian ship
building all over the country. On top of that, its
factories have for a long time been turning out
such civilian goods as refrigerators, washing
machines, tape recorders, furniture, radios and
irrigators.
76. Since 1988, Minsudprom has taken over a
number of enterprises belonging to the former
Ministry of Machine-building for the Light and
Food Industries and it is now producing
turn-key factories for canned food and
equipment for the catering industries.
Moreover, as regards conversion it was ordered
to produce additional equipment for the food
industry and the agro-industrial industry.
rl
rt*
77. The Ministries of the Communications
Equipment and of the Electronics Industry were
less severely hit by demands to produce alien
consumer goods. They were mainly instructed to
increase the production of these civilian goods
which were familiar to them.
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(fi) Minpromsryaai
(Ministry ol the Communications Equipment ladustry)
78. In the defence sector, this ministry is
responsible for the production of communica-
tions equipment, components for radar installa-
tions, computers and equipment for electronic
warfare. At the same time it is the leading
agency for the entire civilian production oftele-
vision sets, tape recorders and radio receivers.
(vii) Minelektronprum(Minbtry of the Elcarutics Industry)
79. Its establishments produce electronic
components and computers for military use.
Similar products are being turned out for
civilian use.
80. Pocket calculators and electric furnaces
belong to its range of civilian products. It is also
responsible for the delivery of complete fur-
nishings for computer instruction classrooms,
but in 1988 it only completed one-sixth of the
planned number. In recent years it has never
been able to satisfy the ever-increasing demands
for electronic components and television tubes,
in which it has a monopoly position in the
Soviet Union.
***
81. Of the two remaining defence complex
ministries the Ministry of Machine-building has
not taken a high profile in the conversion effort,
while the Ministry of Medium Machine-building
was abolished in 1989.
(viii) Minmosh (Ministry of Mochiae-buiWing)
82. For the military, Minmash is responsible
for the production of munitions, switches and
solid propellents. In civilian production, it was
the leading agency for the overall production of
samovars, primus stoves, syphons and sewing
machines. It further produced such goods as
motorcycles, scooters, bicycles, mopeds and
refrigerators. In the enterprises it took over from
the Ministry of Machine-building for the Light
and Food Industries, it is responsible for pro-
ducing installations for the textile industry. It
has been suggested that in conversion activities
it could produce paints, colours, glass cleaners,
furniture, spare parts for motorcars, hunting
munitions, linoleum and disposable syringes,
but little is known about the results of these sug-
gestions.
(ix) Minsredmosh (Ministry of Medium Machiae-building)
(abolished in 1989)
83. Responsible for the development of
nuclear warheads, high energy lasers and nuclear
energy questions, this ministry has always had
an extremely limited share in the production of
consumer goods. Following conversion, it
started to turn out fertilisers, gold and isotopes
for medical use and chemical products such as
acids, tar and fluoroplast. After taking over a
number of firms from the Ministry of Machine-
building for the Light and Food Industries, it
started the production of dairy installations. A
further conversion exercise envisaged the pro-
duction of oil presses, installations for the pro-
duction of fruit extract and food concentrate.
84. In July 1989, however, the decision was
taken to integrate Minsredmash in other minis-
tries due to its popularity having been reduced
to zero after the Chernobyl disaster and to an
increasing sensitiveness of the population as
regards nuclear energy.
YIII. Convercion in the acrospace industry:
industrialists vefitus state planning
85. The aerospace industry is beyond doubt
one of the spearheads of Soviet industry with a
technological level up to world standards,
indeed among the very best. No wonder the
industrialists are very upset about the way con-
version has been forced upon them by the gov-
ernment. They are very worried about orders
they have been given to produce food-processing
machines, sawing machines, bread-cutting
machines and other civilian items which they
deem beneath their dignity and know-how. Prac-
tically all of them have stepped into the devel-
opment of civilian aerospace products, rea-
soning that they do not want to lose their
high-tech capabilities and that they wish to be
able to compete on the world market.
86. One of these industrialists is Mikhail P.
Simonov, general designer of the P.O. Sukhoi
Design Bureau, one of the prime enterprises for
the development of fighter-bombers and air
superiority fighters, who gave his forthright
opinion that it makes little sense to ask a sophis-
ticated defence industry to shift to the pro-
duction of civilian goods which are completely
alien to its original expertise. This will easily
result in squandering expertise. If the Soviet
Union wishes to develop its economy, it will
have to further develop its specific capabilities,
one of which is certainly the aeronautical
industry.
87. In the first wave of conversion orders, the
Sukhoi Design Bureau was ordered to develop
fully-automated salt and sugar packing-
machines. These machines have indeed been
developed and are being produced now in two
different factories. Furthermore, a tomato-
washing machine has been developed, some four
of which have been produced.
88. For the production of civilian goods, Mr.
Simonov prefers to develop Sukhoi's aerospace
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capabilities. In accordance with this line of
thought, several different new programmes are
now under development. With a view to mar-
keting and penetration on the western markets,
he considers co-operation with western partners
to be essential.
89. The best known of these programmes is
the SSBJ supersonic business jet, which is being
developed in a joint venture on a 5G50 basis
together with Gulfstream. In this co-operation,
Sukhoi is responsible for the airframe design,
chassis, hydraulics and the aerodynamic charac-
teristics, while Gulfstream is responsible for the
avionics, cabin design, coating and certifi-
cation.
90. Meanwhile, the Soviet Lyulka Design
Bureau and Rolls Royce have 
- 
in a co-operative
effort 
- 
agreed on a basic engine configuration
for the SSBJ, and they are still engaged in a fea-
sibility study which should be completed by
March 1991.
91. At the moment an 8 to l9-passenger
version with a maximum range of 7 500 km is
under development. Sukhoi still has further
plans for a 50-passenger version with a 9 200 km
range.
92. A quite different and very recent devel-
opment is a programme for a so-called ground-
effect vehicle, which can best be described as ajet-engined aircraft with a very large wing
surface and the hull and floats in trimaranJike
construction. It can land on and take off from
water. The specific design enables this vehicle to
glide over the water surface at a cruising height
of 1.5 m, thus having a very low fuel con-
sumption. A relatively small 60-seater, of which
the research and development cost is estimated
at $1.5 billion, is now being designed in a joint
venture with Aeromarine Aircraft in Singapore.
The basic design could be developed into a
600-ton vehicle with 600 seats. It is thought that
there is a vast market for this vehicle in
South-East Asia and the Pacific with its innu-
merable islands and rather limited possibilities
for landing strips.
93. Other projects are the Su-80M, a small
l9-seat and 3 500 km autonomy transport air-
craft of 16 m length and 23 m wingspan for
rugged conditions which has aroused interest in
Indonesia (IPTN) and the Su-84, a 4-passenger
aircraft.
94. A small aerobatic aircraft, the Su-26M,
which made its first appearance for western
observers at the world aerobatic championships
in Hungary in 1984, is now being offered on the
world market and six have already been sold to
the United States. Meanwhile, Sukhoi has
signed an agreement with Piper for the devel-
opment of a new range of single-engined aircraft
which will benefit from the experience with
composite materials in the Su-26M.
95. In order to face the different conse-
quences ofconversion, Sukhoi and several other
Soviet aerospace defence industries with
expertise in engines, electronics, airframe design
and production have combined forces in the
recently established Aero Conversion Associ-
ation with a view to developing new pro-
grammes for civilian products in their specific
areas of interest.
96. Other Soviet aerospace industrialists
follow the same line of thought. The helicopter
firms Mil and Kamov are proposing co-
operative ventures with western companies for
different new and existing models. Rolls Royce
and Kamov signed an agreement for the supply
of five Rolls Royce/Turbomeca RTM 322
turboshaft engines in 1993 as powerplants for
the l4-seat Kamov Ka-62R helicopter now
under development. After expected certifi cation
to western standards it will be offered for sale
outside the Soviet Union with the RTM 322 2'.
Yakovlev is offering its new Yak 42M three-
engined, 156-seat passenger transport for export
and proposes co-operative ventures especially
for the power plants of the Yak 48, a twin-
engined, 6 to l0-seat business jet now under
development. Ilyushin, Tupolev and Antonov
will also try to penetrate the world market with
their new models.
97. Western industrialists have not ventured
any fundamental objections to business relation-
ships with Soviet counterparts, but they still see
a number of practical obstacles, such as the
current quite chaotic political and economic sit-
uation in the country, the shortage of hard cur-
rency and the lack of legislation concerning
commerce with the West.
98. At the moment, many western firms
wishing to do business are trying to establish
offset and counter-trade arrangements. On the
other hand, they expect that the Soviet Union
will not linger in creating a legal framework in
order to improve the opportunities for interna-
tional business relations since it is a matter of
urgency for its economic development.
99. Mr. Henri Martre, of GIFAS, the French
aerospace industry association, recently made it
clear that the first priority for GIFAS is to sell
its products on the Soviet market. Second, it will
certainly try to develop co-operation with Soviet
industry because innovation in the aerospace
industry is too expensive to act independently.
Aerospatiale has projects for co.operation in
supersonic transport and helicopters. In the first
domain, together with TS AGI and Tupolev, it is
engaged in studies of the environment and pol-
lution. With Kamov and Mil it is discussing
research projects on the de-icing ofrotor-blades,
a helicopter for lifting heavy loads and the
Eurofar. SNECMA sees opportunities for
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technological exchange: titanium metallurgy
against electronic control and high temperature
control 22.
100. It should be noticed here that the
approach of the Soviet aerospace industry
towards conversion, which is to develop its own
existing and specific capabilities into the civilian
area, is now also being pursued by the other
branches of the defence complex. This led to an
intensive lobby seeking to modify the draft state
conversion programme which seems to have met
with some success.
IX. The state conversion programme
l0l. Since it became clear that in 1988-89 a
number of mishaps had discredited the first con-
version efforts, a more structured and deliberate
approach was chosen for the years to come. The
Military-Industrial Commission the co-
ordinating authority of the defence complex -
and the defence industry department of Gosplan
- 
the State Planning Committee - worked out a
state programme for the conversion of the
defence industry for the years l99l-95 in consul-
tation with the Ministry of Defence 23. This has
already been examined and approved by the
Committee on Defence and State Security of the
USSR Supreme Soviet and approved for imple-
mentation by the Presidential Council after
inclusion of some amendments, among which
should be mentioned measures to enhance the
programme's emphasis on civil aviation, ship-
building, communications and space research. It
is not yet completely clear how far it has sur-
vived the compromising over the economic
reform after its inclusion in the Ryzhkov pro-
gramme.
102. The draft state conversion programme
indicates that the civilian production effort of
the defence industry should be aimed at three
main target areas:
(i) Improvement of the population's liviag sundard
and conditions
103. This requires a sharp increase in the pro-
duction of non-food consumer goods, building
up the production of equipment which can
piovide the population with food, clothing and
housing, an upgraded health service and a
normal living environment.
(ii) Stinalatioa of scientifrc and technologicol pngness
in kcy brancha of industry
and the national aconomy as a wholc
104. In this area, the effort is directed at
expanding the development and production of
all items constituting the basic infrastructure of
a modern society, such as information and com-
munication technology and electronics. At the
same time and aimed at the same objective, the
programme requires a major effort in such areas
as civilian aviation and shipbuilding and rel-
evant civilian space technology.
(iii) Developmeat ol aew materials and techrclogies
105. It is being recognised that advanced mate-
rials and technologies, which until recently were
exclusively reserved for the armed forces, can be
employed even more usefully to improve the
technological level of civilian facilities.
106. Until 1995, some 420 production fac-
tories and 200 research institutes and design
bureaux will be involved in the conversion pro-
gramme. Of these, six defence complex firms
producing military goods are being totally con-
verted. They will terminate their military pro-
duction in order to convert to civilian pro-
duction.
107. Partial conversion plays an important
part in the state programme:242 of the defence
-omplex enterprises mentioned above will
reduce their military work by 20o/o or less.
108. Apart from the abovementioned, over 100
firms of other branches of industry are covered
by conversion, of which 34 are being totally con-
verted.
109. According to the state conversion pro-
gramme, the share of Defence Ministry civilian
firoduction in the overall civilian production of
ihe Soviet Union will increase from 430lo in 1988
to 50Vo in 1990 and to over 600/o in 1995. Over
these seven years, the total volume of civilian
production is expected to more than double.
The value of the total quantity of civilian goods
to be produced by the defence complex in the
period l99l-95 is estimated to be ll0 billion
roubles.
I 10. It is envisaged that over the years
l99l-95, a total sum of 40 billion roubles will be
invested in the civilian activities ofthe defence
complex, including the 9 billion roubles which
have been earmarked by Prime Minister
Ryzhkov for re-equipment of the mili-
tary-related production capacity for civilian pur-
poses.
111. Yuri A. Glybin called the three main
target areas first objectives and he said that
industries wishing to produce items specified in
the programme will obtain state support in their
efforts, including financial means.
22. Air et Cosmos, No. 1299, 29th September 1990.
23. v.I. Smyslov, On the basic directions of the draft state
programme for the conversion of defence 
-industry in the
USSR, report for the United Nations conference on con-
version, Moscow, l3th-l7th August 1990; Julian Cooper,
unpublished paper on Soviet conversion, Oxford Analytica,
October 1990.
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ll2. He stressed that this is a task programme,
indicating objectives, tasks, priorities and avail-
abilities. He was well aware that the programme
now developed may not be the ideal one and will
need adaptation and changes, but being the first
one it will allow an organised start to be
made.
ll3. Parallel to the state conversion pro-
gramme, a USSR law on conversion has been
drafted, which has now been submitted for
approval to the Supreme Soviet, with adoption
expected to take place in early 1991. This law
envisages settling a number of problems caused
by conversion. It determines the rights and obli-
gations of the personnel of converted enter-
prises, but also of their administration, estab-
lishes privileges, advantages and financial
incentives for these enterprises and a large
portion is devoted to social issues.
X. Internal criticism against
the state conversion pmgrumme
ll4. The conversion effort, as it is being
organised by the state, has met with quite some
criticism. This criticism was not only voiced by
industry, as referred to in chapter VIII, which
saw its privileged position endangered and was
also afraid of losing its technological edge.
ll5. There was also severe criticism from
radical Soviet economists, who advanced dif-
ferent but no less valuable arguments and who
propose an alternative conversion strategy
which meets growing support. The leading econ-
omist in this criticism is Yuri A. Yaremenko,
Director of the Institute for the Economics and
Forecasting of Scientific and Technical Progress
of the USSR Academy of Sciences, with Alexei
Kireev of the International Department of the
Central Committee of the Soviet Union's Com-
munist Party as one other well-known protag-
onist.
I 16. The! venture that the approach of the
state conversion programme is founded on
administrative methods incompatible with the
market reform envisaged now. Their second
argument says that the planned conversion is
not sufficiently orientated to the modernisation
of the civil industrial base of the economy.
Lastly, they say that the programme provides an
extension of the defence complex at the expense
of the civilian industry rather than the other way
round.
1,17. The main argument is that the Soviet
Union is losing a unique chance to bring about
the demilitarisation in depth of its economy,
which could break through the wall of secrecy
which is at the moment dividing its economy in
two parts 
- 
a civilian and a military one 
- 
which
are completely separated. They observe that,
instead, the defence complex continues to con-
solidate its monopoly in the production of
numerous consumer goods, which alienates the
Soviet economy even further from the devel-
opment of sound competition principles 2a.
ll8. A large part of the proposals of these
radical economists, especially the idea to cut
back the defence industry, has been included in
the Shatalin 500-day programme for economic
reform.
XI. From military to civilian rescarch
and development
ll9. According to official Soviet figures on
defence expenditure in 1989, the Soviet Union
spent 15.3 billion roubles or 19.890 of total
defence spending and 1.890 of the GNP on
research and development. Western observers
put these figures at a higher level and assess
Soviet defence research and development
expenditure at between 20 and 28 billion
roubles, the same 2Uh of total defence spending
but between 2.5 and 3.50/o of its estimate of
GNP.
120. Whatever figures one considers, the pro-
portion of Soviet spending in this area is excep-
tionally high if compared with western spending.
The United States, at the peak of defence
spending under the Reagan administration,
spent 0.80/o of GNP on military research and
development and the Federal Republic of
Germany 0.1I 25.
l2l. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the
reduction of l3.7Vo in defence research and
development in 1990 could result in consid-
erable progress for similar activities in the
civilian sector. It is planned that, during the
l99l-95 period, state budget funding ofdefence
complex civilian research and development will
amount to 36 billion roubles.
122. According to the state conversion pro-
gramme, research and technological personnel
who can no longer be employed in the anna-
ments industry will be employed in the priority
spheres of civilian production identified in the
programme. Their knowledge and capabilities
can be fully used in the civilian industry since
the government has announced that the tradi-
tionally strict security rdgime in the defence
industry has been relaxed and many institutes
and enterprises have been declassified in orderto overcome what President Gorbachev has
denounced as the internal Cocom between the
military and civilian sector. It was mentioned in
paragraph I 17, however, that Soviet critics still
have serious doubts about this relaxation ofthe
security r6gime.
24. Alexei Kireev, La reconversion marque le pas, Temps
Nouveaux, 1G90.
25. SIPRI Yearbook 1990, page 175.
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123. It is planned to increase appropriations
for civilian research by 41.10/o in 1991 as com-
pared with 1988. This increased growth rate of
appropriations for civilian research as compared
with military will completely change the
balance. In 1995 the share ofcivilian projects in
nation-wide research and development should
according to plan amount to 45.80/o while in
1988 it was only 28.5o/o.
124. Priority growth of appropriations in the
years 1990-95 is planned in the following
areas:
- 
information and communication tech-
nology, (growth by 3.7 times);
- 
civil aviation, civilian space explo-
ration and state research programmes
in basic technologies such as high-
energy physics and high-temperature
super-conductivity (growth by 1.5 to
1.6 times).
125. According to the state conversion pro-
gramme, the research capabilities which have
been released and will no longer be used for
defence purposes will be employed in two dif-
ferent ways:
- 
to create technological progress in tra-
ditional spheres of civilian application.
Here there are such items as highly-
productive microchip equipment for
the textile and knitted goods industry,
new equipment for the food industry
guaranteeing a greater range of goods,
personal computers, audio and video
equipment, fibre-optics communication
means, modernisation of civilian air-
craft, new ships and modern medical
equipment;
- 
to create fundamentally new kinds of
machinery, resource-saving technol-
ogies and promising dual-purpose
materials.
126. This will include the development of new
and composite materials, ecologically-safe
means of self-contained power engineering, a
space-based satellite communication system and
automated means for monitoring the ecological
situation in cities and regions 26.
127. It should be observed here that a prG.
gramme which looks flawless in theory may be
less easy to enforce in practice.
128. At a round-table conference organised by
the scientific department of Pravda on 9th June
1990, directors of companies and institutes in
the defence industry complained about reduc-
tions in credits for research and development,
dismantlement and the dissolution of qualified
teams.
129. In this framework, O. Patkulin, Deputy
Director of the Institute for Light Alloys, stated
that, for its own survival, the institute had had
to sacrifice its fundamental research in a period
of growing demand for new materials for
engines. E. Shalin, Director-General of the
National Institute for Aeronautical Materials,
denounced a catastrophic reduction of credits
for fundamental research and thought that the
government should establish large-scale research
and development programmes 27.
130. A number of Soviet authorities venture
that this g;rumbling should rather be dismissed
as being typical of people who have nostalgia for
the good old days when they were spoilt and
who are now in trouble since they have to adapt
to the new situation. Others, however, argue that
indeed a lot of indiscriminate cutting of research
and development budgets is taking place which
may cause the loss of great numbers of capable
scientists and engineers, which in turn will affect
the high technology base of Soviet industry 2E.
XII. Consequenca of convenion
for individual enterprises
131. When conversion was started in practice
during 1989, a number of serious problems
apparently had been neglected in the rush of
sudden changes. It soon became clear that in
these early stages the conversion effort was
rather arbitrary. For some enterprises, military
orders were either cancelled or severely cut and
at the same time replaced by instructions to
increase the existing civilian production. Other
enterprises had their military orders reduced
and were instructed to build new assembly lines
for civilian products for introducing an entirely
new production process simultaneously with the
decrease in military production. Production
goals for civilian output were set far too high,
not taking into account the many problems
which had to be surmounted by the enterprises
concerned.
132. Little attention was paid to the inventory
of specific facilities in order to measure convert-
ibility. Specific existing capabilities of man-
power and assembly lines were too often
neglected and it seems that little attention was
paid to the surrounding infrastructure and to the
r6le of such enterprises in the social-economic
structure of the town or region where they were
situated.
133. The management of many defence
complex enterprises often had no experience in
working for customers other than the state.
27. Air and Cosmos,30th June 1990.
28. Alexei Kireev, La conversion en URSS, Vie Interna-
tionale, May 1990, pages 102-103.26. Y.l. Smyslov, see note 23.
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Accountancy for the sake of economy had not
been a subject of interest for them since they
had been used to priority treatment where
financial resources were concerned.
134. Not surprisingly, many defence enter-
prises faced serious financial problems. Their
defence production, usually reasonably prof-
itable, was reduced and replaced by civilian pro-
duction with lower profit margins or even losses.
At the same time they had to invest considerably
in retraining of personnel, new assembly lines,
tools and other equipment. The inevitable
decline in productivity with simultaneously
climbing operational and investment costs was
due to bring many enterprises to the brink of
bankruptcy. It all happened while the defence
industry was trying to cope with the first major
economic reforms, which came into force in
January 1989, and which introduced the prin-
ciple of self-financing, thus stressing the need to
be profitable.
135. At the same time the customary and pref-
erential supply lines of resources of the defence
complex industries were being cut off while
Gosplan told the enterprises concerned to be
resourceful. This required a complete change in
mentality and a very large degree of adapta-
bility. Civilian production factories, which have
always been in a less privileged position, have
long since learned how to cope with shortages.
They try to find partners in order to swap
resources and so to meet their production
quotas.
136. It has been suggested that defence fac-
tories operate in the same way and pool the
resources and equipment which are being made
available in the framework of conversion. There
can be no wonder when Soviet experts, such as
Evgeny Bougrov, suggest that in a number of
enterprises a change of management would be
helpful.
l3'1. Finally, when all questions mentioned
above have been resolved, the enterprise still
faces two more: fixing the price of its new
civilian products and selling them to customers
of whose need and whereabouts it knows
nothing. Many Soviet economists consider the
prices of new civilian products turned out by the
defence complex to be too high. This may partly
be the consequence of better materials used,
higher production costs and lack of familiarity
with the market, but customers will be reluctant
to pay a higher price which is hardly justified
and which has little relation to the price of
similar products already on the market.
138. Marketing and selling the new civilian
output of the defence complex is also a question
which until now obtained little attention from
the state. It was thought in the beginning that in
a market with shortages in almost every single
product one could imagine, there would be no
problem in finding customers. In practice,
however, there have been problems in finding
customers, also because, understandably,
defence industry enterprises had no knowledge
at all of the market for the sometimes rather
exotic or at least alien products which they were
ordered to turn out such as sugar lumps or
packing machines.
139. Yuri Glybin of Gosplan left no doubt that
lessons have been learned from the first con-
version activities. In the framework of both the
state conversion programme.and the USSR law
on conversion, provision is being made to
furnish financial means where needed if certain
prerequisites have been met. For instance, a
converting enterprise qualifies for financial
support if it is a major defence complex facility
with at least 20plo of its defence production cut
and if it converts to civilian production of items
mentioned in the priority list of the state con-
version programme. Financial support will
include specific means for retraining personnel
and retooling. Moreover, under penalty of a
fine, the state will have to announce cuts in
defence orders between l8 and 24 months ahead
and discuss possible conversion activities with
the establishment concerned.
XIII. Social consequences of conversion
140. It goes without saying that conversion as
envisaged by the Soviet Union will have serious
consequences for the approximately 500 000
defence industry employees who, according to
Soviet estimates, will be directly affected.
According to Madimir Volkov, Chairman of the
Sverdlovsk City Soviet Commission for In-
dustry and Conversion, nearly 30 000 re-
searchers and highly-qualified workers had to
leave defence-related jobs in this city alone in
the last two years 2e.
l4l. To name only a few problems: retraining
programmes will have to be organised, new jobs
created and regions where the defence industry
predominates may have to be partly or totally
restructured. In this respect, it should be
observed that, due to the structure of Soviet
society, a reduction in the financial means of an
enterprise may have consequences, not only for
payment and provisions for its employees, but
also for the social infrastructure of the town and
region where it is located since the social funds
of these enterprises are used to finance housing
projects and social services for its employees.
142. Moreover, as Mikhail Simonov said,
re-employment in the civilian sector of people
who have been working for a long time in the
privileged and well-respected defence sector in
many cases causes a psychological shock which
should not be underestimated and requires ade-
quate therapy.
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143. For many years salaries and social advan-
tages had been better in the Soviet defence
industry than in the civilian industry, but the
prevailing opinion now is that this situation is
no longer so.
144. The Soviet economist A. Izjumov stated
recently that, in the last l0 to 20 years, the dif-
ferences in salaries and social privileges between
the defence and civilian industries have largely
disappeared. On the other hand, in a 1989
interview, the Soviet Minister for Shipbuilding
declared that it was no secret that in the defence
industry higher hourly wages were paid than in
the civilian sector 30.
145. Apparently, the truth is between the two,
because the Supreme Soviet, through Mr.
Leonid Sharin, has stated that, during a transi-
tional period of two years, workers in converted
defence industry establishments should keep
their original wage levels irrespective of changes.
At the same time, Gosplan made it known this
summer that in order to maintain the current
rate of payment for a period of re-training of
some categories of specialists, over 570 million
roubles will be allocated to the wage fund in
lgg9-90 3'.
146. In order to comprehensively seal the right
to social protection for Soviet citizens working
in enterprises affected by conversion or released
as a result of it, a draft USSR law on conversion
has been submitted for approval to the Supreme
Soviet, which is expecting to adopt it in early
1991.
147. According to this draft law, the personnel
of converted enterprises who will lose their jobs
due to the reduction of military contracts must
have a right to corresponding allowances, com-
pensation and preferential pensions. The state
should make provisions to help these people
acquire a new job.
XIY. Arms trade in the Soviet Union
I 48. In a discussion of conversion in the Soviet
defence industry, the arms trade cannot be
ignored.
149. The Soviet Union, with its well-developed
defence industry, has long been listed among the
leaders in the arms trade. Major reasons were,
on the one hand, the moral and material support
given to countries which were fighting for their
freedom and national independence as it was
oflicially stated, and, on the other hand, to earn
badly-needed foreign currency. According to
SIPRI, in 1989, the Soviet Union was the leader
Hans-Henning Schriider, Teil III, pages 34-37.
V.I. Smyslov, see note 23.
in conventional arms exports, with total sales of
$l1.6 billion, followed by the United States with
total sales of $10.7 billion.
150. Of the total $11.6 billion sales, a value of
$8.5 billion was exported to developing coun-
tries and $3.1 billion to developed countries,
these being the Warsaw Pact member states,
Yugoslavia and Finland.
151. The full list of export destinations shows
that the Soviet Union has been rather indiscrim-
inate in this respect 32.
152. It was therefore rather interesting to hear
the opinion of Valentin Sharin, acting Chairman
of the Committee on Defence and State Security
of the USSR Supreme Soviet, on this subject.
Mr. Sharin recognised that, in order to earn hard
currency and to get rid ofexisting stockpiles, the
Soviet Union will continue to sell arms on the
world market. In a way, the Soviets have even
become more audacious than before; recently,
they submitted an oflicial offer to the Swiss
Government to sell MiG 29s. Another reason
for these continuing sales, he added, was to
make sure that the defence industry would not
have to face the additional problem of losing the
export market.
153. Mr. Sharin made it clear, however, that
there is a tendency among members of the
Supreme Soviet to stop indiscriminate arms
trade. These deputies think that in the Soviet
Union legislation should be introduced to
scrutinise arms sales in order to prevent sales
which could destabilise relations in a specific
region or sales to hotbeds of conflict.
154. At the same time international agree-
ments should be concluded to make sure that
such vacuums in arms supply will not be filledby malevolent or less scrupulous arms-
producing countries.
155. In this framework Mr. Sharin recalled that
in the Soviet Union there is wide popular
support for conversion, not as a goal in itself,
but rather as one of the means to bring about a
general restructuring of the entire society.
XY. Can and should conversion still be
centrally planned?
156. Understandably, Gosplan, now preparing
the thirteenth five-year plan since this state
planning system was established in 1928, is still
quite confident of its capabilities to provide a
perfect and balanced state conversion pro-
gramme for the goals to be achieved in the
1991-95 period. In theory, the programme is
indeed well-contrived, and there is reason to
argue that without state planning the defence
32. SIPRI Yearbook 1990, pages 219-316, provides a fairly
complete picture of trade in major conventional weapons.
30.
31.
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industry would be at a complete loss since it has
been pampered by the state for so many years.At the moment, however, a number of
symptoms are casting doubts on this confidence
in the implementation of a traditional state
planning progmmme.
157. There is no longer any doubt that an
increasingly anarchistic situation is reigning as
regards the implementation of a centrally
imposed plan. A clear sign of the desperate situ-
ation appeared when President Mikhail Gor-
bachev issued a decree on27th September 1990
which among other things gave a one-month
deadline to companies in the sectors of pharma-
ceuticals, raw materials, building materials,
spare parts and the food industry to restore their
production in compliance with the plan. Enter-
prises were furthennore called to observe the
contractual obligations which they had taken
until the end of 1991 33.
158. Moreover, there is a strong tendency in
the various Soviet republics to be more auton-
omous, also as regards decisions in social-
economic questions. Differences of opinion over
the road to be followed towards better economic
performance have come to light in violent
debates which more than once were decided to
the detriment of the central authorities.
159. Meanwhile, the struggle of republics at
different administrative levels over the extent
of their autonomous rights is raging unabated.
Mr. Silaev, Prime Minister of the Russian Fede-
ration, has stated that the Russian Federation
has massive imports in mind, for which purpose
it will establish a Russian foreign currency bank,
using the gold and diamond reserve in
Iakoutia.
160. Iakoutia, which would like to keep its
treasures for itself, declared on 27th September
1990 that it was no longer an autonomous
republic within the Russian Federation, but a
sovereign Socialist Soviet Republic 3a.
161. According to President Gorbachev's eco-
nomic reform plan, which was approved on l9th
October 1990, the central government will
retain control over mineral resources and other
raw materials for at least two years from now.
162. The quest for autonomy, in some cases
even for far-reaching sovereignty and indepen-
dence, is at the moment assuming such propor-
tions that it can no longer simply be dismissed
as irrelevant, premature and wishful thinking.
Apparently, President Gorbachev considers it to
be a real threat, judging by a recent address
in which he denounced the disintegration of
Lebanon, once one of the most flourishing coun-
tries of the world but now being abandoned by
k Monde, 29th September 1990.
k Monde, 29th September 1990.
its inhabitants, after which he went on to say
that, for his own country, there was a need to
build a union of sovereign states and to struggle
against separatism 35.
163. On lst November 1990, the Russian
Republic started putting into effect its own more
radical reform plan. Moreover, the parliament
of the Russian Republic approved a law
declaring that the republic had full control of all
its resources. This law stipulates that all agree-
ments with foreign companies involving the
republic's most important resources need the
agreement of the republic's govenment to be
valid.
164. It may be too early for a final opinion, but
it may well be that the state conversion pro-
gramme with its central planning system will
soon be overtaken by the centrifugal effects of
the recently adopted economic reform plan.
XYI. Results of conversion
165. It should be observed that the flrrst results
ofthe conversion effort have been frankly disap
pointing. Apparently, the many problems had
been underestimated.
166. A reduction of 2Wo in the production of
more or less sophisticated pieces of military
equipment does not mean that the same pro-
duction facility or assembly line can, from that
moment on, use the same 20Yo of the production
capacity to turn out civilian products. Ifthere is
no intention of going back to manual pro-
duction, research and development of new pro-
duction equipment has to be undertaken, often
followed by large-scale investment in ma-
chinery, tools and the retraining of workers.
This all takes time and money, much more than
was thought initially.
167. Production goals were set far too high in
relation to specific possibilities. Specialisation,
production volumes and technological level of
defence facilities were taken into account mar-
ginally when orders for civilian production were
issued. The result of this rash action and lack of
experience was that, in 1989, only 23 of the 120
planned civilian articles were accomplished in
mass production while only l59o of these
products were in conformity with world quality
standards. In 1988-89, the Ministry of the Avi-
ation Industry produced 2lVo less civilian
products in the framework of conversion than
planned, saying that some of the products on
order were too dilEcult to produce 36.
168. Too often it was thought that with the
existing shortages sales and marketing of civilian
goods produced by the defence industry would
35. Address at the plenary session of the Central Com-
mittee, 8th October 1990, L€ Monde, l0th October 1990.
36. Alexei Kireev, in Temps Nouveaux, October 1990.
33.
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not be a problem, while in fact the lack of expe-
rience in this field led to unsold stocks.
169. It appeared that the technological gap
between the civilian and military sectors of the
economy is so large that it is impossible to apply
high technology in enterprises which produce for
the civilian market. For instance, without large-
scale restructuring and re-equipment, the Min-
istry for Agricultural Machines would be inca-
pable of using titanium and aluminium alloys,
certain plastics and other materials which need
special processing. There are serious doubts
about whether it will be possible to introduce
rapidly, in existing civilian production facilities,
many of the new technologies which have been
developed and applied in the defence industry
for military purposes.
170. Another reason for conversion not
meeting its goals is 
- 
not surprisingly 
- 
that top
generals and a number of weapon producers are
lobbying against it 37. According to Vsevolod
Avduyevsky, it is also essential for at least those
branches of the defence complex which are pro-
ducing for the civilian market to lift the restric-
tions connected with military production. He
thinks that civil production needs freedom, also
to prevent such firms reverting to military pro-
duction without anyone knowing 38.
17l. Fortunately, there have also been positive
developments. In particular the aerospace
industry has come up with many new and inter-
esting initiatives, inspired by its own existing
high capabilities. It is determined to penetrate
world markets. Since it really has something to
offer, western companies are interested in
co-operation and a number ofjoint ventures and
co-operative agreements have already been con-
cluded. Mention has already been made of
co-operative agreements between different
defence complex enterprises in order to join
forces and operate in civilian markets where
they have specific capabilities.
172. In Sverdlovsk, a traditional defence
industry centre, regional authorities have estab-
lished a company called " IJralkonversia' in
order to attract foreign co-operation in a
number of different activities, such as metal-
lurgy, electric energy and laser technology.
173. [n 1989, the production of consumer dur-
ables increased by 9.3o/o, partly due to the efforts
of the defence industry. It has, however, been
observed that this increased production was less
the result ofconversion than ofthe fact that the
defence industry has used its existing reserves
and facilities 3e.
37. Alexandre N. Yakovlev, International Herald Tribune,
27th September 1990.
38. Vsevold Avduyevsky, Chairman of the Soviet national
committee to promote conversion, Moscow News, No. 39,
7th-l4th October 1990.
39. Le Courrier des Pays de I'Est, June 1990.
174. Concluding, it should be said that until
now the conversion of the Soviet defence
industry has not yet produced the results
expected, mainly because many problems had
not been foreseen or had been underestimated.
On the other hand, the efforts being made are
sincere to all appearances, the more so because
the Soviet authorities have no other choice. The
potential of conversion is important and experts
estimate that it could provide 2 to 50/o additional
civilian production in 1995. Moreover, spin-off
could bring about a general improvemeht of
civilian production capabilities as defence
secrecy will be lifted from a growing number of
technologies, developed in the defence complex
industries. There is reason for optimism, but
large investments and western co-operation are
essential. Moreover, economic reform in the
Soviet Union is a condition sine qua non.
XruI. Economic reform in the Soviet Union
175. Even if it has been an important step to
divert financial means from the military to the
civilian sector in the framework of conversion,
Soviet authorities agree that it is not a cure for all
ills and in fact they are all convinced that the only
real solution for their ailing economy will be a
rapid introduction of the market economy. Pres-
ident Gorbachev during the last months has
repeatedly indicated that the Soviet Union was in
danger of becoming ungovernable and slipping
into economic collapse. He was particularly con-
cerned at the declining respect for the law a0.
176. For a number of months, the political
authorities in the Soviet Union have been haggling
about different possible ways to reform the
economy, a subject which at the same time is
closely linked with the question of how to arrive at
a new treaty to hold the Soviet republics
together.
177. In a preliminary decision on 24th Sep-
tember 1990, the Supreme Soviet granted Pres-
ident Gorbachev special powers which will allow
him to rule by decree during the transitional
period to a market economy.
178. On 4th October 1990, President
Gorbachev in a decree made the first specific
move towards the development of the market
economy, when he authorised enterprises to
negotiate directly and at their own discretion a
part of their wholesale prices ar.
179. Until now, these prices had been fixed
centrally for the whole territory of the Soviet
Union. When, as a consequence of the first
recent economic reforms, enterprises were
granted some autonomy in management, this
resulted in several of them stopping the pro-
duction of items which did not bring any profit,
or even caused losses.
40. The Times, 3lst August 1990.
41. [r Monde, 6th October 1990.
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180. The new decree on price liberalisation was
urgent since enterprises, expecting a price
reform at some moment, no longer signed new
contracts at offrcial prices and tried to break
existing contracts.
l8l. There were some important snags in this
decree which still need clarification in order to
be able to measure their effect. In the first place
it was stated that within ten days councils of
ministers of the Russian Federation and the
republics would have to publish a list of
wholesale prices remaining under state control.
Secondly, the governments would have to
indicate the limits of profit margins above
which all earnings on a fifty-fifty basis would
have to be transferred to the budgets of the
union and the republics.
182. On l9th October, the Supreme Soviet
finally approved in principle President
Gorbachev's plan to.move towards a free market
economy which is a compromise between the
forced-march 500-day approach of the econ-
omist Stanislav Shatalin and the more gradualist
approach advocated by Prime Minister Nicolai
Ryzhkov.
183. Both programmes envisaged financial
stabilisation, the de+ontrol of prices and pro-
duction, privatisation or denationalisation of
state enterprises, greater independence for
republics, an opening to direct foreign
investment, the creation of a modern banking
system and capital markets and external con-
vertibility of the rouble.
184. The approved Gorbachev plan, entitled
* Basic directions for the stabilisation of the
economy and the switch over to the market ",
begins with a declaration of the superiority of
the free market system over the old system of
central planning, stating " The choice has been
made: there is no alternative to a transition to
the market ".
185. Essentially, the transition will take place
in four stages. The first stage will mainly be con-
cerned with basic legislation and with measures
to stabilise the money supply, check inflation
and reduce the budget deficit.
186. It is planned to cut the l99l budget deficit
by around 25Y0, mainly by reducing KGB and
defence expenditure, selling state assets and
slashing capital investment. Shortly, the state
bank will be transformed into a federal reserve
system, with each republic having its own
central bank. The commercial rouble for import
and export transactions will most probably be
devaluated by 60 to 75Yo before the end of I 990.
187. A start will be made with dena-
tionalisation, privatisation and the introduction
of land reform.
188. In the second stage, there will be
liberalisation of the retail price of a large
number of consumer goods. The third stage
should see the development of a market infra-
structure both for consumer goods as well as for
production means. Privatisation should be gath-
ering pace. In the fourth stage, the market and
financial system should stabilise and the con-
sumer market should improve.
189. President Gorbachev has said that the
basis of the new market economy should be
created within a period of 18 to 24 months, but
the reform actions of his programme are
expressed in rather vague and general terms.
190. In the beginning, central direction will be
exerted to avoid a drastic slump in production
and economic breakdown in the coming winter.
For at least two years from now, the central gov-
ernment will retain control over mineral
resources and raw materials.
191. Privatisation will take place over a long
period: by the end of l99l only 7Vo of small
enterprises should be privatised. Private
property of production means has not been
rejected, but during a rather long period it will
be confined to organisations of very limited size.
There is no explicit mention of private own-
ership of land, on which subject the communist
party wants a referendum.
192. The Gorbachev programme is equally
vague about its relation to a general movement
towards more autonomy in the Soviet republics
and Abel G. Aganbegyan, an economist who has
been involved in preparing the compromise, has
conceded that the programme dictates only the
basic direction of reform, leaving much to be
worked out in negotiations.
193. Some well-known Soviet economists,
amongst whom are Stanislav Shatalin, Grigori
Javlinski and Nicolaj Petrakov, have strongly
criticised the compromise economic reform plan
as now adopted. In particular, they were aiming
at the government's price policy according to
which state-controlled prices are to be raised
under control, while at the same time compen-
satory subsidies will be paid to the lowest
income categories. Meanwhile, the decen-
tralisation of economic policy and privatisation
of state property are being delayed. The combi-
nation of these measures, the abovementioned
critics say, will lead to hyperinflation and
further destabilise the rouble.
194. In western countries too, there are strong
fears that President Gorbachev's economic
reform plan is the result of too much 
- 
possibly
inevitable 
- 
political compromising.
195. On 24th October, however, the parlia-
ments of both the Russian Republic and the
Ukraine insisted in resolutions that their
approval was needed before Soviet legislation
could take effect on their territory. The reso'
lution of the Russian Parliament covers nearly
all federal legislation as well as presidential
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" decrees and other decisions " 42. This could
have as a consequence that the central gov-
ernment will have difficulties in enforcing its
economic reform programme, which is less
radical than the Shatalin reform programme,
adopted earlier by the Russian Republic. In par-
ticular, the right to raise taxes and the exploi-
tation of natural resources are matters where the
federal government and the republics disagree.
Meanwhile, on lst November 1990, the Russian
Republic started to put into practice the original
radical 500-day plan for economic reform, thus
consciously adopting a collision course with
President Gorbachev's economic reform plan.
XruII. Conclusions
196. Since 1985, when General Secretary
Gorbachev started to open the Soviet Union's
windows to the world, to ease the tight reins of
central control and to convince the Soviet popu-
lation that radical political and economic
reforms were inevitable, East-West relations
have changed profoundly.
197. In security policy, the perception of the
Soviet Union as a military threat is disappearing
very rapidly. Even up to the point that the
United States Defence Secretary Dick Cheney,
after his visit to the Soviet Union in October
1990, said that ifthings continued as they had in
the last eighteen months * it will be possible to
say that we do not consider the Soviets as
adversaries " 43.
198. Apart from afins reductions in the
framework of international agreements, the
Soviet Union is making important unilateral
reductions in the manpower and equipment of
its armed forces. Conversion in the Soviet
defence industry is no longer a fairy tale, it is
reality. It has a gleat potential insofar as it can
help to build a better performing civilian
industry which could improve the living stan-
dards of the population. Care should be taken,
however, lest it lead to a reinforcement and
extension of the defence complex industries. On
the contrary, the more the civilian production
branches of the defence complex are freed from
the bodice of state protection, state influence
and secrecy, the better they would be able to
integrate into the civilian market and employ
their capabilities to promote its progress and
development.
199. At the moment, more important than any-
thing else and also crucial for the success of con-
version, is a rapid transition of the Soviet Union
to a market economy.
200. Can Western European countries help?
The answer to this question is not easy. Of
course, to sit idle and see what happens is never
International Herald Tribune, 25th October 1990.
International Herald Tribune, 20th-2lst October I990.
satisfactory. But there is no way to set up a new
Marshall plan as the United States did after
World War II to help Western Europe recover.
The Soviet Union lacks the indispensable eco-
nomic, legal and organisational infrastructure of
the market economy of post-war Western
Europe that helped to make the Marshall plan a
success. The prevailing opinion is that pouring
financial aid into the Soviet economy would be
money down the drain until a thoroughgoing
reform is instituted and internal economic and
political relations have been clarified more than
is the case at present.
2Ol. Most useful would be to provide
know-how in the organisation and running of a
modern market economy. International or-
ganisations like OECD, IMF and the World
Bank at the moment provide specialist
knowledge. They discuss existing problems with
Soviet experts, exchange experience and provide
policy recommendations on the basis of
extensive study; Soviets see an advantage in this
multinational approach since the advice is
objective and not biased towards the interests of
a specific western nation.
202. Furthermore, it is important to help to
create new generations of entrepreneurs,
familiar with the theory and practice of the
market economy through extensive training pro-
grammes in business administration and prac-
tical knowledge of the market economy. Western
nations could support and stimulate such
training programmes by sponsoring fellowship
funds and establishing exchange progxammes.
203. Exchange programmes should also be
aimed at administrative experts and politicians
in order to make them familiar with the r6le of
government, administration and democratic
control in a market economy. Such activities can
be embedded in bilateral political agreements
such as the treaties which have been concluded
recently by Germany and France.
204. A third means of assistance is direct con-
tacts between western and Soviet companies in
whatever way is most appropriate. In this area,
there is little to do for western governments. The
potential of the Soviet market is enormous, but
twenty to thirty years may well before there is an
infrastructure and economic environment in any
way comparable to western standards. In certain
areas, Soviet industry has technologies and
know-how to offer. Western companies are
willing to co-operate in many different ways, but
most of them are reluctant to invest large
amounts of money in such co-operative projects
at this hiehly unstable juncture.
205. There is no conclusion other than that the
Soviet Union has first responsibility. But in the
name of history, Western European nations are
obliged to help the Soviet Union appropriatelyto implement the transition to a market
economy.
42.
43.
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TngLE I
Prodaction of M(X)P ministries (in thousands of units)
Ministry 1987 1988 Variation(%)
Ministry for the Radio Industry
(Minradioprom)
Television sets ..
of whieh colorrr
I 274
52r
I 276
396
329
792
I 518
2 178
844
3ll
I 180
t 336
53
4 000
376
tt7
t 023
45
9.3
6 529
I 098
534
163
383
765
220
158
6 914
3 458l 133
5 781
525
596
476
331
523
22.1
I 644
887
I 480
384
330
840
l 548
2200
869
398
t 239
t 376
44.5
4 000
365
90.2
I 084
72.9
7
6 790
I 241
636
2250
3',t9
926
23r
155
6 983
4 080
t 235
5 608
s62
601
550
401
s80
24.7
29
70
16
3
0
6
2
I
3
28
5
3
-16
0
3
-23
6
62
-25
4
l3
r9
4
-l
2t
5
-2
I
l8
9
-3
7
I
5
t4ll
t2
Tane recorders
Refrioerators
\tr/ashino mechi
Vacuum cleaners
Radio receivers
Wafehes
Ministry for the Aircraft Industry
(Minaviaprom)
Refriserators ----
Tene reeorderc
Wachino manh
Vacuum cleaners
Radin receivers
Watches
Ministry for Electronics Industry
(Minelektronprom)
Telew sefs
nf whinh nnlnrrr
Tene recorders
Virlen fane reeorders
Redin
Wafehes
Eleetric hefteries
Ministry for General Mechanical Construction
(Minobchtchemach)
Cnlnrrr telewisnn cefs.
Refrisernfors
Washino mnchines
v elec
Tcne recorde
R crlin
Ministry for Communications(Minpromsvyazi)
Television sets
of which colnrrr
Tane reeorde
Redin
Ministry for the Defence Industry(Minoboronprom)
Refriserators,-,----
Motor bikes and scooters
Sewino machines
Washino mcehi
Vacuum cleaners
Tane recorders
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Ministry l 987 l 988 Variation(%)
Ministry for Mechanical Construction
(Minmach)
Refrioeratnrs t 773
2 4r3
s20
t 132
82 600
106
2900
115
715
383
547
1 879
2 461
577l 139
9s 000
ll5
3 000
r45
75t
376
549
6
2
ll
0.6
l5
9
2
26
5
2
0.4
Bievcles
Tane reeorde
Washino maeh
Eleefric hatteries
Rarlin recei
Wetehes
Ministry for the Naval Industry (Minsudprom)
Refrioeratnrs
\l/qshino rrrcnhines
T rders
Pedin reeei
Inu.E Il
Production of consumer goods by military industry$ coml,afed to tothl national outpat(in millions of units)
Products
1987 production 1988 production
National VPK (90) National VPK (%)
Vacuum cleaners
Batteries
4.4
(*)
5.5
1.5
5.8
0.045
5.0
70.6
1.0
8.2
9.1
4.6
3.4
83.7
2.4
1.5
4.1
0.045
4.8
15.6
0.6
8.2
8.6
4.6
75
(?)
43
r00
78
100
9',t
22
60
100
94
100
4.8
97.3
5.6
1.5
6.1
0.073
5.5
73.5
1.0
8.0
9.6
5.7
3.7
96.2
2.5
1.5
4.2
0.073
5.4
15.9
0.6
8.0
9.0
5.7
77
99
45
100
69
100
98
22
60
100
94
100
Tli mrnlac
Sewing machines ...
Washing machines ..
Video tape recorders
Tqne rer.nrders
\tr/qfnhec
Motor bikes and scooters
Radin reeeiverc
Telcvieinn cef
of which colour
(*) Figure not available.
Source: Vestnik Statistiki No. 5, 1989.
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Revision of the nodilied Brussels Treaty
PART II
WEU and the Eurupean Community
REPORT I
submitted oa behalf of the Political Committee2
by Sir Gnlfrey Finsberg, Ropponeur
Draft Recommendation
oa WEU and tlrc European Commuaity
l. The Assembly is the only parliamentary assembly empowered to deal with the implementation-
of the modified Brussels Treaiy and regrets that, in spite of this, the Council did not inform it of
important proposals made by a member country to associate Western European Union with the
European Community.
2. It notes that the Commission of the European Communities is considering the inclusion in the
Rome Treaty of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, thus separating it from the oaher provisions
of the treaty although they are its essential complement, particularly in regard to relations between
member countries and NATO.
3. It also notes that a resolution adopted by the European Parliament proposes that the reactivation
of WEU be terminated so that it may be integrated into the Community, although some member states
of the EEC are still opposed to developing a European concept of defence.
4. The Assembly considers that, if implemented, these various measures would weaken the Atlantic
Alliance and Europe's ability to play a major r6le in international affairs.
5. It therefore REcoMMENDs that the Council pursue the reactivation of WEU so as to allow Europe
to play a more effective part in NATO and to provide it with the wherewithal to act more effectively
each time the security of Europe is threatened.
6. It also REcoMMENDs that the Council take no decision calling in question the modified Brussels
Treaty without consulting it beforehand.
l. Adopted in committee by 17 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Ahrew (Chairman); Sir Geolfrey Finsberg_, ll/Lr. De_Decker (Nternate-flor Mrs. Staels-Dompas)(Vice-Ctrai.-i,n); MM. Aarts (Alternate:'Verbeek),'Beix, Btihm, Brito, gandal, Caro, 
_Colemal (Alternate: Rowe), Collart,
buatrecasas, ni6i, fabra, Forni, fosctri (Nternate:, Mezzapesa), Hitschler, Koehl, van der Linden, Lotd Mackie,MM. M-artinez,iiiiiri, Uiitt n i.tatiti, pec.ia* , pierilti, de Puig, Roseia, Sirti (elternat e: Scovacricchi), Sir lhilliam Shelton, MM. StoJfelen,
Thyraud, Ward,N...
N.B. Ifte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnerr Rrco*ttrtrNoatlot t
on WEU and the European Community
EXPLANAToRY MsuoRaNouu
submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur
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l. On 28th April 1990, the European
Council decided to hold an intergovernmental
conference on political union in Rome on l4th
December, in parallel with the intergovern-
mental conference on economic and monetary
union. This conference has been prepared by
several meetings of ministers for foreign affairs
and at the meetings between heads of state or of
government held in Dublin on 25th and 26th
June and in Asolo on 6th and 7th October.
2. In October, there were several calls for
WEU to be merged with the European Com-
munity. In particular, Mr. De Michelis, Minister
for Foreign Affairs of Italy, said several times
that he intended to make proposals in this sense
and, according to press reports, he did so in
Asolo. However, no oflicial text of his proposals
has been circulated.
3. Conversely, on 2lst October, the Com-
mission of the European Communities issued an
opinion on the proposed revision of the treaty
establishing the European Economic Com-
munity concerning political union which reads
as follows:
" The term 'common policy' has been
chosen deliberately. In these matters it
would be unrealistic to speak of political
union when it is quite clear that, tradi-
tionally, member states have special rela-
tions with certain parts of the world and
geopolitical positions which are firmly
anchored in their history. More impor-
tantly, the Twelve do not yet share the
same assessment of their responsibilities
or of their general and specific commit-
ments in various parts of the world.
The same considerations have led the
Commission to recommend a specific
approach to security matters. The treaty
should include a reference to this subject
and might incorporate the undertaking
contained in Article 5 of the 1948 Brussels
Treaty on the WEU which speciflres that,
in the event of an armed attack against
one of the contracting parties, the others
are obliged to provide aid and
assistance.
More than that, the new treaty should, in
general terms, point the way towards a
common security policy, including
defence.
It is also in the common interest to bring
defence equipment production and trade
fully under the discipline of the common
market, which would involve inter alia the
removal of Article 223."
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Sil Geolfrey Finsberg, Rapporteur)
4. Finally, on 9th October, the European
Parliament adopted a resolution on the con-
ference on security and co-operation in Europe,
on a report by Mr. Romeros, paragraph 42 of
which reads as follows:
" The pursuit of a common foreign policy
is inextricably linked with the pursuit of a
security and defence policy; the Treaty of
Rome should not hamper the granting offull powers in security and defence
matters to the European union; the
Western European Union should not be
'revitalised' in the process but should,
rather, be integrated into the European
union.'
5. Your Rapporteur has also heard that Italy
has made a proposal in the WEU Council in the
same sense, but neither the text nor the gist of
this proposal has been communicated to the
Assembly.
6. Having been informed of these various
steps, the Presidential Committee of the WEU
Assembly, meeting in Paris on 3lst October
1990, instructed the Political Committee to
present a report on the subject at the Assembly's
forthcoming session to be held from 3rd to 6th
December. This is the report in question.
7. WEU is based on a treaty of alliance, the
modified Brussels Treaty, which includes a
number of binding obligations. To admit coun-
tries which have not subscribed to these obliga-
tions would weaken the institution, deprive the
founding treaty of its significance and, finally,
destroy the only existing European defence
structure.
8. The signatories of the modified Brussels
Treaty are bound to come to the assistance of
any of them that are the subject of an attack in
Europe by all the means at their disposal. It is
the only text by which the deterrent forces of the
United Kingdom and France are placed at the
service of Western Europe as a whole.
9. This provision, which is contained in
Article V ofthe treaty, cannot be separated from
the treaty as a whole, which lays down the condi-
tions allowing the treaty provisions to be imple-
mented, particularly in regard to relations
between member countries and NATO (Article
IV), consultations between them in the event of
a threat to international peace and economic
stability in the world (Article VIII), the balance
of forces and armaments in Europe (Protocol
No. II), parliamentary supervision of these
activities (Article IX) and, finally, the inte-
gration of security co-operation in the process of
uniting Europe (Article I). Article V cannot be
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separated from the treaty as a whole nor can a
similar article be inserted into a treaty with a
different aim.
10. Article 223, paragraph l, of the Rome
Treaty excludes defence from the Community's
responsibilities:
* The provisions of this treaty shall not
preclude the application of the following
rules:
(a/ No member state shall be obliged to
supply information the disclosure of
which it considers contrary to the
essential interests of its security.
(b) Any member state may take such mea-
sures as it considers necessary for the
protection of the essential interests of
its security which are connected with
the production of or trade in arms,
munitions and war material; such
measures shall not, however,
adversely affect the conditions of
competition in the common market
regarding products which are not
intended for specifically military pur-
poses.
Article 30, paragraph 6, of the Single European
Act recognises that NATO and WEU ensure
Europe's security:
* (a) The high contracting parties consider
that closer co-operation on questions
of European security would contribute
in an essential way to the development
of a European identity in external
policy matters. They are ready to
co-ordinate their positions more
closely on the political and economic
aspects of security.
(b) The high contracting parties are deter-
mined to maintain the technological
and industrial conditions necessary
for their security. They shall work to
that end both at national level and,
. where appropriate, within the
framework of the competent institu-
tions and bodies.
(c/ Nothing in this title shall impede
closer co-operation in the field of
security between certain of the high
contracting parties within the
framework of the Western European
Union or the Atlantic Alliance. "
It would be absurd to abolish these institutions
in favour of a Community that has no powers in
such matters.
11. Neither the United Kingdom nor France
is prepare<i to hand over poweri to decide on the
use of their systems of defence and deterrence to
an authority that is outside their control. It is
not by institutional strategems that it will be
possible to change the permanent, carefully
thought-out political guidelines of those two
countries which, moreover, have accepted con-
siderable sacrifices in order to have nuclear
forces and which have always refused to include
them in an arrns limitation process in view of
the disproportion between their forces and those
of the Soviet Union and the United States.
12. There is not a consensus in Europe on the
possible use of forces outside the NATO system.
The modified Brussels Treaty has the advantage
of allowing its members to take such action if
they consider it necessary, without endangering
the cohesion of the organisation. Its members
may also associate non-member countries of
WEU with their action. No Community pro-
cedure offers such flexibility. Where defence is
concerned, there have to be specific decisions by
sovereign states and only their implementation
can be the subject of co-ordination. As was seen
during the recent affair of the conflict between
Iraq and Kuwait, WEU allowed co-ordination of
member countries' military efforts well beyond
anything that could have been done by the Com-
munity because it was based on the sum total of
individual decisions by participating states.
13. Ireland's accession to a joint Western
European defence system is hardly probable.
Nor if Austria joined the Community would it
be likely to wish to take part in the action of
WEU.
14. Since WEU is the European pillar of the
Atlantic Alliance, it might in the near future be
required to allow Europeans to consult each
other on the importance and nature of their par-
ticipation in a new collective security system in
Europe: only in WEU can Europe draw up a
European disarmament programme.
15. The limits imposed on NATO's activities
by the North Atlantic Treaty mean that WEU is
the only body able to examine any action
designed to maintain peace and ensure Europe's
security vis-i-vis any challenge outside the
NATO area.
16. The transfer of defence responsibilities to
the European Community would inevitably
reduce its ability to promote the economic
development of Eastern Europe and prevent any
enlargement of the Community to include not
only countries that were hitherto members of
the Warsaw Pact but also neutral countries such
as Austria. The Soviet Union has made no secret
of the fact that its favourable attitude towards
co-operation between the USSR and its allies
and neutral countries and the Community was
linked with the fact that the Community was not
a military bloc.
17. Conversely, if the Community, European
political co-operation and WEU were to be
grouped, each one remaining attached to the
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juridical text by which it was set up, under the
aegis of a European council consisting,
according to circumstances, of the ministers for
foreign affairs of Community member countries
or of the ministers for foreign affairs and
defence of WEU member countries, with proper
parliamentary scrutiny and oversight, it would
allow a step to be taken towards applying the
decisions of the 1972 Paris summit meeting
without endangering existing structures, in
accordance with Article 223 of the Rome Treaty
and the Single Act.
18. WEU co-ordination of the deployment of
member countries' naval forces to ensure respect
for the embargo against Iraq shows the opera-
tional nature of WEU, which can bring together
member countries' ministers of defence or chiefs
of defence staff. It would be deplorable for
Europe to deprive itself of these means of
action. An institution whose responsibilities do
not extend to the area covered by the modified
Brussels Treaty would be unable to carry out
this r6le.
19. Parliamentary supervision of activities
that remain in national hands will be far more
meaningful if carried out by an assembly ema-
nating from national parliaments, as is the case
of the WEU Assembly, than if exercised by a
European Parliament elected by direct suffrage
but with no means of influencing national gov-
ernments in an area where state sovereignty is in
no way limited.
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INFORMATION LETTER
from Mr. van Eeleclen, Secretary-General of WEU,
on the activities of the ministertd orgails
(Septembu 
- 
November 1990)
Dear President,
As I write this twelfth information letter to you and your colleagues, the Gulf crisis has moved
into its fourth month, Europe is on the eve of a series of summit meetings and intergovernmental
conferences which will sketch out plans for its new architecture, notably in the field of security and -
finally 
- 
the hopes of the new democracies in the East and the uncertainties of the countries on the
periphery of the Europe of the Nine and Twelve are calling urgently for decisive and concerted choices
from our member states. These are the three problems I should like to raise with you, since they will be
the focus of your Assembly's debates during the second part of its thirty-sixth ordinary session at the
beginning of December.
The Gulf conflict has entered into a new phase. Saddam Hussein has repeatedly been warned in
the clearest possible terms of the inevitable consequences of his murderous persistence in brutally
occupying Kuwait. The procession of eminent statesmen to Baghdad to secure the release of as many
" human shield " hostages as possible, with Saddam Hussein responding by allowing some to go in the
hope of dissuading the coalition of nations from taking action against him, or even dividing those
nations, must not mask the essential point: the necessary determination of the United Nations to put
an end to the plunder of Kuwait by persuasion, by the strict application of sanctions and, if necessary,
by force. The further military deployments which have just been agreed are designed solely to give the
United Nations a choice of various options. Saddam Hussein's obstinacy and cynicism are conferring
growing legitimacy on the possibility of armed intervention. The events of the past few weeks have
shown up the limits of conducting a dialogue with a man whose desire to play for time in no way
detracts from the pleasure he derives from humiliating others. Nevertheless, the " logic of war ", illus-
trated by the strengthening of the deployments by the coalition for the liberation of Kuwait, is aimed at
convincing Saddam Hussein of the realities of the risk he is facing and persuading him to take action to
remove that risk for once and for all.
There is a high level of consensus among the members of the Security Council and the interna-
tional community as to the resolutions adopted so far.and the sanctions put in place in response to
Iraqi aggression, combined with a willingness to seek a $eaceful resolution to the crisis, but one uncer-
tainty remains: what would become of this consensus if the international community were constrained
to use force in the near future?
WEU countries are concerned to ensure the cohesion vital to the success of the joint enterprise to
which they are making a unique contribution. Because of their autonomy of decision in practice there
will have to be consultation at the highest level 
- 
at least ministerial 
- 
should greater commitment
become inevitable under United Nations auspices and hence within the WEU framework.
Our member states now have a framework for common action as a result of the guidelines agreed
in the three areas of operation: naval, air/land and logistic.The decisions required in a state of war
could be taken only in the context of a WEU ministerial meeting, which would itself be one of the ele-
ments in the European and international concertation process. In any event, such a situation would be
a litmus test for WEU solidarity.
The limits of European commitment in the Gulf 
- 
only two countries have deployed forces from
all three armed services 
- 
should, however, cause us to reflect on whether it would be appropriate in
the future to envisage simple, yet effective, mechanisms for speeding up WEU's political and military
capacity to react to crises outside Europe. In the final analysis, does not WEU's credibility depend on
the operational r6le it could be given? The co-ordination mechanism now operating to the satisfaction
of all the parties concerned already goes far beyond the ad hoc measures adopted in 1987/88. There
remains the problem of military commitment on the ground, which is fairly thin at the moment in
Saudi Arabia, although it could be substantially strengthened when the time comes.
The appeal launched early in October by Mr. De Decker, Vice-Chairman of the Assembly's Poli-
tical Committee, for consideration to be given to establishing a " European rapid deployment force ",
an idea recently relaunched by some hundred German and French parliamentarians when they advo-
cated " multinational combat forces " and the establishment of " joint intervention forces to protect
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Europe's legitimate security interests ", clearly states the problem and will no doubt lead to the subject
being placed on the agenda of the competent WEU bodies so that its implications for force planning
may be studied. The Gulf crisis is a persuasive argument as to the importance of not prejudging the
mandate for future conventional arms control negotiations, particularly as regards our naval and aero-
naval forces and the possibility of deployments outside Europe.
This crisis must also make us realise that although the Soviet threat is currently receding this
must not be used as a pretext for dismantling NATO's defence planning achievements over the past
forty years. The * volatile crescent " along the southern flank of our continent spans the area from
Central Asia to the Greater Maghreb. The Middle East is, in a way, the epicentre in which many threats
to Europe's peace and prosperity are building up; it is our duty to defend and safeguard that peace and
to extend and share that prosperity.
We have little cause for smug optimism as regards developments in our own continent. What the
peoples of Central Europe have achieved in the spring and autumn of this year is considerable. The
process of democracy has taken root, but economic conditions are creating obvious impatience among
the people. Great hopes are vested in Western Europe and we must therefore be neither inward-looking
nor fragmented in our efforts to respond. A potentially explosive situation is brewing in the Balkani
and the Soviet Union. Despite his immeasurable power, President Gorbachev cannot derive from it
the authority he needs, and is impotent in the face of the relentless disintegration of the Soviet Union.
The same causes, the same effects: 1990 echoes 1917, with the reappearance of the spectre of famine
and worsening shortages in Moscow and the main urban centres. In this potentially explosive situation,
stabilisation through the creation or extension of a market economy is a priority for our own
medium-term security policy. Emergency food and economic aid should be immediate and uncondi-
tional, but investment programmes will have to be linked with the development of democratic institu-
tions. So great is the risk of political and ethnic unrest growing and spreading, leading to migration on
a 
-scate that might well exceed current forecasts, that there must be a mobilisation of minds and energy
within our member states. It is the responsibility of elected representatives to encourage private initia-
tives to back up the programmes drawn up by states, the Community and the international institutions.
Such steps might, for example, take the form of twinning or solidarity agreements. The coming months
will provide the opportunity to flesh out the concept of co-operation and security in Europe, which will
be the focus of debate for the heads of state and government of WEU member countries together with
their opposite numbers from elsewhere in our continent at the CSCE summit in Paris.
In May 1989, in a conversation with Professor Hans Maier, Chancellor Kohl said that " today's
Europe of the Community is just a limbless torso ". There is virtually unanimous recognition that
Europe is our destiny. Events have put Europeans on the spot. They may have had some excuse for
being taken by surprise last year, but with the timetable for the year-end 
- 
the CFE agreement, CSCE
summit, WEU ministerial meeting and intergovernmental conferences on European union 
- 
they
should be able to define the fundamental principles of European security irrespective of any debate on
possible and desirable institutional arrangements, a debate into which I shall not enter for the time
being.
If a European security identity is truly to exist in the minds of our peoples, the geographical and
cultural contours of the European space to be defended if and when necessary must be specified,
together with what is meant by European citizenship.
Basic questions as to the goals ofEuropean union can no longer be evaded. The new thresholds
that our states must cross together imply an acceptance of tighter disciplines and transfers of sove-
reignty at times yet to be determined. It is essential that the pace of future progress towards European
union should not be uneven because some are wholehearted and others hesitant. The interests of
Europe require that at each of the stages envisaged all the partners should have a firm and vigilant
resolve to create the synergy that enables them to move for,ward as one. In defining the European enter-
prise, there is a need for clarity as regards declared applications for membership and the accumulation
of priorities,with which the institutions 
- 
WEU, the Community, NATO and the Council of Europe 
-
will be confronted, each in its own sphere. Quite apart from the economic rationale, the poHfico-
strategic considerations that will determine the r6le that Europe decides to play on the world icene in
the 2lst century must already be central to our thinking.
Thought should be given to the organisation of relations with third countries that are members
neither of WEU nor of the Community, and the arrangements adapted to each individual state. On the
strategic level, the firmest of these links should be with the pivotal states on the northern and southern
flanks. The eastern periphery of Europe and the borders of the Mediterranean call for special attention,
si_nce in the final analysis our own stability depends in part on theirs. Finally, neutral states in the heart
ofthe European continent and in Scandinavia are addressing the issue oftheir neutrality and calling it
into question.
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WEU's parliamentary Assembly has an important r6le to play in clarifying these matters, since
the success ofEuropean integration depends to a great extent on the consensus ofpublic opinion. In the
last resort, we shail have to give a convincing reply when a future European conscript asks: what
Europe am I supposed to be fighting for?
***
Since last September, WEU's Permanent Council has met on five occasions (on 26th September,
on lTth and 31st October and on l4th November).
The meeting on 3rd October was a formal session to commemorate the Day of German Unity. I
think it would be-useful to bring to the attention of WEU parliamentarians the text of the speeches
made by the German Ambassador, the French Ambassador speaking on behalf of the Presidency of.the
Councii and the representatives of Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and the United
Kingdom. The Council also took note of the declaration by the German Government. All these docu-
ments are set out in Annex I to this letter.
At the four other Council meetings, the prevailing themes of discussions were the exchange of
information on the Gulf situation and follow-up on the extraordinary ministerial meetings held on 2lst
August and l Sth September.
Another major theme was WEU's relations with third countries. The Council embarked on
detailed discussion of the attitude member states should adopt towards applicant countries over the
next few months, the presence of observers at future WEU ministerial meetings (Denmark, Gr€ece,
Ireland and Turkey had been invited to send observers to the extraordinary ministerial meeting of 2l st
August) and two-way information contacts with the democratically-elected governments of Central and
Eastern Europe. The debate on the prospects for a European security identity continued, in preparation
for the eventa scheduled for the end of the year. The Council devoted particularly close attention to the
progress with the Vienna negotiations for the conclusion of a CFE agreement. WPU's rdle in the new
European security architecture will be the focus of debate for the Enlarged Council with a view to pre-
paring for the Ministerial Council.
For their part, the Council's working groups have also tackled these questions during their mee-
tings. The Special Working Group and the Defence Representatives Group have held three joint mee-
tings (on 3rd September, l0th October and 8th November).
In dealing with topical questions, delegates have exchanged information and comment on deve-
lopments in thtculf criiis, the co'ordination measures adopted by WEU countries and the diplomatic
initiatives designed to strengthen the application of the embargo. The Special Working Group has
decided to retain on its agenda the problem created by the existence of weapons of mass destruction in
the Middle East, which may well represent an even greater threat in the region by the end of the
century.
On the basis of an informal document submitted by the WEU Institute and a Secretariat working
document, the delegations to these meetings considered the problems that would have to be solved
before the conclusion ofthe CFE agreement negotiations: air forces and ground-based aeronaval forces;
circumvention and verification at a time when the withdrawal of modern Soviet equipment to the east
of the Urals is accelerating; the question of parity, taking into account the decisions as to sub-regional
apportionment; personnel strength; and the definition of sufficiency, whose implications are as much
pblitical as they are military. The Special Working Group prepared for the NATO High-Level Task
Force seminar held in Rome on I lth September, devoted to the steps to be taken between the Paris
CSCE summit and the Helsinki review conference scheduled for 1992.In the declaration adopted at
the London summit, WEU states undertook, together with their allies, to work for fresh negotiations
with the same mandate, the aim being to limit the strength of armed forces in Europe. Since the " bloc-
to-bloc " criterion no longer applies, in the situation that has existed in Europe since 3rd October and
with the German Governmenf i declared intentions as to the organisation of the defence of the unified
Germany, the western approach must be adapted to changing circumstances. Steps should be taken
here and now to define i European position on the global political concept and on general objectives
for the continuance of the conventional arms control negotiations that will follow the Helsinki review
conference in L992. The stress should also be on the gradual development of confidence-building mea-
sures which should, despite Soviet hesitancy, be promoted in a pragmatic spirit.
As part of the preparations for the Paris summit, delegations discussed the security institutions
that might be establiihed under CSCE. The plan to set up a conflict prevention c€ntre, based on the
principles set out in paragraph 22 of the London declaration, was the subject of broad-ranging dis-
iussion. If a centre oflnis-tinO is to be genuinely capable of reducing the risk of confrontation, it must
have the benefit of direct means of communication among states to increase the flow of available infor-
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mation and thus prevent misunderstanding and miscalculation. The centre's essential function, then,
should be to clarify unusual military activity and implement confidence-building measures. Thereafter,
political conciliation at the time when conflict is imminent can be envisaged only if the centre has
proved its worth in the priority field of achieving transparancy.
The problems of European security co-operation will continue to be debated in the light of deve-
lopments in the Atlantic Alliance, with due regard for NATO's current strategic review.
The Defence Representatives Group met on 9th October to continue its discussion on the pro-
blems of verification of the future CFE agreement and to review experience with bilateral trial inspec-
tions conducted by member states. A report on co-operation on verification is being finalised and will
be submitted to the Enlarged Council meeting planned for 29th November. The group embarked on
preparations for a meeting of chiefs-of-staffto be held in the first half of 1991, the agenda for which
should focus on the lessons to be learned from developments in the Gulf crisis, but also cover: the eva-
luation of out-of-Europe risks and the advisability of having joint intervention facilities; a review of
NATO strategy; and Soviet military capabilities by the year 1995.
On 27th September a meeting of veriJication experts was held in London to compare national
experiences with setting up bodies responsible for the implementation of verification missions, training
and inspectors' equipment and training.
The ad hoc Sub-Group on Space met on 24th and 28th September and on 7th November to
finalise the report requested by ministers at their April meeting and to draft a ministerial decision to be
referred to the Enlarged Council on 29th November. Several meetings of experts were also held on
technical aspects of the planned space co-operation projects.
!t
**
Relations between the public, the administration and the armed forces provided the theme of the
39th seminar for WEU government fficials organised by the Public Administration Committee at the
Paris oflices of WEU on 8th-l2th October. Mr. Michel Franc, Conseiller d'Etat, Director of the Ins-
titut International d'Administration Publique, had drawn up the programme for the meetings which
were chaired by Colonel Marc Giacomini, Chef de la Division Etudes, Planification, Evaluation at the
Service d'Information et de Relations Publiques des Armdes (SIRPA), Ministry of Defence. Two
working groups discussed the problems of the evaluation of public attitudes to the armed forces and
communication in times of crisis. Participants also pooled their views on ways of stimulating a defence
awareness.
In a democracy, there must be an active policy on the dialogue between the armed forces and
public opinion, which presupposes a balance between the right of the public to be informed and the
duty of the armed forces to inform on the one hand and, on the other, the genuine need for infor-
mation. This may vary from one situation to another, as illustrated by the current commitment of
military resources in different forms by WEU member states to the Gulf region. In the opinion of those
present, the quality of national assessments conducted up to this time would have been enhanced had
they been comparable. An exchange of information and research documents would be a first step
towards a security " Eurobarometer ".
Communication in times of crisis calls for continuing adjustments to a shifting situation and for
the mobilisation of highly-skilled staff trained in the use of very diversified techniques. The message to
be conveyed to the public is an active factor as a crisis develops, because of the impact it makes on
human minds. Communication is of course centralised at the highest level of nationaf authority, and a
key factor is interministerial co-ordination. Transparency and a positive attitude towards journalists
are essential since, by definition, in times of crisis the only restrictions that may be placed on the media
are those imposed by mutual consent.
Stimulating a European defence awareness is an imperative over the coming decade. The success
of this enterprise depends on whether European peoples believe that they belong to societies worth
defending and recognise the essential aim of WEU member states in their defence effort: to ensure that
Europe retains control over its own destiny and can therefore protect its vital interests and its nationals
thourghout the world. No field of state activity can be indifferent to the need to strengthen defence
awareness. National identities and European identity must reinforce each other in this respect. The
geostrategic developments of the past few months are leading to a reappraisal of security policy aims
and methods and to a review and adaptation of public information literature. The restructuringof the
armed forces should be a good opportunity to adapt the deployment of units more closely to their
human and economic environment, both nationally and at the European level.
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In conclusion, the participants at the seminar stressed that the European defence identity must
no longer just be a mattei of words. With growing contact and inte-rchange among the armed forces of
WEU douirtries, there would be every benef-rt in continuing that effort through the formation of multi-
national units, more exchanges of personnel, greater equipment compatibility and enhanced inter-
operability.
***
In accordance with the ministerial mandate requesting the WEU Council Presidency and the
Secretary-General to establish two-way information contacts with the democratically-elected govern-
ments of Central and Eastern Europe, I visited Hungary on 22nd and 23rd October last, together with
Mr. Philippe Guelluy, Chef du Service des Affaires Strat6giques et des Pactes at the Quay d'Orsay. We
went on io meet representatives of the Hungarian Government: the Secretary of State for Defence,
Lt. Gen. Antal Annus, and the Foreign Minister, Mr. Geza Jeszensky, as well as the Deputy Speaker
of the Hungarian Parliament, Mr. Dornbach, and the Chairmen of the Foreign and Defence Commit-
tees, Mr. Horn and Mr. Balogh.
Hungarian policy on security and the future of the Warsaw Pact, the European.security^archi-
tecture and-the CSCE iummit were the main topics of discussion. The Hungarian ministers informed
us that the Warsaw Pact summit was being postfoned, giving grounds for thinking that it mlgry be di,s;
solved before several of its European members withdrew. In the opinion of those we met, CSCE should
be a sort of model for a future European security system, offering a range of two-way guarantees to the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
The idea was put fonrard of a seminar to bring together the officials responsible for politico-
military affairs in tfe foreign and defence ministries of Hungary, Poland, Cz_echoslovakia and the
WEU iountries, in order to develop informal contacts under the auspices of the WEU Institute. At the
same time, the intensification of contact between WEU's parliamentary Assembly and the Hungarian
Parliament might well help to promote the political dialogue.
On 5th and 6th November, Mr. Guelluy and I visited Czechoslovakia, where we were received
by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Jiri Dienstbier, the Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr- Zdenko Pirek, and the
Deputy Deflnce Minister, Mr. Rasek. We also met several senior officials in their entourage..The
Cz6ch authorities were closely monitoring developments in the Soviet Union, w-hose future was still in
the balance. Nationality tensions were, in their view, secondary to the urgency of the measures that had
to be taken to prevent economic collapse, with all its disastrous consequences. They saw European and
Atlantic institutions as being a key factor in the stability and progress of Europe as a whole. Democrati-
sation could only benefit from closer links among all the peoples in the continent. Russia should not be
left isolated from the development of pan-European structures. The future of European integration and
the Warsaw Pact were also discussed.
The main topics of our discussions with Mr. Ivan Simko and Mr. Ladislav Lis, Chairman of the
Federal Assembly Committees on Armed Forces and Security, were 
-the reorganisation of the armed
forces and the future of the Warsaw Pact. They expressed a wish for the establishment of contact
without delay between the Czech Committees on the Armed Forces and Security and the corres-
ponding committees in WEU's parliamentary Assembly.
At the end of each of these preliminary missions to the democratic governments of Central
Europe, Mr. Guelluy and I briefed the heads of mission of WEU member states in Budapest and
Prague on our discussions with the Hungarian and Czech authorities.
***
Turning to the relations between your Assembly and the Permanent Council, I should first like
to stress how Eonstructive the dialogue was on 9th October between the members of the Political Com-
mittee and myself on developmenis in the Gulf crisis and the security situation in Europe. If the
Assembly committees think if would be helpful, I am at their disposal to come and share my thoqghts
with their members and make my contribution to the debate on the necessary acceleration of the
process of European integration in ihe fields of defence and security. {,s w-e move into the 1990s, this is
the level at whiih substantial progress should be made, just as the period following the Treaty of Rome
saw economic advances, while the 1970s was the decade of political progress.
The information booklet published by the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly, containing the
information report on WEU presented by Mi. Tummers to the second part of the 35th oldinary session
in December l-989, should be revised regarding certain points now that the Agencies for Security q99s-
tions have been wound up and the WEU Institute for Security Questions set up on lst July 1990.
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First of all, may I point out that the commonly-used term, " ministerial organs', has the
advantage of succinctly distinguishing, within WEU, between the field of activity for which the Minis-
terial Council, the Permanent Council and its working groups are responsible and the field for which
your parliamentary Assembly is responsible.
WEU has two seats. The Secretariat-General has been in London, at 9, Grosvenor Place, since
1957 and it is where the Permanent Council and, since its reactivation, its working groups meet. In
Paris, the WEU buildingat 43, avenue du Pr6sident-Wilson has, since 1962, been thcseat of the Coun-
cil's subsidiary organs. Today it houses the ACA and the WEU Institute for Security Studies 
- 
as well
as accommodating the Offrce of the Clerk of the Assembly. The ACA, a subsidiary organ of the Council
whose creation was decided in the Paris Agreements and included in Article VIII of the modified
Brussels Treaty, has had no seat laid down by treaty. Operational considerations prevailed in this case,
namely that it was deemed useful and necessary for the ACA to be close to NATO.
At lst January 1991, the Secretariat-General will have 53 posts, two of them hors grade, at lst
January 1991, the ACA will have one post and the WEU Institute for Security Studies will have
23 posts, one of which is hors grade.
The Institute comes under the authority of the Permanent Council, although this does not affect
the " intellectual independence " it was granted by ministers in the decision by which it was set up. The
ACA staff member who acts as Deputy Director is responsible to the Permanent Council and comes
under my administrative control.
The staffemployed by WEU are international civil servants whose contract of employment with
the organisation is based on the current staff rules. Some of them have been sent by their national
authorities. Since March 1984, contracts of employment offered to new WEU staff have been for a
fixed period. The Council and I have naturally taken care to arrange for a fair apportionment of posts
among nationals of the various WEU member states.
***
On l3th and l4th September, I paid an oflicial visit to Portugal, accompanied by Mr. E. Deste-
fanis, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs. This visit, which was extremely well-organised
by the Portuguese authorities, gave me an opportunity for very constructive discussions at the highest
level.
I had the honour of being received by the President of the Republic, Mr. Mario Soares, who
granted me a hearing of over 40 minutes.
The Prime Minister, Mr. Anibal Cavaco Silva, also received me for a long discussion which bore
on the situation in the Gulf and WEU's future within the context of the move towards European union.
With the Foreign Minister, Professor Juan de Deus Pinheiro, and the national Defence Minister,
Dr. Fernando Nogueira, I had fruitful exchanges of views on the Portuguese contribution to be made to
the embargo in the Gulf as part of WEU co-ordination, as well as on progress with the Vienna negotia-
tions and preparations for the CSCE summit. We spoke of the possible extension of this process to the
Mediterranean. Finally, we mentioned developments in thinking on the future European security
architecture and the need to strengthen co-operation on security among WEUmember states.
I also met Professor Crespo, President of the Assembly of the Republic, and several members of
the Portuguese Delegation to the WEU parliamentary Assembly.
During the visit, I paid a visit to the IEPG Secretariat and made a speech on WEU and European
security to the National Defence Institute.
*
tl. {.
In the field of public relations and information regarding WEU's current and future r6le and
missions, my colleagues and I have taken part in the following events:
- 
From 3rd to 5th September, Ambassador H. Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, attended the
second workshop in Vienna on the verification of arms reduction arranged under the auspices
of the Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt. He gave a paper in the pleniry session on the r6le
of WEU in verification.
- 
On 5th-8th September, at Hot Springs, Virginia, I attended the 32nd annual conference of the
International Instutute of Strategic Studies (IISS) on America's r6le in a changing world.
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- 
On l Tth September, I spoke at Bad Godesberg at a conference arranged by the German
Society for Foreign Affairs.
- 
On 17th September, Mr. E. Destefanis received a group of United States journalists at the
Secretariat and adressed them on WEU and its r6le in the emergence of new security struc-
tures in Europe.
- 
On 2l st and 22nd September, I took part in the second seminar in Copenhagen organised by
the European Movement on the subject " Towards a larger Europe ".
- On 24th September, Ambassador Holthoff attended the international sympbsium of the
Spanish Atlantic Association in Madrid on the future of the alliance. He took the floor during
the debate on NATO, WEU and CSCE.
- 
On 4th October, I gave a speech to the British association " Families for Defence " on the
future of European security.
- 
On 5th October, I gave the inaugural tutorial in the Master's course on international politics at
the Centre for the Study of International Relations (CERI), Universit6 Libre de Bruxelles, on
the security dimension of European integration.
- On l lth October, I attended the NATO Central Region Air Command seminar in Ramstein.
- 
On l2th October, I spoke in The Hague on WEU's contribution to the security of Western
Europe as part of a conference organised by the Royal Society for Military Science on West
European security after 1992.
- 
On 14th October, at the Secretariat, my colleagues and I welcomed General Milani, SACEUR
representative to the WEU Council, for a working meeting on the situation in the Gulf and
progress with the review of Atlantic Alliance strategy.
- On l5th October, I made a speech on WEU at Greenwich to the oflicers on the Joint Service
Defence College course and the teaching staff 
'.
- 
On l6th October, under the programme of co-operation between ASEAN and the European
Community, Ambassador Holthoff addressed the European Political Co-operation (EPC)
Secretariat on European security policy in the light of the situation in Eastern Europe and the
Gulf crisis.
- 
On l8th-2lst October, I attended a seminar in Alanya organised by the Turkish Atlantic
Treaty Association on the impact of changing East and West relations on NATO and-Turkey's
colleciive security and defence, where I spoke to the seminar on the new r6le of WEU.
- 
On 29th October, Mr. E. Destefanis gave a talk on WEU and the security of Europe to
diplomats enrolled on the MA/post-graduate diploma in diplomatic studies at the Diplomatic
Academy of London.
- On 7th November, I made a speech to the French Atlantic Treaty Association on European
security.
- 
Also on 7th November, I gave a talk on WEU and European security in a study session
arranged by the NATO Defence College.
- On 9th November, I spoke on the same topics in The Hague during a conference organised by
the Peace Policy Foundation, entitled "Extending Europe in four dimensions".
- 
On l3th November, I gave a talk to the Eurodispuut Association in Utrecht on international
organisations in the field of European security.
- 
On l5th November, I attended the annual conference of the Centre for European Policy
Studies (CEPS) in Brussels.
- 
Finally, on l6th November, I went to Brunssum to pay an information visit to the Allied
Forces Central Europe (AFCENT).
Over the past two and a half months, I have continued to have regular contact with the press,
radio and television both in London and during my visits to WEU member countries. Through these
meetings I was able to clarify the direction in which WEU is working in the cha_nging context of
European affairs and to explain the co-ordinating r6le that our organisation has so effectively assumed
since the Gulf crisis broke out.
l. The text is attached to this letter as Annex II.
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ANNEX I
This annex contains:
- 
the texts of the declarations made at the Council meeting on 3rd October 1990, celebrating the
Day of Common Unity;
- 
the text of the letter from the Federal German Chancellor to heads of state and government,
marking this day;
- 
the press release issued after the Council meeting the same day.
Opening oddress by the Secretary-General, Dr. |l/. van Eekelen
With this extraordinary meeting of our Council, we are marking the Day of German Unity.
Today, the aspirations of the German people to achieve unity and freedom based on self-determination
have been realised. Today not only heralds the end of the artificial and often cruel division of
Germany, it also terminates the division of our continent. Therefore at midnight we witnessed the
closing of the post-war period and today we begin a new chapter in European history. As a European I
feel moved and privileged to chair our Council meeting today.
The peaceful and democratic way in which these historic changes have taken place deserves
respect and admiration. Respect and admiration for the present German Government for its vision
and vigour but also for all its predecessors. So does the spirit in which the two-plus-four negotiations
were conducted, where all sides endeavoured to place greater emphasis on joint success than on seeking
individual advantage. These are promising contributions indeed towards the building of a just and
lasting order of peace in Europe.
German unification contributes towards the achievement of the fundamental aims of WEU, as
laid down in the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty. Let me remind you that member states
declared in that preamble that they were resolved ..." to fortify and preserve the principles of demo-
cracy, personal freedom and political liberty ... and to promote the unity and to encourage the pro-
gressive integration of Europe ".
Germany's friends and allies wholeheartedly share the joy of the German people.
Statement by the German Representative, H.E. Mr. H. von Richthofen
Germany is united today.
United in peace and freedom through free self-determination and in agreement with our partners
and our neighbours. We have joined together to form a single state, the Federal Republic of Germany,
with complete sovereignty over her internal and external affairs.
Forty-five years after the end of the second world war which originated from German soil and
caused untold suffering in Europe and throughout the world, the painful division of Germany has
come to an end.
This is indeed a day of joy and it is my privilege today to express my deep gratitude to our
partners and friends who gave their support and helped us on our way to unity.
In the diflicult years of the cold war, you, our partners in WEU and NATO have stood by our
side and shared our concern for German unification. I am happy today to be able to inform you that
the united Germany is a full member of Western European Union.
It is my country's wish to serve the cause of global peace and to advance the uniflrcation of
Europe through its regained national unity. This is the mandate of our constitution given to us in 1949,
and this remains our supreme goal for the future.
We know that upon unification we will have to assume greater responsibility within the com-
munity of nations. Our foreign policy will remain directed towards global partnership, close co-
operation and peaceful reconciliation of interests.
Only peace will emanate from German soil.
The inviolability of borders and the respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all
states in Europe is the precondition for peace. For this reason, we have confirmed the final character of
all borders of the united Germany including the border with the Republic of Poland.
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We will take into account the protection of confidence and the interests of all states concerned
when we start discussing the contractual obligations of the former German Democratic Republic.
With the same determination with which we worked for German unity we will foster European
unification in order to complete the single European market by 1992, in ordei to achieve economii and
monetary union, in order to advance towards political union.
. _ 
Tt e CqCE process is essential in building a new structure of security and co-operation for the
unification of the whole of Europe. We are firmly committed to this intensification and institutionali-
sation.
For more than forty years the members of the North Atlantic Alliance have, in their community
based on the shared values offreedom and democracy, preserved peace and freedom on our contineni.
We will continue to be a full member of NATO and we will strive to develop and to adapt the alliance
to the continuing progress in East-West relations while maintaining its r6le as the basiC pillar of new
security structures in Europe.
Disarmament and arms control remain key elements of our security policy.
We have affirmed our renunciation as a united Germany of the production, possession and
control of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Germany remains committed to the non-
proliferation treaty. Within the process of conventional arms reduction in Europe, we have declared
our willingness to reduce the armed forces of the united Germany to 370 000 men. We trust that the
other participating countries will join in our effort to consolidate security and stability in Europe in the
follow-on negotiations.
The united Germany is committed to play a full part in ensuring that the United Nations fulfils
its mission of building a peaceful world. As German unity with complete sovereignty has been
achieved, the Federal Republic of Germany is prepared to participate in United Nations measures
aimed at preserving and restoring peace through the deployment of her forces.
Today and in future, Germany stands shoulder to shoulder with all those who are committed to
peace, respect for human rights and freedom.
Now that the burden of division has been lifted from us, we Germans are prepared to redouble
our efforts towards shaping a common peaceful future in trustful co-operation wittratt countries and
people.
^_ . 
Mr. Secretary-General, your Excellencies, dear colleagues, I would like to make the following
official statement:
"Today, on 3rd October 1990, the German people's wish to achieve in free self-determination
the unity and freedom of Germany has been fulfilled.
As the German Representative to the Permanent Council of Western European Union, I am
happy to be able to inform the Council that henceforth the united Germhny will be a full
member of Western European Union.
Questions regarding the territory of what was until now the German Democratic Republic and
Berlin are settled in the treaty of l2th September 1990 on the final settlement with respect to
Germany. I refer to Article 6 of this treaty which states, and I quote 'The right of the united
Germ-any to belong to alliances with all the rights and responsibilities arising therefrom shall not
be affected by the present treaty'.
The overall obligation to provide assistance in case of an armed attack referred to in Article V of
the modified Brussels Treaty and all other provisions of the set of treaties shall apply with imme-
diate effect on the whole territory of the united Germany. "
Statement by the French Permanent Representative,
H.E. Mr. L. de la Bane de Nanteuil, on behalf of the Presidency of the Council
On behalf of all delegations, I should like to thank the German Ambassador for his statement.
I am delighted that, as chance and the calendar would have it, it has fallen to a Frenchman to
reply and express the WEU Council's pleasure at seeing Germany recover its full and complete sove-
reignty, thus bringing an anomalous situation to an end.
I should like to highlight three characteristic aspects of today's event.
In the first place, this event can obviously not be divorced from the changes that have been
taking place in all the countries of Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. For the first time in
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history, all the peoples of Europe are seeking to espouse the same values: peace, liberty, democracy,
respect for human rights and a state founded on the rule of law. It is for this reason that German unifi-
cation should be but one stage in the general process of unification of our continent.
Secondly, the agreement that has made German unification possible has been achieved in a
climate in which the protagonists of the last world conflict no longer harbour any wish to impose discri-
minatory conditions on one of their number. All the provisions of the treaty on the final settlement
with respect to Germany have been freely accepted by all its signatories. The reaffirmation of the
binding nature of the frontiers has been preceded in particular by declarations from both German Par-
liaments. Germany's renunciation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons only confirms its past
undertakings. Lastly, Germany retains the right to decide on its membership of alliances, with all the
rights and responsibilities arising therefrom.
It is for this reason that we have convened here today and have heard the German Permanent
Representative declare that the united Germany is a full member of Western European Union. I
propose that the Council take note of this declaration and make it public in the form of a press release,
to be issued after our meeting.
Thirdly, I should like to say how greatly I, as a Frenchman, rejoice at the culmination of the
process of German unification and share in the German people's joy. Our two peoples have been in
conflict on three occasions, but neither of us believes that history must inevitably repeat itself. Looking
far beyond the reconciliation decided upon in 1963 when the ElysCe Treaty was signed, their aim is to
build up the closest possible understanding and co-operation. Today, I should like solemnly to declare
that my country will abide faithfully by the policy line it has set itself. France will preserve its special
relationship with a democratic, peaceful and united Germany, and will work to further the building of
the community of Europe.
France is convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long
as it does not include security and defence. It will redouble its efforts to forge an increasingly coherent
European defence identity that more effectively embodies the commitments of solidarity into which we
have entered under the modified Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty.
Statement by the Belgian Permanent Representative, H.E, Mn J-P, van Bellinghen
Mr. Secretary-General, dear colleagues, I have been attending this Permanent Council
throughout the seven years I have been in London, and it is truly the first time that we have witnessed
such a major event. A major event which goes to the very heart of our treaty and to the heart of our pre-
occupations; an event which marks the culmination of one of our objectives. Our feeling is therefore
one of profound joy.
As our Chairman has said, this achievement is undoubtedly due to the changed international
climate but equally to the will of the German people, its courage, patience and, quite simply, the social,
political, democratic and economic success of the Federal Republic of Germany. At midnight last night
I was in a house two doors away from my own, in the Embassy of what was the German Democratic
Republic. There were only young people there speaking German, clustered around their Trabants, one
of which was wrapped in the red, black and gold colours of Germany. Hearing them speak, I said to
myselt the event taking place is not a reminder of the past but the expression of a guarantee for the
future. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Statement by the United Kingdom Pennanent Representative, Mr. J, Greenstock
Mr. Secretary-General, the United Kingdom welcomes the fact that Germany is being unified in
the best possible way, democratically, in peace and freedom and as a member of the North Atlantic
Alliance, the EC and WEU. The United Kingdom is glad to have played a full part in the two-plus-four
negotiations, which resolved the external aspects of German unification and paved the way for full
German sovereignty. This was the culmination of our r6le as one of the four powers in the post-war
period, helping to reconstruct and defend a free democratic Germany. We are particularly proud of our
r6le in defending Berlin. At the request of the German Government, we are contributing a British
military presence in Berlin while Soviet forces remain on German soil. German unification takes place
in a Europe that is rapidly changing for the better. A united Germany will have an important r6le to
play in this new Europe and in the wider world. We will be working with Germany as a friend, ally and
partner, as we have done with the Federal Republic up to now. We pay tribute to the people of Eastern
Germany, who demanded and won freedom and democracy, and to the people of West Germany, who
have helped them to achieve it on this historic day. Thank you.
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Statement by the Spanish Pennanent Representative, H,E. Mr. F. de la Morena
Mr. Secretary-General, German Ambassador, dear colleagues, I would like to join my 
-colleagues
who have precededme in congratulating the German Ambassador on this momentous day of the unifi-
cation of Germany. It is certainly an historic day on which to rejoice, and as Europeans, we are sure
that this day will be remembered by future generations. It is impossible to think of Europe without
Germany, in the same way as it is impossible to think of Germany_outside the context of Europe. That
is why tliis event is so imfortant for all of us and not only for the German people. I do not think this is
a moment for a long speech, but I would simply like to extend our warmest congratulations and very
best wishes for a spiendid future for Germany, which will also be a splendid future for Europe. Thank
you very much.
Statement by the Portuguue Permanent Representative, H.E. Mn A. Yaz'Pereira
I would like to join my colleagues in congratulating the German Representative on this historic
occasion, so importani not ohly for the German people but also for all of us and for all of Europe. Last
night, we saw the end of a period of 40 years that rep-resented not-o_nly the.division of Europe but the
co-nfrontation between two worlds and the division of the whole of Europe into opposite camps. So, at
this particular moment, I do believe that we should rejoice in what has happened^and especi{_V w.e
shouid rejoice at what is coming. All the best for the German people and all the best for all of us. Thank
you.
Statement by the Netherlands Pennanent Representative, H.E. Mr. l,-8. Hoekman
Mr. Secretary-General, first of all I would like to join previous speakers where they have
expressed their feelings ofjoy on this day.
As Her Majesty Queen Beatrix recently said in her speech from the throne opening the parlia-
mentary year, Europe's division is nearing its end.
The Netherlands Government has always welcomed the prospect of German unification; the
partition of Germany reflected an unnatural state of affairs, and the lack of freedom in the GDR a
painful injustice to the people.
Taking into consideration the period of 40 years of democracy in the FRG.and the need for
freedom in t[e GDR, there is every reason to trust that a unified Germany will be a pillar of demgcryly
in Europe, all the more because Germany will continue to be a member of NATO, the EC and WEU.
The new Germany will be able to contribute to the new Europe.
The unification of Germany symbolises the process of peaceful change, the healing of a once
bitterly-divided Europe. The Netherlands rejoice with our German friends that the unity which they
have long sought has finally become a reality on this day, 3rd October.
Today, Secretary-General, we are celebrating without afterthought Germany's most remarkable
achievement and the coming of age of a post-war Europe.
(In German) I should like to offer my German colleague warmest congratulations on the unifi-
cation of Germany and the restoration of German sovereignty.
Statement by the Luxembourg Representative, Mr. J.-J. Welfring
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I should like in turn to associate myself fully with.the words that you,
the Presidency aiO the other delegations have spoken on this great occasion, and simply to cite two
sentences from the official statemeit on German unity published by the Luxembourg Government this
morning:
" The people of Luxembourg welcome the unification of Germany,.in the-certainty that the fresh
-ornentum imparted to thelurrent progress towards European union will further strengthen the
solidarity binding our peoples.
They wish the German people happiness and prosperity in their newly-found unity and
freedom. "
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Statement by the Italian Pennanent Representative, H.E. Mr. B. Biancheri
_ 
The feeliltgs of the members of WEU have been expressed by the French Presidency, by yourself,
Vr. Secretary-General and by other delegations very well and very eloquently. I will simply iay (to theGerman Ambassador) that the ltalian people and the Italian Government do rejoice witlr you. ttrey
reioice fully, entirely and sincerely. We rejoice because the German land, the German heiitage, the
German peoplg are now one; we as Europeans, as members of this union, therefore feel strong-er and
more secure. We are sure that with the same determination and the same vision, unified Germany will
now work together with its partners for the construction of Europe.
Reply by the German Permanent Representative, H.E. Mr. H. von Richthofen
Mr. Secretary-General, dear colleagues, may I thank you all for your congratulations, your best
wishes and your very kind words. It is a great happiness for us to know that you rejoice over this his-
toric day with us. May I also again express my gratitude for all the support you have given us both in
difficult times and in good ones. May I also thank you for the understanding and encouragement you
have given us for the future. This will not be an easy process, but we know that assisted by our friends
and partners, we will be able to succeed. Thank you very much.
Message of the Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany sent on 3rd October 1990
to heads of states and governmenf
The German nation has reunited in peace and freedom today.
Forty-five years after the end of the second world war, which originated from German soil and
caused untold suffering in Europe and throughout the world, the painful separation of the German
people has come to an end.
In exercising our right to free self-determination, in harmony with our neighbours and on the
basis of the treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany, we Germans have today united to
form a single state 
- 
the Federal Republic of Germany 
- 
with complete sovereignty over its internal
and external affairs.
On behalf of the German people I would like to thank all those who stood up for our right of self-
determination and smoothed our path towards unity. Conscious of the continuit, of German history,
we particularly appreciate this contribution.
I. Our country wants to serve the cause of global peace and advance the unification of Europe
through its regained national unity. That is the mandate of our constitution, the Basic Law, which has
stood the test of time and which will also apply to the united Germany.
At the same time,. 
-we 
stand by our moral and legal obligations resulting from German history.
We. know that upon unification we will also assume greater responsibility within the community of
nations as a whole. Our foreign policy will therefore remain directed towaids global partnership, ciose
co-operation and a peaceful reconciliation of interests.
In future, German soil will be a source of peace only. We are aware that the inviolability of the
borders_and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty ofall states in Europe is a basic precon-
dition.for peace. That is why we have confirmed the final character of the united Germany's borders,
including the border with the Republic of Poland. At no time in the future will we mak6 territoriai
claims on any other country. Now that German unity has been established, we shall discuss with the
contracting parties concerned the international treaties of the German Democratic Republic with a
view to.regulating or confirming their continued application, adjustment or expiry, takinf into account
protection of confidence, the interests of the states concerned and the contractual obligations of the
Federal Republic of Germany, as well as the principles of a free, democratic basic ordei governed by
the rule of law, and respecting the competence of the European Community.
II. The unification of Germany is inextricably linked with that of Europe. We will resolutely
continue to strive for European unification with the same determination with which we worked
towards German unity.
. 
Important steps lie immediately before us. Together with our partners in the European Com-
munity, we want to complete the single European market by 1992. We are steadily moving towards
2. Unofficial translation.
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economic and monetary union. The united Germany will play an active part in the development of
political union.
The European Community will be ready to co-operate closely with the other countries in Europe.
In particular, wt intend to contiibute to the development of closer ties between the Europea^n Com-
-rnity and the countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Eur-ope which have won their freedom
and set out on the path towards political, economic and social reform.
We are convinced that the countries of Europe can best safeguard and strengthen their indepen-
dence and their citizens' human rights and fundamental freedoms if they work together.
For this reason, an important forum for our co-operation is and remains the Council of Europe.
We are committed to the process of security and co-operation in Europe as a sou-rce of hope for
the European nations and as a siepping-stone towards their future unity. We are therefore strongly in
favour of this process being intensified and institutionalised.
III. The community of free western democracies based on shared values and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation liave preserved peace and freedom on our contine.nt 9}ring difficult decades. For
this reason, the united Germany will continue to be a member of this alliance.
Together with our allies, we also want to further develop this successful alliance in line with the
progress irade in East-West relations and the changing demands of our time, as well as to preserve its
iOte as the basic pillar of new, overarching security structures in Europe.
We advocate a joint declaration by the members of the two alliances in Europe, reaffirming their
intention to refrain fiom the threat or use of force and establishing a new partnership in the deve-
lopment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.
Disarmament and arms control remain key elements of our security policy.
In the context of German unif,rcation we have reaffrrmed our renunciation of the manufacture,
possession and control of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The united Germany remains
committed to the non-proliferation treaty.
Our willingness to reduce the united Germany's armedforces to 370 000 is contribution to the
success of the nelgotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Fu16pe- We assume that in the
iotto*-on negotiitions the other participating countries, too, will play^ their pa_rt in consolidating
security and itability in Europe, not least through measures to reduce force levels.
On the global level, too, we shall seek disarmament agreements that will increase stability and
security. The -principle of basing the level of forces only on self-defence requirements must apply
throughout the world.
An agreement on reductions in strategic nuclear weapons between the United States and the
Soviet Uni6n, negotiations on reducing American and Soviet short-range nuclear weapons and, not
least, a global ban on chemical weapons are still urgently required.
IV. The countries of Africa, Asia and America can continue to count on the solidarity of the united
Germany. We will not invest in German unity at their expense.
On the contrary, the end of the conflict in Europe will free intellectual and material resources to
tackle the fundamentii tasks for peace which are now facing us: the struggle against poverty and under-
development and the preservation of our natural environment.
Terrorism and drug abuse are challenges to all states throughout the world, which call for joint
action. We will shoulder our share of the responsibility.
V. The elimination of the East-West conflict has also opened up new avenues for fully imple-
menting the high goals of the United Nations Charter. At the same time, the events of the last few
weeks liare derion-strated the extent to which world peace is still endangered by disregard for the prin-
ciples of the United Nations Charter.
The Federal Republic of Germany wishes to play a part in ensuring that the United Nations
fulfils its indispensabli r$le in the process of building a peaceful world and meeting the global chal-
lenges we face.
As German unity with complete sovereignty has been achieved, the Federal Republic. of
Germany is prepared to participate in United Natibns measures aimed at preserving and..restoring
t d ihi"rgt, tti. development bf its forces, too. We will create the necessary internal conditions for
this.
VI. At the beginning of the last decade of this century, we see new opportunities for a world which
solves its problims thr:ough reconciliation and understanding, and remains committed to the principles
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of international law. Our country stands shoulder-to-shoulder with all those who are committed topeace, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as individual well-beinC. - -
Now that the burden of division has been lifted from us, we are prepared to redouble our efforts
towards shaping a common peaceful future in trust and co-operation wilh a[ with all countries andpeoples who share these worthy objectives.
Press release
The Council of Western Furopean Union (wEU) rejoices at the culmination today of the processof German unification, following the siglqature in Moscow of the treaty on the final settlemeirt *itfr
respect to Germany o:r l2th September. Tgd_ay, the. aspirations of the Grman people to complete 1119
unity and freedom of Germany-in free self-determinalion become reality. The'CoiinciL*e6dm;a i[;peaceful, democratic nature of these historic changes, which contribute fiirther towards buildi"g u ir.iand lasting order of peace in Europe.
Together with the recent changes in Europe, German unification marks the end of the division of
our continent and contributes towards the achievement of the fundamental aims of WEU: nuiopian
unity and integration.
The Council of WEU welcomes the statement-made today by the German Permanent Represen-
tative that the united Germany is a full member of western European Union.
on this historic day, the council shares the joy of the German people.
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ANNEX II
Joint Semice Defence College, Greenwich,
15th October 1990
Westem European Union and European security, by
Dn W.F. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of Western European Union
Commandant, ladies and gentlemen, it is agreat honour and privilege for me to be with you at
the Joint Service Defence College for a free-wheeling discussion on the problems of European security
in the new geostrategic situation of our continent.
Allow me to take as a starting-point the following quotation from the message sent by the chiefs-
of-staffat the college's inaugurationin 1947: " In peace, they told your predecessors, the bow is unbent,
the spur of great events no longer presses ". Indeed, we have had the alliance, NATO and a status guo
with-a few major crises which have ensured 35 years of peace in Europe. Now, history has come back as
if to make up for lost time. It has come back East and South. To meet the challenges of an increasingly
multipolar and complex world, we need a common purpose reconciling patriotism and a vision of our
long-t-erm interests and ambitions. Only through the building of a European union with its orvn foreign
and security policies can we find such a purpose and ensure that the successor generation will inherit a
safer world.
As chance would have it, I became Secretary-General of WEU in the spring of 1989, scarcely
three weeks before the general elections in Poland. On 4th June, Solidarity's triumph heralded the
return of democracy in the centre of Europe. On l6th June, the official funeral of Imre Nagy was also
that of his executioners and marked the end of the Kadar era. Then on 9th November, the totalitarian
dyke finally burst with the breaching of the Berlin wall.
On 3rd October, the Permanent Council of WEU met in London to celebrate the culmination of
the process of German unification. This breath-taking acceleration in the pace of events has.given-
added urgency and significance to the problems associated with constructing the security dimension of
Europe. Europe at peace has turned its back on its divisions but must be on its guard against any return
to the bloody aberrhtions of the past. At the same time, it must equip itself to play a r6le on the interna-
tional stage commensurate with its resources and wealth.
The forthcoming signing of the treaty on conventional forces in Europe, the CSCE summit fol-
lowed by the ministerial meetings of WEU and NATO, the intergovernmental conferences on political,
economic and monetary union will all be positive steps, we hope, along the road to European union,
and towards a new order of peace in our continent without which Europe cannot become the respon-
sible power which the world needs.
***
Not long ago, concern was expressed over Western Europe's will to force itself into a more
effective force on the continent as well as on the world political scene. Today, a rather contradictory
concern is being voiced 
- 
often from the same quarters 
- 
about Western Europe's slackness in getting
its act together. This is particularly true in the context of the Gulf crisis which is there to remind us that
the end of ttre cold war is not the end of all conflict and threat to our security and to our vulnerable
prosperity. From North Africa to Central Asia, from Egypt to the tip of the Arabian Peninsula, chal-
lenges are emerging of an unprecedented magnitude in the demographic, social, economic, cultural and
religious fields.lf Europe islo play a significant r6le in establishing somebalance in those regions, it
will have to devise a common foreign policy and set intervention mechanisms and possibly common
forces in order to tackle contingencies. It will also have to propose a framework for dialogue. Th_e
Italian-Spanish proposal for a conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean is a signif-
icant step forward in that direction.
The same goes for recent calls for a Euro-Arab dialogue which is indeed necessary if we want to
address the long-term problems and achieve stability at the south-eastern periphery of our
continent.
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Europe as a whole is at a crossroads. For the first time in its long and tumultuous history a
genuine prospect of continental unity based on a comprehensive co-operative framework lies ahead.
Security issues arc at the core of the debate on future pan-European architectures. The definition of
concrete steps towards union has just been clearly put on governments' agendas after having been
argued by numerous political scientists and essayists last year. When it comes to a common foreign
policy or a common defence, the key issue to be addressed is that of transfer of sovereignty to whiih
states are prepared to consent.
Four main challenges have to be faced which call for new European security structures at a conti-
nental level:
- 
the emergence of a new political order in Europe and the need to manage the transition
towards new forms of pan-European co-operation;
- 
the political evolution and economic reconstruction in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union;
- 
the future of disarmament negotiations and the new European strategic equation, with all its
effects on transatlantic relations;
- 
the development of co-operation on security, in particular to give Europe the capacity to look
outward to other theatres.
The WEU states must bring bold solutions to those problems, which will help them to perform
their r6le on the world stage to the full and will expunge the traces of Yalta and the cold war fiom our
continent. In this final decade of the 20th century, Europe must make every effort to channel the
expression of resurgent nationalism through democratic institutions, reinforced by appropriate regu-
lating mechanisms at both regional and pan-European level, to ensure that any disputes that arlse
lryqlg nations and ethnic groups in Europe are never again settled by resorting to force. Hopefully, theCSCE will soon be in a position to play a constructive r6le in that respect.
It is by advancing along this path, a path strewn with many obstacles, that a new strategic
balance can be achieved, providing that Western Europe displays cohesion, realism and determinati-on
in adapting its institutions to the new realities. Adaptation should mean rationalisation and democratic
accountability rather than bureaucratisation in an even more complex web of organisations if the
hearts and minds of the Europeans are to be won over.
Three factors continue to determine the political context in which new European security struc-
tures will have to be established:
(i) the transformation of the Soviet Union,
(ii) the rooting of democratic systems in Eastern Europe,
(iii) German unity, and its impact on those bodies responsible for European security: WEU and
NATO.
Faced with the grave crisis in the Soviet Union, European countries must direct their efforts
towards implementing a global Ostpolitik. It is a central factor in the formulation of a European
foreie! policy, including its security dimension, that European governments must give the Sovief lea-
dership the political and material support which may help it to move forward in the direction of demo-
cracy and a market economy. At the same time, it must make due allowances for the Soviet Union's
legitimate security interests and apprehensions.
It is vital for the- European Community to establish itself as a dynamic instigator of initiatives
promoting the unity of the continent and the reconstruction of its easiern part. Thl Community has
already taken over the co-ordination of economic assistance to Eastern European countries. Germany
clearly has a r6le to play as prime mover in this context, in view of its expeiience with the economil
restructurilg of the GDR. The countries of Eastern Europe will be spared profound social and eco-
nomic difficulties if adequate intervention and association mechanisms can-be established under the
Community's auspices, paving the way for ultimate economic integration, with each country adapting
to a market economy at its own pace. This should not be a one-way process. The Comminity hust
encourage Eastern European countries to come together and harmonise their own economic poli6ies.
The new Germany is clearly under a European roof, just as Chancellor Adenauer had advocated.
In. assuming the obligations into which the Federal Republic has just entered, Germany acts as a pro-
minent member of the Atlantic Alliance, the-European Communlty and WEU. No artificial strat^egic
vacuum has been created in the centre of Europe that would have been destabilising. Western
European countries are united in recognising that Germany is firmly anchored in the western security
community. As Thomas Mann put it, unity has led more to a European Germany than it will lead to iGerman Europe.
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Our common sense tells us to refute those negative ideas floating around about Germany's
future. German unity must foreshadow the unity of the continent, based on institutional arrangements
drawn up by Western Europe in the light of changed conditions. The very diversity of those arrange-
ments bears witness to the dynamic nature of the process of European integration and may serve as a
basis for the formulation of the pan-European structures of the future.
***
The current situation is a source of hope, but it also entails obvious risks. It would be inadvisable
to weaken or hastily dismantle Western European defences. The governments of Western Furope-must,
then, resist the temptation to make disorderly unilateral reductions beyond the levels envisagcd for the
CFE treaty. On the other hand, they must improve and develop their bilateral and multilateral co-
operation in every possible field. It is with these constraints and objectives in mind that recent pro-
pbsals on the adjuslment and strengthening of European security structures should be analysed.
The reactivated WEU is in a position to make a vital contribution in the fields of arms control,
the restructuring of forces and the creation of military co-operation arrangements at a more opera-
tional level. All6w me therefore to recall the reasons why WEU is still so necessary in today's fast-
changing world.
According to the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty, WEU is the only European organi-
sation competent to deai with European co-operation on security. It has undeniable advantages arising
from its threefold vocation:
- 
as an organisation within which the European members of the alliance can meet and discuss
their concerns in matters of security and the adaptation of this alliance to a radically-altered
European context, with the foreign and defence ministers coming together to create the
momentum for this process of ongoing consultation;
- as the only specifically European organisation whose members are commitled by treaty to
afford muiual support if their frontiers come under attack, a commitment which goes beyond
the provisions of Article V of the Washington Treaty;
- 
as an organisation representing those governments resolved to give European union a defence
and security dimension.
Political consultations on European security concentrate on those issues which have- an impact
on the continental strategic balance. The first one is indeed the residual military power of the Soviet
Union.
While we should welcome the Soviets' intention to shift the emphasis to the defensive in their
military doctrine, it should also be borne in mind that this intervention has hitherto had little practical
effect it grassroots level. It has not incited the Soviets to slow down the modernisation of their
weapons.ln 1995-96, the Soviet army may well possess a modern military potential,.with fewer but
more professional troops. The risk of a surprise attack will no doubt have disappeared, or at least the
intention to attack by iurprise, but the capacity to conduct offensive operations may remain. Europe
and its allies must remain capable of forestalling any such contingencies.
Since the Soviet Union will inevitably continue to be the leading military power on the European
continent as well as a major nuclear power, NATO and SHAPE will have to continue to embody and
preserve the transatlantic-political and military link on which deterrence is founded, until such time as
pan-European security structures offering all European countries firm guarantees have been created
ind consolidated. Thii may well happen by successive enlargements of the alliance, or alternatively the
CSCE may take NATO as'its model in planning future institutionalisation under its first basket. But
these prospects are still remote, and Western Europe must be ready, at least over thecurrent decade, to
devoti adequate resources to its defence on the continent and outside Europe. Public opinion should
continuously be warned against the illusion that peace or disarmament " dividends "_can-be reaped in
the short-teim even though such a dream has been shattered by the events in the Gulf.
The denuclearisation of Europe is another dangerous myth. On this level as in the field of space,
the Soviet Union will continue to be a major power. In view of the strategic nuclear arsenals that exist,
Europeans will for a long time to come have to accept the inherent irrationality of the deterrent nature
of nuilear weapons, which forces the potential adversary to disperse its offensive resourcss. The course
of events is uncertain and seems mori like an obstacle race. Even if there is striking progress towards
the control of all other categories of weapons, those European stat€s having nuclear wsapons will, in all
probability, keep them as long as they can, since nuclear weapons are the weapon of last resort and the
ultimate form of deterrence.
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However that may be, the more modern weapons will continue to be indispensable to European
security 
-as 
they give armed forces the flexibility of action they need to face up to the multiplicity ofpotential risks with yhiclt they may have to contend. One need merely point out that in thespace of
two weeks, from l8th July to 2nd August, the western world went from-a state of near-euphoiia to a
state of crisis, with prospects of armed intervention in the Gulf and aggravated economic slowdown.
The outcome of the CFE negotiations will narrowly avert the risk of structural disarmament.
Growing European co-operation on arrns matters would no doubt satisfy both finance ministers and
taxpayers. In the final analysis, much will depend on the necessary rationalisation of the European
arms industry curr^ently suffering from-over-capacity. Defence budg6ts will, moreover, be burdeneO by
the restructuring-of forces as a result of the implementation of the future CFE treaty. Finally, the des-
truction and re-allocation of equipment limited by this treaty will inevitably have substantiai financial
repercussions as well.
An idea that might contribute something new to methods of co-operation among Europeans and
with Europe's North American allies has been put forward: multinational units. Man-y experts regard
this concept as leasible in military terms and as right in political terms, strengthening Europe's def6nceidqnJltJSnd making common efforts in this field more aiceptable to public opinion.It is being debated
at NATO in the context of-the ongoing strategy review. Multinational unitimight well also-be consi-
dered as a good formula for the development of co-operation between national rapid deployment
forces.
***
Although the risk of military confrontation has almost disappeared, the East-West dimension of
security.will be no less important in the immediate future. But demographic and religious factors, com-
bined with grgyi.ng poverty and the first results of more general ecologiial phenomena, are making the
North-South divide a particular concern. In view of geostrategic factors and Europe's dependenci on
imports of raw materials and sea lines of communication, Euiopeans will have to consult about how
to meet those challenges which, while not always directly military, will have a growing impact on
worldwide^security 
-il tE broad sense, and on prosperity. The current crisis in the Gulf is a good
example of the need for European states to have navies that can guarantee security of supplies aJweil
as air and land intervention forces that can protect their nationals and interests wherevei it may be
necessary. The deployment of these forces will require, as now in the Gulf, operational co-ordinalion
mechanisms.
Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty provides for very detailed consultation on " out-of-
Europe " questions. Experience has shown how useful WEU, with its competence vis-d-vis external
dangers, can be to Europe and to the alliance. WEU provides a framework for concerted action in the
event of direct threat when one or more member states' prosperity and security interests in the broad
sense are at stake in another continent. The success ofpolitical consultation and the co-ordination of
naval action in the Gulf in 1987-88, in reaction to threats against the freedom of navigation, militates
in favour of almost pennanent consultation on " out-of-Europe " matters within WEU.
Drawing on this experience, WEU foreign and defence ministers met in extraordinary session on
2lst August,-at the behest of the French Presidency, to co-ordinate their actions in response to the Iraqi
invasion and annexation of Kuwait. This was followed by a meeting of WEU chiefs oTdefence staffon
27th Augu-st, the first in the history of the organisation,'which traislated into military terms the will
expressed by member countries at the Ministerial Council to take concrete steps to show their determi-
nation and solidarity in the face of Iraqi actions. A second ministerial meeting followed on l8th Sep-
tember to assess progress made and initiate land/air co-ordination.
The resulting guidelines for the co-ordination of naval operations of WEU members in the Gulf
region,.aim-e{ at ensuring the effective implementation of the United Nations embargo against Iraq on
the basis of Security Council resolutions, endorsed the establishment of co-ordination rnechanismi at
three levels:
- an ad hoc working group of officials from foreign and defence ministries;
- 
naval contact points in capitals;
- 
unit commanders in the Gulf area.
The competence of the ad hoc working group goes beyond the 1987/88 arrangements since it
addresses the following areas of co-operation:
- 
the scale and nature of WEU deployments;
- 
areas of operations;
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- 
execution of missions;
- 
exchange of information;
- 
logistic and operational support, and
- 
the functioning of co-ordination structures.
All WEU member countries have contributed to the naval effort in the Gulf area. Belgium,
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom have sent over 30 warships - a number
roughly equal to that of the United States fleet. Germany dispatched naval units to the eastern Medi-
terranean to free United States vessels. Luxembourg has given financial assistance and Portugal has
made available naval and air transport capabilities.
An increasing number of WEU countries are also contributing ground and air forces, while
others have made available facilities such as air bases or air transport. In addition, economic aid is
being provided to those countries in the region most affected by the implementation of the embargo.
The recent United Nations decisions on an air embargo as well as the continuing build-up of
ground forces call for new forms of co-ordination among WEU countries. For obvious reasons, I
iannot comment further on what they entail, but I can assure you that they are gradually being put into
effect.
Since the United States has the largest forces in the area, WEU has been keen to ensure that its
activities are co-ordinated with them, as well as with the other allies and the Arab countries taking part
in the implementation of the United Nations embargo. In this context the WEU co-chairmanship
together with the United States and the Arab states of the naval planning conference held in Bahrain
on 8th/9th September is an indication of its essential r6le in the Gulf.
The WEU reaction to the current Gulf crisis has sent a clear signal that the nine member coun-
tries are prepared to shoulder their full responsibilities in order to defend their legitimate security inte-
rests.
While it is too early to make an assessment of the impact of the Gulf crisis, it is clear that WEU's
competence in out-of-area crises enables its member countries to make a more co-ordinated and hence
more valuable contribution to the international effon in the Gulf than would have been the case if they
had responded on an individual basis. Indeed, some countries made clear that they would only respond
if the operations were co-ordinated under WEU auspices. Until the European Community assumes res-
ponsibility for security and defence matters, WEU will remain the only forum in which West Euro-
peans can co-ordinate their security response to threats such as those posed by a Saddam Hussein.
***
Western European leaders are therefore rightly putting forward more and more proposals for a
confederation of the whole of Europe, drawing on what has already been achieved by European institu-
tions and the CSCE, the essential foundation for democracy and self-determination. It is the priority of
Western European countries, and foremost among them the nations that have come together within
Western European Union, to reinforce exchanges at every level between the two parts of Europe, but it
is also a priority to move towards the objective stated in the Single European Act: European union.
The stronger and more united the Europe of the Community, the better placed it will be to exert
a positive influence over current developments in the eastern part of our continent. The European
union must be built up in the economic and monetary areas, but also through growing harmonisation
offoreign and security policies so that Europe can speak with a single voice on the international scene.
The consolidation ofall existing European co-operation structures existing in the security field -
IEPG, Eurogroup and WEU - into a single " European security community ", is advocated. Thus a
European defence pillar would come into being, which could formulate a common defence strategy and
a coherent armaments policy. At the same time, European political co-operation would be streng-
thened to give the Community the foreign policy dimension it lacks.
WEU will play a vital r6le in the definition of a European security identity until such time as the
Twelve agree on how security matters are to be handled within the Community. At the suggestion of
the ltalian Presidency, the problem of the Community's r6le in matters of security has now been placed
on the agenda of the intergovernmental conference on political union. WEU may have only a transi-
tional r6le to play, but the obstacles to the immediate creation of a European security community are
related mainly to the variable geometry of the composition of existing institutions and the divergences
in thinking and strategic commitments which that variable geometry expresses. In the first place, then,
a cohereniEuropean security identity should be formulated, to which European states would subscribe,
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rather than resorting to unconditional expansion out of an artificial concern for geographical sym-
Betry. A policy on possible enlargement still needs to be defined once the democratisalion proceis isfirmly rooted.
The WEU Assembly and, since last April, the WEU Council are both engaged in a policy of
extended contacts with the new democracies of Central Europe. I shall be in Budapest on 22nd October
to have talks with the Foreign Minister and the First Deputy Defence Minister. Fact-finding missions
to Prague and Warsaw are being prepared for the end of the year
The common European home dear to President Gorbachev will be constructed out of elements
that have already been tried and tested in the West. The uncertainties of their situation have forced the
Soviet leaders to be slightly more modest about it. They are not in a position to propose a model for a
pan-European structure, whether on the political, economic or social level. We have WEU, the
European Community, EFTA, the Council of Europe, OECD and NATO, all of which have chalked up
remarkable successes whilst at the same time promoting prosperity and security.
The Community is the focal point for European construction. WEU is Europe's nucleus in the
field_of security. Will the Twelve be able to make the fullest use of the power of at[raction exerted by
the European institutions and reinforce those institutions, while forging new links with Eastern Europb
as economic cmperation gradually develops and as the process of democracy is strengthened? Unlil
the events broke out-in the Gulf, Community member states seemed divided on the advisability of
developing common foreign and security policies. The Gulf crisis seems to be precipitating a change of
thinking at the highest level.
In the run-up to the summit meeting of the 34 states participating in the CSCE, the first
gbjective of Europeans should be to seek a formula that would unreservedly integrate the Soviet Union
int the European security system without allowing it to assume a dominaiing rdle. The CSCE process
must develop according to the principle that contributions are complementary and that none should be
subsidiary. Each existing organisation should be able, in the first phase, to find its place in a pan-
European structure, with its own terms of reference and its own methods. On the basis of common
principles, concentric circles, partially overlapping but with different radii, are de facto already
coexisting: the European institutions, the Atlantic Alliance and the CSCE.
As regards the first security circle, the European institutions, WEU has a clear-cut mission of a
conceptual nature: to define a European security identity. This definition should be such as to win
acceptance from non-member countries, if we hope that it will found a new European security balance
predicated on concepts ofdeterrence, sufficiency and transparency. The intergovernmental conference
in December next should open up new prospects for WEU. [t would be more logical for the security of
Europe ultimately to be the responsibility of a European union; Europe would then be better-equipped
to confront the challenges of development aid, energy and the environment among others. But thii his-
toric step torvards a union of free, pluralist democracies in our continent calls foriareful preparations,
to which WEU will make a decisive contribution. Further integration in the security field can only
lrapp"n on the basis of shared principles, a shared strategy and common tactical concepls and doctrineifor arms co-operation and procurement. WEU is the only available framework for such harmoni-
sation.
As for the second circle, that of the Atlantic Alliance, the renewal of NATO will be based on the
Plilgt^plgs *.!lqh have made it cohesive and have preserved peace and security for the past 40 years.NATO is still indispensable for at least three reasons: the need for ongoing consultation with North
America on international politico-military problems coupled with a iignificant American military
deployment in- Europe; tle prerequisites of arms control and verification of agreements; and thl
prospect of an increase in the responsibilities of the CSCE in the field of European Jecurity. NATO will
continue to embody the necessary North American presence in Europe, which will continue to serve as
a counterweight to-residual Soviet_power and contribute to guaranieeing the full, complete indepen-
dence of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Eurofie.
^ It is mainly at the level of these two circles that the work of discussing and thinking about theformulation of a pan-European architecture based on the institutionalisation bf the CSCE ihould take
place.
rt
**
The 1989 revolution and events in the Gulf have forced a change in the pace of construction of
European union. Should it be deepened or broadened? Could we be thinking about narrowing the gap
between lhe twg processes so that they converge as nearly as possible? Migha an enlargement of Bf'fe
and the Council of Europe be an acceptable interim solution in view of the progressive integration of
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new partners in both Eastern and Northern Europe? In the final analysis, the future of peace and
security in Europe depends on the political will of the WEU member states and the Community to
develop their co-operation and harmonise more closely their policies within the three existing circles of
European institutions.
The Gulf crisis shows that, for want of a foreign and security policy, there is a genuine risk of the
Community being a spectator on the sidelines of history, a mere commentator on world events. Europe
owes it to itself to take prompt action to remedy these major shortcomings. We cannot accept to see a
major economic and cultural power reduced to a " regional non-power ". The time has come for a
choice in favour of a fully-fledged European union as the backbone of a wider pan-European archi-
tecture. That choice can no longer be delayed.
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l. Europeans will see the second half of 1990
as a period of deeprooted changes. On the one
hand, the end of the cold war and the birth of a
new Europe were consecrated in the Charter of
Paris and, on the other hand, the invasion of
Kuwait showed our countries the need to stand
firm against new threats. In both cases, the Pres-
idential Committee believed the potential of the
modified Brussels Treaty should be brought into
play.
I. Political action
(i) The Gulf cdsis
2. When the Gulf crisis broke out, the Presi-
dency of the Assembly informed the Chairman-
ship-in-Office of the Council of its concern at
the gravity of an aggression which violated inter-
national law and was accompanied by many
infringements of human rights. It also expressed
its concern that the Council should ensure that
Europe's security interests were taken into
30th November 1990
consideration. In other words, it was for the
WEU Council to meet to examine, in the
context of Article VIII of the modified Brussels
Treaty, a situation which was an obvious threat
to peace and endangered economic stability.
3. It became clear that these views largely
coincided with those of the Chairmanship-in-
Offrce of the Council since the French Minister
for Foreign Affairs quickly convened an extraor-
dinary ministerial meeting of the WEU Council.
4. It was only appropriate that, on that
occasion, there should be a dialogue between the
Council and the Assembly. The Chairmanship-
in-Oflice of the Council acceded in full to the
Assembly's wishes since, on 2lst August 1990,
at the close of the ministerial meeting, a joint
meeting was held with the Presidential Com-
mittee. The Assembly's steering body was able
to discuss with the Minister for Foreign Affairs
and the Minister of Defence of France and the
Secretary-General of WEU the events that hadjust occurred and the positions the Council had
adopted in response. At the close of this
Action by the Presidential Committee
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by Mr. Martine6 Yice-President of the Assembly
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meeting, the Presidential Committee issued the
communiqud reproduced at Appendix I.
5. Continuing its meeting without the
ministers, the Presidential Committee asked the
Defence Committee and the Political Com-
mittee to prepare, each within the sphere of its
responsibilities, a report on the Gulf crisis and
to submit it to the Presidential Committee so
that recommendations on this highly topical
matter might be communicated to the Council
without delay. The Assembly's steering body
was thus exercising its powers under Rule 14,
paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure to act on
behalf of the Assembly between sessions.
6. The two committees instructed to prepare
reports on the Gulf crisis agreed to meet on
20th September. The Presidential Committee
was convened to meet at the close of the two
committee meetings to examine their conclu-
sions and adopt two recommendations for
immediate transmission to the Council.
7. In the meantime, the violation of
European diplomatic premises in Kuwait City
by Iraqi forces marked a further infringement of
international law.
8. On l8th September 1990, a second extra-
ordinary meeting of the WEU Council of
Ministers was therefore convened at which it
was decided " to strengthen the WEU co-ordi-
nation and to extend the co-ordination at
present operating in the maritime field to
ground and air forces " and " to identify the
forms that these new deployments will take, to
seek to ensure that they are complementary, to
harmonise the missions of member states'forces
and to pool their logistic support capabilities as
required ".
9. Reporting on the Council's work, the
French Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed to
brief the Presidential Committee, the Political
Committee and the Defence Committee,
meeting at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, on
20th September, on the political framework of
the action by member countries, deployments
and the co-ordination of measures being imple-
mented.
10. The Political and Defence Committees
then adopted their reports. The Presidential
Committee discussed them the same day and
adopted Recommendations 488 and 489, which
were immediately communicated to the Council.
This action by the Presidential Committee is sub-
mitted to the Assembly for ratification.
I l. It may therefore be considered that the
dialogue between the two WEU organs on a
matter that affects security and peace has pro-
ceeded satisfactorily.
12. The Presidential Committee felt that, in
view of its importance, the Assembly should
follow the Gulf question vigilantly. The President
therefore led a four-member parliamentary dele-
gation to obtain information on the coordi-
nation of European naval forces deployed in the
region under the aegis of WEU.
13. So that the Assembly may debate the Gulf
affair in the light of the most recent develop-
ments, the Presidential Committee asked the
two committees concerned to present two new
reports at the December session. Since it is to be
expected that the Chairmanship-in-Office will
make a detailed statement on the matter, the
Assembly will certainly be able to address
recommendations to the Assembly based on an
in-depth examination of a situation that is
steadily deteriorating.
(ii) Secuity in Europe as a wholc
14. While WEU has been able to play a major
r6le in co-ordinating European forces in the
Gulf to ensure application of the embargo
decided upon by the United Nations, it is not
yet playing the r6le one might expect of it in
terms of security and guaranteed peace in
Europe.
15. The Presidential Committee for its part
wished to propose a line of action. Before the
meeting of the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe held in Paris from 19th
to 2lst November 1990, the Presidential Com-
mittee therefore, still in the exercise of its res-
ponsibilities under Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the
Rules of Procedure, transmitted a message to
the Council (see Appendix II) making several
recommendations on the defence of European
security interests. The Presidential Committee
also asked the President of the French Republic
to transmit a message to participants in the
Paris conference (see Appendix III).
16. The Presidential Committee believed the
problems raised by the organisation of security
throughout Europe were so important that they
should be discussed by representatives of the
parliaments of all European countries.
17. It therefore decided to organise a sym-
posium to be held at the end of the first quarter
of next year on the new circumstances of
European security. The President of the
Assembly will keep the Assembly informed of
preparations for this important event.
18. Conversely, the extremely full time-table
of international meetings in the last three
months made it impossible to hold the meeting
between the Presidential Committee and the
Chairmanship-in-Offrce of the Council which
usually precedes ordinary ministerial meetings
of the Council. Since the Chairmanship-in-
Off,rce of the Council has met Assembly com-
mittees twice, the Presidential Committee did
not consider it should insist on the application
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of this practice, but it wishes to emphasise that
it considers this omission, which is regrettable
even if justified, to be an exception and not a
precedent.
II. Administrative action
(i) Budgetary quatioas
19. On 20th September, the Presidential
Committee adopted a draft supplementary
budget of the administrative expenditure of the
Assembly for the financial year 1990. Once the
work included in the supplementary budget for
1989 to allow the Assembly to receive the Portu-
guese and Spanish Delegations in the conditions
provided for in the Rules of Procedure of the
Assembly had been almost wholly completed
and accepted, it proved essential to adjust the
initial estimates and assess the supplementary
sums required. The fact that the initial estimates
were exceeded is due in particular to work being
carried out to modify or complete the initial
programme such as repairs to the air condi-
tioning in Room A, the installation on the roof
of equipment to produce iced water for the air
conditioning, etc. The Presidential Committee
also felt that, since the national delegation
offices had been transferred to the second floor,
it was essential to install a video message system
and receivers on that floor.
20. It was possible to complete all this work a
few days before the June session with excess
expenditure of only 50/0, which may be consi-
dered a satisfactory result.
21. At its meeting in November, the WEU
Budget and Organisation Committee therefore
recommended that the Council approve the
draft supplementary budget for 1990.
22. Approval having been given on 29th
November 1990, the budget concerned came
into force on the same date in accordance with
Rule 47.2 of the Rules of Procedure of the
Assembly.
23. On 20th September 1990, the Presidential
Committee also adopted a draft budget for the
financial year 1991. There was a significant
increase in Head I of this budget concerning the
structure of the Office of the Clerk since it pro-
vided for an increase in the number of per-
manent staff of the Assembly with the creation
of six new posts, including two grade A posts for
senior officials to be recruited.
24. The WEU Budget and Organisation Com-
mittee, composed of the Council's budget
experts, considered unacceptable the creation of
posts or the regrading ofothers requested by the
Assembly since they resulted in an increase in
the Assembly budget as a whole that could
hardly be reconciled with the aim of zero
growth.
25. The President of the Assembly wrote to
the Chairman of the Council asking him to
support the Assembly's requests, which cor-
respond to its concern to have the wherewithal
to carry out its tasks effectively (see letter at
Appendix IV).
26. Not until Thursday, 29th November, did
the secretariat of the Assembly receive by tele-
phone a few indications about the result of the
Council's discussions. It would appear that it
did not accede to the Assembly's wishes since it
agreed only to the creation oftwo grade A posts
at a level lower than that requested and refused
the creation of corresponding posts for executive
staff. Furthernore, it apparently insisted on a
corresponding reduction in the Assembly's oper-
ating budget, at least for one of the two posts.
The problem raised by the Council's attitude
will be discussed in the appropriate Assembly
bodies.
27. It is important to stress that estimates
under Heads II to V, in the management of
which the Assembly has budgetary autonomy,
were worked out in the light of experience. In a
spirit of economy and to offset the increase in
estimates under Head I, the overall increases
under these heads are lower than the foreseeable
rate of inflation in France.
28. The present report on the action of the
Presidential Committee between sessions can do
no more than record this latest information.
Your Rapporteur can but regret that he has not
yet received the prior opinion of the Council
provided for in the procedure described in Rule
47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.
29. In this particular instance, the opinion of
the Council will inevitably arrive too late for the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration and the Presidential Committee to be
able to discuss it after in-depth reflection before
the session. Because of the Council, the budget
debate will therefore be somewhat impromptu,
which is especially regrettable in that it relates
not to minor problems but to the possibility for
the Assembly to have, at a particularly serious
international juncture, the essential where-
withal to exercise its tasks as the parliament of
European defence.
(ii) Choice of a logo for the Assembly
30. The Presidential Committee approved the
choice proposed by Mr. Ewing on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions.
31. However, to make the logo clearer, it was
agreed to add the initials UEO-WEU. The Presi-
dential Committee congratulated the committee
for the standard of the result obtained at least
cost.
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32. This logo should allow the Assembly's
graphic identity to be enhanced on all its written
texts once a graphic chart has been drawn up
covering all the principles for using the logo. As
a result, texts will be more homogenous and
therefore more effective.
rl.
**
33. In conclusion, I wish to underline the
contrast between the Presidential Committee's
satisfaction regarding its dialogue with the
Council at political level and its displeasure at
the dilatory budgetary procedure and the inade-
quate results obtained. I therefore express the
hope that the Council, in the concern it shares
with the Assembly to promote Europe's security
and defence identity, will review the positions
taken on its behalf in administrative matters.
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APPENDIX I
Communiqui issued at the close of the meeting
of the Presidential Committee on 21st August 1990
The Presidential Committee of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU met in Paris following the
meeting of the Council of Ministers of that organisation. Representatives of all member countries and
all political groups were present.
Fully informed by its talks with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence of
France, Chairmen-in-Office of the Council, and with the Secretary-General of WEU, the Presidential
Committee approved the conclusions reached by the Ministers.
In particular, the Presidential Committee expressed its indignation at the violation of interna-
tional law represented by the invasion and annexation of Kuwait and Iraq's threats to Saudi Arabia
and other Arab states. It considered that fundamental human rights had been seriously violated by the
taking of hostages among foreign nationals. Finally, it expressed the utmost concern at Iraq's threat to
member countries' economic life and that of developing countries.
It urged Iraq to apply United Nations Resolutions 660 and 662 immediately and welcomed the
fact that the Council had stressed the importance of the rOle of the Arab countries in this affair.
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APPENDIX II
Messase to the ,*T': 
!!:!3!r:!orthe 
Presidentiat committee
The conference beginning in Paris on 19th November closes one period of history and starts
another.
Ideological confrontation has disappeared with East.ern_ Europe.lallying to the principles on
which the injtitutions to the West of the Continent are based. Yet new risks are emerging with the rise
of nationalism and the spread of particular interests.
Security is therefore no longer based on the organisation ofdefence alone but increasingly on the
establishmenf of a new internatio.-nal order. To the frevention of war by deterring aggres-sion must be
addeO the organisation ofpeace by persuasion so as to base order not on the constraint offorce but on
a-tu.111ory oTwills. In this undertiking, Western Europe will occupy.a vital position. While an all-
Eu.opeu, order still has to be established, the Western Europe now being organised is at one and the
same time a model, a pole of attraction and a factor of peace.
This organisation, however, is still incomplete. What is being pur_sued.is monetary and.political
matters and vlitt not be complete'if not extended to defence questions. In this connection, it is for the
Councif to underline the imbortance of the undertakings thal nine Western European states entered
into in the framework of the modil-red Brussels Treaty.
The spirit of this treaty is expressed in its preamble which,in particular, affirms the resolution of
the contracting parties " to promoti the unity and to encourage the progress.ive integration of Europe-"
unOl;to asJo.ia'te progressively in the pursuance of these aims other states inspired by the same ideals
and animated by the like determination ".
Since WEU is one of the cornerstones of the future European union, its Council should
contribute here and now to the success of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe that
ir tJUr opened in Paris on lgth November. The heads of state or.of go.vernment.taking Pa+ iqtfe
6S-Cf rriiting *iff formally close the period of confrontation or tension which was characteristic of the
twentieth ceniury until iti hst decade and determine the institutions and all the arrangements-for
i.tuUliifiing an oid.r of security, peace, freedom_and respect for human rights throughout Europ-e' It is
for the WEU Council to speciiy tne nature of Western Europe's participation in a new collective
security system in EuroPe.
There must be a conjunction of the political, economic and military aspects of a policy to-esta-
blish an all-European order-. The WEU Council for its part should endeavour to pursue and consolidate
itie Oirar.u-eni process that is already under way. To this end, it should ensure the harmonisation of
;h;;;J6;r oitfre member countries. European-interests in disarmament que.stions must be defined
;;di[t."r*ct implementation of the agreements concluded must then be monitored through an inde-
pendent verification system, including the use of satellites.
Furthermore, the Council should promote guaranteed frontiers. The creation of a conflict pre-
vention cinire will'bring an atmosphere-of mutuil confidence that is the condition for lasting peace'
fnii-UoOi sliould playi growing i6le in reducing.risk factors and inquiring into any-activities that
migtrf uppeur to eirOingel peacj. Its implementation should be the subject of consultations in the
Council.
The success of this vast undertaking will require a deepening of the intra-Euroqean dialogue fo.r
which the Paris conference will lay nei founditions and whiCh the Assembly, for its part, will
endeavour to develop at parliamentary level.
In short, the WEU Assembly, which wishes all-European co-operation-to be based on agreements
anO e*isting institutions, conveys-to the heads of state orof government taking part in the Paris con-
igxeff it. "good wishes ior suciess. It urges the WEU Couniil to ensure here and now that existing
iig*ir"tiois are given tasks which correJpond to the_new r6le that they will have to play- in a vastly-
.tZ"giO i"ternatiSnal context. Our countries have to find a balanced structure allowing a harmonious
io.rEig"ncJ of the efforts undertaken in three axes of go-operation: Western European, Atlantic and
all-Eur6pean. The Assembly intends to give the Council its full support in this task.
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APPENDIX III
Messagle to- heads of state or of government participating
in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in-Europe
rhe 
". 
,",",!"JJ{,!I:,',';:::::,:,:::::::::':::::;:'::",his,ory and sta.s
another.
The heads of state or of government taking part will formally close the period of confrontation or
tension which was characteristic of the twentieth century until itilast decade and determine the insti-
tutions and all the arrangements for establishing an order of security, peace, freedom and respect for
human rights throughout Europe.
The WEU Assembly, which wishes all-European co-operation to be based on agreements and
existing institutions, conveys its most ardent wishes for success.
It is their task to pursue and consolidate the disarmament process that is already under way andpromote guaranteed frontiers. The creatioq of a conflict prevention centre will bring an atmosph6re of
mutual confidence that is the condition for lasting peaie. This body should pla/a growing r6le in
reducing risk factors and inquiring into any activiiies that might appear to endanger peace.
The success of this vast undertaking will require a deepening of the intra-European dialogue
which the WEU Assembly, for its part, will endeavour to devrelop it parliamentary level.
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APPENDIX IV
I*tter from Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assemhly,
to Mr. Dumas, Chairman-in-Oflice of the Council,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of France
I have been informed by the Assembly secretariat that the Council's Budget and Organisation
Committee did not adopt a position on the Assembly's stafling requests and that the Permanent
Council would be taking a decision on the subject in the very near future.
I can but stress that an increase in the number of staff in the secretariat of the Assembly is abso-
lutely necessary to meet the consequences of the enlargement and reactivation of WEU.
In exercising my mandate as President, I have been able to see quite clearly that it is essential to
create the posts of Secietary to the Political Committee and Head of the Research Office, together with
the executive staff mentioned in the budget.
It also seems to me evident that the secretariat of a parliamentary assembly such as ours must
have a Portuguese offrcial and a Spanish official to facilitate its relations with the representatives and
authorities of the two countries which recently acceded to the modified Brussels Treaty.
I should therefore be particularly grateful if you would ask the Council to accede to requests
which are based solely on the concern to ensure that the parliamentary assembly of European security
has the means that are strictly necessary for the exercise of its tasks.
Paris, 20th November 1990
Robert PoNtIt-t-oN
H.E. Mr. Roland Dumas,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
37, Quai d'Orsay,
75700 PARIS.
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Logo of the WEU Assembly
292
Document 1253 30th November 1990
Replies of the Council to Recommendations 479 to 489
RECOMMENDATION 479 
'
on the establishment of a just, Wacefal and securc order in Europe -
prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe2
Adopted by the Assembly on 23rd March 1990 during the extraordinary session (3rd sitting).
Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Pontillon on behalf of the Political Committee (Document I 2 I 6).
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The Assembly,
I
(i) Welcoming the fact that the developments which started with the peres_trolka movement in the
tiSSn and contiiued in.many Central and Eastern European countries in 1989 at last make it possible
to consider establishing a new, peaceful order throughout Europe;(ii) Considering, nevertheless, that there is still much uncertainty about the future and stability of
those countries;
(iii) Noting with satisfaction the considerable progress made in the CFE negotiations and gratified
Itrdt ttre cointries concerned are considering starting further negotiations, shortly after a first
agreement is signed, to reduce even further the level of forces and armaments in Europe;(iv) Welcoming also the convening of a conference of heads of state or of government in 1990 to give
new scope to the CSCE process;
(v) Noting the broad convergence between proposals by Eastern and Western European countries to
give EuropJ as a whole economic, juridical and cultural structures designed to organise a new
European order;(vi) Anxious, however, not to precipate the premature disbandment of organisations which have so
iai ensured peace in Europe since thiiwould make it more difficult to establish this new peaceful order
and considering that the blses of European security should be maintained for as long an interim period
as necessary;
II
(i) Welcoming the progress made towards reuniting the German people in a single po_litical system,
wtrictr is one of the main aims that the WEU member countries set themselves in 1954;
(ii) considering that the attainment of this aim implies a negotiated a^greeqrent between the two
bi:rman states an-<l noting that it catls for an understanding on the status of unified Germany between
the two states and the four responsible powers;(iii) Considering that the countries of Europe as a whole are concerned by the formation of a new
German state at the heart of Europe;(iv) Considering that the perrnanency of the present frontiers of Germany must be confirmed by a
frior undertakingly the two German siates, tog-ether with one by the_other European countries, for the
ireation of a Gerinan state not to jeopardise what has been gained in European integration nor to be an
obstacle to the establishment of a new peaceful order in Europe;(v) Noting that many provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty aPPly, for fifty years at least, to the
Fi:Oerat Rep-ubtic of G-ermany and that they cannot be infringed without a revision of the treaty;
(vi) Recalling that the Council has decided to proceed with such a revision as soon as the accession of
Portugal and Spain becomes effective;
(vii) Considering that the geographical situation and strength of a unified German state make it unde-
sirable to grant it neutral status;
(vill,/ Noting also that the integration of the entire German territory in NATO seems unacceptable to
many Central and Eastern European countries;
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Qn Considering, however, that it is essential for the new German state to be integrated in aEuropean collective security system with which the United States and Canada remain ass6ciat"o ino
constituting in itself the nucleus of an all-European security system;
III
(t) Noting that in a period of instability it is.hardly des_irable to add to the degree and variety of
uncertainty and hence the maintenance of ihe alliances-is a factor of peace and orde-r in Europe aaibr;
as a new security order has not been organised throughout Europe;
(iy' 
. 
Considering-that the reduction of armed forces stationed in Europe makes it necessary to
conduct an immediate review of the deployment of NATO forces;(!iil. Considering that the forces of the WEU countries will have a larger part to play in this new
deployment than heretofore;(iv) Considering that all the western countries have to limit their military expenditure;(v) 
. 
Considering, therefore, that closer co-operation between WEU member countries for their joint
security is becoming essential;(vi) Considering that, for this reason, the European members of the alliance will have to exercisegreater po-titical responsibilrlies, particularly in -regard to arms control, organising the collectivi
security. of Euroae as a whole and defence igainst any threat from outside tfie areicovered Ui ttriNorth Atlantic Treaty,
RecouurNns rHAT rsr CouNcrr-
I
l. Draw without delay the first conclusions from the study it is conducting into the consequences of
a CFE agreement for Europe's security and inform the Assembly accordingly;
2. Extend this study subsequently to cover all the consequences ofthe changes in Eastern Europe;
3. Prepale carefully a joint position for the WEU countries in regard to matters within its purview
that are included in the agenda of the CSCE;
II
1. Inform the Assemb]y 
-whether the commitments entered into by the Federal Republic ofGermany under the modified Brussels Treaty are also valid for a unified German state;
?. _ Befo-re anyrevision of the modified Brussels Treaty, analyse the consequences of a devolution ofthe Federal Republic of Germany's csmmitments to a uirified German state-for the application of the
treaty and the platform adopted in The Hague, paying particular attention to:
(a) co'operation between WEU and NATO, provided for in Article IV of the treaty;
(b) trypleryentation of mitltgly as_sistance in the conditions laid down in Article V and paragraphIII.4 of the platform of The Hague, specifying on which frontiers member countriei arjn6*
obliged to contribute to the defence of Germany;
(c) application to qly state that succeeds the German Democratic Republic of Article VII
according to which the high contracting parties will participate in ho coalition directed
against any of them;
(d) implementation of Article VIII, paragraphs 2 and 4, Protocols Nos. II, III and IV and, in par-
ticulSr, Annex I to Protocol No. IIIbn-determining the level of forces, renunciation of tfreproduction of certain armaments and control oflhe application of'the relevant under-
takings;
(e) tespect for Article XII fixing the period after which each member country shall have the right
to cease to be a party to the treaty;
3. Inform the Assembly of the results of this analysis;
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4. Ensure that the states participating in the conference that will define the status of G-ermany are
duly and fully informed of tliese reiults so t-trat they may take account of the grrarantees.offered 
-by the
.ofineO Brussels Treaty for the security of both Germany and its neighbouring countries and for the
establishment of a new peaceful and secure order in Europe;
III
l. Explore forthwith the possibilities offered by WEU as a medium for assessilg possible threats to
member countries and for rbsearch into the prospects of an all-European security area for which it
might eventually be an appropriate framework, in particular:
(a) for defining a sufficiency threshold in defence matters;
(b) for analysing the concept of shared security;
(c) for developing means of arbitration, confidence-building measures and disarmament;
2. Use WEU as a lever for a new European security order in which it might:
(a) gtarantee the intangibility of its members' frontiers, including those resulting from the unifi-
cation of the two German states;
(D/ ensure respect for the commitments entered into by its members in the context of agreements
' - limiting forces or annaments or the non-production of certain weapons;
3. Assess the level of forces that WEU countries should deploy for Europe's security and agree on a
fair sharing of the efforts required;
4. Use the modified Brussels Treaty as the juridical basis for the presence of forces of member
states on the territory of other membei states insofar as their presence would help to strengthen a
peaceful order in Europe;
5. Convene regular meetings of chiefs-of-staff of member countries to examine European ?rmq-
ments requiremenis, thus givin-g political impetus to the standardisation and joint production of such
armaments;
6. Draw up a programme for the joint organisation of verification measures required for the appli-
cation of the CFE agreements;
7 . For this purpose, pursue further its study of the possibility of setting up a European observation
satellite agency;
8. Have the WEU Institute for Security Studies organise a pennanent exchange of information with
the Eastern European countries on military deployment in Europe and the application of the CFE
agreements;
9. Keep the public regularly informed of work carried out by its specialise_d-_groups to allow
European bublic-opinion io beiome aware of co-operation in the framework of WEU.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 479
I: 
^ 
The.strategic situation in Eu-rop! ir undergoing far-reaching changes. The study undertaken by
the Council on the consequences of a CFE agreemenion Europeai secur'ity is a long+er- process andit would be premature to draw on it for final ionclusions whileihe politico-military s-ituatio-n i, frropiis evolving so fast.
At the Ministerial Council meeting in Brussels on 23rd and24th April 1990, Ministers were
briefed on how far th.inking ha{progressed on the subject, a subject which was one of the main pointi
of their discussion. Since the CFE agreement was crucial to the eitablishment of peace in Europi ifrev
reiterated the_importance they attached to its conclusion. More generally, Ministers instrucieO ttL
experts to work on the form-ula1i91of a joint approach to all questions relating to European security, inparticular with a view to the CSCE summit.
II. 
. 
The treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany, signed in Moscow on l2th Sep-
tember, exprelsly gives the united Germany the * right to belong io afiiances, with all the rights alid
obligations arising therefrom ", specifying that this right is not afrected by other provisions cintaineOin the treaty.
. _ 
Tlr. provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty have not, therefore, been called into question by
unification. The WEU Council thus took note of a declaration by the German Representative on 3rtOctober that the united Ggrmany will be a full member of Weslern European Union and that 
'' 
thi
overall obligation to provide assistance in case of armed attack referred to in Article V of the modified
Brussels Treaty and_all other provisions of the set of treaties shall apply with immediate effecrto ttri
whole territory of the united Germany ".
III.
1..-. The concept of sufliciency of the level of a country's forces is one of the foundations of the future
military order in Europe as it will ensue from the CFE igreements. Progress with negotiationi o, Cff
and confidence-building. measures is being closely monitored by the Coincil. The geieral aims of these
negotiations,-together with the institutional arrangements that iryitt Ue set up underihe CSCE, ar. .quai
security for all, greater stability in Europe and lesser disparities in the field bf conventionat wi:iponj.
2. The inviolability of frontiers is a general principle of the Helsinki Final Act, and it applies to all
CSCE member countries.
With regard to the monitoring of arms control agreements, WEU member countries share thebelief that each agreement calls for adequate verification procedures.
Thus, the limitation of 
.specific categories of the conventional military capability of the statesqarty to the CFE negotiations is being covered by the Vienna CFE negotiationi, and it is in this context
that compliance with the commitments entered into by the states iarty *itt be guaranteed.
-.^Thg provisions concerning the non-production of certain weapons are laid down in the non-proliferation treatyon nuclear weapg-ns or ihe relevant protocols to the modified Brussels treaty, and
are monitored by the controls speciflred in those agreements.
3.... It is the responsibility of WEU bodies constantly to reflect on the concept of defence and the
military needs arising from that concept in order to guarantee the security df eact count.y. ftriithinking helps to arrive at a useful evaluation of the co-ntributions that Europeans can make to their
own security, and therefore to the security of all their allies.
. 
Ne-vertheless, each member state retains its sovereign right to decide on the size and structure ofits own forces.
4, 
- 
The presence of the forces of one state in the territory of other WEU states is regulated by spe-
cific agreements. The modified Brussels Treaty does not regulate the quesiion oi siatio-neO forc,js i'naprovides no legal basis for such a presence.
New prospects fo-r turopean security are being opened up by the remodelling of the European
strategic landscape, and these should be explored. T.he-review bf ttre modified Bru-ssels i.eat -;;;i:
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th November 1990.
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saged by Ministers at the time of WEU's enlargement to Portugal and Spain will be one.aspect of this
general-issue. It is in this context that thought should be given to the most appropriate- means of
itrengthening cohesion and co-operation among member states and also to the question of the compo-
sition of WEU.
5. The chiefs-of-staffmet for the first time in the history of the organisation on27th August 1990.
This meeting showed that member states have the capacity to arrive at joint military responses to an
exceptional iituation, and they are conferring together as to the advisability of holding more meetings
as and when necessary.
6. A study of the procedures for the implementation of the treaty on conventional armed forces in
Europe is on-e of the priority areas of the Council's work. The specific task is to optimise the verifi-
cation procedures which will be implemented for member states. This co-operation covers exchanges
related to the training of teams of inspectors, the inspection methods drawn up and the measures
planned in order to derive maximum benefit from the inspection rights to be granted to WEU coun-
tries: the inclusion of inspectors from other member countries in national teams and preference for
other member states in the transfer of active quotas not taken up. Several partners have recently
conducted or are planning to conduct joint training exercises.
7. Following the report by the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space set up 9V tlg Ministerial Council on 3rd
April 1989, Miiisters iequeited at the Council meeting on 23rd April 1990 that " conc.rete proposals
should be iubmitted to them at their next meeting, inter alia with a view to the possibility of esta-
blishing a satellite verification agency ". Since that date, the ad hoc sub-groqP llas [rsl! many plenary
meetinls, convened meetings of experts and paid visits to the satellite installations of member coun-
tries. Siecific proposals wifl be laid before Ministers at their next Council to enable them to take a
decision.
8. The r6le of the WEU Institute for Security Studies is to carry out analyses and fonrard studies
and to promote a European security identity. One of its tasks is to develop contacts-with officials and
research workers in the countries oi Centrai and Eastern Europe. These contacts will help to improve
the flow of information on politico-military questions in Europe, whether on disarmament or on
defence policies.
g. The Brussels Ministerial Council of 23rd April 1990 fortunately resumed the practice of issuing
a communiqu6, the public expression of the joint position of member states on major politico-military
issues of the day.
In the same way, the conclusions of the extraordinary Ministerial Councils in Paris on 21st
August and lSth September 1990 were brought to the attention of the general-public. The r6le played
Uy -WfU in the current Gulf crisis has been widely acknowled_gcd, especially 
-as 
the communiquds
islued after the first meeting of WEU chiefs-of-staffin Paris on27th August and the ad hoc.group for
the co-ordination of naval oierations in the Gulf in Paris on 3l st August gave the public detailed infor-
mation on the implementation of ministerial decisions.
The Presidency also welcomes the fact that the Assembly is actively contributing, through the
efforts of its membeis and through the activities it arranges itself, to improving the public perception
of WEU's r$le. Quite apart from the normal procedures, this is why the Presidency attachesparticular
importance to th; provision of information to members of the Assembly, as testified by the hearing of
its'Minister for Foreign Affairs by the Political and Defence Committees on 20th September 1990.
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RECOMMENDATION 480 
'
on WEU in the Atlantic Alliance2
l. THrAssrNasr-v recalls that Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty closely associates WEU's
activities with those of NATO and that NATO is still the essential guarantee of Europe's security
because it is the only framework in which the deterrent power of the United States can be used for the
benefit of Europe.
It recognises the progress made towards limiting armaments but notes that the Soviet Union has
not yet taken any decisive steps to reduce its forces and armaments and still remains the leading mil-
itary power on the European continent.
It considers that the security situation in Europe has been fundamentally changed through the
democratisation processes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe and the opening of borders,
including the one between the Federal Republic and the GDR.
It wishes the CFE negotiations to be concluded rapidly, a new mandate to be drawn up by the
CSCE for a subsequent reduction in the level of armaments, exclusively defensive military systems to
be established and negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons to be started immediately.
It welcomes the development of the CSCE and the efforts made in that framework to establish a
new peaceful order in Europe.
It considers that in the context of the conference on confidence- and security-building measures,
the Vienna negotiations and other forums significant steps are being taken to improve the security situ-
ation in Europe.
It considers that, with the increasing pace of European developments and the changing nature of
security problems, planning for European security co-operation must be accelerated.
It considers that, in the new circumstances, Western European countries will have to play a
r6le in this planning process, which will require closer co-operation between WEU member
It therefore RrcouurNos that the Council do its utmost to facilitate the United States Govern-
ment's action to maintain and strengthen the association of the United States with the organisation of
European security by:
(a/ asserting itself as the European pillar of the alliance, inter alia by moving the seat of its min-
isterial organs closer to that of NATO;
(b) askrne those of its members which do not participate in the NATO integrated commands to
examine to what extent the new situation and the new r6le to be played by NATO allow them
to associate their armed forces more closely with joint deployment;
(c) keeping the Assembly constantly informed of the discussion that is to be held on the
reorganisation, r6le and future of NATO in the context of the transformation of the military
pacts into political alliances following arms reduction agreements;
(d) tightening its links with the European members of the Atlantic Alliance which are not at
present members of WEU;
(e,) ensuring that member countries make a military effort sufficient to guarantee a balance of
conventional forces between the West and the Soviet Union;
(J) for this purpose, fixing the troop levels that each of them undertakes to place at the service ofjoint defence and providing for these undertakings to be revised in conformity with future
CFE agreements;
(g/ ensuring maximum security in Western Europe with a minimum deployment of forces and
urgently studying the conditions in which multinational units might be set up;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1990 during the first part ofthe thirty-sixth ordinary session (3rd sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Political Committee (Document
t22s).
larger
states.
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(h) organising, in the framework of a general reduction in military expenditure and the level of
armaments, fair burden- and responsibility-sharing in the alliance and between WEU
member countries.
2. THr AssrMsr.y considers it necessary for a reunified Germany not to be neutral and that it be
integrated in the European Community and play a full part in an all-European securitysystem as soon
as iiis set up by the CSCE and, during a transitional period, a search be made for solutions acceptable
to all concerned with maintaining balance and peace in Europe.
It also considers that reunified Germany must formally recognise the frontiers with its neigh-
bours resulting from the second world war and recognised by the Helsinki agteements.
It therefore RrcourrlrNos that the Council facilitate the search for a status for reunified Germany
which ensures that it participates in the collective security of Western Europe while giving the Soviet
Union and the Central and Eastern European countries the political and military assurances necessary
for maintaining a balance of forces and advancing future negotiations on peace and disarmament.
It also RrcouurNos that the Council ensure consultations between its members on matters on
the agenda of the negotiations on the status of Germany between the two German states and the four
powers directly concerned.
3. THr AsseMsly considers that recent developments in certain non-European countries, particu-
larly in the Near and Middle East, are a new danger to international peace and the security of Europe.
It notes that the Atlantic Alliance is making no provision for the necessary guarantees against such
threats but that any initiatives Europe may take to counter them help to strengthen American confi-
dence that the alliance is operating correctly.
It therefore Rrcour*lrNos that the Council make regular assessments of all possible threats to
European security and inform the public of the results of its work on security in the Mediter-
ranean.
4. THr AssrMsr-v hopes that the difliculties now arising in the CFE negotiations, in particular over
the level of air forces, will be rapidly overcome, that an agreement will be concluded in 1990 and that
further negotiations will be starttd before the end of the year to speed up the reduction in the level of
forces and armaments in Europe.
It welcomes the steps taken by the Council to co-ordinate member countries' action for applying
an open-skies agreement and for ensuring the effectiveness of verification operations.
It RrconaurNps that the Council contribute to the success of the disarmament negotiations and
enable member countries to play an active part in verifying and implementing future agreements by:
(a) talong an early decision on the joint production and use of observation satellites;
(D/ widening the decision taken in Brussels on 23rd April in order to organise a qermanent
exchange of information between its members on the results of each one's verification opera-
tions;
(c/ organising co-operation between member countries and, possibly, other European members
of-NATO for training the staff necessary for carrying out these operations.
5. THr Assr,Nlsly notes that Western European security continues to be guaranteed through imple-
mentation of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty.
It therefore Rscour*lrNos that the Council fulfil that guarantee by ensuring that member states
make an effort to facilitate the rapid conclusion of the first phase of the Vienna negotiations on con-
ventional disarmament and urge the immediate commencement of Vienna II negotiations.
6. THr AssrMsly notes that the limitation of forces and armaments in Europe will lead to a
reduction in arms production and troop levels in national armies.
It therefore Rrcouusnps that the Council exercise its mandate and at last give the necessary
impetus to the establishment of interoperability of armaments used by NATO and the standardisation
and joint production of armaments by member countries by:
(a/ assessing the requirements of European security in this area during the period of implemen-
tation of the CFE agreement;
(b/ fostering understanding between arrns-producing firms in member countries, inte_r alia
' ' 
through harmonisationbf relevant national legislation, as suggested in the study conducted
by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee in April 1982;
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(c) having the WEU Institute for Security Studies give priority to studying the economic and
social consequences of a potential reduction in the activities of the arms industries and the
number of persons employed on defence work.
It RrcouurNos that the Council take steps to prepare for changing military strategies and doc-
trines and to adjust to the new situation in Europe: whilst retaining defensive capabilities, the present
strategy of fonvard defence and flexible response in Europe will have to be re-examined and in this
context the deployment of the armed forces may have to be changed.
It welcomes the decision of President Bush and the NATO Nuclear Planning Group to terminate
the follow-on to Lance programme and to cancel any further modernisation of United States nuclear
artillery shells deployed in Europe which indicates the willingness and ability of the alliance to take the
initiative in a rapidly changing situation.
7. THe AsseMsI-v welcomes the fact that the Soviet Union and its allies are now open to exchanges
of views and information with the West on defence and security matters.
It therefore RrcouurNos that the Council help to restore mutual confidence between Eastern
and Central European countries and Western European countries by holding, together with the WEU
Institute for Security Studies, exchanges of information with appropriate bodies in the Soviet Union
and the Eastern and Central European countries on matters relating to security, disarmament and veri-
fication, as decided on 23rd April 1990.
8. THr Assnrrrsrv welcomes the Council's efforts to help to inform the public about its work. It notes
with satisfaction that, for the first time, the Council has given it a document in which the IEPG gives it
information about its activities. It considers, however, that this policy of openness is still inadequate,
which is detrimental to the cohesion of NATO.
It therefore RrcouueNos that the Council provide the public with more information about the
work of its dependent organs and the results they obtain. It also recommends that it ask the presidency
of the IEPG to report regularly and directly to the Assembly on its activities.
9. THe AssrNasl,v notes that the decisions taken by the Council on the abolition of arms control and
of the Standing Armaments Committee have in fact impaired the WEU ministerial organs' relations
with NATO. It welcomes the steps taken by the Council to develop other forms of contact.
However, it RrcoralrsNos that the Council resume the practice of asking the NATO authorities
for an opinion on matters within their purview raised by Assembly recommendations or written ques-
tions from members of the Assembly.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 4E0
1. With the total disruption of the strategic landscape in Europe, the Atlantic Alliance will be per-
forming its mission in a profoundly different context. It has embarked on a searching review,
conducted at different levels, to determine how it should fulfil that r6le in the future.
The debate has been launched and it is impossible to prejudge the outcome. Each of the allies is
making a specific contribution to ensure that the future configuration will reflect the cohesion of the
alliance in the new circumstances with due regard for the concerns of each of its members.
The structure of the joint defence effort cannot be determined at this phase, nor can its outline
yet be decided. It should also be borne in mind that, in the final analysis, the size and composition of
each state's armed forces are matters of national sovereignty.
The WEU Council is keeping this issue on its agenda. There is concertation on both WEU's own
tasks and how to include those tasks in the broader Atlantic framework. This concertation keeps in
mind that WEU is an organisation whose vocation is distinctly European, and one which makes a spe-
cific contribution to the building of Europe.
2. The treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany, signed in Moscow on l2th Sep-,
tember 1990, re-established the unity and full sovereignty of Germany. On 3rd October, the day of
German unity, the WEU Council adopted the communiqu6, the text of which is cited for the Assem-
bly's information:
" The Council of Western European Union (WEU) rejoices at the culmination today of the
process of German unification, following the sigrrature in Moscow of the treaty on the final settle-
ment with respect to Germany on l2th September. Today, the aspirations of the German people
to complete the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination become reality. The
Council welcomes the peaceful, democratic nature of these historic changes, which contribute
further towards building a just and lasting order of peace in Europe.
Together with the recent changes in Europe, German unification marks the end of the division of
our continent and contributes towards the achievement of the fundamental aims of WEU:
European unity and integration.
The Council of WEU welcomes the statement made today by the German Permanent Represen-
tative that the united Germany is a full member of Western European Union.
On this historic day, the Council shares the joy of the German people. "
3. The Gulf crisis has met with a co-ordinated response from WEU member states, with the
Assembly being kept duly informed. This action demonstrates WEU members'capacity for joint mobi-
lisation.
WEU keeps a close watch on the general situation in the Mediterranean, several of its member
countries having borders along that sea. This is a field for discussion and consultation to which the
Council attaches constant importance. A specific ad hoc group on security in the Mediterranean meets
regularly.
4. The verification of CFE agreements is one of the fundamental aspects of negotiation, since it
underpins their credibility. The Council has wasted no time in devoting its full attention to this
subject. For example, the standard method it devised for using gathered data has subsequently been
adopted by the Atlantic Alliance.
The importance of observation satellites in verification, and also in crisis monitoring, was justi-
f,rcation for the request by the Ministerial Council in 1989 for a study on the feasibility of WEU deve-
loping its own capability. As a result of the assiduous efforts that have been made since that time,
Ministers will be able to reach a decision on the subject in the near future.
5. The corpus of pertinent provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty helps safeguard the security
of WEU member countries. The platform on European security interests, adopted on 27th October
1987, spelt out these provisions in the contemporary politico-military context. To base the guarantee of
WEU members'secuiity on Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty would be to reduce the scope of
that guarantee.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th November 1990.
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WEU member countries are naturally aware of the issues affecting their security which are at
stake in the Vienna CFE negotiations. They have spared no effort to bring about a satisfactory
conclusion to the CSCE summit to be held in Paris on l9th November, and are already thinking ahead
to a complementary phase.
6. Co-operation in the production of armaments is an extremely complex question embracing
military, political, economic and social aspects. Many bilateral and multilateral programmes have been
implemented, while others are under way or being planned.
For internal organisational reasons, the Council decided to wind up the Standing Armaments
Committee on lst July 1990, but co-operation on armaments is a subject still requiring careful conside-
ration by member countries, in addition to the co-operation efforts they are making elsewhere, espe-
cially within the Independent European Programme Group.
The economic and social implications of trends in the arms industry together constitute one of
the elements of this wide-ranging question.
7 . In setting up the WEU Institute for Security Studies, one of the Council's objectives was the devel-
opment of exchanges with countries in the central and eastern part of our continent. In accordance
with the decision reached by Ministers at their meeting on 23rd April 1990, the Council for its part is
establishing information contacts with the states in the region. The first such mission took place this
autumn, with a joint visit by the Presidency and the Secretary-General to Hungary and Czechoslo-
vakia, and this will be followed by the forthcoming visit to Poland.
8. The IEPG is a body independent of WEU and could not, in respect of its activities, refer to a
body to which it is not attached.
9. Although developments over the previous decades have undoubtedly modified the form of
contact between WEU and NATO, the changes have occurred against the background of a comple-
mentary European and Atlantic approach to security, without calling into question the solidarity that
exists among all members of the Atlantic Alliance.
The Council's replies to Assembly recommendations or written questions from its members are
given in this spirit.
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(t)
RECOMMENDATION 481 I
on Vienna" disarmament and Western European Unionz
The Assembly,
Welcoming the recent developments in Europe which promise a dramatic reduction in
East-West tension;
(iil Considering, however, that the establishment of lasting security greatly depends on decisions
which have to be taken forthwith;
(iii) Aware that the democratic evolution in the countries of Central Europe faces growing problems
of internal argument and traditional nationalism;
(iv) Convinced that progress in the Vienna talks, both on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) and
on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM), is an essential prerequisite for stability and
security in Europe;(v) Stressing the necessity to continue arms control negotiations immediately after the signing of the
first CFE treaty;(vi) Certain that further cuts in weapons and force levels in Europe are desirable but that they must
be agreed collectively and not decided unilaterally;
(viil Noting the convergence of views on arms control between WEU member countries and a
growing number of Warsaw Pact countries;
(viiil Recognising that few nations, in the East or the West, continue to have the financial means to
maintain defence spending at former levels;
(ix) Determined that there must be greater European co-operation in the field of defence and
security, especially over arrns control in general and verification of agreements in particular;(x) Pleased that the NATO nations have tabled a series of measures in Vienna which are setting the
pace for the forthcoming CFE treaty;
(xil Saddened that the French Prime Minister's proposal of 7th September 1989 that WEU should
start a specific programme of immediate co-operation with regard to verification and disarmament has
not yet been taken up by the Council;
(xiil Encouraged, however, by the proposal on 23rd March 1990 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Federal Republic of Germany to create a centre for verification in Europe, which echoes pre-
vious French ideas on the necessity for transparency and reciprocal openness;
(xiii) Recalling that Recommandation 465 proposed the creation of a European observation satellite
agency to assist in the verification measures agreed by each member country;
(xiv) Welcoming the fact that the Council is studying a possible WEU contribution to the CFE verifi-
cation system based on the enhancement of European capabilities and the pooling of all member coun-
try's assets;
(xv) Convinced of the urgent need for a European veriJication centre and struck by the fact that the
ideal nucleus for such a body is WEU, plus those other states (signatories of the forthcoming CFE
treaty) desiring to take part;
(xvi) Suggesting that the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, together with the Secretary-General,
should immediately begin consulting not only member states but other interested nations from both
East and West which meet the necessary requirements with a view to their participation in the work of
this centre,
RrcouueNos rHAT rHE CouNcrl
Take the action
which all states which
participate.
necessary to create, under WEU auspices, a European veriJication centre
meet the necessary requirements, from both East and West, be invited
Adopted by the Assembly on 7th June 1990 during the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session (4th sitting).
Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Lord Newall on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1223).
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to Recommendation 481
No reply has yet been received from the Council.
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The Assembly,
(t) Noting that the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE), now taking place in
Vienna, are likely to lead to an agtreement within a year's time;
(it) Considering that European nations have played a substantial r0le in these negotiations and will
also be signatories to a future CFE treaty in their own right;
(iit) Aware that a future CFE treaty will also include extensive arrangeqtents for verification and
bx6hange of information considered as confidence-building measures by dl parties concerned;(iv) Conscious that, apart from co-operative measures of verification, national or international tech-
nical means of verification, in particular satellites which can be employed without the co'operation of
the contracting party whose territory is under investigation, are of perennial importance in the entire
verification process;
(v) Taking into account that verification satellites can also be employed to monitor territories in the
world where new security threats might arise;
(vt) Stressing the need for Western European nations to develop an autonomous European verifi-
baiion satelfitJcapability in order to meet their responsibilities in a changing security situation while at
the same time strengthening the alliance as an equal partner;
(vit) Aware that all the technological and industrial capabilities required_p1_the establishment and
op6ration of a full-scale verification satellite system are available in the WEU member states;
(viii) Aware of the plans for a research and technology project on satellite surveillance technology in
the framework of the Independent European Programme Group's Euclid programme;(ix) Recalling that the European Space Agency has gained invaluable competence and experience in
minaging complicated international space progtrammes including earth observation,
RecouurNns rHAT rsr CouNcII-
1. Decide as a matter of urgency on the establishment of a WEU satellite image-processing and
interpretation agency;
2. Reach decisions on further steps for establishing a full-scale European verification satellite
system without delay, taking into account the time necessary for developing the various-segments, such
ai optical satellites, groundltations and, in a later phase, synthetic aperture radar satellites and data-
relay satellites.
RECOMMENDATION 482 
'
on obsewation satellites - a European meons of vertfying disatmament -
guidelines drawn from the symposium2
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th June 1990 during the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session (4th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. trnzer on behalf o[ the Technological and Aerospace Committee(Document 1230).
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to Recommendation 482
No reply has yet been received from the Council.
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RECOMMENDATION 483 
'
on the Independent Earopean Programme Group (IEPG)
and Westera Eurupean Union2
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th June 1990 during the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session (5th sitting)-
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee(Document 1228).
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The Assembly,
(t) Recalling that, in the Rome declaration of October 1984 re.vitalising WEU, the Council stated
ihat WEU snoltd provide political impetus to European co-operation in armaments matters and reite-
rated that this is a key r6le for WEU;
(ii) Believing that reductions in East-West military confrontation in Europe should lead to a
necessity for ritionalisation, diversification and, where appropriate, specialisation so as to manage
overcapacity in defence-related industries;
(iii) Aware that the possibility of substantial trgop reductions on the part of bolh NATO and the
Wirsa* Pact as well ai of withdrawals of United States military manpower from Western Europe will
heighten the signihcance of weapon effectiveness and sophistication in deterrence at a lower level of
in-place forces;
(iv) Conscious that reductions in defence budgets-must be anticipated whi.c-l will put-a premium on
itri: benefits of arms co-operation to secure value for money and on the utilisation of the most eco-
nomic productive and maintenance capacities for defence equipment;
(v) Anticipating that, whilst the United States' political and nuclear guarantees 
_to the security of
Western Eurbpe w-ill remain, pressures of public opinion in the United States will induce congressional
initiatives foi reductions of transatlantic co-op-erative equipment programmes in favour of pro-
curement from United States domestic sources;
(vt) Mindful that the IEPG operates in a political vacuum sustaining no 
^significant information 
pro-
l;rimme on its work and winning no European constituency of support for its activities;(vil Convinced that the IEPG can offer, through the harmonisation-of operational requirements and
ie-6quipment timescales as well as through a concerted European military research programme, cost-
iffecliui defence equipment programmes-to meet the challenges of a rapidly evolving security situation
in Europe, and that its work merits more substantial backing,
RrcourueNos rHAr rur CouNctl-
l. Arrange for the presidency of the IEPG to address the Assembly once a yeat to inform it about
developmenls in European armaments co-operation and to answer questions from members;
2. Organise the regular circulation of progtress bulletins to the Committees on Technoloqf pd_$:1-
ospace arid Defence oTthe Assembly of WnU to sustain a better appreciation of the work of the IEPG
among key political opinion formers in Europe;
3. Ensure that the Commission of the EEC is formally informed on a regular basis of the work of
the IEPG so as to sustain a beneficial dialogue on issues of mutual interest such as the maintenance of
Europe's industrial base, technical capability and competitiveness;
4. Build on the welcome creation of a small permanent secretariat of the IEPG in Lisbon by co1-
centrating the support ofthe presidency there and by establishing a strengthened corpus ofspecialist
expertiselhrough longer detachments of procurement experts to the secretariat;
5. Pursue vigorously the initial stages towards more integrated European military research gn$er
the auspices of ihe Bu6tiO programmJby increased joint funding and the rationalisation of existing
national defence research establishments;
DOCUMENT 1253
6. Explore with the Commission of the EEC possibilities for some acceleration of harmonised
European company law to facilitate fair cross frontier competition and the processes of transnational
merger, acquisition and collaboration between defence companies;
7. Maintain effort^s to secure- a_So.re genuinely open defence equipment market in Europe by uni-
versal distribution of contract bulletins and data collection and ex-change whilst ensurin! thit the
interests of the member defence industry countries are secured
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to Ruommendation 483
The Council shares the interest expressed by the Assembly in its Recommendation 483 in streng-
thening relations between WEU and the IEPG.
This interest has been conveyed to the United Kingdom Presidency of the IEPG, by whom it was
registered in a spirit of open-mindedness.
The IEPG already keeps WEU regularly informed on the content of its activities, and the
exchanges between ttre ifpc and the Council in this field appear to be satisfactory.
It would be difficult to go further and to seek the creation of a formal link between the IEPG and
the WEU Assembly.
Given the informal nature of the IEPG - one of the reasons for its existence and its success - and
the fact that its composition does not correspond with that of WEU, it could no! be envisaged as things
now stand that the IEpG should be subjected to what might be regarded as the first step towards parlia-
mentary control by the WEU Assembly over the IEPG.
While the WEU Council shares the Assembly's positive views on the r6le of the IEPG, moreover,
it has no authority to state opinions as to its method of operation, nor to seek to influence the outcome
of its deliberations.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l4th November 1990.
309
DOCUMENT 1253
RECOMMENDATION 484 
'
on WEA, research institutes atd non-governmental organisations
conceraed with security and European defence2
(i) THe AsseMsr-v is aware that it is important for WEU to take full advantage of the work of the
various research institutes concerned with security and defence and which are -apable of exercising
considerable influence on public opinion and politicians, thus contributing to the enlargement of the
public debate on these questions;(it) It welcomes therefore the fact that the organisation of relations with such institutes in and
beyond Western Europe and the development of greater public awareness of European security ques-
tions are among the tasks of the newly-created WEU Institute for Security Studies;(iit) It is gratified that according to the Council's reply to Recommendation 474 the institutes's
unclassified work will be widely available to the public;(iv) It is happy that one of the tasks of the institute will be to establish and keep up-to-date a data
bank for research and information purposes;(v) 
.lt recalls that its services have so far no means of access to computerised documentation systems
established in various research institutes and documentation centres;(vi) It considers the advantages WEU could derive from closer collaboration with appropriate non-
governmental organisations capable of giving maximum publicity to the organisation's aims, initiatives
and achievements and promoting a public awareness of European security questions in all countries
concerned.
THe AsseN{sr-y therefore RncoruueNos that the Council:
L Grant the WEU Institute for Security Studies the broadest possible independence for its work,
including the development of fruitful relations with parliamentarians, the media-and the public and foi
establishing an active information policy;
2. Allow the Assembly appropriate access to the institute's documentation data base for its own
work;
3. With the help of the institute, develop closer cooperation with those international non-
governmental organisations which are particularly representative within the organisation's sphere of
competence 1n4, by their activities, are capable of contributing to promoting a European securityidentity and inform the Assembly of the action taken.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th June 1990 during the first part ofthe thirty-sixth ordinary session (5th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Stegagnini on behalf of the Committee for parliamentary and publicRelations (Document 1226).
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'
to Recommendation 484
The Institute for Security Studies is an original creation in terms of both its vocation and ope-
ration. It is the first institute to be set up at a Eur6pean and international level with the aim of helping
io O."eiop the European security identity. Its funition is both internal, in that it contributes as and
*frrn nii.5a.y io the work of thb Council and its working grgups,-3n$ external in that its work is also
Jiii.liO toiiriioi omciats in third countries, to all sectorsbf public life concerned with security pro-
blems, and to international public opinion in general.
Whereas, institutionally, it comes under the authority of the Council-pu^rsuant to Article VIII of
the modified BhssetsTreaty, the ministerial decision of t3th November 1989 setting.up.th-g lnstitute
stipufates that the wort of ttr6 Institute shall be carried out " independently and objective.ly ". In nqfl-
ili"r;la irih;Irrstitrt." r.sponsibility to devise its work programhe by developing the widest possible
nitw6rt< for contacts and io-operati,on with the outside world, including those international non-
governmental organisations concerned with security questions.
The activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studies are set against a background of a. heigh-
tened European awareness of security issues. The Asiembly ha_s helped bring.that about.by an intense
effort orer-many years to alert polificians to these issues-and to keep public opinion informed; the
Council welconiei this contribution. Appropriate co-ordination between the Institute and the
nrr.-Ufy *iff pio-ot. it is objective, wittr-tire institute for example allowing the Assembly access to its
unclassified documentation.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 9th November 1990.
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RECOMMENDATION 485 
'
on the future of low flying,
The Assembly,
(i). 
. -Recalling_ the motion for a resolutionjrn the bannin-g of low-altitude military training flights,tabled by Mr. Biichner and others3 on 5th December tggd'(oocument i6t;- --(ii) Aware that the effects of low-altitude flying are suffered in all member states of WEU, as well asin most other European countries, including-th6se of the Warsaw freati Oilanil"tion;(iii) Considering the easing of tension between East and West;
(iv) 
. 
In view of the Prospect of agreement in Vienna to make substantial reductions in certain cate-gories of conventional weapons in-cluding combat aircraft;
(v) 
- 
Convinced that it should be possible to make greater use of simulation in preparing pilots forlow-altitude flight;
(yi) Stressing that there-shoqld_be gleater consultation and agreement between member states to
share the burden of low-altitude flighi training;
(vii)- Bggtlting that in the past the Council has forwarded cettain recommendations of the Assemblyto the NATO authorities,
RrcouurNos rHAT rne CouNclI_
I' Include the subject.of low-altitude flying and attendant problems in its own agenda and urge theNATO authorities to do likewise, with the lim of making an urgent stuov of tne t"aGin which itE rni-
ueTq4 European problem of low-altitude flying may be ai=tenuat-ed in the futuri, incioOing;;;;h ili;public knowledge of and attitudes to the bro-Uteni;
2. Ensure that the general and sqecific points made in the present report are taken into account
and, in 
-particular, fully examine the following suggestions with a view to tfei.'aOopiion Uy NAiO-;anational governments as norms for the future: - -
(a) i!^peacetime, minimum heights for low-altitude flights over urban areas to be not less than300 metres;
(b) interc,eption exercises and formation flying at low altitude to be banned in the vicinity ofheavily populated areas;
(c) airuaft speed to be limited to 420 knots maximum, so that noise is reduced;
(d) very low-altitude flights (i.e. those at less than 75 metres) to be authorised only over training
areas ofsuflicient size and consideration to be given to iuppressing tte usi oiaU ircn aiiiiin peacetime, to be reactivated only in time oI tension;
(e) all low-altitu{e flying to be-banned.between l0 p.m. and 8 a.m. (even in training areas) andgenerally on Sundays and bank holidays;
0 !\e authorisation of night low-flying routes to be subject to agreement by national author-ities;
@ all necessary training for flights at low and very low altitude in 'real' conditions to takeplace in areas where geography allows such flighis without ca"siog consiOiiaUfe disturbanceto the population;
l. Adopted bv the Assembly on 8th June 1990 during the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session (6th sitting).2' Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1222).3. MM' Biefnot, Holtz, Eicher, Pdcriaux, Stoffelen, Schmidt, Mrs. Luuk, Mrs. Blunck and Mr. Scheer.
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(ft/ although the current state of simulation techniques cannot completely replace actual low-
altitude flying, consideration to be given.to further research and development with the aim
of improving-low-altitude flying simulation (the high financial cost would be more than jus-
tified);
(/ consider, in addition, ways in which the unsocial aspects for aircrews of training in areas
overseas or remote from home bases might be alleviated;
(j) the standard of the equipment of various types of aircraft should not be the only factor for
determining low-altitude training techniques and conditions;
(k/ whereas, formerly, low-altitude training flights in potential zones of action were desirable for
making use of geographical data and for tactical reasons, the greater perfection of naviga-
tional aids has virtually removed the need for visual contact, thus allowing such training to
be carried out in other more sparsely populated areas;
(f units of the air forces of WEU member countries must be able to conduct low-altitude' 
training with realistic advance warning, after an analysis of the actual threat, which at the
presenitime does not justify exercises based on the hypothesis of a few hours' warning time.
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to Recommendation 485
Military training flights are regulated by each state within a national context, in compliance with
international commitments where these have been entered into. Neither WEU nor any other organi-
sation is empowered to intervene in this field and to lay down regulations applicable to member c-oun-
tries.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l4th November 1990.
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RECOMMENDATION 486 
'
on developments in command, conttol, commuilications and intelligence (C3D2
The Assembly,
O Recognising the tightening of defence budgets in all allied countries;(iil Conscious of the serious intentions of both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries to reduce their
conventional armed forces;(iiil Considering that a combination of reduced conventional forces and limited defence budgets cq4s
for improved co-operation between allied forces in order to employ troops and equipment most effi-
ciently;
(iv) Convinced that an integrated allied command, control and information system as it is-now being
planned by NATO will act as a force multiplier and will g;reatly improve the performance of the lesser-
armed forces that will be available in the future to guarantee peace and security for Europe;(v) Convinced that some systems for command, control, communications and intelligence, in par-
ticular those for airborne early warning and control and for stand-off surveillance and targeting, could
also play an important r6le in the process of verification of conventional arms reduction agree-
ments;
(vil Convinced that the systems mentioned in paragraph (v/ could greatly contribute to building con-
fidence about military matters if members of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO agree to open their
skies for unarmed aerial surveillance flights over their territory as proposed by President Bush in May
1989,
RncoulurNns rHAT rne CouNcu.
l. Urge member governments to endorse NATO's planning for an integrated command control and
information system for Allied Command Europe and to provide the required financial means;
2. Study the possible r6le of European and multinational aerial systems for stand-off surveillance
and targeting and of airborne early warning and control in the process of verifying the implementation
of a CFE treaty, and in the framework of a future open skies agreement.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th June 1990 during the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session (6th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Hill on behalf of the Technicological and Aerospace Committee(Document 1229).
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
to Recommendation 4E6
No reply has yet been received from the Council.
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RECOMMENDATION 487I
on the budgets of the ministerial organs.of |lutern European Union
for the financial yean 1989 (revise$ and 19902
The Assembly,
(i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western EuropeanUnion
for 1989 (revised) and 1990, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the
Charter;(it) Considering that:
(a) the budget of the Secretariat-General for the financial year 1990 may be considered provi-
sional insofar as the proposals to create seven new posts, withdrawn at the request of the
WEU Budget and Organisation Committee, will be considered subsequently on the basis of a
management survey to be conducted by a specialised body;
(b) in doing this, the Budget and Organisation Committee has relinquished responsibility for
organisation, which is part of its attributions;
(c) the * liquidation' version of the 1990 budget of the Paris agencies is based on a wholly theo-
retical assumption and is therefore liable to be changed significantly;
(d) the operating budget of the WEU Institute for Security Studies has not yet been drawn up;
(e) the Assembly is consequently unable to express an opinion on the abovementioned budgets;
(iiil Regretting that:
(a) the Council has decided not to pay additional indemnities to oflicials not recruited by the
WEU Institute for Security Studies;
(b) the participation ofrepresentatives ofthe staffofthe co-ordinated organisations in negotia-
tions on procedure for adjusting salaries does not appear to correspond to their legitimate
expectations;
(c) there is no agreement between the secretaries-general of the co-ordinated organisations to
facilitate the movement of staff from one organisation to another, which would have been
very useful on the occasion of the winding up of the Paris agencies,
RecounarNos rHAT rnr CouNcrr-
l. Reconsider the composition and mandate of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee, in
particular its responsibility for organisational matters;
2. Support the action taken by the staff associations of the co-ordinated organisations with a view
to playing a more effective part in negotiations on staff employment conditions;
3. Ask that the question of the movement of stafffrom one organisation to another be included in
the agenda of a forthcoming meeting of the Committee of Secretaries-General of Co-ordinated
Organisations in order to work out means of fostering and facilitating such movement.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th June 1990 during the first part ofthe thirty-sixth ordinary session (6th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Lord on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration (Document l2l8).
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'
to Recommendation 4E7
l. The Budget and Organisation Committee fulfils all of the mandate it has been given and there is
no plan whatsoever to modify its responsibilities. Its members are the delegations designated by
member countries to sit on that Committee.
The Budget and Organisation Committee may, if it thinks fit and with the Council's approval,
call upon independent experts, who then provide their technical opinion, which in no way releases the
committee from its responsibilities towards the Council.
2. Negotiating procedures within the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts are
currently under review, the conclusions of which have not yet been agreed.
Staff associations may nevertheless make their views known now if they differ from the recom-
mendations finally adopted by the Coordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts. Mention
of this is made in the report setting out the recommendations to the Councils of the co-ordinated
organisations, who will thus take due note of the fact.
3. The Secretary-General has proposed to the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General of the
co-ordinated organisations that the question of the movement of stafffrom one organisation to another
should be put on the agenda of one of its forthcoming meetings. The Assembly will be informed of the
outcome of the committee's deliberations on this subject.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l4th November 1990.
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RECOMMENDATION 488 
'
on the coilscqaences ofthe invasion of Kuwait:
operutions in the Gulf2
l. The Assembly approves the action taken by the Council in invoking Article VIII, paragraph 3, of
the modified Brussels Treaty as a result of lraq's aggression against and occupation of Kuwait.
The Assembly welcomes the Council's readiness to place WEU co-ordination in the context of
the implementation of United Nations Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665.
The Assembly supports the Council's decision, not only to convene the meeting of the Minis-
terial Council, but also to constitute an ad hoc group to cover the Gulf crisis especially to call the first
meeting, under direct WEU auspices, of the chiefs of defence staffs.
The Assembly believes that the Council should remain open to the idea of further co-operation
and co-ordination at different levels over all aspects of operations in the Gulf area and therefore
RscouunNDs that the necessary steps be taken to formalise the Gulf and hoc group to consider policy
and implementation on a day-to-day basis, as long as the present crisis lasts, and urges all WEU nations
to provide maximum information to the operational cell being run in the French Ministry of Defence.
2. Concerned that the proliferation of vessels in the Gulf area could lead to problems in the very
near future, the Assembly RncouuENDs that further consultations take place immediately at govern-
mental level to establish common command and control in the various Gulf zones already agreed and
further RrcouueNDs that urgent measures be taken to harmonise rules of engagement at least within
each zone, and ensure that recognition procedures (IFF) are properly co-ordinated between all aircraft
and naval units to assure the safety of friendly forces.
3. The Assembly considers that WEU could play a useful r6le in helping to co-ordinate (perhaps in
conjunction with other agencies) logistic support, reinforcement and resupply for the Gulf operations
and that WEU nations' assets for sea- and airlift might be provided, in some cases where combat
forces, for whatever reason, may not be available, and RrcourrarNDs that the Council study the
options for providing such assistance without delay.
4. Disappointed that the transatlantic presentation of WEU's contribution to support the United
Nations' efforts to solve the crisis in the Gulf has yet to have an impact, the Assembly Rrcout"tENos
that the Council establish forthwith a liaison office in Washington to serve as a channel for North
American links and as a matter of priority to convince the United States' Administration that direct
dialogue with WEU is possible and to be welcomed, particularly at present. The Council should make
every effort to ensure that WEU is perceived as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.
a OO** O, presidential Committee on 20th September 1990, in application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of a.o..-
dure.
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document
1243).
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'
to Recommcndatioa 188
l. The extraordinary ministerial meetings convened on 2lst August and l8th September 1990
enabled WEU policy in the Gulf crisis to be defined and the necessary decisions taken in response to
the crisis. An ad hoc group of foreign affairs and defence representatives was instructed to co-ordinate
the action by member states. To date, it has met five times and may be convened at any moment if cir-
cumstances should warrant. It has, in particular, set up a WEU naval co-ordination unit in the naval
staffheadquarters of the presidency. This unit centralises all the data supplied by the defence staffs of
the member states and draws up a summary which it then circulates in return. It also produces a daily
update of the situation of all merchant vessels in the Gulf region, which it transmits to the other
capitals.
2. Joint specific guidelines concerning the co-ordination of WEU member states' naval forces in
the region were adopted on 3lst August. They established a framework for joint action regarding the
missions of WEU fleets to enforce the naval embargo, rules of engagement, preferential zones of ope-
ratbn, theexchange of information,logistic and operational support and co-operation structures. This
internal co'operation within WEU in no way precludes contact with the other naval forces in the
region, notably the United States forces, with whom co-ordination is entirely satisfactory.
3. As mentioned above, the guidelines on naval forces relate in particular to the co-ordination of
logistic support for this armed service. That support is co-ordinated to tle maximum extent so that
optimum use can be made of the vessels deployed. Further guidelines were adopted on 3fth October
concerning logistic support to the ground and air forces of WEU countries deployed in the zone. Spe-
cific co-operation measures, principally concerning the transport of units and equipment between
Europe and the theatre of operations, are now under way.
4. The co.ordinated action by WEU in the Gulf region is a practical reality that is visible to all the
third countries,'notably by the United States, in the theatre of operations. In the naval sector, the
general conference in Bahrain on 9th and Ifth September 1990 at which all the naval commanders in
the zone met to discuss the enforcement of the embargo against Iraq was co-organised by WEU 
- 
as
represented by the presidency 
- 
and the United States. Two other similar conferences, covering a
smaller geographical area, have already taken place. In future, these meetings will be more frequent.
Prior to all such meetings there is co-ordination ort all the agenda items among the commanders of the
WEU countries'fleets in the zone, thus demonstrating that WEU is operating as a full partner in the
reglon.
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RECOMMENDATION 489I
on Earopean securiv and events
in the Near and Middle East2
1. The Assembly welcomes the holding of an extraordinary ministerial meeting of the Council in
Paris on 2lst August 1990 to implement Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty
with a view to co-ordinating member countries' action following Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.
It welcomes the fact the Council invited the countries taking part in European political
co-operation to attend its meeting and that Denmark and Greece were represented, as was Turkey.
It welcomes the fact that the Council placed its action in the framework of the implementation of
United Nations Security Council resolutions and asked the Security Council to define additional mea-
sures that would be necessary in applying an embargo on Iraq and the territory of Kuwait. It welcomes
the fact that Security Council Resolution 665 meets this request and that it stresses the need to make
maximum use of political and diplomatic measures, the first of which was the visit by the Secretary-
General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, to Amman.
The Assembly notes that, in adopting without delay several Security Council resolutions on the
first international crisis following the East-West rapprochement, the United Nations has emerged from
the paralysis forced upon it by the cold war and the opposition between the military blocs to become
the guarantor of peace and international order. It welcomes the fact that WEU, by the decisions taken
at the extraordinary meeting of its Council of Ministers on 2 I st August I 990, aflirmed the prestige and
authority of the United Nations in the first major international crisis since the end of the cold war andjust when a new international order is emerging.
Recognising the importance of co-ordination with the United States, it also welcomes the fact
that the Council has expressed the will to support efforts by the Arab states to find a political solution
to the conflict.
Finally, it welcomes the establishment of a system of co-ordination of member countries' naval
and air action in the Gulf.
It RecouurNos that the Council pursue the undertaking thus started and make the withdrawal of
Iraqi forces from Kuwait a prior condition for any settlement of the conflict.
2. The Assembly has noted with satisfaction that useful consultations between member countries
and the Soviet Union helped to ensure the adoption of Security Council Resolution 665.
It welcomes the fact that, at the annual session of the United Nations General Assembly on27th
September, the Twelve reached agreement with the Soviet Union to adopt a joint statement on the situ-
ation in the Gulf region.
It RrcourrreNps that the Council pursue and develop these consultations in order to maintain and
develop the cohesion shown by the international community in imposing respect for the embargo
against Iraq.
3. The Assembly has noted with indignation the many violations of the law of nations committed
by Iraq and in particular:
- 
the threat to use chemical weapons which is a violation of the " Protocol for the prohibition of
the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of
warfare " that was signed in Geneva on lTth June 1925 and entered into force on 8th February
1928. This threat is particularly serious since chemical weapons were effectively used during
the war against Iran and, in particular, against the Kurdish people;
- 
many violations of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the protection of civilian persons in time
of war;
- 
violations of the 196l Vienna Convention on the protection of diplomats.
It therefore RrcouurNos that the Council use every means at its disposal to terminate these vio-
lations and bring Iraq to destroy its stocks of chemical weapons under international control and make
l. Adopted by the Presidential Committee on 20th September 1990, in application of Rule 14. paragraph 2, of the Rules
of Procedure.
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Preralli on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1242).
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reparations for the wrongs inflicted upon foreign nationals detained in Iraq against their will and those
inflicted on diplomatic representations in Kuwait.
4. The Assembly notes that the twelve EEC countries have announced their decision to afford eco-
nomic assistance to Arab 
- 
and other 
- 
countries victims of the embargo against Iraq. It considers this
to be a positive decision and Rrcourvreups that the Council consider the possibility of convening a con-
ference on Euro-Arab co-operation bringing together the member countries of the EEC and of the Arab
League.
It is gratified that the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers in Paris on 2lst August
provided an opportunity, on the same day, for a meeting of ministers for foreign affairs of the twelve
European Community countries to examine the political aspects of the crisis and, in particular, the
question ofthe hostages held by Iraq contrary to international conventions. It considers this to be a
good example of task-sharing and close co-operation between WEU and the Twelve.
5. The Assembly considers that the weakness shown by the international community in ensuring
that the Iraqi Government respects human rights is one of the sources of the conflict. Many eastern and
western countries bear the responsibility for supplying Iraq with a powerful, dangerous military arsenal
during and after the war with Iran.
It recalls that it has denounced the delivery of arms to Iraq and illegal transactions in advanced
military technology by banks and producing firms in a few member countries of WEU and in the
United States.
In Recommendation 475, it also made detailed proposals for terminating the arms race in Iraq
and in all Middle Eastern countries.
It regrets that the Council's reply was hardly satisfactory and, in the light of current events,
wishes greater attention to be paid to those proposals.
6. The Assembly regrets that, in many cases, the United Nations has been unable to ensure the
application of resolutions adopted by the Security Council. It fears that if this situation persists it may
lead to new and serious crises.
The Assembly considers that, after lraq has been made to respect the Security Council decisions
and international law, the international community and the United Nations muit demonstrate the
same cohesion in employing all political and diplomatic means and adopting vigorous measures of eco-
nogic and political pressure to obtain respect for Security Council decisions by confirming Israel's
right to exist within sure, recognised frontiers and the right of Palestinians to self-determination. This
would bring about the end of Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. Similarly, a political
solution to the present conflict may help to create conditions favourable to a settlemen[ of the
Lebanese problem and the withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces from Lebanon.
It therefore RrcouurNos that the Council implement without delay the provisions of Assembly
Recommendation 475 adopted in December 1989 which underlined the importance of convening an
international conference on peace in the Middle East under the aegis of the United Nations.
7. The Assembly strongly endorses the appeal made by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, for immediate humanitarian assistance for the hundreds of thousands
of refugees from different countries who are leaving or who have left Iraq via Jordan.
It therefore RrcounaeNos that the Council ask the governments of member countries to take part
in this humanitarian effort.
8. The Assembly notes that, for the second time, Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels
Treaty has been the basis for co.ordinated action by member countries to foster the restoration of a
peaceful order threatened outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty.
It therefore Rrcout'rnNns that the Council maintain and strengthen in any revision of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty the commitments in that paragraph and ensure that no country is asked to join
WEU if it is not effectively prepared to fulfil these commitments.
9. The Assembly notes that none of the WEU member countries alone has adequate means of
taking effective action in the Gulf.
It RrcouueNos that the Council analyse the shortcomings that have thus emerged, particularly in
regard to monitoring and data-processing, and speed up consideration of measures to be taken to
remedy this situation on the basis of Recommendation 482 on observation satellites.
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10. The Assembly welcomes the fact that arbitration by the revitalised United Nations, security
through an alliancebf WEU countries against aggression and, in Vienna tomorrow, disarmament may
help t-he emergence of a new system of security and international co-operation.
Finally, to achieve this end, it RrcorarvrsNos that the Council make intensive use of all the pros-
p..tr i.*ui6it UV the dramatic irisis in the Gulf for achieving as quickly as possible an effective
European defence organisation.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
to Recommendatbn 4E9
No reply has yet been received from the Council.
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Written qaestions 285 to 287 and replies of the Council
QUESTION 285
pat to the Council bY Mr,-Pontillon
on 16th January 1990
Can the Council saY:
l. how it intends to improve its public rela-
tions effort following the WEU seminar on
changes in public perceptions of European
defence;
2. what proposals the Secretary-General has
made in this connection;
3. whether it is prepared to include the
problem of WEU's information policy 
.in its
isenda as a matter of urgency with a view to
eiamining specific initiatives, e.g.:
(ai publishing guidelines for the press at
' itre close of meetings of the Per-
manent Council;
(b) preparing and publishing. easy-to-
' . 
understand basic information docu-
ments for widespread circulation in all
member countries;
(c) creating a WEU periodical in the
' ' 
official languages of all member coun-
tries for thE dissemination of articles,
communiquds and news about WEU
activities;
(di establishing WEU information offices
' ' in the European member countries of
the alliance and, in particular, in the
United States and Canada;
(e) inviting member ,governments to' ' 
release- more information about
WEU;
(J) defining methods of 
-organising
opinion Polls at EuroPean level;
(8/ strengthening. 
. 
co-operation 
. 
with
groups, assoCiations and private insti-
lutes in order to enhance the interest
aroused bY studies on Western
European securitY matters;
(ft/ strengthening co-operation, discus-
' ' 
sionJ and exchanges of views with
industrial associations, trades unions,
cultural associations, educational esta-
blishments and universities;
(/ using television as a means of pre-
senting WEU;
4. in the light of the abovementioned consi-
derations, whether it is prepared to grant the
financial means WEU needs to pursue a public
information policY;
5. whether it is prepared to follow up my
proDosal to set up a WEU public relations com-
init-tee composed of representatives of both the
Assembly and the Council?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL '
communicated to the AssemblY
on 30th November 1990
l. The Council shares the honourable mem-
ber's concern that public opinion should be kept
fully informed of WEU's activities. It considers
thai the momentum generated by WEU reacti-
vation must be reflected in an active public rela-
tions policy. This active apProach is all the more
necesiary at a time of profound structural
chang. in the international situation and of
acute crisis in one part of the world.
To ensure that the outside world is more
familiar with the r6le of WEU, two types of
action have been stepped up: informing the
public of the Council's position on major
iecurity problems of the day and, where apPro:
oriate.ihe measures taken in response to topical
bvents, and creating an awareness of the
changing features of the strategic landscape and
their-effects on the emergence of a European
security identity.
The Council believes that, at this stage,
such action should be conducted in a variety of
ways through WEU bodies, each 
-adapting it-s
own partic[hr approach, rather than through
the setting-up of ipecific new communication
structures] Furthermore, members of the dif-
ferent bodies act as an interface in informing the
public in their own countries about WEU.
2. Over the past six months, no fewer than
six press communiqu6s have been issued at the
end'of the major me-etings held by the Council at
different levels.
This occurred at the three Ministerial
Councils that have met since the beginning of
the year. On the Day of German Unity, the Per-
manent Council issued a communiqud on this
sreat event and its implications for WEU. The
first chiefs-of-staff meeling in the history of the
organisation, held on 27th August 1990, was
AJo tne subject of a press bulletin, as was the
work of the id hoc group on WEU co-ordination
in the Gulf crisis. Given the importance and also
the diversity of all this information, the aim is to
provide as comprehensive a briefing as.possible
bn the organisation's thinking and decisions.
3. As part of its rdle to stimulate debate, it is
for the Piesidency to assume responsibility for
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political information. It fulfils that responsi-bility towards the Assembly, to whicir the
country holding the Presidency regularly pre-
s91ts a report on the Council's work. When jus-
tified by the circumstances, arrangements are
made for the additional briefing of parlia-
mentary representatives, as in the case of the
hearing of the Council Chairman-in-Office
before the Political Committee, following the
two extraordinary Council meetings on the Gulf
crisis. Finally, the Presidency ensures that third
countries are informed of WEU activities, parti-
cularly when measures adopted by WEU iffect
them directly.
4. The WEU Secretary-General also has an
important task in the area of public relations
and contact with the press. Through his involve-
ment in international seminars, heetings with
leading political figures and interviews riith the
press, he helps to ensure that the voice of WEU
is heard in the debate on- security. The Secretary-
General's quarterly information letter to t6e
President of the Assembly provides substancefor the dialogue with th-e Assembly. The
Secretariat-General also issues press rbleases,
information and leaflets and- is currently
increasing its efforts in this direction.
5. The creation of the WEU Institute for
!9c^qrilV.Studies, which started work on lst July1990, is in a sense also a response to the need for
information. One of the Insiitute's missions is to
stimulate the public debate on the various
aspects of European security and to contribute
19 tfe emergence of a European securityidentity. The Institute has already made very
many contacts with study and research centresin WEU member countries and elsewhere in
Europe. It has itself organised three seminars in
Paris, which have been attended not only by
foreign Ministry oflicials but also by teahin!Furopean_ figures,concerned with thd securit!
issues addressed there: security in the Mediter-
ranean, new security structures in Europe and
the political union of the Twelve.
The WEU Institute for Security Studiesdoes not confine its contacts to European
research institutes specialising in security ques-
tions but is also in touch wittr teaOii g aca-
demics, industrialists, journalists and [arlia-
mentarians. In particular, the Institute hajtaken
the question of the European arms industries as
one of its priorities: a seminar is about to be
devoted to the subject and will be attended by
many 
.representatives from industry and thefinancial world. On a more general l6vel a data
bank is being set up by the WEU Institute for
Security Studies and will be accessible to allparties concerned with the debate.
6. Finally, the Council welcomes the
imp.etus given by the Assembly in informingpublic opinion; its members cah, in their res-pective parliaments, play a useful-r6le in mobi-
lising opinion on European security, and moreparticularly on WEU's efforts in the new
European context.
QUESTTON 2t6
put to the Council by Mr. Eicher
on 6th lune 1990
A new European security order
James Baker's speech in Berlin on l2th
December 1989 is today the reference for the
United States Department of State,s policy
towards the concept of a new European se-curity
order. In any event, the extension bf the CSCII
process that the United States wishes must not
result in it replacing the Atlantic Alliance or leadto its disbandment. The allies, too, seem to
uphold this point of view.
On the contrary, the Atlantic Alliance,
oriented towards a more political r6le and abouito modernise its strategy, including nuclear
strategy, will remain the essential element of
European security. In the words of Mr.
Genscher, the strengthening or even institu-
tionalisation of the CSCE wiU be intended to
establish additional structures for co-operation.
Does the WEU Council of Ministers
intend to play a specific r6le in the estab-
lishment of this new security order and in thedefinition of this complementarity between
western structures and the future all-European
structure?
No reply has yet been received
from the Council.
QUESTTON 287
pat to the Council by Mr. Eicher
on 6th lune 1990
German unity
At the beginning of May, a commentator
Fi4 qf the two-plus-four conference that, whileinitially intended as a means for the vicioriouspowers to organise unified Germany's return to
the concert of nations, it was in thb process of
lurning^into hagqling over the price to be paidfor a Soviet withdrawal from the German
scene.
Three of the six participants in the confe-
lence-qle m_ajgr members of WEU (the FederalRepublic of Germany, France and'the United
Kingdom). Has the WEU Council served as a
framework at least for informal discussions on
the German question? If so, what is the Coun-
cil's position?
No reply has yet been received
from the Council.
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Consequences of developments in Cenfial and Eostem Europe
for European security
REPORT I
submitted on behalf of the Political Committee2
by Mr. I*moino, RapPorteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnart RrcoutrlrxonrloN
on the consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for
European security
ExpLRNRronv Mnuonenpuu
submitted by Mr. Lemoine, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
IL Developments in Eastern Europe since the Assembly's extraordinary
session in Luxembourg
(i) The Soviet Union
(iil Developments in other Eastern European countries
III. Settlement of the German problem
IV. Problems for the organisation of Europe
(i) The future r6le of the CSCE
(ii) The parliamentary dimension of new all-European co-operation
(iii) Ertropean integration and Eastern Europe
(iv) The organisation of security and the r6le of WEU
V. Conclusions
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Fin1berg,.M1. De Decker (Afternate for Mrs. Staels-Dompas)(Vice-Chairmen); MM. ea.tr (,qIe;utii,: Verbiek), Seii, SOhm, f iito, Candal, Caro, Coleman, Collart, Cuatrecasas,Eigh, Fgb1q,i'";i iAlt;;;iii ieittiniirl,'Foschi, Goerens,'ilitschler, Koehl, van {e1.L!1d.9n (A^lternate: pi-sny),.1-ord Mackie, MNL
Uaittnbr, Martino, fr4iiff.i, f(Ltai, peirii"*, piirolli, de Pu'ig, Roseta, Sarti, Sir William Shelton,MM. Stolfelen,Thyraud, Ward-
N.B. Zfte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
""*';xff#rfl{ ff:"f1ffi:'l:frtr"""0
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the adoption by thirty-four countries of the Charter of Paris for a new Europe and
the signing of the agreement on the limitation of conventional armaments;(ii) Recalling that implementation of the principles set out in the security basket of the Helsinki
Final Act is an essential condition for advancing the entire CSCE process;(iit) Welcoming the fact that the states participating in the CSCE have decided to set up a conflict
prevention centre which they consider to be a first step towards the creation of a true political
instrument allowing them to settle all disputes that may arise between them;(iv) Considering that, because of the imminent meeting of heads of state or government of the
Twelve in Rome, the present report can present only provisional conclusions,
RrcouurNos rHAT rnr CouNclL
l. Ensure, at the Rome summit meeting, that the requirements of European security in the new
situation are guaranteed;
2. Promote implementation of the decisions taken by the CSCE, in particular by:(/ ensuring that the conflict prevention centre carries out its tasks in optimum conditions;
(ii) gtving strong impetus to the monitoring of disarmament agreements, inter alia by setting up
a centre for processing data obtained by observation satellites, and inform participating
countries of its conclusions;
3.- Propose to the CSCE the continuation of negotiations on conventional forces in Europe and,
after the Helsinki conference, promote further stages of disarmament and guarantee stabllity in
Europe;
4. Keep the Assembly continuously informed of the progress of negotiations relating to the
organisation of Western Europe and security and co-operation in Europe.
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I. Introduction
l. The extraordinary session of the Assem-
bly in Luxembourg on 22nd and 23rd March
1990 was devoted entirely to a debate on the
prospects offered by the upheavals in Central
and Eastern Europe since the previous summer
which made it urgently necessary to think about
preparing the first stages of a new just, peaceful
and secure order in Europe. These deliberations
led to the adoption of Recommendation 479.
2. Since then, developments in the region in
question have been so swift and extensive that it
is essential for the Assembly to pursue the task it
started in Luxembourg on the basis of the new
facts that have emerged in the meantime. It is
particularly important for the Assembly to adopt
a further position since vital decisions may be
taken between now and the end of the year,
either at the meeting of heads of state or of gov-
ernment of the thirty-four countries taking part
in the Conference on Security and Co-operation
in Europe to be held in Paris from l9th to 2lst
November 1990 or at the intergovernmental
meetings of member countries of the European
Community to be held in Rome on l4th and
l5th December 1990 with a view to moving
towards the establishment of economic and
monetary union and political union.
3. In this context, the next ordinary meeting
of the WEU Council, which is to be held on
lOth December 1990, i.e. between the
abovementioned two meetings and after the
second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session
of the Assembly, will be of special importance.
However, this timetable also means that it will
not be possible to finalise the report that the
committee is to submit to the Assembly until
very late in the day if all the elements necessary
for drawing conclusions and making useful pro-
posals are to be included.
II. Developments in Eastem Eurupe
since the Assembly's
extraordinary session in Luxembourg
(i) The Sovia Union
4. The economic crisis and disputes about
how to solve it continue to raise very serious
problems, on the one hand for the people, who
are facing growing shortages, and on the other
hand for the government and parliament, which
must agree on how to reform an economic
system marked by dirigism.
Explanatory Memorandum
(submiued, by Ml lzmoirc, Rapporteur)
5. The diflicult transitional period leading
up to the introduction of a market economy
(which would still to a certain extent be regu-
lated) that has been decided upon in principle in
spite of deep-rooted divergences over the pro-
cedure to be followed between Prime Minister
Ryzhkov's moderate reformers and Mr.
Yeltsin's radicals may make matters even worse.
The fact that on 24th September 1990 the Soviet
Parliament granted full powers to Mr.
Gorbachev until 31st March 1992 so that he
might rule by decree on measures necessary for
carrying out reforms in the entire economic
system might facilitate the application of these
reforms but also worsen the constitutional con-
flict, inter alia with the Russian Republic, over
the sharing of legislative powers.
6. The liberalisation process is continuing
with the Supreme Soviet's adoption on l2th
June 1990 ofa law guaranteeing the freedom of
the press and the media's creative rights; laws on
religious freedom in the Soviet Union and on
the establishment of a multi-party system have
also been passed. At the same time, constitu-
tional conflicts continue to raise problems for
the central authorities following attempts by a
number of republics of the union to become
more independent. Account must first be taken
of the serious tension that emerged after the
three Baltic states declared their sovereignty on
the basis of the illegality of their annexation by
the Soviet Union in 1940. Although the two
parties involved have apparently agreed to avoid
carrying their differences too far (on 30th June
1990 Moscow lifted the embargo on oil and
natural gas imposed on Lithuania on lTth April
once the Lithuanian Parliament had suspended
its declaration of independence), the problem
complicates the preparatory work on
reorganising the structures of the union.
7. The election of Mr. Yeltsin, on 29th May
1990, as President of the Supreme Soviet of
Russia, the largest republic in the Soviet Union,
and the approval by the Congress of Deputies of
the Russian people of a proclamation of sover-
eignty by which the constitution and laws of that
republic would have priority over those of the
union marked a further stage in the conflict
emerging between the rival legislative author-
ities and executives. This trend is not sparing
other Soviet republics. On 20th June 1990, the
Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan adopted a decla-
ration on the sovereignty of the republic in the
framework of a renewed Soviet federation. On
l6th July 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the
Ukraine proclaimed a Ukrainian republic which
would not be a member of an alliance and whose
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territory would be free of nuclear weapons. At
the same time, the declaration specifies that it is
not intended to withdraw from the Soviet
Union. However, on l3th October 1990, this
republic concluded a treaty of good neighbour-
liness with Poland, the first a Soviet republic has
signed directly with a foreign country. This
treaty provides for an exchange of diplomatic
representations.
8. On 27th July 1990, the Supreme Soviet of
Byelorussia proclaimed the republic's sover-
eignty, announcing, inter alia, neutrality and
renunciation of nuclear weapons. The same day,
the Supreme Soviet of Moldavia declared itself
the supreme authority in the region. On l0th
August, the autonomous republic of Karelia pro-
claimed its sovereignty without wishing to
withdraw from the union, on 22nd, and 23rd
August 1990, the republics of Turkistan and
Armenia in turn proclaimed their sovereignty
and, on 25th August 1990, the Supreme Soviet
ofTajikstan adopted a declaration on that coun-
try's sovereignty.
9. It is certain that none of these events facil-
itates the work started in the Supreme Soviet of
the Soviet Union on a new treaty laying new
bases for relations between the central author-
ities and the republics of the union in which all
the republics concerned are nevertheless partici-
pating, with the exception of the three Baltic
states which seem to prefer separate negotia-
tions. However, following demonstrations by
tens of thousands of students in Kiev, the
Ukrainian Parliament decided not to sign a new
treaty on the union as long as Ukraine did not
have a new constitution.
10. A new ethnic crisis came to the fore on
4th June when clashes between Kirgis and
Uzbekis broke out in the town of Osh in
Kirgiziya, causing about ten deaths and a
hundred wounded. At the end of October, the
Soviet army had to intervene in Moldavia fol-
lowing steps by the Turkish Gagauz minority
who wished to declare their own republic within
the Moldavian republic and organise local elec-
tions.
1 l. Another factor of uncertainty is the future
r6le and internal situation of the Soviet anny.
There is no denying that, whereas in the pre-
vious forty years the army had been a main
factor of power and stability in the Soviet
Union, it is now facing a serious crisis. On l4th
June 1990, Marshal Akhromeyev informed the
Supreme Soviet that the unsolved social
problems of armed forces and a press campaign
to discredit the army had created alarming dis-
content.
12. It is indeed the Soviet army which, with
the end of the East-West confrontation and the
withdrawal of its forces from Eastern and
Central Europe, has been the big loser, not just
in political influence but also psychologically
and socially. The problems are particularly dif-
ficult for the some 360 000 Soviet forces sta-
tioned on the territory of the former GDR who
will have to be repatriated, with their families,
by 1994. In spite of the considerable assistance
the German Government has undertaken to
provide in financing and organising this with-
drawal, the situation is diffrcult, particularly for
maintaining the morale and discipline of troops
on a territory where they have nothing to do and
are left to their own devices in what has become
a capitalist environment without being able to
enjoy it. A rise in the number of deserters is
therefore only one of the consequences to be
expected.
13. Psychologically, it is certainly not easy for
such a powerful body as the Soviet army to
understand why the political leaders have made
concessions to the West, particularly in regard to
German unification, but this may also be true of
other sectors of the Soviet leadership. In any
event, the Soviet Government saw fit to explain
Soviet external policy publicly in a special
article by Mr. Shevardnadze, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, in Pravda at the end of June
1990.
14. While it is difficult to discern stabilising
factors in internal developments in the Soviet
Union, some are to be found in the international
reputation acquired by the Soviet Union since
Mikhail Gorbachev came to office. The new
guidelines of Soviet external policy are clear in
most areas of its international relations where
there have been sometimes spectacular changes
compared with the positions defended by the
Soviet Union for more than forty years.
15. In Europe, by renouncing its stubborn
opposition to the idea of unified Germany being
free to choose its alliances, i.e. by agreeing to the
GDR leaving the Warsaw Pact and Germany as
a whole being a member of NATO and by
undertaking to withdraw its troops from the ter-
ritory of the former GDR by the end of 1994,
the Soviet Union has removed the main obstacle
to the settlement of the German problem and at
the same time has cleared the way for estab-
lishing a new security system in Europe which
will have to take account of very different facts
and prospects from those existing until last
summer.
16. The new direction being followed by the
Soviet Union includes the establishment of rela-
tions with various institutions at European level,
i.e. the Council of Europe, the European Com-
munity and WEU, and also with NATO, with
which it established diplomatic relations in July
1990.
17. At international level, the Soviet Union is
now an observer in GATT and the IMF, whose
Executive Director was informed in Moscow at
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the end of July that the Soviet Union was pre-
pared to negotiate its accession to that insti-
iution. However, this accession will raise many
problems because of the Soviet Union's grollng
external debt which Soviet leaders find
alarming.
18. The new atmosphere in Soviet-American
relations at the latest summit meeting between
Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev allowed progress
to be made towards lessening and even elimi-
nating their political and military rivalry and
also -towardi co-operation over worldwide
problems of concern to the United Nations.
Thanks to this new understanding between the
two world powers, it was possible, for the first
time, to reach agreement on sustained action by
an overwhelming majority of the member coun-
tries of the United Nations in order to face up to
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
19. While it may be inferred that the Soviet
Union's new international policy made a
decisive contribution to ending the cold war, the
attribution of the Nobel Peace Prize to Mr.
Gorbachev may give psychological support to
the Soviet leader in his efforts to stabilise the
country's internal situation since much uncer-
tainty still remains. The first concerns develop-
menfs in Soviet society, the Communist Party
and democratic, non-communist parties. Any
progress towards democratisation and
tiUeratisation of the country depends on these
developments. The second uncertainty, linked
to the first, is whether the country will be able to
overcome its enormous economic problems and
by what means. A third uncertainty concerns the
difficulty of maintaining constitutional cohesion
in the Soviet Union as a whole in the teeth of
centrifugal tendencies that are emerging_in many
of its republics. Finally, it must notte forgotten-
that the Soviet arny, in spite of its loss of
influence, is still one of the most powerful in the
world, with a nuclear and conventional arsenal
that continues to ensure that the Soviet Union
not only has the wherewithal to use force when it
considers it useful but also a political arm whichit can use to impose its will in disarmament
negotiations or in future discussions on the
Soviet Union's place in a new European security
order.
20. Regarding developments in the Soviet
Union, accounf must also be taken of the fact
that Marxist-Leninist ideology, if not wholly dis-
owned, has in fact been abandoned and is no
longer either a factor of internal cohesion or a
mafter for external emulation. The Soviet Union
has therefore stopped assimilating capitalism
with imperialism, i.e. using upheavals in the
third wolld to disturb international order, and
no longer considers that it is encircled by a capi-
talist world determined to destroy the moth-
erland of socialism. It is therefore no longer, nor
is it likely to become in the near future, a dis-
rupter of internal order, but has every interest in
stability and disarmament.
(ii) Developments in other Eostem Eatopaa countries
21. As regards the Eastern European.coun-
tries which, with the exception of Albania and
Yugoslavia, are so far the Soviet Union's allies
in the Warsaw Pact, two goups of countries
should be distinguished. The flrrst consists of
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, which
now have non-communist democratic govern-
ments, while Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia
continue to be governed by communist rdgimes
that have been reformed in very different ways.
However, the special case of Albania should not
be neglected.
22. In the case of Poland, it is first coming to
grips with the difficult task of overcoming its
Economic difficulties. Abrbad, it has to organise
its future relations with unified Germany in a
manner satisfactory to both countries so as to
make a significant contribution to a stable,
peaceful order in that part of Furope. There are
good prospects of success in this area following
ihe fixing of Poland's western frontiers as set outin the treaty on the final settlement with
Germany, which will be confirmed by a treaty
between-the two countries and by their determi-
nation to conclude a wide-ranging treaty of
co-operation.
23. At the same time, it is clear that Poland,
on whose territory there are not only minorities
of German origin but also Byelorussian,
Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Slovak ethnic
groups, while there are Polish minorities beyond
its frontiers, is worried about internal develop-
ments in its great neighbour to the East, the
Soviet Union. In addition to its relations with
the Soviet central authorities, Poland has started
to establish direct contacts with neighbouring
republics, i.e. Ukraine, the Russian Republic,
Byelorussia and Lithuania, in order to
stiengthen co-operation, stability and security in
its eastern frontier regions and guarantee the
rights of minorities.
24. Czechoslovakia, for its part, is faced with
the difficult task of introducing the economic
reforms it believes necessary for which, like
Poland, it has an urgent need of effective
assistance from Western Europe. Furthermore,
the country is trying to reorganise constitutional
relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks.
Czechoslovakia, a key country of Central
Europe, is very actively endeavouring to
promote a new all-European security system on
ihe basis of the CSCE and, at the same time, to
strengthen regional co-operation with Italy,
Hungary, Yugoslavia and Austria in the pen-
tagonal framework.
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25. Hungary is perhaps the country that has
moved the furthest away from the alliance in
which it was formerly incorporated. Its par-
liament has asked the government to start the
process of withdrawing from the Warsaw pact
and, as well as establishing diplomatic relations
with NATO, its Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Jeszenszky, addressing the Assembly on 7th
June 1990, asked for his country to be asso-
ciated with Western European Union. Finally,
Hungary has asked for association status in the
European Economic Community with a view to
subsequent accession.
26. In the case of Hungary, moreover, there
are clear signs of a problem that arises to varying
degrees in several regions ofEastern Europe, i.e.
qhat of the large Hungarian majority in
Romania. Rioting broke out in the region of
Tirgu Mures in Romania on 19th March l99O
following a strike by students of Hungarian
origin calling for teaching in the Hungarian
language. There were several deaths and about a
hundred wounded. Tension also arose between
the Romanian and Hungarian Governments
when the President of Romania criticised
Hungary for having encouraged the Hungarian
minority to provoke incidents. Furthermore, in
Romania, there are also German, Croat, Serbian
and Bulgarian minorities, whereas there is a
Romanian minority outside its frontiers, partic-
ularly in Soviet Moldavia.
27. According to certain observers ofdevelop-
ments in Romania, the revolution that over-
threw the Ceausescu r6gime at the end of 1989
has not yet been completed. They say the revo-
lution served only to change the leaders but not
the former r6gime as such. In any event, when
presidential and parliamentary elections were
held on 20th May 1990, Mr. Iliescu, the can-
didate of the National Salvation Front, obtained
more than 8570 of the votes cast, which led to
counter-demonstrations in the streets of
Bucharest in June that were repressed by the
police with the help of miners loyal to the gov-
ernment. Uncertainty about the future of
democratisation in Romania is also affecting the
pace of economic reforms which are as essential
as external assistance in this area.
28. The situation is uncertain in Bulgaria,
too, where the first elections since 1946 were
held on lTth June 1990 as a result of which the
Bulgarian Socialist Pafty, which succeeded the
former Communist Party, obtained a majority
of_seats in parliament (21I out of 400). Growin!
political tension and economic difficulties in theqoultry, whgre there is a large majority of
Turkish origin, left their mark on discussions at
the thirty-ninth socialist party congress at the
end of September. The governmentls therefore
trying to implement a vast reform programme in
order to introduce a market economy-. New leg-
islation should also allow private firms greater
freedom and also authorise foreign invest-
ments.
29. Where Yugoslavia is concerned, problems
stem primarily from the difficulty of main-
taining a federation between several ethnic
groups in spite of the centrifugal forces which
are gathering strength. Constitutional and ethnic
conflicts in the country have recently increased
to such an extent that the prospects of safe-
guarding the country's unity seem more and
more remote.
30. Having been one of the most isolated
countries in Europe, Albania has taken the first
step towards the outside world, inter alia by
restoring diplomatic relations with a number of
countries including the Soviet Union. On 5th
and 6th June I 990, the country took part for the
f,rrst time as an observer at a meeting of min-
isters for foreign affairs of the CSCE to which it
has applied for full membership.
31. Finally, it must be admitted that all the
Eastern European countries are facing enonnous
economic and social problems and need massive
aid in order to emerge from slumpflation and
improve the living conditions of their people.
Any worsening of the economic situation might
have dangerous repercussions, particularly-in
r-egions 
-where there is tension stemming fromthe conflict between opposing political foices or
hostile ethnic groups. Although at the moment
there is no sign of a major crisis in the region
that might affect European security, the iitu-
ation is still unstable.
III. Settlement of the German problom
32. On lzth September 1990, only ten
months after the fall of the Berlin wall and six
months after the first free elections in the GDR,
the ministers for foreign affairs of the four
second world war victorious powers having
s_pecial responsibilities and rights in regard to
Germany as a whole 
- 
i.e. France, the-soviet
Union, the United Kingdom and the United
States 
- 
together with their opposite numbers
from the Federal Republic of Germany and the
German Democratic Republic met in Moscow
to sign the treaty on the final settlement with
respect to Germany.
33. This title conceals the fact that the two
plus four, as they were called at the Ottawa dis-
armament conference in February 1990,
managed to reach agreement on international
conditions for German unification to the satis-
faction of all parties concerned after only four
plenary negotiating meetings.
34. As regards the consequences of this set-
tlement for European security, all concerned,
and particularly the WEU Assembly, have
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reason to welcome the provisions of this treaty
since they give satisfactory answers to a number
of the cbncerns expressed in Mr. Pontillon's
report and in Recommendation 479 ot estab-
lishing a just, peaceful and secure order.
35. For instance, the following should be
recalled. On frontiers, Article I confirms that:
" The united Germany shall comprise the
territory of the Federal Republic of
Germany, the Democratic Republic and
the whole of Berlin. Its external borders
shall be the borders of the Federal
Republic of GermanY and the German
Democratic Republic and shall be defin-
itive from the date on which the present
treaty comes into force...
The united Germany and the Republic of
Poland shall confirm the existing border
between them in a treaty that is binding
under international law.
The united Germany has no territorial
claims whatsoever against other states and
shall not assert any in the future.
... the constitution of the united Germany
(shall) not contain any provision incom-
patible with these PrinciPles' "
In accordance with these provisions, the inter-
German treaty on establishing German unity,
concluded on 31st August 1990, deletes Article
23 of the federal constitution (Basic Law) which
covered the possibility of other parts of
Germany joining the Federal Republic so that,
following the accession of the GDR, German
unification would be an established fact. Article
146 of the Basic Law was also amended for the
same reason.
36. At the end of October, German-Polish
negotiations started in Warsaw with a view to
concluding as soon as possible a treaty con-
firming the present frontier between the two
countries and an agreement covering every
asDect of bilateral co-operation, including the
prbblem of minorities of German origin in
Poland.
37. As for unified Germany's membership of
NATO and WEU, Article 6 of the Moscow
Treaty confirms that " the right of the united
Germany to belong to alliances, with all the
riehts ahd responsibilities arising therefrom,
sliall not be affeited by the present treaty ". This
means that the wish expressed several times by
the Government of the Federal Republic that
unified Germany should remain a member of
NATO is no longer questioned by the Soviet
Union.
38. Under this agreement, the inter-German
treaty on the establishment of German unity
confirmed that the North Atlantic Treaty and
the modified Brussels Treaty will be among the
international agreements concluded by the
Federal Republi- whose field of application will
be extended to unified Germany. In regard to
WEU in particular, the Federal German Gov-
ernment had already asserted on 30th July 1990
in answer to a question without debate put by
the German Delegation to the WEU Assembly
that:
" Under international law, the Brussels
Treaty and its protocols also apply to
unified Germany. "
This was officially conf,trmed on 3rd October
1990 in a statement by the German represent-
ative to the WEU Permanent Council.
39. Article 3 of the Moscow treaty also con-
firms uniflred Germany's renunciation of the
manufacture and possession of and control over
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
40. The Government of the Federal Republic
of Germany undertakes to reduce within three to
four years ihe level of troops in the armed forces
of unified Germany io 370 000 (land, sea and air
fbrcei). Moreover, according to Article 4:
" ... the united Germany and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics will settle by
treaty the conditions for and the duration
of th-e presence of Soviet armed forces on
the teriitory of the present German Dem-
ocratic Republic and of Berlin, as well as
the conduct of the withdrawal of these
armed forces which will be completed by
the end of 1994."
To solve the problems raised by this withdrawal,
the German and Soviet Governments have
worked out agreements on financial arrange-
ments for stationing Soviet forces in unified
Germany during a tiansitional period and their
subsequent repatriation. The Federal Gov-
ernment has undertaken to pay about DM
l2 000 million towards the cost of withdrawing
Soviet troops. However, the agtreements will be
signed only when German unification becomes
etTective. fhe Federal Republic and the Soviet
Union have also initialled a treaty of good
neighbourliness, partnership and co-operation
which provides for co-operation in all areas of
the ecbnomy, science, technology' cultural
affairs, the -environment and humanitarian
matters.
41. On the deployment of allied forces on the
territory of ttre former GDR and in Berlin,
Article 
-5 
of the Moscow Treaty provides that:
" Until the completion of the withdrawal
of the Soviet armed forces from the ter-
ritory of the present German Democratic
RepriUlic andof Berlin in accordance with
Article 4 of the present treaty, only
German territorial defence units which
are not integrated into the alliance struc-
tures... will be stationed in that territory
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as anned forces of the united Germany.
During that period... armed forces of
other states will not be stationed in that
territory or carry out any other military
activity there.
... armed forces of the French Republic,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the United States of
America will, upon German request,
remain stationed in Berlin...
Following the completion of the with-
drawal of the Soviet armed forces... units
of German armed forces assigned to the
military alliance structures... may also be
stationed in that part of Germany, but
without nuclear weapon carriers. This
does not apply to conventional weapon
systems which may have other capabilitiesin addition to conventional ones but
which in that part of Germany are
equipped for a conventional r6le and des-
ignated only for such. Foreign armed
forces and nuclear weapons or their car-
riers will not be stationed in that part of
Germany or deployed there. "
42. Finally,
" The French Republic, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the United States of America
hereby terminate their rights and
resonsibilities relating to Berlin and to
Germany as a whole...
The united Germany shall have accord-
ingly full sovereignty over its internal and
external affairs. "
Since these provisions, and the treaty as a whole,
can come into force only when ratified by the
parliaments of the contracting parties, it was
decided in a separate agreement that the four
pgwers would suspend their rights and responsi-
bilities in Berlin and Germany until iatifi-
cation.
43. With this settlement of the German
problem, the results of which will be presented
at the CSCE summit meeting in Paris, the long
period of division of Europe and Germany fol-
lowing the second world war and of East-West
confrontation came to an end in conditions
which, only a year ago, would have seemed to be
a figment of the imagination.
44. Thus, the joint aim set out in 1954 in the
convention on relations between France, the
United Kingdom and the United States, on thegne hand, and the Federal Republic of
Germany, on the other, taken up again in the
final act of the nine-power conferenie creatingWEU, has become a total reality: * Tha
achievement by peaceful means of a unified
Germany enjoying a liberal-democratic consti-
tution, like that of the Federal Republic, and
integrated within the European Community. "
45. 
- 
It is gratifying that the integration of
unified Germany in the Atlantic Alliance and
Western European Union will enhance the
security and stability of Western Europe and of
the alliance as a whole. The prospects thus
opened up, together with the withdrawal of
Soviet forces from Central and Eastern Europe
and the abandonment of its attempts to impose
a communist order there, now allow the nec-
essary conditions for organising European
security to be fixed.
46. The determination of the government and
people of unified Germany to continue and
strengthen Germany's links with the West and
in Europe should not be doubted, even without
knowing the results of the first elections in
unif-red Germany, to be held on 2nd December.
Nothing suggests that the electorate of the
eastern part of Germany will show a less
European spirit than that of the western part. At
the same time, as Mr. Genscher stressed in his
address to the Vienna conference on conven-
tional disarmament on 30th August 1990, the
Germans are well aware that unification must
not upset the balance of forces in Europe orjeopardise the security interests ofany European
state. Similarly, they realise that Germany's
allies expect it to assume greater responsibilitiesfor joint defence, which may include an
engagement outside Europe in certain cases, the
Gulf conflict being an example. In a message to
all the governments of the world on 3rd Octbber
1990, Mr. Kohl, the German Chancellor, said:
* Germany unity having been restored in
full sovereignty, the Federal Republic of
Germany is now prepared to take part,
including with the use of its armed foices,
in measures taken by the United Nations
to maintain and restore peace. For this
purpose, we will make the necessary
internal arrangements. "
47. While welcoming this announcement and
understanding the reticence hitherto shown by
Germany in regard to the use of its armed forces
outside its territory and the area of application
of the North Atlantic Treaty, your R-apporteur
considers that WEU, particularly through the
intermediary of its Assembly, should encburageits German partner not to place, in the
framework of a constitutional revision, unduly
strict limits on its ability to take military action,
so that it will be quite free to decide on its par-
ticipation, with its armed forces, in any peace-
keeping operation in the framework of interna-
tional organisations of which it is a member.
48. In the new circumstances, it is essential to
consider carefully all the measures which may
s-ee1n necessary in Europe in regard to joini
defence. The intention announced more oi less
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unilaterally by several countries of the alliance
to make very large cuts in their armed forces sta-
tioned on German territory, seems to follow log-
ically from the reduction of the Soviet threat.
However, any decisions to be taken must be
based on treaties in force, including Protocol
No. II on forces of WEU, under Article VI of
which the United Kingdom has to:
" continue to maintain on the mainland of
Europe, including Germany, the effective
strength of the United Kingdom forces
which are now assigned to the Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe, that is to say
four divisions and the Second Tactical Air
Force, or such other forces as the Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe, regards as
having equivalent fighting capacity. "
Since, in accordance with this protocol, the
United Kingdom undertook not to withdraw
these forces igainst the wishes of the majority. of
member countries or of the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe, any major reduction must
be discussed and agreed by the WEU Council.
This also applies to all matters relating to the
redeployment of other allied forces in Europe,
which must be discussed and co-ordinated in the
framework of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance in
accordance with a new concept which must be
worked out urgently on the basis of the treaties
and, in particular, the platform adopted in The
Haeue. lt is not iust a matter of reconsidering
the-forward defence strategy and studying the
possible consequences of a new strategic formula
'for the deployment of allied forces, but also of
re-examining the conditions governing the
deployment of short-range nuclear systems.
49. Since allied forces have ensured joint
defence for the last thirty-five years and allowed
confidence to be restored and the closest
co-operation to prevail among all the member
countries of the alliance and of WEU, the worst
that could happen would be to give the public
the impression that it was now intended to
withdraw " foreign " or even " occupying "
forces from Germany. While Germany cannot
continue indefinitely to be the only country to
have allied forces on its territory, Recommen-
dation 479, advocating that the modified
Brussels Treaty " be used as the juridical basis
for the presence of forces of member states on
the terrilory of other member states insofar as
their presence would help to strengthen a
peaceful order in Europe ", is now more topical
ihan euer, as is the proposal being discussed in
the WEU Council to set up multinational forces
which might include American units. If one
examines Protocol No. II on forces of WEU,
which is part of the treaty, one cannot fail to be
astonished that the Council's reply to Recom-
mendation 479 aflirms that " the modified
Brussels Treaty does not regulate the question of
stationed forces and provides no legal basis for
such a presence ".
50. In this context, co-operation and future
understanding in defence and security matters
between the two countries that will have to play
the biggest r6le at the centre of the European
continEnt, i.e. France and Germany, will be
decisive. The two countries took exemplary
measures of co-operation by setting up the
Franco-German Council and the Franco-
German brigade, which became fully opera--
tional on lTth October 1990. In the interests of
all Europeans, it essential for this co-operation
to continue to bear fruit after the establishment
of a unified German state.
IY, Problems for the organisation of Europe
(i) The future rdl4 oI the CSCE
51. The end of the East-West confrontation
and the division of Europe, together with
liberalisation and democratisation in Central
and Eastern Europe, accompanied by the end of
the Soviet Union's r6le as the power guaran-
teeing the communist order in Eastern Europe
are eicouraging the alliances to start to view
their respective vocations and r6les from a dif-
ferent standpoint.
52. The Atlantic Alliance drew the first conse-
quence from the new situation in the proposal
fbr a joint declaration that it addressed to the
Warsiw Pact on 6th July 1990 in which the two
pacts * solemnly state that we are no longer
idversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain
from the threat or use of force against the terri-
torial integrity or political independence of any
state or from acting in any other manner incon-
sistent with the purposes and principles of the
United Nations Charter and with the CSCE
final act ".
53. The signing of a declaration on non-
recourse to force between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact on the eve of the summit meeting
between heads of state or of government of the
thirty-four CSCE member countries held in
Parii from 19th to 2lst November 1990, will
mark a major step in the process of reducing the
military r0le of the alliances and consolidating
efforts to establish all-European co-operation
and security structures grouping all European
countries, together with the United States and
Canada. ihJsigning of a Charter of Paris for a
new Europe on2lst November 1990 at the close
of the Paris conference will therefore give strong
impetus to the evolution of this plocess which
wili henceforth take the form of two-yearly
summit meetings and meetings, at-least once a
year, of minisiers for foreign affairs 
. 
in the
iramework of the " Council on Security and
Co-operation in Europe " which has been set up.
335
DOCUMENT 1255
54. In assessing what may be expected of the
strengthening and institutionalisation of the
CSCE process in security matters, it must be
recalled that it was first a matter of finding a
means of attending to the interests of the Soviet
Union, which was afraid it would lose its
influence and right to intervene in European
affairs by withdrawing its forces from Central
and Eastern Europe and giving up its preroga-
tives in Germany. Account also has to be talien
of the Soviet Union's security interests which it
considers to be less well protected with the
Warsaw Pact as it now is, compared with the
Atlantic Alliance.
55. The other Eastern European countries will
find in the CSCE an all-Euiopean framework
that can bring them a new standard of security.
However, the positions of these countries
towards the new r6le of the CSCE seem
ambiguous. On the one hand, some of them 
-including Czechoslovakia and Poland 
- 
are
actively promoting the establishment of an all-
European security system based on the Helsinki
process, but in the same countries there is still
some support for the idea that there can be no
real security outside the alliances, and this is
leading certaln countries, such as Hungary, totry to establish closer links with the Atlantic
Alliance and WEU.
56. Any attempt to develop all-European
security 
-co-operation must result in greatersecurity for all participants and not the reverse.
This process should therefore be considered
complementary to the present system of alli-
ances, but this does not prevent new elements
being grafted on to this process at a later stage.
57. With this aim in mind, it is essential to
encourage the United States and Canada to play
an active part in this new process. Here, it iigratifying to note that, at the beginning ofOctober 1990, the United States - hosted a
meeting of CSCE ministers for foreign affairs
held for the first time in New York. -
58. All the thinking that will be necessary in
order to help to ensure the success of new fo-rms
of co-operation in the CSCE should take into
consideration the scope of the Helsinki final act,
*lticlr covers a very vast range of subjects of
which security is only one. While ii seemsprobable that the thirty-four CSCE countries
will manage to reach agreement in many areas,
matters become more complicated in the case of
security from the moment one steps beyondgeneral principles to tackle more tangible
matters. For instance, difficulties arose when it
was decided at the Vienna conference to adopt a
mandate for opening negotiations on conven-
tional forces in Europe and the mandate was
limited to the member countries of the two alli-
ances. The very extent of the process involves
opportunities and risks, the former stemming
from experience that joint interest in obtaining
results i! a specific area may lead to progress in
others. Conversely, stumbling over one matter
may also hold up progress in other matters. In
this context, the risk of splitting up the process
into several sub-processes handled separately
must not be overlooked once the insti-
tutionalisation stage is reached. It is therefore
essential to safeguard the coherence andpolitical nature of the entire process in which
the development of regional co-operation must
be included. In security matters, it is for WEU
in particular to help to ensure that the new all-
European co-operation in this area is developed
!o t-he advantage of all other areas, since secuiityis the key factor in this new system.
59. In regard to the WEU Council's position
towards the CSCE, the first part of the thirty-
sixth annual report reproduces the text of tlie
communiqu6 issued at the close of the meeting
of the WEU Council of Ministers held in
Brussels on 23rd April 1990, according to
which:
" The CSCE is the framework within
which all Europeans, together with the
United States and Canada, can establish
new relations and develop co-operative
structures capable of assuring each one of
them that peace and stability will be
maintained and their legitimate interests
safeguarded. "
60. Your Rapporteur does not know to what
extent the Council is making concrete proposals
to make a diplomatic contribution to prepara-
tions for the CSCE meeting in Paris anO the
future development of that process, but if one
compares its public statements with the detailed
positions on the same subject adopted by the
European Council in Dublin on 25ih and- 27th
June 1990 or those of the North Atlantic
Council published in Turnberry on 8th June
1990 and London on 6th July 1990, one can but
be disappointed at the lack of substance in the
WEU declaration.
61. While it cannot be denied that the rel-
evant Council bodies such as the Special
lorking Group and the Defence Representa-
tives Group are making every effort to work out
a joint approach by WEU countries to the CSCE
summit meeting, one may nevertheless wonder
why the Council of Ministers is being so shy
about publishing its conclusions and pioposad.In the circumstances, it is not surprising that
many_observers feel WEU is used only to repeat
or defend decisions taken in other forums, evenif this is not justified.
6_2,__ 
_ 
The 
. 
security basket of the CSCE gives
WEU particular responsibility in continuiig to
assert Western Europe's concept of how to carry
out proposals to set up specific institutions.
336
DOCUMENT 1255
63. This concerns inter alia the establishment
of a conflict prevention centre which is to be
located in Vienna. According to the Charter of
Paris for a new Europe, this centre will have the
following duties and structure:
" During its initial stage of operations the
centre's r6le will consist in giving support
to the implementation of CSBMs such as:
- 
mechanism for consultation and
co-operation as regards unusual mil-
itary activities;
- 
annual exchange of military infor-
mation;
- 
communications network;
- annual implementation assessment
meetings;
- 
co-operation as regards hazardous inci-
dents of a military nature.
The centre might assume other functions
and the above tasks are without prejudice
to any additional tasks concerning a pro-
cedure for the concilitation of disputes as
well as broader tasks relating to dispute
settlement, which may be assigned to it in
the future by the Council of the Foreign
Ministers. "
In this connection, the German Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs, Mrs. Adam Schwaetzer, said
in an address in Berlin on 5th October:
" This centre... will be the starting point
for consultation procedure centred on dia-
logue, co-operatiron and the prevention of
conflicts. Its hrst specific task should be
to recognise possible military crisis situa-
tions and to help to eliminate them as
soon as possible: it is therefore particu-
larly appiopriate to implement confidence
measures providing for exchanges of mil-
itary information- and examination of
unusual military activities.
The centre will develop through the tasks
that it will be given by the council of min-
isters for foreign affairs. It must therefore
have a non-restrictive mandate: its future
tasks will be to defuse causes of political
conflict by joint agreement with its
members and to find common solutionsto conflicts affecting securitY and
co-operation in EuroPe. "
64. This description seems to correspond to
the compromise reached at the meeting of CSCE
ministers for foreign affairs in New York
between those who wished to give this body a
more political mandate by setting up some kind
of security council and those who preferred a
more technical information bodY.
65. Starting with the less ambitious model,
while leavingopen the possibility to extend the
mandate of the centre at a later stage, many
questions must be discussed, only some of which
can be tackled in this report:
- 
Will participation in the centre be com-
pulsory or voluntary?
- 
Will it be possible for facts established
by the centle to lead to sanctions and, if
nbt, how will a conflict be settled?
- 
What geographical area will the centre's
activities cover?
- 
Will there be a CSCE steering com-
mittee and who will its members be?
- 
To what extent will WEU be rePre-
sented as an organisation in conflict
prevention activities?
- 
What will be the relationship between
the tasks and activities assigned to this
centre and those of the joint centre for
verifying disarmament agreements,
now being defined, inter alia, bY
WEU?
66. Since all these questions are at the very
heart of WEU's responsibilities and experience,
the Assembly expects the Council to play 
.a
leading rOle in working out the details of this
undertaking and keep the Assembly perma-
nently informed of its work in this area. In par--
ticular, this concerns the peaceful settlement of
disputes where the Charter of Paris defines new
forms of co-operation which will be discussed in
detail at the meeting of experts to be held in Val-
letta from l5th January to 18th February
199 1.
67. In matters relating to disarmament and
the limitation of armaments, the CSCE should
henceforth be the principal forum for con-
ducting the necessary negotiations on out-
standing problems so that the agreements con-
cluded lirne a wide area of application. It is
therefore gratifying that, in Paris on 2lst
November 1991; tha thirty-four countries partic--
ipating in the CSCE meeiing voted in favour of
"-discissions and consultations among the
thirty-four participating states aimed at estab-
lishiirg by t992, from the conclusion of the Hel-
sinki -foliow-up meeting, new negotiations on
disarmament and confltdence and security
building open to all participating states ".
(ii) The parlianteatary dimension of all'European co-opemtioa
68. In the London declaration of 6th July
1990 on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance,
the NATO heads of state and government were
inter alia in favour of creating in the framework
of the CSCE:
" a parliamentary body, the Assembly.of
Europe, to be based on the existing Parlia-
mentiry Assembly of the Council of
Europe (the French text uses the words'd
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6tablir sur le modble de l'actuelle
Assemblde parlementaire du Conseil de
I'Europe'), in Strasbourg, and include
representatives of all CSCE member
states. "
69. In a resolution adopted on 27th Sep-
tember 1990, the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe proposed in particular that
the CSCE summit meeting:
* 
... provide for continuous parliamentary
involvement in the CSCE process,
through an Assembly of Europe (based onthe Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe). The Assembly of
Europe would be the interlocutor of CSCE
governments and any intergovernmental
CSCE institutions to be established. "
70. It also recommended that the Committee
of Ministers:
" declare before their colleagues of the
other twelve CSCE participating states
their unequivocal support... for the prin-
ciple that the Parliamentary Assembly at
Strasbourg should be the basis for an
'Assembly of Europe', constituting a
forum for debate on all fields of activity
for which the CSCE will retain compe-
tence, as well as being the natural inter-
locutor of ministers and of any future
CSCE secretariat. "
71. While paying tribute to an initiative
aimed at enhancing the rOle and responsibilities
of parliamentarians in managing European and
international political problems, at the same
time increasing interparliamentary contacts,
your- Rapporteur believes the idea is good
insofar as the new CSCE structures will probably
strengthen the governmental and ministerial
aspects of Europe in face of which parliamentary
Europe must not be neglected.
72. As always, the difliculties lie in the
details. They start when one tackles the idea of
making the Assembly of the Council of Europethe interlocutor of " any intergovernmenfal
CSCE institutions to be established ". If, for
instance, the CSCE decides to create a centre forthe prevention of conflicts, WEU and its
Assembly should be called on to shoulder their
responsibilities.
73. Since the security basket continues to play
an important r6le in the process as a whole,lt is
essential to work out methods of co-ordination
with relevant parliamentary bodies in these
matters in order to avoid duplication of effort.
One way might be to have representatives of the
WEU Assembly take part in a liaison committee
which might be set up to meet between sessions
of the " Assembly of Europe ".
74. Another problem stems from the United
States Congress's hesitation about accepting the
structure of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
C-ouncil of Europe as a model for the Assembly
of Europe. However, the harmonisation of thii
plan with the idea of a European confederation
put forward by the French President must also
be taken into consideration.
75. Since the creation of a parliamentary
dimension for the CSCE process raises a numbei
of problems, it would be desirable for the inter-
governmental CSCE meeting in Paris to give the
appropriate parliamentary authorities the
responsibility and time to work out co-ordinated
methods satisfactory to all concerned. These
methods should nevertheless be based on the
principle of national delegations as in the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and
the WEU Assembly, criteria for determining the
number of seats perhaps being left open, and
they should at the same time strengthen the
interest of the North American democracies in
playing a full part in the undertaking.
76. WEU and its Assembly have every reason
to make an active contribution to the estab-
lishment of the new all-European co-operation
system on the basis of the final act. Even if thisprocess is apparently being concentrated
increasingly on economic, humanitarian, eco-
logical and social matters, security aspects must
not be forgotten and here our organisation must
shoulder its responsibilities, which are not con-
fined to purely military aspects as is sometimes
believed.
(iii) European in egration and Eastera Europe
77. Europe's opening towards the East is con-
fronting the European Community with the
problem of reconciling the aims it set itself of
strengthening its internal integration by setting
up the single market, monetary union andpolitical union, on the one hand, and the
question of its enlargement, on the other. The
number of European countries determined tojoin the Community is growing and it will bediflicult to satisfy all these requests withoutjeopardising the progress of internal integration.
Furthermore, procedure for a more flexible form
of association with the Community for some of
the interested countries can but be a transitional
solution in the majority of cases. However, at
the present junctur€ it seems essential to study
methods of organising and co-ordinating the
indispensable economic assistance urgently
needed by all the Eastern European countiies ii
they are not to collapse and to ensure that the
economic evolution of countries wishing to
establish closer links with the Community is
such as to facilitate their subsequent inte-
gration.
78. The success of the EEC makes it Western
Europe's principal pole of attraction in the eyes
ofthe eastern countries and they cannot be con-
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fronted with a choice between joining a military
alliance or giving up the prospect of one {aI
belonging to-the Community. Turning the EEC
into I mititary alliance might also make the
Soviet Union 
- bring pressure to bear on the
eastern countries to induce them to renounce
their approaches to the Community.
79. In spite of the reticence of a minority of
its member countries, which give priority to
developing relations with the Eastern European
countries,-the European Community is deter-
mined to face up io the situation by giving
strong impetus to every aspect of. its. internal
inteeiation. It was as a result of a joint initiative
bv t[e French President and the German Chan-
".Uo. 
on l8th April 1990 that the European
Council decided to hold an intergovernmental
meeting on political union in Rome on 14th
December 1990 at the same time as that on eco-
nomic and monetary union.
80. Now that we are examining the many pro-
posals made in the meantime by Community
bodies on ways and means of including- the
security dimension in this undertaking, it.is high
time to remind the Council that it is primarily
for WEU to give its views on incorporating this
vital element into a political union which,
otherwise, would be incomplete, as the Council
of Ministers rightly underlined in its platform
on European securitY interests.
81. The Council's almost total silence
regarding a discussion which has been con-
tiiuing -in the Community framework for
seueral months is particularly hard to under-
stand since the WEU ministers not only under-
lined in the abovementioned platform and in the
communiqud of 23rd April 1990 that they were
committed to building a European union, they
also asserted that the modified Brussels Treaty
was " an important means to this end " and that
the treaty " marked one of the early steps on the
road to European unification ".
82. Since the European Community countries
are considering completing procedure for rati-
fying the agreements on political union before
tlre 6nd of 1992, it is not enouglt to note that at
the present time most of the countries concerned
prefer to leave the existing. 
- 
institutions
unchanged. The political union, with-all its con-
sequenc.-es, is on the agenda and, 
-if WEU does
noi give its views, decisions will be taken else-
wheie with no guarantee that account will be
taken of all the essential factors that should
feature in the security and defence dimension of
the future Political union.
(iv) The organisation of security and the rdle of WEU
83. Proof that there is not yet a European
security identity was recently given by the
simple- fact thaf two WEU member countries,
France and Germany, have just concluded
bilateral treaties of co-operation with the Soviet
Union containing proviiions governing bilateral
relations in the event of crisis whose content
reveals a somewhat different approach from the
security point of view.
84. It is in WEU that problems in achieving a
defence identity must be identified, this be.ing
an essential aspect of a European political
union. This first requires political will on the
part of member governments to hold such a
^debate 
and to do so in WEU. It then requires an
open debate on the differences of views which
sfill exist between certain member countries on
the final terms of this identity. In this debate, it
can be seen without difficulty that the modified
Brussels Treaty offers an appropriate framework
for achieving a synthesis allowing differences
over the aimi of the undertaking to be solved'
85. The treaty contains elements of European
integration in its preamble and Articles I, II, III
andl especially, V; Atlantic elements are to be
founO iir Artiite IV, Protocols II, III and IV and
the final act of the nine-power conference, and
there is an " out-of-area" element in Article VIII
*t i.t has proved to be particularly useful
during the two Gulf crises. All these elements
form a whole whose components must be care-
fullv examined to determine whether they
stroirtO be retained, developed, modified or
deleted in the framework of a European political
union. In any event, it would be vain to try to
pick out at rindom an isolated part.of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty for incorporation in a new
Community treaty, as the European- Com-
mission proposed in its opinion of 2lst October
1990 on the possible revision of the Rome
Treaty.
86. From a procedural standpoint, WEU
might apply seveial methods to determine which
areis strouid be the subject of a joint policy' It
might adopt a selective ora general approach on
thJ basis bf common values and interests, as
Mr. Dumas, French Minister for Foreign
Affairs, recently said at his press conference in
Venice on 6th October 1990 and when speaking
in the French National Assembly on 9th October
1990.
8'7. Where structures and institutions are con-
cerned, one may fully agree with the assessment
made by Mr. Delors, President of the European
Commiision, who noted in an interview granted
to Le Monde on l2th October 1990 that " in
defence matters the Twelve would be wrong to
ptace the institutional question leforg the fun-
-damentat questions. Th-e institutional aspect is
the consequence, but also the cement, of
political choices... ".
88. In order to provide the necessary
" cement " referred to by Mr. Delors, Belgium
suggested an interesting idea, i.e. that the presi-
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dency of the European Council should coincide
with that of the WEU Council, which seems dif-ficult to achieve if the two organisations con-
tinue to have a different number of member
countrie^s. However, a new development may
gm-ergq from the invitation to Denmark, Greece,
Ireland and Turkey to attend extraordinary
meetings of the Council on the Gulf crisis ai
observers. This is in line with current thinking
on the enlargement of WEU to include all
member countries of the Community provided,
however, that such enlargement does not
weaken the cohesion now achieved in WEU. In
such conditions, WEU might be placed under
the aegis of the European Council while being
left intact.
89. From a practical standpoint, the WEU
Council of Ministers affirmed on 23rd April
1990 that reinforcement of Europe's secuiity
identity was " destined to be given concrete
expression in the form of close, and even new
co.operation between the member countries ". If
such co-operation is achieved, it will be an ideal
way of making a valid contribution to efforts to
achieve political union in this area. Although the
lrst part of the thirty-sixth annual report 6f tneCouncil gives no details in this connection, the
Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. van Eekelen,
gave some interesting points in an article pub-
lished in the NATO Reviewr, in which he paysparticular attention to the expediency of-crb-
ating multinational forces:
* Firstly, these might serve to demon-
strate European solidarity in matters of
security policy, and secondly, to assist the
European/United States relationship by
easing the aggravation over buiden--
sharing.
Examples of multinational co-operation
already exist of course, and offei usefulpoints of departure. Contributions from
different countries could best be at
brigade level or above. "
90.. On the question of American partici-pation in the project, the Secretary-General
believes that:
" European units could be twinned withtheir North American counterparts.
Indeed, the interest shown by the UniteO
States authorities at the highest level indi-
cates that the United States Government
realises the potential of such a concept fora credible future military link with
Europe. It is up to the Europeans to makeproposals for new arrangements withNorth American troops. Variable
geometry would allow for either European
multinational units or mixed Europtan/
American forces. " -
91. Such a concept is quite appropriate as the
start of a constructive European reattion to the
United States invitation to " partnership in lead-
ership " in the alliance and its politico-military
bodies, since it shows the Euiopeans' will to
have the Americans maintain both a political
and_military presence in Europe. It also-implies
further thought about the development of iela-
tions between WEU and NATO on the basis of
Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, par-
ticularly where military co-operation is con-
cerned, now that, for the first time, the chiefs of
defence staff of WEU member countries have
met on the occasion of the Kuwait crisis.
92. The need to ensure European security
with due account for reductions in conventional
forces under the CFF, treaty means not only
d.efining new concepts in WEU but also revising
alliance strategy and structure as a whole. This ii
an area where a WEU approach might show to
what extent member countries are prepared topursue an identical policy. This should be
proved also in preparations for future post-CFE
conventional disarmament negotiations.
93. Another problem that calls for a WEU
approach is the review of the future rOle that
nuclear weapons may have to play in Europe,
and in particular the need for negotiations on
short-range nuclear weapons.
94. It is in the context of verification in par-
ticular that WEU's work seems to have grown,
with the plan to create an observation sitellite
system.. Apart from the information given by the
Council in its thirty-sixth annual rep6rt, thesec-
retary-General of WEU specifies that:
" Arrangements for co-operation are being
set up... including work on a programme
of trial inspections between member
states, on multinational participation in
national inspection teams, and on
inspector training courses. This work is
carried forward through regular meetings
of specialist working gioups of the
Council, held at the Secretariat-General in
London...
Adequate, coherent and co-ordinated ver-
ification of the provisions of the treaty
will be of decisive importance. As part oT
an intensification of the WEU wbrk in
this area in recent months, experts are
assessing common European require-
ments as well as existing national capabil-
ities and projects with a view to setting upa European space-based observation
system. Such a system would comprise a
ptellite component and a WEU agency
for the exploitation of satellite imagis. Ii
would have three goals: to contribute tothe verification of conventional arns
control agreements, to monitor crises with
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security implications particularly outside
Europe - and to monitor environmental
hazards. " 2
95. If, as we hope, this already very well-
advanced preparatory work leads to flrrm deci-
sions at the level of the Council of Ministers, the
question will have to be solved of co-ordinating
this project with that for the conflict prevention
centie io be created in the framework of the
CSCE in which WEU will have a major contri-
bution to make.
96. Finally, the new Gulf conflict has again
shown that WEU must strengthen its efforts to
make use of all the means offered by the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty to avert more rapidly and
effectively the dangers that might arise outside
Europe. By so doing, it could form.a hard core
that might be joined by any like-minded coun-
tries participating in all-European co-
operation.
97. The cohesion necessary for creating a
ioint defence and security identity depends also
bn the spirit in which WEU member countries
considei the juridical basis for such cohesion,
i.e. the modified Brussels Treaty. In this con-
nection, it is interesting to note that, for some
time, there has been a tendency for the treaty to
be presented increasingly to the public as the
' 1948 treaty ". Indeed, WEU owes its origins to
the defence organisation set up under the
Brussels Treaty signed on lTth March 1948
between the United Kingdom, France and the
three Benelux countries.
98. However, the true birth certificate of
Western European Union as we now know it is
the Paris Agreements of 23rd October 1954
modifying and considerably amplifying the^
originil tieaty to such an extent that a treaty of
quiie a new character came into being, not only
with the accession of Germany and Italy to the
modified treaty but also with the United
Kingdom commitment on the mainland. Con-
vers-ely, the 1948 treaty provided for a specifi-
cally European deployment with integrated mil-
itary commands. If the governments consider
thaf the 1948 treaty is still thejuridical basis for
a military alliance, the full consequences must
be drawn, particularly for the deployment of
forces in the event of withdrawals of American
forces from Europe calling in question the appli-
cation of Article IV of the modified treaty. Euro-
peans would then have to operate their
deployment themselves and jointly, pending.a
poisilile return of American forces if a crisis
made this necessary.
99. According to Article XII, the " treaty of
economic, social and cultural collaboration and
collective self-defence, signed at Brussels on
lTth March 1948, as amended by the protocol
modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty "
is to remain in force for fifty years.
100. Without wishing to enter into juridical
discussions about the interpretation of the
treaty, an assessment should nevertheless be
made of the political implications of the
position adopted by the governments of two
member countries, the United Kingdom and
Germany, which have expressed the opinion
that the ieference date for denouncing the treaty
is 25th August 1948, i.e. the entry into force of
the initial treaty. As long as there is no other
concrete prospect guaranteeing that all the ele-
ments nebessary for Western Europe's security
will be incorporated into a true European
political union, it miglrt be dangerous to wish to
dispense casually with a juridical bdsis for col-
lecfive security which is proving increasingly
effective.
Y. Conclusions
lol. The fundamental upheavals in Central
and Eastern Europe not only disturbed the
political order in that region of the world, they
ilso ended the old system of East-West balance
which, until summer 1989, was based on the
division of Europe and a system of opposing
political philosophies and military pacls.
Whereas Germany recovered its unity quite
freely by choosing to be anchored to the democ-
racies giouped in the Atlantic Alliance, the situ-
ation in Eaitern Europe and the Soviet Union is
still in a state of evolution. The new order that
will be established in that part of the world is
not yet clear. We are living in a transitional
period during which the emergence of new risks
and dangers cannot be excluded. They may-stem
either from the serious economic crises facing
most of these countries or from the revival of
nationalisms that might be a consequence of
being released from the old constraining order
imposed by the Soviet Union.
lO2. The disappearance of this order left a
vacuum which means that the countries con-
cerned are faced with the problem of seeking
new guidelines and a reference framework in
which they can settle themselves and in which
they can find a new standard of security and
prospects for their future existence.
103. It is thanks to the soundness and homoge-
neity of co-operation and integration built up by
the western-democracies as a whole, in par-
ticular those of Western Europe, since the
second world war that the latter will be able to
assume the weighty responsibility of working
out a new system of security and all-European
co-operation to fill the vacuum in the East.
Howtver, the western democracies would be
mistaken not to rely on the strengthened founda-
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tions of the tried institutions they have set up,
particularly in security matters; they must, on
the contrary, pursue and increase their efforts
until the aim of a true political union has been
attained.
104. At the same time, the establishment of
all-European co-operative structures by
institutionalising the CSCE should provide an
essential additional means of allowing Eastern
Europe to participate progressively in new forms
of co-operation extended to the whole of Europe
by means that remain to be defined.
105. As for laying the bases for new all-
European co-operation in security matters, it is
mainly in WEU that joint proposals for the
agenda of the CSCE summit meeting to be held
in Paris should be worked out and tiansmitted.
This applies to the deflrnition of the essential
principles of this new co-operation and also the
creation of any structures that have to be
created. It is above all in regard to the intro-
duction of machinery for verification and the
prevention of conflicts that WEU should work
out firm proposals.
106. The Assembly expects the Council to
ensure that the new forms of all-European
co.operation strengthen the security which
WEU and the Atlantic Alliance now guarantee
for Western Europe.
107. The Assembly also expects the Council to
work out here and now, in close co-operation
with it, a joint concept of the conditions for
including the security and defence dimension in
a European political union and present it in the
framework of preparatory work on that union.
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Amendments l, 2, 3, 4, 5r 6, 7 and 8
5th December 1990
Consequences of developments in Central and
Eastern Europe for European secutity
AMENDMENTS 1,2,3, 4,5,,6,7 and 8'
tabled by Mr, Brtb and others
l. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, after paragraph (i), add the following new
paragraphs:
.. Welcoming the end of the division of Europe and. of the East-West confrontation and the pro-
gr.ri io*u.J, democratisation and liberalisition in the Soviet Union and the other Eastern
European countries;
Concerned nevertheless at the alarming decline in the economic situation in Eastern Europe in
view of its possible unforeseeable repercussions;
Recalling Article I of the modified Brussels lrgaty in which all WEU member countries
undertodk to promote the economic recovery of Europe; "
2. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, after paragraph (il, add the following new
paragraphs:
.. Emphasising that European security would be threatened if areas of instability emerged in
Eastern Europe;
Considering that the strengthening and institutionalisation of the 9SCE process offer the peo^ples
of Europe i.* pioip.cts ind imiroved security on the basis of a strengthened system of all-
European co-operation;
Considering that the strengthened CSCE should henceforth be used as the principal forum for
advancing disarmament and the limitation of armaments;"
3. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, after paragraph (ii), add the following new
paragraphs:
.. Welcoming the fact that the final settlement of the German pr-oblgm has made it possible to
anchor Germany ai a *trote to the Atlantic Alliance and allowed the German people to be united
in freedom, thui enhancing stability and security in Central Europe;
Considering that Germany's undertakings-in regard to recoglition of its present frontiers with
Fof.an0, .o,if,r-ution of itr renunciation-of egc-*eapons and the limit placed on the levels of its
armed iorces are exemplary measures that are likely tb strengthen the confidence of all European
countries; "
4. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, after paragraph (iii), add the following new
paragraphs:
,, Supporting the steps being taken to establish an assembly of Europe, on the basis of the Parlia-
mer'tiry esiemUiv <if the C-ouncil of Europe, which ryg]rla giv.e. the. parliamentary dimension to
the CSaE proi.ir as decided by the Paris-summit, while recalling its own responsibilities in all
areas covered by the modified Brussels Treaty;
Recalling that WEU has special respo_nsibility in_ the establishment of a new European security
.orcipt [ased on1t 
" 
Oo.t'iio. of suffrciency and taking account of the situation that will exist
after ihe treaty on conventional disarmament has been signed;
Considering the maintenance of United States and Canadian armed forces in Europe to be an
essential faitor for guaranteeing the future security of Europe in a new environment; "
5. After paragraph I of the draft recommendation proper' add a new paragraph:
.. Play an active part in building the new all-F,uropean system of co.operation and security and
giue it uiefri imiitus based on-the co-operation itructires set up by. member countries in the
iramework of WEU, the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance;'
l. See l2th sitting, 6th December 1990 (amendments agreed to).
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7.
After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:
" Give strong impetus to the European Community's efforts to organise and co-ordinate assis-tance to the economies of the countries concerned;"
After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:
" In accordance with the modified Brussels Treaty, examine from a military standpoint the
consequences of the reduction in tension in Europe following the progresiiie *itt O.awal ofSoviet tr-oops and define,-in preparation for examinition in the-Atlantic Xrrianci, u n.* conceptfor the deployment of allied foices in Europe; ,,
After paragtaph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add the following new paragraphs:
" Follow up the iltention it expressed in Brussels to strengthen co-operation between member
countries il security. matters so as to open.the way for a pos-sible Euroiean union associutiniirriEuropean Community, European political co-oplration- and WEU;
Pursue its efforts to ensure that current thinking about the creation of multinational forces is setin the context of a European security dimensi6n;
Work out, with due account for th-e specific qatulg. of European security interests, a European
P_ot]ti9lf91_ry-u-,:ilg the strategy of the Atlantic Alliance in order to rnaii,tuin fridp.'r r.cuiiivln a new envlronmenu
Develop means of countering more quickly and more effectively any dangers which may arise
out of area;
Examine the expediency of regular meetings of chiefs of defence staff of WEU member coun-tries;
Re-examine the role of deterrence in the new European security context;
Take the decision to create an observation satellite agency..
Signed: Brito, Finsberg, Mackie of Benshie, Martinez
8.
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Paris, 5th December 1990
noUe.t PoNrtLLoN
Budget of the odministrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1991
Letter from Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly,
to Mr. Dumas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France,
Chairman-in-Otfice of the Council
* 
-, letter of 20th November 1990,-I stressed the extent to which the estimates in the Assem-
UfV's UuOgLt loi increasing the number oi staff in its secretariat were justified. You can therefore
i#"!ir. iiy Oisappointmeit, *hich is shared by my co-lleagues, on taking cognisance of the Council's
opifion on ou. airiruat budgit which reached m6. oniy after lhe.opening of the session. We note that the
i'ermanent Council has coifined itself to allowing the Assembly to create two senior posts, at grades
lower than those requested, the cost of one of which must be offset by savings to_ an equivalent amount
in the operating bu-dget so that the Assembly's total budget shows zero growth.
On this point, I should be very grateful if you would point out to the Council that these compen-
satory savings'are particularly unreillstic since ihe operating b.udgjt submitted.to the Council, insteadif i"if"*irg"innatii,n, was inientionally reduced to altenuatE the -financial implications of creating the
posts requested.
Furthermore, the Council has refused to allow the recruitment of executive staff who arc al
present too few in number to meet requirements.
More generally, I believe the attitude adopted towards the Assembly.shows little r-eg.ard for
fairneiJln v'iew of ihe refusal of the proposed regradings and of the practical necessities of the ope-
rating means granted to the Assembly.
Nor does the Council appear to be respecting the Assembly's ir_rdependencein the administration
of its secretariat. Thii is cleii from its decision Io assign a sfeciflrc post to a Spanish national and
another to a Portugueie national as well as its proposa!to appigve a_regrading that.the.Assembly.had
."iiiq*.tio *triG iejecting the regradings included in.its budget. It is the Prelidential Committee
tt 
"t ir iiip""siUte, wittrin itre fraire*orL 
of the credits and -posts in Head I. of- its budgPt, tor
"pp"i"tfi, i"-ifefoing and 
promoting the staff of the Assembly on. the proposal of the Clerk. The
a;;Ai cin decide neitlher the nationali-ty of the holder of a post nor which post should be regraded.
In these circumstances, the Assembly wished to avoid an immediate and poqsibly public confron-
tation with the Council. It therefore decided to accept the renewed budget, on which there is no disa-gi..-.nt, and to submit in a supplementary budget its_p_ro_p-osals for adapting.the structure of the
bmce of ihe Clerk to the enlargemeit and reactivation of WEU. This document will allow all the WEU
bodies concerned to re-examin? the problems to which the Council has offered only a very incomplete
solution.
I hope you will be good enough to draw the attention of the Permanent Council to the importance
of the draft iupplementiry budget which will be presented in order to allow the Assembly at last to
have the wherewithal to carry out its tasks at this new juncture.
H.E. Mr. Roland Duuns,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council
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